parent. In granting the joint petition, the court first cites the section of the adoption statute that allows a single adult to adopt. Then the court cites the rule of statutory construction that states the singular includes the plural, thereby allowing two single adults to adopt together. Finally since the statute is silent about the consequences of a joint adoption by two single adults, the court rules that, as joint petitioners, the two adults both become legal parents upon the granting of the adoption The courts that grant same-gender co-parent adoptions also rely on the legislative intent of the adoption codes to support their statutory-interpretation analysis Most states= adoption codes specifically state that the adoption statutes should be interpreted to promote >the best interests of the child. Even if the code does not state this principle specifically, under the common law, all proceedings involving children, including adoptions, are governed by this general, and overriding, legal principle, court decisions involving children must be made >in the best interests of the child. Because of the facts presented in the es the courts find that to deny the adoption contravenes this overrid ing legal principle Although the various state-court decisions that grant the adoptions are interpreting statutory language that differs from state to state, the factual analysis and rationale in these co parent adoption cases are remarkably similar. The cases generally involve a lesbian relationship in which the couple has decided to have children and one, or both, of the women have had a child by alternative insemination. #The child ren nave been born into a two-parent family and have been raised by both women as equal co-parents. The petition for adoption by the co-parer is an attempt by the couple to legalize what is occurring in fact-that the children have two parents. The adoption is the only legal solution that creates this parent-child relationship. The language of the first case in which the highest state-appellate court granted a same-gender co- arent adoption clearly shows this analysis The intent of the legislature was to protect the security of family units by defining the legal rights and responsibilities of children who find themselves in circumstances that do not include two biological parents To deny the children of same-sex partners, as a class, the security of a legally recognized relationship with their second parent serves no legitimate state interest By allowing same-sex adoptions to come within the stepparent exception of 448, we are furthering the purposes of the statute as was originally intended by allowing the children of such unions the benefits and security of a legal relationship with their de facto second parents []t is the courts that are required to define, declare and protect the rights of In re M M.D.& B H.M., 662 A2d 837(D. C Cir. 1995) See the following highest-appellate-court opinions in the states of Vermont, New York, and Massachusetts: Adoptions of B L.V.B. and E L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368, 628 A 2d 1271, 27 A.L.R. 5th 819 ( 1993), Matter of Jacob, 86NY 2d 651, 660 N E 2d 397, 636 NY..2d 716(1995)(also involving Matter of Dana, which the court combined with Matter of Jacob), Adoption of Galen, 425 Mass. 201, 680 N.E. 2d 70(1997), Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 619 N E 2d 315(1993)parent. In granting the joint petition, the court first cites the section of the adoption statute that allows a single adult to adopt. Then the court cites the rule of statutory construction that states the singular includes the plural, thereby allowing two single adults to adopt together. Finally, since the statute is silent about the consequences of a joint adoption by two single adults, the court rules that, as joint petitioners, the two adults both become legal parents upon the granting of the adoption.42 The courts that grant same-gender co-parent adoptions also rely on the legislative intent of the adoption codes to support their statutory-interpretation analysis. Most states= adoption codes specifically state that the adoption statutes should be interpreted to promote >the best interests of the child.= Even if the code does not state this principle specifically, under the common law, all proceedings involving children, including adoptions, are governed by this general, and overriding, legal principle; court decisions involving children must be made >in the best interests of the child.= Because of the facts presented in these cases, the courts find that to deny the adoption contravenes this overriding legal principle. Although the various state-court decisions that grant the adoptions are interpreting statutory language that differs from state to state, the factual analysis and rationale in these co￾parent adoption cases are remarkably similar. The cases generally involve a lesbian relationship in which the couple has decided to have children and one, or both, of the women have had a child by alternative insemination.43 The children have been born into a two-parent family and have been raised by both women as equal co-parents. The petition for adoption by the co-parent is an attempt by the couple to legalize what is occurring in fact - that the children have two parents. The adoption is the only legal solution that creates this parent-child relationship. The language of the first case in which the highest state-appellate court granted a same-gender co￾parent adoption clearly shows this analysis: The intent of the legislature was to protect the security of family units by defining the legal rights and responsibilities of children who find themselves in circumstances that do not include two biological parents. . . . To deny the children of same-sex partners, as a class, the security of a legally recognized relationship with their second parent serves no legitimate state interest. . . . By allowing same-sex adoptions to come within the stepparent exception of ' 448, we are furthering the purposes of the statute as was originally intended by allowing the children of such unions the benefits and security of a legal relationship with their de facto second parents. . . . [I]t is the courts that are required to define, declare and protect the rights of 42 In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 43 See the following highest-appellate-court opinions in the states of Vermont, New York, and Massachusetts: Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368, 628 A.2d 1271, 27 A.L.R.5th 819 (1993), Matter of Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 660 N.E.2d 397, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1995) (also involving Matter of Dana, which the court combined with Matter of Jacob), Adoption of Galen, 425 Mass. 201, 680 N.E.2d 70 (1997), Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 619 N.E.2d 315 (1993)