history awakening into consciousness. We must therefore conclude that Kant's seemingly paradoxical statement is a precise description of what actually follows from every functionally correct action of the proletariat This insight alone puts us in a position to see through the last vestiges of the reification consciousness and its intellectual form, the problem of the thing- in-itself. Even Friedrich Engels has put the matter in a form that may easily give rise to misunderstandings. In his account of what separates Marx and himself from the school of Hegel, he says: We comprehend the concepts in our heads once more materialistically-as reflections of real things instead of regarding the real things as reflections of this or that stage of the absolute 63] But this leaves a question to be asked and Engels not only asks it but also answers it on the ollowing page quite in agreement with us. There he says: that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes. But if there are no things, what is reflected in thought? We cannot hope to offer even an outline e the history of the ' reflection theory even though we could only unravel the full implications of this problem with its aid In the theory of reflection' we find the theoretical embodiment reified consciousness. And from that point of view it is immaterial whether things are t o a of the duality of thought and existence, consciousness and reality, that is so intractable to the regarded as reflections of concepts or whether concepts are reflections of things. In both cases the duality is firmly established Kants grandiose and very cogent attempt to overcome this duality by logic, his theory of the synthetic function of consciousness in the creation of the domain of theory could not arrive at any philosophical solution to the question. For his duality was merely banished from logic to reappear in perpetuity in the form of the duality of phenomenon and the thing- in itself. And in these terms it remained an insoluble philosophical problem. The later history of his theory shows how very unsatisfactory his solution was. To see Kants epistemology as scepticism and agnosticism is of course a misunderstanding. But it is one that has at least one root in the theory itself-not, be it admitted, in the logic but in the relation between the logic It must be clearly understood that every contemplative stance and thus every kind of pure thought that must undertake the task of knowing an object outside itself raises the problem of subjectivity and objectivity. The object of thought(as something outside) becomes something alien to the subject. This raises the problem of whether thought corresponds to the object! The purer' the cognitive character of thought becomes and the more critical thought is, the more vast and impassable does the abyss appear that yawns between the subjective mode of thought and the objectivity of the(existing)object. Now it is possible-as with Kant-to view the object of thought as something created by the forms of thought. But this does not suffice to solve the problem of existence, and Kant, by removing it from the sphereof epistemology, creates this philosophical situation for himself even his excogitated objects must correspond to some 'reality or other. But this reality is treated as a thing- in-itself and placed outside the realm of that which can be known by the critical mind. It is with respect to this reality(which is the authentic, the metaphysical reality for Kant, as his ethics shows) that his position remains one of scepticism and agnosticism. This remains true however unsceptical was the solution he found for epistemological objectivity and the immanent theory of truth It is, therefore, no accident that it is from Kant that the various agnostic trends have taker their cue(one has only to think of Maimon or Schopenhauer). It is even less of an accidenthistory awakening into consciousness. We must therefore conclude that Kant’s seemingly paradoxical statement is a precise description of what actually follows from every functionally correct action of the proletariat. This insight alone puts us in a position to see through the last vestiges of the reification of consciousness and its intellectual form, the problem of the thing-in-itself. Even Friedrich Engels has put the matter in a form that may easily give rise to misunderstandings. In his account of what separates Marx and himself from the school of Hegel, he says: “We comprehend the concepts in our heads once more materialistically – as reflections of real things instead of regarding the real things as reflections of this or that stage of the absolute concept.”[63] But this leaves a question to be asked and Engels not only asks it but also answers it on the following page quite in agreement with us. There he says: “that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes.” But if there are no things, what is ‘reflected’ in thought? We cannot hope to offer even an outline of the history of the ‘reflection theory’ even though we could only unravel the full implications of this problem with its aid. In the theory of ‘reflection’ we find the theoretical embodiment of the duality of thought and existence, consciousness and reality, that is so intractable to the reified consciousness. And from that point of view it is immaterial whether things are to be regarded as reflections of concepts or whether concepts are reflections of things. In both cases the duality is firmly established. Kant’s grandiose and very cogent attempt to overcome this duality by logic, his theory of the synthetic function of consciousness in the creation of the domain of theory could not arrive at any philosophical solution to the question. For his duality was merely banished from logic to reappear in perpetuity in the form of the duality of phenomenon and the thing-in￾itself. And in these terms it remained an insoluble philosophical problem. The later history of his theory shows how very unsatisfactory his solution was. To see Kant’s epistemology as scepticism and agnosticism is of course a misunderstanding. But it is one that has at least one root in the theory itself – not, be it admitted, in the logic but in the relation between the logic and the metaphysics, in the relation between thought and existence. It must be clearly understood that every contemplative stance and thus every kind of ‘pure thought’ that must undertake the task of knowing an object outside itself raises the problem of subjectivity and objectivity. The object of thought (as something outside) becomes something alien to the subject. This raises the problem of whether thought corresponds to the object! The ‘purer’ the cognitive character of thought becomes and the more ‘critical’ thought is, the more vast and impassable does the abyss appear that yawns between the ‘subjective’ mode of thought and the objectivity of the (existing) object. Now it is possible – as with Kant – to view the object of thought as something ‘created’ by the forms of thought. But this does not suffice to solve the problem of existence, and Kant, by removing it from the sphere’ of epistemology, creates this philosophical situation for himself: even his excogitated objects must correspond to some ‘reality’ or other. But this reality is treated as a thing-in-itself and placed outside the realm of that which can be known by the ‘critical’ mind. It is with respect to this reality (which is the authentic, the metaphysical reality for Kant, as his ethics shows) that his position remains one of scepticism and agnosticism. This remains true however unsceptical was the solution he found for epistemological objectivity and the immanent theory of truth. It is, therefore, no accident that it is from Kant that the various agnostic trends have taken their cue (one has only to think of Maimon or Schopenhauer). It is even less of an accident