VAN HOEK e. ving direct effect 23), the European Convention on Human Rights and the emational Convention on Social and Economic Rights ILO conventions will not as a rule have direct effect. yet the noms conta ined therein have influenced dutch la bour law. for several decades a fter the Second World War, la bour conditions were part of the general econom ic policy and as such a primary concen for the central government. The govemment had several legal instruments to control wages and other primary labour conditions, both in the profit and the non-profit sectors of the economy. These instruments did not sit well with the international obligations taken on by the Netherlands 4 and were gradually abandonded. One of the ast vestiges of this interventionist policy was the Pay Adjustment(semi-public sector) Act25, which was repealed in 1995.26 This Act govemed the wage levels of employees in organisations funded by the govemment As it severely limited the right of negotiation for employers and unions, it was deemed to be incompatible with intemational law. To date, all that remains of the powers of government to intervene in the setting of wages is de Wage Formation wages in an economic emergency. Article 5 ff. conta in a procedure under which the Minister of Socal Affairs may create regulations similar in content and effect to collective agreements(see below). Both powers are rarely use 2.2 Freedomand duty to negotiate Collective agreements in dutch law are based on the aw of contract. In line with the la won contracts in general, parties to the collective agreement, i.e. employers and the unions, have freedom as to whether they want to negotiate and with whom. This means that Dutch aw does not contain a general obligation to negotiate, enter into agreements and/or regularly amend them as some other countries do(e.g. france) As collective negotiations are widely accepted in industry, most employers will be willing to negotiate. If not, pressure can be applied by way of industralaction, but no employer can be forced by law to enter into negotations. Once negotations are commenced, however, the freedom to choose with whom to negotate is lim ited by law, a lbeit only marginally. Dutch law contains hardly any specific conditions which parties to a collective agreement have to fulfil Any union may enter into negotations and become a party to collective agreements, the only prerequisite being that the union is an association with full legal capacity which has been given the authority to 23. HR 30 May 1986, NJ1986, 688; Jacobs 1986, p. 154; H.L. Bakes, I.P. Ascher- Vonk, W.J. P.M Fase, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, 16thedition 2000, P. 233. K Boonstra, The ILOand the Netherlands, Leiden: Stichting NJCM-Boekenj 1996 Kamerstuk 22830nr 1 Stb. 1993.557 and 1994.985 Note to hR ll December 1992. NJ1996 229 L M. van der Sluis, Toelating tot CAO-onderhandelingen, Arbedsrecht 1995/3, p. 33; J. van der Hel Rechtop CAO-overleg, Arbeidsrecht 1999/10, P. 19-22; C.E.M. Schutte, Overzichtvan het CAO-recht, 2th edition 1998,$2.1.2, H L. Bakels, I P. Ascher- Vonk, WIP M Fase, Schets van het Nederlands Arbedsrecht, Deventer. Kluwer, 16th edition, 203-204VAN HOEK 6 having direct effect 23 ), the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Convention on Social and Economic Rights. ILO conventions will not – as a rule – have direct effect. Yet the norms contained therein have influenced Dutch labour law. For several decades after the Second World War, labour conditions were part of the general economic policy and as such a primary concern for the central government. The government had several legal instruments to control wages and other primary labour conditions, both in the profit and the non-profit sectors of the economy. These instruments did not sit well with the international obligations taken on by the Netherlands24 and were gradually abandonded. One of the last vestiges of this interventionist policy was the Pay Adjustment (semi-public sector) Act25, which was repealed in 1995.26 This Act governed the wage levels of employees in organisations funded by the government. As it severely limited the right of negotiation for employers and unions, it was deemed to be incompatible with international law. To date, all that remains of the powers of government to intervene in the setting of wages is de Wage Formation Act27. Article 10 of this Act contains the possibility for the government to freeze wages in an economic emergency. Article 5 ff. contain a procedure under which the Minister of Social Affairs may create regulations similar in content and effect to collective agreements (see below). Both powers are rarely used. 2.2 Freedom and duty to negotiate28 Collective agreements in Dutch law are based on the law of contract. In line with the law on contracts in general, parties to the collective agreement, i.e. employers and the unions, have freedom as to whether they want to negotiate and with whom. This means that Dutch law does not contain a general obligation to negotiate, enter into agreements and/or regularly amend them as some other countries do (e.g. France). As collective negotiations are widely accepted in industry, most employers will be willing to negotiate. If not, pressure can be applied by way of industrial action, but no employer can be forced by law to enter into negotiations. Once negotiations are commenced, however, the freedom to choose with whom to negotiate is limited by law, albeit only marginally. Dutch law contains hardly any specific conditions which parties to a collective agreement have to fulfil. Any union may enter into negotiations and become a party to collective agreements, the only prerequisite being that the union is an association with full legal capacity which has been given the authority to 23. HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688; Jacobs 1986, p. 154; H.L. Bakels, I.P. Ascher-Vonk, W.J.P.M. Fase, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, 16th edition 2000, p. 233. 24. K. Boonstra, The ILO and the Netherlands, Leiden: Stichting NJCM-Boekerij 1996. 25. Wet arbeidsvoorwaarden gesubsidieerde en gepremieerde sector. 26. Kamerstuk 22830 nr. 1, Stb. 1993, 557 and 1994, 985, Note to HR 11 December 1992, NJ 1996, 229. 27. Wet op de loonvorming. 28. L.M. van der Sluis, Toelating tot CAO-onderhandelingen, Arbeidsrecht 1995/3, p. 33; J. van der Hel, Recht op CAO-overleg, Arbeidsrecht 1999/10, p. 19-22; C.E.M. Schutte, Overzicht van het CAO-recht, 2th edition 1998, § 2.1.2; H.L. Bakels, I.P. Ascher-Vonk, W.J.P.M. Fase, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, 16th edition, 203-204