J Bus Psychol(2010)25: 55-74 We take the focal firm's perspective and analyze the potential for opportunistic behavior by its partner, so that an increase in the level of a particular determinant(as it relates to the partner firm) would be likely to increase/ decrease partner opportunism. In Fig. I we present our framework of determinants of partner opportunism. Economic determinants The economic determinants of opportunism are the most pledged in the literature, bu saction cost economics (Klein et al. 1978: Masten 学了 Williamson 1975, 1979, 1993). Scholars hat an alliance partners opportunism is shaped by eco- ner is driven by the need to procure economic benefits or to 点岩自 avert economic losses. When such needs are acute, an alliance partner may harm other alliance members in fur therance of its own economic self-interest. The larger the potential economic gains to be made, the more an alliance partner would be driven toward opportunism. Thus,"even among the less opportunistic, most have their price"to give in to opportunism(Williamson 1979, p. 234 ). The presence or absence of these factors can restrict or facilitate a partner in opportunistically pursuing its economic self- interest. As a group, we call these factors the economic determinants of partner opportunism. The set of economic determinants comprise equity involvement, alliance-spe- ific investments, mutual hostages, and payoff inequity Equity Involvement Broadly, alliance structural arrangements can be either 目冒 equity-based or nonequity-based Equity alliances are con- sidered more effective than nonequity alliances in curbing opportunistic behavior(Das and Teng 1996: Gulati 1995) because equity binds member firms to the alliance, making 自日飞 it difficult for them to withdraw easily. A partner firm will not jeopardize its alliance relationship by exploiting the focal firms alliance-specific investments if it has an equity take in that alliance. Similarly, if both firms contribute known shares of equity in their alliance, they would be more 且言多 accepting of asymmetric resource commitments Equity is generally expressed in monetary terms. The equity invested in the alliance would get tied up with ongoing operations for an indefinite period of time and hus, cannot be readily retrievable. In fact, a partner would have to depend on the focal firms cooperation to withdraw its equity stake from the alliance. Plainly, a partner behaving opportunistically with the focal firm cannot expect cooperation from the focal firm in the withdrawal process. Thus, opportunism creates problems for the partner in recovering its equity stake in the alliance. The value of 2 SpringerWe take the focal firm’s perspective and analyze the potential for opportunistic behavior by its partner, so that an increase in the level of a particular determinant (as it relates to the partner firm) would be likely to increase/ decrease partner opportunism. In Fig. 1 we present our framework of determinants of partner opportunism. Economic Determinants The economic determinants of opportunism are the most widely acknowledged in the literature, but especially so in transaction cost economics (Klein et al. 1978; Masten 1988; Williamson 1975 , 1979 , 1993). Scholars maintain that an alliance partner’s opportunism is shaped by eco￾nomic considerations (e.g., Klein 1996). An alliance part￾ner is driven by the need to procure economic benefits or to avert economic losses. When such needs are acute, an alliance partner may harm other alliance members in fur￾therance of its own economic self-interest. The larger the potential economic gains to be made, the more an alliance partner would be driven toward opportunism. Thus, ‘‘even among the less opportunistic, most have their price’’ to give in to opportunism (Williamson 1979, p. 234). The presence or absence of these factors can restrict or facilitate a partner in opportunistically pursuing its economic self￾interest. As a group, we call these factors the economic determinants of partner opportunism. The set of economic determinants comprise equity involvement, alliance-spe￾cific investments, mutual hostages, and payoff inequity. Equity Involvement Broadly, alliance structural arrangements can be either equity-based or nonequity-based. Equity alliances are con￾sidered more effective than nonequity alliances in curbing opportunistic behavior (Das and Teng 1996; Gulati 1995 ) because equity binds member firms to the alliance, making it difficult for them to withdraw easily. A partner firm will not jeopardize its alliance relationship by exploiting the focal firm’s alliance-specific investments if it has an equity stake in that alliance. Similarly, if both firms contribute known shares of equity in their alliance, they would be more accepting of asymmetric resource commitments. Equity is generally expressed in monetary terms. The equity invested in the alliance would get tied up with ongoing operations for an indefinite period of time and, thus, cannot be readily retrievable. In fact, a partner would have to depend on the focal firm’s cooperation to withdraw its equity stake from the alliance. Plainly, a partner behaving opportunistically with the focal firm cannot expect cooperation from the focal firm in the withdrawal process. Thus, opportunism creates problems for the partner Table 2 in recovering its equity stake in the alliance. The value of continued Authors Hypotheses Study sample Findings Remarks Pressures for quick results Das and Teng (1999) ‘‘Partners demand quick results in the short run and tend to be less patient with long-term investment and commitment. Consequently, alliance performance evaluation will rely heavily on financial and market￾based indicators.’’ (p. 59) – – Pressures for quick results are very real in most alliances. Many firms are unable to cope with such pressures for various reasons. Since oppor￾tunism offers a clear-cut and quick way to reap substantial benefits (albeit through unfair means), these firms have a higher potential to act opportunistically to respond to the pressures for quick results. Kanter (1994) ‘‘Many relationships die an early death when they are scrutinized for quick returns.’’ (p. 102) – – An alliance partner that evaluates alliance performance without allowing sufficient time is not going to be satisfied with the results. A dissatisfied partner will be disinclined to continue in the joint project, perhaps causing premature termination of the alliance. J Bus Psychol (2010) 25:55–74 63 123