Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies FIGURE 2.Religiosity,ideology,education,and social distance -0001v00006/AL0LoL none none none visitor visitor visitor citizen citizen citizen coworker coworker coworker neighbor neighbor neighbor friend friend friend relative relative relative 4 cular s religious trad. e (a)Religiosity (b)Political Ideology (c)Education Subfigure (a)presents the predicted values for social distance by varying levels of religiosity:secular,traditional,religion,and ultra Orthodox(UO)respondents.Subfigure (b)presents the predicted values for social distance by ideology,ranging from far left(1) to far right(7).Subfigure (c)presents the predicted values for social distance by levels of education:primary school,high school, undergraduate degree,and graduate degree. these regressions,we include a number of variables lic goods game.8 For instance,Zussman (2013)finds 4号元 that might also influence economic decision-making, that Jews discriminate against PCI in the Israeli car including gender and income,and yet the influence of market due to concerns over trustworthiness.We there- this basic exclusionary attitude remains large and sta- fore include a binary variable for respondents'percep- tistically significant. tions of whether PCI can be trusted.with and with- Not only do exclusionary preferences powerfully out individual level covariates in Table 2(Columns 3 predict cooperation,suggesting that people who ad- and 4 respectively).19 Again,exclusion predicts a lack vocate for the exclusion of minority groups will not of cooperation,suggesting that the failure to cooper- subsequently come to cooperate,but a preference for ate is not rooted merely in statistical discrimination exclusion seems to dominate other attitudes,as is ex- based on outgroup stereotypes,but in exclusionary pected if exclusionary preferences are symbolic atti- preferences. tudes.Even with control variables,moving from low Second,we examine whether repeated interactions exclusion to high exclusion reduces the predicted prob- with outgroups may nudge individuals with a distaste ability of cooperation by 14.6 percentage points [95% for the outgroup toward cooperation,as argued by CI:-0.287:-0.003].Given that only 33%of subjects the important work of Axelrod (2006)on the evo- chose to cooperate with the PCI player,this represents lution of cooperation.By Axelrod's logic,the pay- an over 40%decrease in the average probability of co- offs for cooperation change as the frequency of inter- operation. action increases,making cooperation a more attrac- tive strategy.Thus,we should expect the influence of Potential Mitigating Factors in the exclusionary attitudes to become weaker as interac- Preferences-Behavior Link tions increase.To test this,we interact the binary so- cial distance variable with respondents'self-reported We now turn to investigate the power of exclusionary attitudes to predict behavior in the face of possibly mit- frequency of interaction with PCI.The results,pre- sented in Table A.6 in the Online Appendix,suggest igating covariates.If exclusionary preferences are sym that repeated interactions across groups do not sig- bolic attitudes,their relationship with behaviors should nificantly moderate the relationship between preju- not be affected by changes in other non-symbolic at- titudes or contexts.We focus on three such factors dice and lack of cooperation,again suggesting that,as would be expected of a symbolic attitude,preferences that may affect cooperation:stereotypes of the trust- eys worthiness of outgroup members,repeated interac- for exclusion are slow-moving and not immediately tions with outgroup members,and the local residential responsive to changes in other variables,even poten- environment.17 tially powerful influences such as interpersonal inter- First,it could be that lack of cooperation stems not actions.We note that measuring interpersonal contact through self-reports is standard in the literature (Islam from symbolic exclusionary preferences toward PCI but rather from general stereotypes that PCI are un- trustworthy and therefore likely to defect in the pub- 18 For an extended discussion of the role of general trust in cooper- ative games,see Yamagishi and Cook (1993). 17 The variablesexplored in this section correlate with social distance 19 We dichotomized"Trust in PCI"to be consistent with our treat- ment of social distance.It is coded one for those who have some or a at the following levels:trust =-0.36,frequency of interactions with lot trust in PCI,zero otherwise.In Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Online the outgroup =-0.37,and Arab segregation =0.04. Appendix,we present results with an ordinal coding of the variable. 751Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies FIGURE 2. Religiosity, ideology, education, and social distance



relative friend neighbor coworker citizen visitor none secular trad. religious UO (a) Religiosity relative friend neighbor coworker citizen visitor none 1234567 (b) Political Ideology



relative friend neighbor coworker citizen visitor none prim. high under. grad (c) Education Subfigure (a) presents the predicted values for social distance by varying levels of religiosity: secular, traditional, religion, and ultra￾Orthodox (UO) respondents. Subfigure (b) presents the predicted values for social distance by ideology, ranging from far left (1) to far right (7). Subfigure (c) presents the predicted values for social distance by levels of education: primary school, high school, undergraduate degree, and graduate degree. these regressions, we include a number of variables that might also influence economic decision-making, including gender and income, and yet the influence of this basic exclusionary attitude remains large and sta￾tistically significant. Not only do exclusionary preferences powerfully predict cooperation, suggesting that people who ad￾vocate for the exclusion of minority groups will not subsequently come to cooperate, but a preference for exclusion seems to dominate other attitudes, as is ex￾pected if exclusionary preferences are symbolic atti￾tudes. Even with control variables, moving from low exclusion to high exclusion reduces the predicted prob￾ability of cooperation by 14.6 percentage points [95% CI: −0.287:−0.003]. Given that only 33% of subjects chose to cooperate with the PCI player, this represents an over 40% decrease in the average probability of co￾operation. Potential Mitigating Factors in the Preferences-Behavior Link We now turn to investigate the power of exclusionary attitudes to predict behavior in the face of possibly mit￾igating covariates. If exclusionary preferences are sym￾bolic attitudes, their relationship with behaviors should not be affected by changes in other non-symbolic at￾titudes or contexts. We focus on three such factors that may affect cooperation: stereotypes of the trust￾worthiness of outgroup members, repeated interac￾tions with outgroup members, and the local residential environment.17 First, it could be that lack of cooperation stems not from symbolic exclusionary preferences toward PCI but rather from general stereotypes that PCI are un￾trustworthy and therefore likely to defect in the pub- 17 The variables explored in this section correlate with social distance at the following levels: trust =−0.36, frequency of interactions with the outgroup =−0.37, and Arab segregation =0.04. lic goods game.18 For instance, Zussman (2013) finds that Jews discriminate against PCI in the Israeli car market due to concerns over trustworthiness.We there￾fore include a binary variable for respondents’ percep￾tions of whether PCI can be trusted, with and with￾out individual level covariates in Table 2 (Columns 3 and 4 respectively).19 Again, exclusion predicts a lack of cooperation, suggesting that the failure to cooper￾ate is not rooted merely in statistical discrimination based on outgroup stereotypes, but in exclusionary preferences. Second, we examine whether repeated interactions with outgroups may nudge individuals with a distaste for the outgroup toward cooperation, as argued by the important work of Axelrod (2006) on the evo￾lution of cooperation. By Axelrod’s logic, the pay￾offs for cooperation change as the frequency of inter￾action increases, making cooperation a more attrac￾tive strategy. Thus, we should expect the influence of exclusionary attitudes to become weaker as interac￾tions increase. To test this, we interact the binary so￾cial distance variable with respondents’ self-reported frequency of interaction with PCI. The results, pre￾sented in Table A.6 in the Online Appendix, suggest that repeated interactions across groups do not sig￾nificantly moderate the relationship between preju￾dice and lack of cooperation, again suggesting that, as would be expected of a symbolic attitude, preferences for exclusion are slow-moving and not immediately responsive to changes in other variables, even poten￾tially powerful influences such as interpersonal inter￾actions. We note that measuring interpersonal contact through self-reports is standard in the literature (Islam 18 For an extended discussion of the role of general trust in cooper￾ative games, see Yamagishi and Cook (1993). 19 We dichotomized “Trust in PCI” to be consistent with our treat￾ment of social distance. It is coded one for those who have some or a lot trust in PCI, zero otherwise. In Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Online Appendix, we present results with an ordinal coding of the variable. 751 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000266