Barbro Bjorkman of character make one a good person? Traits or qualities one is born with do not qualify as virtues. Rather, it has to be something that one can induce oneself to achieve or learn through proper upbringing and education. Note, however, that this does not imply a total disregard for the actual action as such, nor for its consequences. We can well imagine cases where the virtuous agent so should we be. a key claim made by virtue ethicists is that we ought to do what a(fully informed) virtuous person would have done. So how can we meet this requirement and how do we determine whether virtuous persons would donate rather than sell their organs? Broadly speaking, there are two answers to this question, the classic Aristotelian approach and a more modern one. Aristotle claimed that the virtuous character traits are those we need to live humanly flourishing/fulfilled lives. He argued that it is only when we live virtuously that our rational capacity can guide our lives. Character traits have to be stable-that is, the disposition has to be firm and unchanging -and should, in this context, be understood as something that is manifested in habitual action. However, habitual should not be interpreted as"automatic Describing an action as habitual does not necessarily mean that it is also effortless or spontaneous, although it could well be; in fact, most decisions would be reached through deliberation. In short, moral virtues are those virtues that are good for everyone to have. The more modern approach, partly seeking to avoid references to human nature, claims that the virtues come from the commonsense views about which character traits we typically find admirable, traits manifested by people we look up to. These are the kind of people we ought to model ourselves on when seeking to act virtuously. It seems plausible to argue that it is more admirable to donate than to sell ones organs-we look up to those who take personal risks not for the sake of economic compensation but simply because the pesu ably this could be the see"that helping their fellow man is a fine and worthwhile thing to do. Pr practical expression of a number of virtues such as unselfishness, generosity kindness, beneficence, and so forth. There is quite a bit of disagreement with regards to what the virtues are and eir relative order. Central virtues for the ancient thinkers were, for example, courage, wisdom, generosity, and truthfulness. The list could, of course, be extended to include many other qualities such as moderation, justice, benevo- lence, loyalty, tolerance, patience, and so forth. Would it then be fruitful to talk of the good person? Is there a single set of virtues that are desirable for, or ndeed essential to, everyone? The Aristotelian reply is that there is a catalog of virtues that would be required by all people in all walks of life because of basic facts about our human condition impossible to mitigate by social convention It should be noted that Aristotle was less concerned with connecting the virtues to the solutions to normative problems. He proposed that the virtues, rather, would help us to find the right path, the golden mean, in life and perhaps assist us in staying on it. Equipped with the combination of practical wisdom and the virtues, we would "see" what should be done and then desire to act accordingly. It is quite possible that there are no fully virtuous persons in existence, but the point is that we could imagine what such a person would be like and thus aspire toward that ideal. Human flourishing should, however, not be understood as having instrumental value-we should all aim to flourish simply because that is the best thing to do. The fulfilled life is the best life anyof character make one a good person?” Traits or qualities one is born with do not qualify as virtues. Rather, it has to be something that one can induce oneself to achieve or learn through proper upbringing and education. Note, however, that this does not imply a total disregard for the actual action as such, nor for its consequences. We can well imagine cases where the virtuous agent would, in fact, be highly concerned with the consequences and then, naturally, so should we be. A key claim made by virtue ethicists is that we ought to do what a (fully informed) virtuous person would have done. So how can we meet this requirement and how do we determine whether virtuous persons would donate rather than sell their organs? Broadly speaking, there are two answers to this question, the classic Aristotelian approach and a more modern one. Aristotle claimed that the virtuous character traits are those we need to live humanly flourishing/fulfilled lives. He argued that it is only when we live virtuously that our rational capacity can guide our lives. Character traits have to be stable—that is, the disposition has to be firm and unchanging—and should, in this context, be understood as something that is manifested in habitual action. However, habitual should not be interpreted as “automatic.” Describing an action as habitual does not necessarily mean that it is also effortless or spontaneous, although it could well be; in fact, most decisions would be reached through deliberation. In short, moral virtues are those virtues that are good for everyone to have.14 The more modern approach, partly seeking to avoid references to human nature, claims that the virtues come from the commonsense views about which character traits we typically find admirable, traits manifested by people we look up to. These are the kind of people we ought to model ourselves on when seeking to act virtuously. It seems plausible to argue that it is more admirable to donate than to sell one’s organs—we look up to those who take personal risks not for the sake of economic compensation but simply because they “see” that helping their fellow man is a fine and worthwhile thing to do. Presumably this could be the practical expression of a number of virtues such as unselfishness, generosity, kindness, beneficence, and so forth. There is quite a bit of disagreement with regards to what the virtues are and their relative order. Central virtues for the ancient thinkers were, for example, courage, wisdom, generosity, and truthfulness. The list could, of course, be extended to include many other qualities such as moderation, justice, benevo￾lence, loyalty, tolerance, patience, and so forth. Would it then be fruitful to talk of the good person? Is there a single set of virtues that are desirable for, or indeed essential to, everyone? The Aristotelian reply is that there is a catalog of virtues that would be required by all people in all walks of life because of basic facts about our human condition impossible to mitigate by social convention.15 It should be noted that Aristotle was less concerned with connecting the virtues to the solutions to normative problems. He proposed that the virtues, rather, would help us to find the right path, the golden mean, in life and perhaps assist us in staying on it. Equipped with the combination of practical wisdom and the virtues, we would “see” what should be done and then desire to act accordingly. It is quite possible that there are no fully virtuous persons in existence, but the point is that we could imagine what such a person would be like and thus aspire toward that ideal. Human flourishing should, however, not be understood as having instrumental value—we should all aim to flourish simply because that is the best thing to do. The fulfilled life is the best life any Barbro Björkman 64