COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [vol.91:10 The 1890s'populists were not alone in loathing Wall Street;the Progressive movement did as well.Businesspeople preferred to be un- controlled.Elites who were not associated with Wall Street or the uld displa e their power and status r Robert Follette,in a prominent speech,argued that le ss than one hundred people controlled the nation's major businesses.91 A market for capital was needed,said La Follette,but centralized banking concentrations must be opposed;small business must have a chance.92 In 1911 ss la nched a widely follo ed investigation into the financial Wall Street. he Pujo inve tion, as it wa s calle seemed to confirm the popular judgment that the Morgan interests had their fingers everywhere in corporate America.9 At the core of the Progressive movement was the ense that indi. viduals must be protected agai ainst the large institutions then forming in business and government;"the Progressive movement was the com plaint of the unorganized against the consequences of organization."94 The Populist and the Progressive movements,different in most re spects,had in mmon a istrust of the easterr aboard and its ecc mic capital, Wall Street. Neither the eroic c yeoman er cultivating the land without economic complexities,nor the self-relian small businessperson or white collar reformer had any use for a Wall Street stretching its tentacles out from the urban Eastern seaboard into the hinterland.An organized corporate/financial nexus exploited a di vided and helpless of all far s and bu people.95 Such senti nts made it e r politicians to pass laws to fragment the ownership interests of Wall Street. securities legisla tion of f the 1930s the House of Representatives applauding calls to limit the power of bankers: [T]he failure of many of our to iny ent-banker [B] mgaeiom erated h of the the di The situation of m indu ico8oa di cily due their banke 90.1d.at92-93. 91.1d.at232. 92.See J.Weinstein,The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State:1900-1918,at 157-58(1968) 93.See Money Trust Investigation:Hearings on H.Res.429 &H.Res.508 Before oferese Comm.on Banking and Currency,62d Cong.3d Sess. er Money Trust Investiga on B.Wicbe.The Searc For Orr supra not 9,at214;see id.at6-7,10-11COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW The 1890s' populists were not alone in loathing Wall Street; the Progressive movement did as well. Businesspeople preferred to be un￾controlled. Elites who were not associated with Wall Street or the emerging industries of the early twentieth century feared a Wall Street that would displace their power and status.90 Senator Robert La Follette, in a prominent speech, argued that less than one hundred people controlled the nation's major businesses.9' A market for capital was needed, said La Follette, but centralized banking concentrations must be opposed; small business must have a chance. 92 In 1911, Congress launched a widely followed investigation into the financial workings of Wall Street. The Pujo investigation, as it was called, seemed to confirm the popular judgment that the Morgan interests had their fingers everywhere in corporate America. 93 At the core of the Progressive movement was the sense that indi￾viduals must be protected against the large institutions then forming in business and government; "the Progressive movement was the com￾plaint of the unorganized against the consequences of organization.' 9 4 The Populist and the Progressive movements, different in most re￾spects, had in common a mistrust of the Eastern seaboard and its eco￾nomic capital, Wall Street. Neither the heroic yeoman farmer, cultivating the land without economic complexities, nor the self-reliant small businessperson or white collar reformer had any use for a Wall Street stretching its tentacles out from the urban Eastern seaboard into the hinterland. An organized corporate/financial nexus exploited a di￾vided and helpless citizenry of small farmers and businesspeople. 95 Such sentiments made it easy for politicians to pass laws to fragment the ownership interests of Wall Street. The attitude persisted. Floor debates over the securities legisla￾tion of the 1930s show the House of Representatives applauding calls to limit the power of bankers: [Tihe failure of many of our great industrial corporations is due to investment-banker management. [B]anker directors living remote from the properties operated have no under￾standing of the . industry they direct . The deplorable situation of many of our great industrial corporations is di￾rectly due to their banker management . Congress must make it unlawful for any person to act as a director . who 90. Id. at 92-93. 91. Id. at 232. 92. See J. Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900-1918, at 157-58 (1968). 93. See Money Trust Investigation: Hearings on H. Res. 429 & H. Res. 508 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 1011-20 (1913) [hereinafter Money Trust Investigation]. 94. R. Hofstadter, supra note 89, at 214; see id. at 6-7, 10-11. 95. Id. at 20-21, 24, 65 & n.8; R. Wiebe, The Search For Order 52-53 (1967). [Vol. 91:10