War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 171 172 Charles Tilly produces both the danger and,at a price,the shield against it is a racketeer. authority's monopoly of force.A tendency to monopolies the means of violence Someone who provides a needed shield but has little control over the danger's makes a government's claim to provide protection,in either the comforting or the appearance qualifies as a legitimate protector,especially if his price is no higher ominous sense of the word.more credible and more difficult to resist than his competitors'.Someone who supplies reliable,low-priced shielding both Frank recognition of the central place of force in governmental activity from local racketeers and from outside marauders makes the best offer of all. does not require us to believe that governmental authority rests "only"or Apologists for particular governments and for government in general "ultimately"on the threat of violence.Nor does it entail the assumption that a commonly argue,precisely,that they offer protection from local and external government's only service is protection.Even when a government's use of force violence.They claim that the prices they charge barely cover the costs of imposes a large cost,some people may well decide that the government's other protection.They call people who complain about the price of protection services outbalance the costs of acceding to its monopoly of violence. anarchists,""subversives,"or both at once.But consider the definition of a Recognition of the centrality of force opens the way to an understanding of the racketeer as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction. growth and change of governmental forms. Governments'provision of protection,by this standard,often qualifies as Here is a preview of the most general argument:Power holders'pursuit racketeering.To the extent that the threats against which a given government of war involved them willy-nilly in the extraction of resources for war making protects its citizens are imaginary or are consequences of its own activities,the from the populations over which they had control and in the promotion of capital government has organized a protection racket.Since governments themselves accumulation by those who could help them borrow and buy.War making, commonly simulate,stimulate,or even fabricate threats of extemnal war and extraction,and capital accumulation interacted to shape European state making. since the repressive and extractive activities of governments often constitute the Power holders did not undertake those three momentous activities with the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens,many governments intention of creating national states -centralized,differentiated,autonomous, operate in essentially the same ways as racketeers.There is,of course,a extensive political organizations.Nor did they ordinarily foresee that national difference:Racketeers,by the conventional definition,operate without the states would emerge from war making,extraction,and capital accumulation. sanctity of governments. Instead,the people who controlled European states and states in the How do racketeer governments themselves acquire authority?As a making warred in order to check or overcome their competitors and thus to question of fact and of ethics,that is one of the oldest conundrums of political enjoy the advantages of power within a secure or expanding territory.To make analysis.Back to Machiavelli and Hobbes,nevertheless,political observers more effective war,they attempted to locate more capital.In the short run,they have recognized that,whatever else they do,governments organize and, might acquire that capital by conquest,by selling off their assets,or by coercing wherever possible,monopolize violence.It matters little whether we take or dispossessing accumulators of capital.In the long run,the quest inevitably violence in a narrow sense,such as damage to persons and objects,or in a involved them in establishing regular access to capitalists who could supply and broad sense,such as violation of people's desires and interests;by either arrange credit and in imposing one form of regular taxation or another on the criterion,governments stand out from other organisations by their tendency to people and activities within their spheres of control. monopolize the concentrated means of violence.The distinction between As the process continued,state makers developed a durable interest in "legitimate"and "illegitimate"force,furthermore,makes no difference to the fact. promoting the accumulation of capital,sometimes in the guise of direct return to If we take legitimacy to depend on conformity to an abstract principle or on the their own enterprises.Variations in the difficulty of collecting taxes,in the assent of the governed(or both at once),these conditions may serve to justify, expense of the particular kind of ammed force adopted,in the amount of war perhaps even to explain,the tendency to monopolies force;they do not making required to hold off competitors,and so on resulted in the principal contradict the fact. variations in the forms of European states.It all began with the effort to In any case,Arthur Stinchcombe's agreeably cynical treatment of legiti- monopolies the means of violence within a delimited territory adjacent to a macy serves the purposes of political analysis much more efficiently.Le- power holder's base. gitimacy,according to Stinchcombe,depends rather little on abstract principle or assent of the governed:"The person over whom power is exercised is not Violence and Government usually as important as other power-holders.Legitimacy is the probability that What distinguished the violence produced by states from the violence delivered other authonties will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority.Other by anyone else?In the long;run,enough to make the division be authorities,I would add,are much more likely to confirm the decisions of a challenged authorty that controls substantial force;not only fear of retaliation, but also desire to maintain a stable environment recommend that general rule. The rule underscores the importance of theWar Making and State Making as Organized Crime 171 produces both the danger and, at a price, the shield against it is a racketeer. Someone who provides a needed shield but has little control over the danger's appearance qualifies as a legitimate protector, especially if his price is no higher than his competitors'. Someone who supplies reliable, low-priced shielding both from local racketeers and from outside marauders makes the best offer of all. Apologists for particular governments and for government in general commonly argue, precisely, that they offer protection from local and external violence. They claim that the prices they charge barely cover the costs of protection. They call people who complain about the price of protection "anarchists," "subversives," or both at once. But consider the definition of a racketeer as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction. Governments' provision of protection, by this standard, often qualifies as racketeering. To the extent that the threats against which a given government protects its citizens are imaginary or are consequences of its own activities, the government has organized a protection racket. Since governments themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of external war and since the repressive and extractive activities of governments often constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens, many governments operate in essentially the same ways as racketeers. There is, of course, a difference: Racketeers, by the conventional definition, operate without the sanctity of governments. How do racketeer governments themselves acquire authority? As a question of fact and of ethics, that is one of the oldest conundrums of political analysis. Back to Machiavelli and Hobbes, nevertheless, political observers have recognized that, whatever else they do, governments organize and, wherever possible, monopolize violence. It matters little whether we take violence in a narrow sense, such as damage to persons and objects, or in a broad sense, such as violation of people's desires and interests; by either criterion, governments stand out from other organisations by their tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of violence. The distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" force, furthermore, makes no difference to the fact. If we take legitimacy to depend on conformity to an abstract principle or on the assent of the governed (or both at once), these conditions may serve to justify, perhaps even to explain, the tendency to monopolies force; they do not contradict the fact. In any case, Arthur Stinchcombe's agreeably cynical treatment of legiti￾macy serves the purposes of political analysis much more efficiently. Le￾gitimacy, according to Stinchcombe, depends rather little on abstract principle or assent of the governed: "The person over whom power is exercised is not usually as important as other power-holders."1 Legitimacy is the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority. Other authorities, I would add, are much more likely to confirm the decisions of a challenged authority that controls substantial force; not only fear of retaliation, but also desire to maintain a stable environment recommend that general rule. The rule underscores the importance of the 172 Charles Tilly authority's monopoly of force. A tendency to monopolies the means of violence makes a government's claim to provide protection, in either the comforting or the ominous sense of the word, more credible and more difficult to resist. Frank recognition of the central place of force in governmental activity does not require us to believe that governmental authority rests "only" or "ultimately" on the threat of violence. Nor does it entail the assumption that a government's only service is protection. Even when a government's use of force imposes a large cost, some people may well decide that the government's other services outbalance the costs of acceding to its monopoly of violence. Recognition of the centrality of force opens the way to an understanding of the growth and change of governmental forms. Here is a preview of the most general argument: Power holders' pursuit of war involved them willy-nilly in the extraction of resources for war making from the populations over which they had control and in the promotion of capital accumulation by those who could help them borrow and buy. War making, extraction, and capital accumulation interacted to shape European state making. Power holders did not undertake those three momentous activities with the intention of creating national states – centralized, differentiated, autonomous, extensive political organizations. Nor did they ordinarily foresee that national states would emerge from war making, extraction, and capital accumulation. Instead, the people who controlled European states and states in the making warred in order to check or overcome their competitors and thus to enjoy the advantages of power within a secure or expanding territory. To make more effective war, they attempted to locate more capital. In the short run, they might acquire that capital by conquest, by selling off their assets, or by coercing or dispossessing accumulators of capital. In the long run, the quest inevitably involved them in establishing regular access to capitalists who could supply and arrange credit and in imposing one form of regular taxation or another on the people and activities within their spheres of control. As the process continued, state makers developed a durable interest in promoting the accumulation of capital, sometimes in the guise of direct return to their own enterprises. Variations in the difficulty of collecting taxes, in the expense of the particular kind of armed force adopted, in the amount of war making required to hold off competitors, and so on resulted in the principal variations in the forms of European states. It all began with the effort to monopolies the means of violence within a delimited territory adjacent to a power holder's base. Violence and Government What distinguished the violence produced by states from the violence delivered by anyone else? In the long; run, enough to make the division be