Alex Gourevitch enjoy.Second,and consequently,the right to strike is conditions to actual circumstances in the wrong way.It grounded in an interest in using one's own individual makes it appear like those ideal rights-their grounds. and collective agency to resist-or even overcome- limits,and permissions-apply as limiting conditions that oppression.The interest in using one's own agency to severely nonideal political and social relations.As to resist oppression flows naturally from the demand such,it lends the moral weight of the ideal to the real for liberties not yet enjoyed.After all,that demand for in a way that obscures the oppression of that social control is in the name of giving proper space to work- reality. ers'capacity for self-determination,which is the same To be clear,this methodological error is not a log- capacity that expresses itself in the activity of striking ically necessary feature of the liberal or social demo- for greater freedom. cratic views I shall present and criticize.But it is a recur- op//s On this radical view.the right to strike has both an ring or latent tendency that leads to mistakes and ambi- intrinsic and instrumental relation to liberty.It has in- guities about the basis for and the proper shape of the trinsic value as an (at least implicit)demand for self- right to strike.Insofar as this methodological issue is emancipation or the winning of greater liberty through not directly confronted,it creates real confusion about one's own efforts.It has instrumental value insofar as the basis for the right to strike-about whether the lib. the strike is on the whole an effective means for resist- eral or social democratic versions of the right to strike ing the oppressiveness of a class society.For the right are responses to oppression or theories of a species of to strike to enjoy its proper connection to liberty,work- right that one enjoys under ideal conditions.The radi- ers must have a reasonable chance of carrying out an cal version of the right to strike that I defend,however, effective strike,otherwise it would lose its instrumen- is explicit in its justificatory approach.The radical ar- tal value as a way of resisting oppression.If prevented gument makes no claim regarding whether members of from using a reasonable array of effective means,ex- an ideal society would enjoy a right to strike nor does ercising the right to strike would not be a means of it say what that right to strike would look like under reducing oppression and,therefore,strikes would also ideal circumstances.20 Instead,it answers the question, 4号元 be of very limited value as acts of self-emancipation.It "What kind of right to strike should workers have?"by would not be an instance of workers attempting to use asking,"What may workers who face oppression do to their own capacity for self-determination to increase resist that oppression?"That is to say,it is an argument the control they ought to have over the terms of their about the kinds of rights those who face oppression daily activity. have in virtue of the fact that they are oppressed and To grasp what makes this radical view distinctive,let only in the context of that oppression.This is a different us compare it with two other conceptions of the right kind of reasoning and yields a different view about why to strike:the liberal and the social-democratic.These certain ways of exercising that right are permissible or two other accounts are internally coherent.But they not,21 are deficient in at least one,potentially two,ways.The Again,the primary disagreement for the view I de- 是 first deficiency is substantive.The liberal and social- fend is substantive.The radical view takes a distinct po- democratic accounts fail to properly identify the na- sition on what is oppressive about a class-divided soci- ture,depth,and scope of the class-based oppression in ety and therefore what kind of right workers have to existing capitalist societies.This means their justifica- resist it.But a parallel and secondary concern regards 5.501g tion of the right to strike is improperly narrow or oth- the method by which this argument is justified.In what erwise constrained in ways it ought not to be follows,I will make clear when the critique of the lib- The second deficiency is methodological.Some lib eral and social democratic point of view is substantive eral and social democratic accounts proceed in a dif- and when it is methodological. ferent way that,at best,results in some confusion and at worst,produces ideological obfuscation.Those ac- counts begin by asking what kind of right to strike would workers in an ideal society enjoy.They then use the answer to justify and describe the shape of the right 20 It is worth observing that in nearly all visions of ideal societies. including classless ones,every work-capable individual is under some to strike that workers in actually existing.class-divided kind of work obligation to do at least what is necessary to maintain societies,enjoy.This move,whether explicit or implicit the existence of that society.Though there might not be classes,there is always illicit.It not only changes the normatively would be workers in workplaces,and thus one might imagine that relevant question from what is permitted under condi- some kind of properly regulated right to strike would be a constitu- tive feature of the ideal constitution.As one such right,it would be tions of oppression to what one ought to be free to do limited by the need to respect the other equally fundamental rights,it under ideal ones,but it also lends the weight of ideal would be instantiated in legitimate law,and would be administered by the relevant legal authority.I do not defend or reject that argu- ment,my point is just to show that (a)it is not absurd to imagine some kind of right to strike even in an ideal society and (b)its shape. relationship to legal authority,and its derivation are dramatically dif. self-determination in economic life (Borman 2017).While very friendly to his contractualist argument,mine springs from argu- ments about freedom (and oppression)beyond the absence of for- of nights to resist oppression.But I consider myself a kind of fellow mal practices of justification in workplace governance.Further,I see traveler with other similar attempts,like that of Tommie Shelby,to ar- the problem of self-determination as including the problem of self- ticulate the different rights and liberties that people have in the face emancipation,of justifying mass disobedience,and of how to explain of systematic oppression,or what Shelby calls "intolerable injustice' the shape of right to strike. (Shelby2016,1-48.201-27). 910Alex Gourevitch enjoy. Second, and consequently, the right to strike is grounded in an interest in using one’s own individual and collective agency to resist—or even overcome— that oppression. The interest in using one’s own agency to resist oppression flows naturally from the demand for liberties not yet enjoyed. After all, that demand for control is in the name of giving proper space to work￾ers’ capacity for self-determination, which is the same capacity that expresses itself in the activity of striking for greater freedom. On this radical view, the right to strike has both an intrinsic and instrumental relation to liberty. It has in￾trinsic value as an (at least implicit) demand for self￾emancipation or the winning of greater liberty through one’s own efforts. It has instrumental value insofar as the strike is on the whole an effective means for resist￾ing the oppressiveness of a class society. For the right to strike to enjoy its proper connection to liberty, work￾ers must have a reasonable chance of carrying out an effective strike, otherwise it would lose its instrumen￾tal value as a way of resisting oppression. If prevented from using a reasonable array of effective means, ex￾ercising the right to strike would not be a means of reducing oppression and, therefore, strikes would also be of very limited value as acts of self-emancipation. It would not be an instance of workers attempting to use their own capacity for self-determination to increase the control they ought to have over the terms of their daily activity. To grasp what makes this radical view distinctive, let us compare it with two other conceptions of the right to strike: the liberal and the social-democratic. These two other accounts are internally coherent. But they are deficient in at least one, potentially two, ways. The first deficiency is substantive. The liberal and social￾democratic accounts fail to properly identify the na￾ture, depth, and scope of the class-based oppression in existing capitalist societies. This means their justifica￾tion of the right to strike is improperly narrow or oth￾erwise constrained in ways it ought not to be. The second deficiency is methodological. Some lib￾eral and social democratic accounts proceed in a dif￾ferent way that, at best, results in some confusion and, at worst, produces ideological obfuscation. Those ac￾counts begin by asking what kind of right to strike would workers in an ideal society enjoy. They then use the answer to justify and describe the shape of the right to strike that workers in actually existing, class-divided societies, enjoy. This move, whether explicit or implicit, is always illicit. It not only changes the normatively relevant question from what is permitted under condi￾tions of oppression to what one ought to be free to do under ideal ones, but it also lends the weight of ideal self-determination in economic life (Borman 2017). While very friendly to his contractualist argument, mine springs from argu￾ments about freedom (and oppression) beyond the absence of for￾mal practices of justification in workplace governance. Further, I see the problem of self-determination as including the problem of self￾emancipation, of justifying mass disobedience, and of how to explain the shape of right to strike. conditions to actual circumstances in the wrong way. It makes it appear like those ideal rights—their grounds, limits, and permissions—apply as limiting conditions to severely nonideal political and social relations. As such, it lends the moral weight of the ideal to the real in a way that obscures the oppression of that social reality. To be clear, this methodological error is not a log￾ically necessary feature of the liberal or social demo￾cratic views I shall present and criticize. But it is a recur￾ring or latent tendency that leads to mistakes and ambi￾guities about the basis for and the proper shape of the right to strike. Insofar as this methodological issue is not directly confronted, it creates real confusion about the basis for the right to strike—about whether the lib￾eral or social democratic versions of the right to strike are responses to oppression or theories of a species of right that one enjoys under ideal conditions. The radi￾cal version of the right to strike that I defend, however, is explicit in its justificatory approach. The radical ar￾gument makes no claim regarding whether members of an ideal society would enjoy a right to strike nor does it say what that right to strike would look like under ideal circumstances.20 Instead, it answers the question, "What kind of right to strike should workers have?" by asking, "What may workers who face oppression do to resist that oppression?" That is to say, it is an argument about the kinds of rights those who face oppression have in virtue of the fact that they are oppressed and only in the context of that oppression.This is a different kind of reasoning and yields a different view about why certain ways of exercising that right are permissible or not.21 Again, the primary disagreement for the view I de￾fend is substantive. The radical view takes a distinct po￾sition on what is oppressive about a class-divided soci￾ety and therefore what kind of right workers have to resist it. But a parallel and secondary concern regards the method by which this argument is justified. In what follows, I will make clear when the critique of the lib￾eral and social democratic point of view is substantive and when it is methodological. 20 It is worth observing that in nearly all visions of ideal societies, including classless ones, every work-capable individual is under some kind of work obligation to do at least what is necessary to maintain the existence of that society. Though there might not be classes, there would be workers in workplaces, and thus one might imagine that some kind of properly regulated right to strike would be a constitu￾tive feature of the ideal constitution. As one such right, it would be limited by the need to respect the other equally fundamental rights,it would be instantiated in legitimate law, and would be administered by the relevant legal authority. I do not defend or reject that argu￾ment, my point is just to show that (a) it is not absurd to imagine some kind of right to strike even in an ideal society and (b) its shape, relationship to legal authority, and its derivation are dramatically dif￾ferent from the radical right to strike articulated in this article. 21 It is beyond the scope of my article to develop a general theory of rights to resist oppression. But I consider myself a kind of fellow traveler with other similar attempts,like that of Tommie Shelby, to ar￾ticulate the different rights and liberties that people have in the face of systematic oppression, or what Shelby calls “intolerable injustice” (Shelby 2016, 1–48, 201–27). 910 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000321