1996] CHINA:DEVELOPMENT LEGISLATION 5 by the early 1980s,it still had a mixed bag of technologies:Perhaps 5%,late 20th century(mainly in the military and military produc- tion);about half,a decade or more out of date;the rest,far behind the first world.21 China's farmers fed 22%of the world's population on 7%of world's arable soil,22 but to do so employed 40%of its popula- tion.23 The government concluded that,to accelerate its economic growth,it must introduce fundamental economic reforms24 and open its economy to the outside world. China's leaders moved rapidly.In 1979,they first largely de-col- lectivized agriculture.25 Increasingly,in as many sectors of the econ- omy as feasible,they sought to submit investment decisions to market forces'guidance.26 Simultaneously,they aimed to attract for- eign private investment,managerial skills,know how'and access to international markets.27 Their new strategy produced some remark- minimum necessary food supply.Primary school enrollment was high.Most people had access to basic medical care and family services.In 1985,life expectancy,"proba- bly the best single indicator of the extent of real poverty,"averaged 67 years -well above the Third World median.World Bank,supra n.18. 21.World Bank,supra n.18. 22.Stavis,"People's Communes and Rural Development in China,"in 2 Rural Development and Local Organization in Asia 13 (Norman Uphoff,ed.1982). 23.By contrast,less than 2%of the United States's population not only fed its population,but produced substantial food surpluses for export.U.S.Bureau of the Census,U.S.Statistical Abstract (114th ed.1994). 24.Described in a series of documents:E.g.,Communique,supra n.17;Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the Eco- nomic Structure,adopted at the 12th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at its Third Plenary Session,October 20,1984.These documents make it clear that China's leaders at the time believed that they could maintain legitimacy only by providing a rising standard of living for the mass of the population.Max Weber of- fered two propositions that may help to explain why the Chinese initiatives towards establishing a legal order emerged at this time in Chinese history.He held that,to create a framework of predictability of state action,market actors require adherence to law and legal-rational thought.'(But see below,text at infra n.126).Further,he suggested that all revolutionary regimes achieve their initial legitimacy because of the 'charisma'of a great leader-George Washington,Lenin,Ghandi.Charisma has no real content;literally,it means a gift of God.Weber used the term to mean that indefinable something that great leaders have.With the death of the great leader,the successor rulers have little choice save to search for legal-rational legitimacy.Max Weber,The Theory of Social and Economic Organization(A.M.Henderson Talcott Parsons,tr.;Talcott Parsons,ed.1947);Max Weber,Economy and Society (G.Roth C.Wittich,eds.1978).Legal-rational legitimacy implies the rule of law.China's search for a rational legal framework for government seems to exemplify both Weber's propositions. 25.See,generally,William Hinton,The Great Reversal(1989);Potter,supra n. 17.While the state retained formal land ownership,the peasants contracted to use it for prolonged periods in exchange for fixed annual quotas of grain at a pre-set low price.They had the right to sell all their surplus output on the free market(where prices ranged significantly higher than the government's contract price).In effect, they leased the land from the state for a rent equal to the difference between what they received from the state and what they might have received by selling all their crop at the market price. 26.Potter,supra n.17. 27.World Bank,supra n.18;see also Potter,supra n.17. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82 207 on Thu,15 Nov 2012 12:37:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions1996] CHINA: DEVELOPMENT LEGISLATION 5 by the early 1980s, it still had a mixed bag of technologies: Perhaps 5%, late 20th century (mainly in the military and military produc￾tion); about half, a decade or more out of date; the rest, far behind the first world.21 China's farmers fed 22% of the world's population on 7% of world's arable soil,22 but to do so employed 40% of its popula￾tion.23 The government concluded that, to accelerate its economic growth, it must introduce fundamental economic reforms24 and open its economy to the outside world. China's leaders moved rapidly. In 1979, they first largely de-col￾lectivized agriculture.25 Increasingly, in as many sectors of the econ￾omy as feasible, they sought to submit investment decisions to market forces' guidance.26 Simultaneously, they aimed to attract for￾eign private investment, managerial skills, 'know how' and access to international markets.27 Their new strategy produced some remark￾minimum necessary food supply. Primary school enrollment was high. Most people had access to basic medical care and family services. In 1985, life expectancy, "proba￾bly the best single indicator of the extent of real poverty," averaged 67 years - well above the Third World median. World Bank, supra n. 18. 21. World Bank, supra n. 18. 22. Stavis, "People's Communes and Rural Development in China," in 2 Rural Development and Local Organization in Asia 13 (Norman Uphoff, ed. 1982). 23. By contrast, less than 2% of the United States's population not only fed its population, but produced substantial food surpluses for export. U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Statistical Abstract (114th ed. 1994). 24. Described in a series of documents: E.g., Communique, supra n. 17; Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the Eco￾nomic Structure, adopted at the 12th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at its Third Plenary Session, October 20, 1984. These documents make it clear that China's leaders at the time believed that they could maintain legitimacy only by providing a rising standard of living for the mass of the population. Max Weber of￾fered two propositions that may help to explain why the Chinese initiatives towards establishing a legal order emerged at this time in Chinese history. He held that, to create a framework of predictability of state action, market actors require adherence to law and 'legal-rational thought.' (But see below, text at infra n. 126). Further, he suggested that all revolutionary regimes achieve their initial legitimacy because of the 'charisma' of a great leader - George Washington, Lenin, Ghandi. Charisma has no real content; literally, it means a gift of God. Weber used the term to mean that indefinable something that great leaders have. With the death of the great leader, the successor rulers have little choice save to search for legal-rational legitimacy. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons, tr.; Talcott Parsons, ed. 1947); Max Weber, Economy and Society (G. Roth & C. Wittich, eds. 1978). Legal-rational legitimacy implies the rule of law. China's search for a rational legal framework for government seems to exemplify both Weber's propositions. 25. See, generally, William Hinton, The Great Reversal (1989); Potter, supra n. 17. While the state retained formal land ownership, the peasants contracted to use it for prolonged periods in exchange for fixed annual quotas of grain at a pre-set low price. They had the right to sell all their surplus output on the free market (where prices ranged significantly higher than the government's contract price). In effect, they leased the land from the state for a rent equal to the difference between what they received from the state and what they might have received by selling all their crop at the market price. 26. Potter, supra n. 17. 27. World Bank, supra n. 18; see also Potter, supra n. 17. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.207 on Thu, 15 Nov 2012 12:37:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions