in other states with respect to other kinds of insurance policies and other insureds The Campbells' attorneys introduced this evidence to show that State Farms treatment of the Campbells was part of a nationwide policy of sharp practices by which the insurer sought to reduced payouts on claims and increase profits. This was error because it permitted the jury to award punitive damages to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the Campbells'harm. A defendant,'s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability is premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. A defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business. Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of .. reprehensibility Punishment on these bases creates the possibility of multiple punitive damage awards for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not bound by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains 8 Although I am inclined to agree with the initial sentiment expressed in the first full sentence of this passage, it seems hard to defend given the Court's analytic framework. Its basic conclusions are that unrelated misdeeds"may not serve as the basis of for [a given plaintiffs] punitive damages, "and that, a person may not be punished for being "an unsavory individual .. The latter assertion is a red herring. A punitive award is always predicated on the showing of a completed tort, so the defendant is not being punished merely for being unsavory. Meanwhile, the former seems hard to justify given the Court's nominally regulatory approach to punitive damages. If such damages are meant to serve a state's interest in deterring socially undesirable behavior 8 538 U.S. at 423(citations omitted10 in other states with respect to other kinds of insurance policies and other insureds. The Campbells’ attorneys introduced this evidence to show that State Farm’s treatment of the Campbells was part of a nationwide policy of sharp practices by which the insurer sought to reduced payouts on claims and increase profits. This was error because it permitted the jury to award punitive damages to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the Campbells’ harm. A defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability is premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. A defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business. Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of … reprehensibility analysis …. Punishment on these bases creates the possibility of multiple punitive damage awards for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not bound by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains.8 Although I am inclined to agree with the initial sentiment expressed in the first full sentence of this passage, it seems hard to defend given the Court’s analytic framework. Its basic conclusions are that unrelated misdeeds “may not serve as the basis of for [a given plaintiff’s] punitive damages,” and that, a person may not be punished for being “an unsavory individual ….” The latter assertion is a red herring. A punitive award is always predicated on the showing of a completed tort, so the defendant is not being punished merely for being unsavory. Meanwhile, the former seems hard to justify given the Court’s nominally regulatory approach to punitive damages. If such damages are meant to serve a state’s interest in deterring socially undesirable behavior, 8 538 U.S. at 423 (citations omitted)