86:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY It is also important to point out that while Washington's hostility toward the Chinese Revolution offended Mao and his comrades,the perceived American disdain for China as weak and the Chinese as inferior made them angry.In the anti-American propaganda campaign following the publica- tion of the China White Paper,Mao sought to expose the "reactionary"and "vulnerable"nature of U.S.imperialism and encourage the ordinary Chi- nese people's national self-respect.In other words,Mao changed the anti- American discourses into means of mobilizing the masses for his "continu- ous revolution,"a practice that would reach its first peak during the "Great War of Resisting America and Assisting Korea"(the Chinese name of China's participation in the Korean War)in 1950-1953. It is apparent that the CCP's adoption of an anti-American policy in 1949-50 had deep roots in China's history and modern experiences.Sharp divergences in political ideology (communism versus capitalism)and per- ceived national interests did contribute to the shaping of the Sino-American confrontation;and suspicion and hostility were further crystallized as the result of Washington's continuous support to the GMD and the CCP's handling of such events as the Ward case.But,from a Chinese perspective. the most profound cause underlying the CCP's anti-American policy lay in its connection to Mao's grand plans of transforming China's state,society. and international outlook,and the policy was made an integral component of these plans from the very beginning.Even though it might have been possible for Washington to change the concrete course of its China policy (which was highly unlikely given the policy's own complicated back- ground),it would have been impossible for the United States to alter the processes and goals of the Chinese Revolution,let alone the historical- cultural environment that gave birth to it.America's "lost chance"in China must therefore be regarded as a myth.86 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y It is also important to point out that while Washington’s hostility toward the Chinese Revolution offended Mao and his comrades, the perceived American disdain for China as weak and the Chinese as inferior made them angry. In the anti-American propaganda campaign following the publica￾tion of the China White Paper, Mao sought to expose the “reactionary” and “vulnerable” nature of U.S. imperialism and encourage the ordinary Chi￾nese people’s national self-respect. In other words, Mao changed the anti￾American discourses into means of mobilizing the masses for his “continu￾ous revolution,” a practice that would reach its first peak during the “Great War of Resisting America and Assisting Korea” (the Chinese name of China’s participation in the Korean War) in 1950–1953. It is apparent that the CCP’s adoption of an anti-American policy in 1949–50 had deep roots in China’s history and modern experiences. Sharp divergences in political ideology (communism versus capitalism) and per￾ceived national interests did contribute to the shaping of the Sino-American confrontation; and suspicion and hostility were further crystallized as the result of Washington’s continuous support to the GMD and the CCP’s handling of such events as the Ward case. But, from a Chinese perspective, the most profound cause underlying the CCP’s anti-American policy lay in its connection to Mao’s grand plans of transforming China’s state, society, and international outlook, and the policy was made an integral component of these plans from the very beginning. Even though it might have been possible for Washington to change the concrete course of its China policy (which was highly unlikely given the policy’s own complicated back￾ground), it would have been impossible for the United States to alter the processes and goals of the Chinese Revolution, let alone the historical￾cultural environment that gave birth to it. America’s “lost chance” in China must therefore be regarded as a myth