and n(d((r-pl-d)-U(r-Z+/)) (1-x)U/(Y-pl-d)+U/(Y-z+1-pl-d) If perfect insurance is available, what does this imply about the level This is moral hazard- because of the availability of insurance, the only equilibrium has far too little self protection How can we construct a more efficient contract that still leaves zero profits for the Insurerand  dUY  pI  d  UY  Z  I  pI  d  1  U Y  pI  d  U Y  Z  I  pI  d If perfect insurance is available, what does this imply about the level of c? This is moral hazard– because of the availability of insurance, the only equilibrium has far too little self protection. How can we construct a more efficient contract that still leaves zero profits for the insurer?