24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger November 29. 2001 Duty and Famine: Singer IL t time we considered Mills version of Utilitarianism called eudaimonistic Utilitarianism, characterized by what he the greatest-happiness principle You ought always to act so as to maximize happiness, L e, the right act is the act that results in the greatest amount of happiness overall The"greatest-happiness principle", however, just states one version of Utilitarianism. Other versions of Utilitarianism emphasize, e.g., pleasure or welfare as opposed to happiness, the utility of rules or principles as opposed to particul: actions. etc As we discussed. there are a number of at least potential problems with Utilitarianism i It does not respect ordinary moral principles, e.g., keep your promises, don 't lie, respect for human rights i It does not respect ordinary moral distinctions, e.g., between harming and failing to help i It asks too much of us, e. g, we could always be doing more to increase overall happiness i It asks to little of us, e.g., what matters for Utilitarianism is only the actual consequences, but this lets people who are lucky off the hook But Utilitarianism does seem to capture some basic elements of moral thinking, e.g, that one person 's welfare is no more important than any other,s, and that moral thinking ought to be impartial in how it regards each person's well-being Drawing on these insights Peter Singer argues that our everyday moral thinking is deeply misguided, and our obligations to those who suffer are much greater than what we might have thought Note that Singer is not aiming to defend Utilitarianism itself, although he is sympathetic to Utilitarian considerations, the main principle he relies on requires less than full-blooded Utilitarianism. His point is to show that there are compelling considerations--considerations that he hopes anyone would be willing to endorse--that raise deep challenges to our ordinary moral beliefs; in particular, he's concerned to show that the line we draw between DUTY and CHARITY is misplaced. Here's the argument 1. Suffering and death from lack of food. shelter and medical care are bad. 2. PREVENT SUFFERING PRINCIPLE (strong version ) If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.(p 592,597) i This principle doesn 't require that we promote happiness or whatever else we might take to be good; it simply requires24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger November 29, 2001 Duty and Famine: Singer Last time we considered Mill's version of Utilitarianism, called Eudaimonistic Utilitarianism, characterized by what he calls "the greatest-happiness principle": You ought always to act so as to maximize happiness, i.e., the right act is the act that results in the greatest amount of happiness overall. The "greatest-happiness principle", however, just states one version of Utilitarianism. Other versions of Utilitarianism emphasize, e.g., pleasure or welfare as opposed to happiness, the utility of rules or principles as opposed to particular actions, etc. As we discussed, there are a number of at least potential problems with Utilitarianism: ï It does not respect ordinary moral principles, e.g., keep your promises, don't lie, respect for human rights. ï It does not respect ordinary moral distinctions, e.g., between harming and failing to help. ï It asks too much of us, e.g., we could always be doing more to increase overall happiness. ï It asks to little of us, e.g., what matters for Utilitarianism is only the actual consequences, but this lets people who are lucky off the hook. But Utilitarianism does seem to capture some basic elements of moral thinking, e.g., that one person's welfare is no more important than any other's, and that moral thinking ought to be impartial in how it regards each person's well-being. Drawing on these insights Peter Singer argues that our everyday moral thinking is deeply misguided, and our obligations to those who suffer are much greater than what we might have thought. Note that Singer is not aiming to defend Utilitarianism itself; although he is sympathetic to Utilitarian considerations, the main principle he relies on requires less than full-blooded Utilitarianism. His point is to show that there are compelling considerations--considerations that he hopes anyone would be willing to endorse--that raise deep challenges to our ordinary moral beliefs; in particular, he's concerned to show that the line we draw between DUTY and CHARITY is misplaced. Here's the argument: 1. Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad. 2. PREVENT SUFFERING PRINCIPLE (strong version): If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it. (p. 592, 597) ï This principle doesn't require that we promote happiness or whatever else we might take to be good; it simply requires