Political Geography of Immigration Control 693 demand for immigrant labor will be strongest where employers experience inflexible labor markets. Opposition to Immigration I argue that local conditions trigger anti-immigrant sentiment through the level of native-immigrant competition.Although this thesis is not original,I clarify the con- ditions under which competition increases and diminishes,thereby isolating those factors that intensify opposition to immigration.This competition contains at least three dimensions.The first dimension,labor market competition,is triggered by economic recession.The second dimension,competition over state resources,is trig- gered by economic recession and the rate of growth of the immigrant community,as well as the level of immigrant access to publicly provided goods.The third dimen- sion,competition over societal identity,is triggered by the size of the immigrant community but is offset by assimilation of the immigrant community into the native population.The argument is conjunctural;that is,opposition to immigration that becomes politically important is triggered by the presence of an immigrant commu- nity in conjunction with economic recession.It is aggravated by the degree to which the migrant community challenges the preeminence of the native community. Competition over market-based resources.A considerable amount of controversy exists regarding the position of the migrant vis-a-vis the native workforce.24 Some economists argue that migrants complement the native workforce and actually en- hance the returns of the native population by increasing their productivity and,hence, their wages.Others argue that the immigrant labor force substitutes for the native workforce;in this view,immigrants obtain employment at the expense of the native population.For example,where indigenous labor is skilled and immigrant labor un- skilled,immigrants may be employed to increase the productivity of the native work- force,thereby increasing the wages of those workers.In contrast,unskilled immi- grant workers may compete with and displace native unskilled workers,thereby reducing the wages of those workers.Because the labor market is never completely segmented,undoubtedly there is some truth to both propositions.I focus on the variation in labor market segmentation during periods of recession and economic prosperity that modifies the level of competition between the native and immigrant workforce. Economic recession places the native and immigrant labor forces in more direct competition than in periods of economic prosperity.The dynamic proceeds because workers are often willing to take otherwise unacceptableemployment during periods of economic downturn.To be sure,this willingness is mitigated by the presence of a "reservation wage,"the remuneration available from nonwork sources,such as un- employment benefits and family allowances.To the extent that employment exists at greater than the reservation wage,unemployed workers accept employment that is 24.See Borjas 1994 for an overview of the debate as well as extensive citations of the literature.demand for immigrant labor will be strongest where employers experience in exible labor markets. Opposition to Immigration I argue that local conditions trigger anti-immigrant sentiment through the level of native–immigrant competition.Although this thesis is not original, I clarify the con￾ditions under which competition increases and diminishes, thereby isolating those factors that intensify opposition to immigration. This competition contains at least three dimensions. The Ž rst dimension, labor market competition, is triggered by economic recession. The second dimension, competition over state resources, is trig￾gered by economic recession and the rate of growth of the immigrant community, as well as the level of immigrant access to publicly provided goods. The third dimen￾sion, competition over societal identity, is triggered by the size of the immigrant community but is offset by assimilation of the immigrant community into the native population. The argument is conjunctural; that is, opposition to immigration that becomes politically important is triggered by the presence of an immigrant commu￾nity in conjunction with economic recession. It is aggravated by the degree to which the migrant community challengesthe preeminence of the native community. Competition over market-based resources. A considerable amount of controversy exists regarding the position of the migrant vis-a`-vis the native workforce.24 Some economists argue that migrants complement the native workforce and actually en￾hance the returns of the native populationby increasing their productivityand, hence, their wages. Others argue that the immigrant labor force substitutes for the native workforce; in this view, immigrants obtain employment at the expense of the native population. For example, where indigenouslabor is skilled and immigrant labor un￾skilled, immigrantsmay be employed to increase the productivity of the nativework￾force, thereby increasing the wages of those workers. In contrast, unskilled immi￾grant workers may compete with and displace native unskilled workers, thereby reducing the wages of those workers. Because the labor market is never completely segmented, undoubtedly there is some truth to both propositions. I focus on the variation in labor market segmentation during periods of recession and economic prosperity that modiŽ es the level of competition between the native and immigrant workforce. Economic recession places the native and immigrant labor forces in more direct competition than in periods of economic prosperity. The dynamic proceeds because workers are often willing to take otherwise unacceptable employment during periods of economic downturn. To be sure, this willingnessis mitigated by the presence of a ‘‘reservation wage,’’ the remuneration available from nonwork sources, such as un￾employment beneŽ ts and family allowances. To the extent that employment exists at greater than the reservation wage, unemployed workers accept employment that is 24. See Borjas 1994 for an overview of the debate as well as extensive citations of the literature. Political Geography of Immigration Control 693