436 JACOBSON.MORTENSEN.AND CIALDINI side well-kn age from the nove T regulation in responding to descriptive norms is likely to be similar d h Aunt Poll puckish om of his tic cu for behavior ance using deserintive nomms can at times lead demo towar orite band must co ial inf the mind-numbingly unp to provide the f self-regulatory effort towa dering th onl goalsin the g the hen and to straint is necessary.In this m may not s omple ents in address chal engesof the ended Fridav after degree of conformity to descriptive social norms Implications for Cognition and Affect contrary to what may be Consideration of these different roles for injunctive and descrip Self-Regulation and Descriptive Norms racy/and the goaof social approval be rast,the inforr ion communicated by descriptivenorms eleva ct b what is typi ontrast t motives)For n about the es to the intrapersona sts that the choice of that favor hasa high-calori also might be expected to have different conse onal aspects of self.To the extent that injunctive nomms en socially beneficial be r,they shoul ie. ntrapersonal (i.e.,ma ng acd ate/effi )rather than mula on mo the ice icius Gold use of descriptiveso cial informat tion as the decision-making heu ristic of"social proof,"suggesting that it serves as a time-and s“injunctive norm: 2006; Lahti & Weinstein, 2005),1 responding to injunctive norms often involves the experience of dual (and dueling) motives. As an illustration, consider a well-known passage from the novel, The Adventures of Tom Sawyer. In the passage, puckish Tom is as￾signed to whitewash Aunt Polly’s front fence as a penance for one of his many transgressions. On the sun-drenched Saturday morning in which he is to serve his sentence, Tom must decide between behavior prescribed by a salient injunctive norm (i.e., he “should” respect his guardian Aunt Polly and dutifully whitewash the fence) and what, at the moment, he might rather do (e.g., play pirates on an abandoned, ramshackle riverboat). More mundane examples demonstrating the relevance of this conflict to injunctive norms are pervasive in daily social life: Just available front row tickets to our favorite band must compete with a spouse’s reminder that we are obligated to dine with our ill-tempered in-laws. Although we might love to spend a beautiful Friday afternoon at the beach or the golf course, a colleague’s e-mail message reminds us that we really ought to endure the mind-numbingly unproductive, multihour de￾partment meeting. Although self-regulatory capacity appears to provide the “strength” necessary to restrain drives toward immediate intraper￾sonal goals in these cases, a critical role for injunctive norms is to indicate when and to what extent such restraint is necessary. In this manner, injunctive norms and effortful self-regulation can often serve as functional complements in addressing challenges of the implicit bargain of social life—increasing the likelihood of un￾comfortable dinners with the in-laws, well-attended Friday after￾noon department meetings, whitewashed fences, and a variety of other behaviors that are socially, if not personally, desirable. Thus, contrary to what may be expected from prior research on persua￾sion and compliance, self-regulation may actually serve to facili￾tate rather than restrict the influence of injunctive norms. Self-Regulation and Descriptive Norms In contrast, the information communicated by descriptive norms appears less relevant to this conflict between immediate intraper￾sonal impulses and long-term interpersonal goals. By communi￾cating what is typical in a given context, descriptive norms provide heuristic cues for behaviors that are likely to be desirable or immediately advantageous for the individual (i.e., aligned with intrapersonal motives). For example, out of countless flavors of ice cream, evidence that a certain variety is a shop’s “best seller” suggests that the choice of that flavor has a particularly strong likelihood of satisfying one’s hedonistic craving for a high-calorie, high-fat dairy product. Even though this information is derived from social behavior and injunctive inferences can be made about the possible approval or disapproval associated with those actions, this information is most clearly and most immediately relevant to intrapersonal (i.e., making accurate/efficient decisions) rather than interpersonal goals (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Supporting this contention, and consistent with the ice cream example, individuals tend to use descriptive information to guide behavior especially in situations that are novel, ambiguous, uncer￾tain, or threatening (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Griskevicius, Gold￾stein, Mortensen, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006; Sherif, 1936; Tesser, Campbell, & Mickler, 1983). Cialdini (2009) has described this use of descriptive social information as the decision-making heu￾ristic of “social proof,” suggesting that it serves as a time- and effort-saving shortcut that can promote effective behavior across a wide variety of circumstances. Thus, the role of effortful self￾regulation in responding to descriptive norms is likely to be similar as to that demonstrated for persuasive messages and compliance techniques—as a means to override the tendency to use this information as a heuristic cue for behavior. Although following descriptive norms may most often lead to behaviors that are more accurate or efficient than would have been possible without this information, this is not universally true in all cases. As is demonstrated by the phenomenon of pluralistic igno￾rance, using descriptive norms as behavioral cues can at times lead to very negative outcomes, like an increased tendency toward binge drinking (e.g., Prentice & Miller, 1993) or a decreased tendency to escape emergency situations involving personal peril (e.g., Latane´ & Darley, 1968). Additionally, Berger and Rand (2008) have provided evidence that social influence attempts using descriptive norms can actually decrease (rather than increase) compliance when the descriptive norm is associated with an un￾desirable group. This implies that individuals tend to exert at least a limited degree of self-regulatory effort toward considering the implications of the descriptive norm and possible behavioral al￾ternatives— helping to counteract the possibility that following the norm may not be consistent with self-interest. Given this tendency, impairing the ability to engage in such effortful cognitive activity (via self-regulatory depletion) should be expected to increase the degree of conformity to descriptive social norms. Implications for Cognition and Affect Consideration of these different roles for injunctive and descrip￾tive norms in social life also leads to the expectation of differences in the typical cognitive and affective responses to the norms. The salience of an injunctive norm should lead individuals to consider their behavior as it relates to both the intrapersonal goal of accu￾racy/efficiency and the interpersonal goal of social approval be￾cause it suggests the possibility of a situation in which social standards may not be aligned with immediate self-interests. In contrast, thoughts associated with social approval should not nec￾essarily be stimulated by the salience of a descriptive norm. Rather, as a cue for accurate or efficient behavior, the descriptive norm should lead individuals to consider this information about the behavior’s prevalence primarily as it relates to the intrapersonal goal of choosing correctly. The norms also might be expected to have different conse￾quences for attention directed toward intrapersonal versus inter￾personal aspects of self. To the extent that injunctive norms en￾courage cooperative and socially beneficial behaviors, they should stimulate a comparatively greater interpersonal focus of attention (i.e., focus on group memberships and social relationships). In contrast, descriptive norms should stimulate a focus on more intrapersonal aspects of self because they are most immediately relevant to intrapersonal rather than interpersonal goals. Finally, the salience of dual and potentially dueling goals for an injunctive norm should lead individuals to experience conflict over decisions 1 Bicchieri (2006) uses the term social norms, and Lahti and Weinstein (2005) use the term moral norms to refer to the category of norms we label as “injunctive norms.” 436 JACOBSON, MORTENSEN, AND CIALDINI This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly