Along with this optimistic estimate, I must in all candor leave one note of caution. if the level of enemy activity significantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago there was some conf usion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North etnam they would stop the shelling of cities in South vietnam want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program. We have noted the reduced level of inf iltration, the reduction of our casualties and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy. Hanoi could make o greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage If I conclude that increas ed enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy which as commander in chief of our armed forces I am making and meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really have only two choices open to us if we want to end this war. I can order an immediate precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement, if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization, if necessary. A plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program as the South vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the night way. It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace, not just in Vietnam but in the Pacif ic and the In speaking of the consequences of a precipitous withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose conf idence in America. For more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. but as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people Ve have faced other crises in our history and we have become stronger by rejecting the easyAlong with this optimistic estimate, I must in all candor leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly. However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point. At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam, they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program. We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors. If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy. Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation. This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy which as commander in chief of our armed forces I am making and meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be. My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really have only two choices open to us if we want to end this war. I can order an immediate precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action. Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement, if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization, if necessary. A plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom. I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way. It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace, not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and the world. In speaking of the consequences of a precipitous withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America. For more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people. We have faced other crises in our history and we have become stronger by rejecting the easy