portion of the farm -Lorentz of portion'A and Van Boeschoten of portion"B' The further provided that " if Lorentz lays out a township on his portion, Van Boeschoten shall have one-half of the net profits arising from the sale of such township payable from time to time as each lot or erf is sold...'. The same right was stipulated in favour of lorentz over the portion registered in Van Boeschoten's name. It is important to note that, according to the agreement, these rights were also to operate in favour of the two parties'"heirs, executors and assigns. The agreement was contained in a notarial deed which was registered against the title deeds of the respective properties and also of further subdivisions thereof. Melle( the respondent in the case) was one of Van Boeschoten's successors-in-title. She intended to sell her portion to a company for the purposes of establishing a township thereon Obviously she wanted to ensure that the purchaser would not be obliged to pay over half the profits which might accrue to it from the establishment of a township. She therefore approached the court for a declaratory order that the township clause only created personal rights in favour of Lorentz and Van Boeschoten(and their heirs, executors and assigns). The rights accord ingly had no real effect in the sense that they could also bind later purchasers such as the company to which she intended to sell her portion The court a quo granted the order. The present case was an appeal against the decision of the court a quo On appeal the appellant argued that the agreement and subsequent registration of the notarial deed d id in fact create real rights in the form of praedial servitudes. They therefore bound all successors-in-title of the original parties, including later purchasers of the land. This argument African law.30 On the basis of this analysis the court rejected the argument that praedial servitudes were created in casu. The court concluded that the rights created were merely ersonal 31 The right [and obligation] under consideration, so it appears to me, is essentially a personal one sound ing in money.. The cond itional obligation to pay attaches of rights are curtailed but not in relation to the enjoyment of the land in a physical seno o necessity not to the land [which is not burdened but merely to the owner thereof. Hi The mere fact that these rights were by mistake registered against the title deeds of the properties could not convert them into real rights. Accord ing to the court this was a case where the sanctity of the register'had to yield to the need for deleting the incorrect registration of contingent personal rights.32 Comments on the lorentz case have generally been favourable. 33 It has even been described as 30At1049-1051 31 At 1052D-E 32At1054F 33See, for example, H.J. Delport and N J.J. Olivier Sakereg Vonnisbundel(2nd ed. Juta and Co., Cape Town(1985) 542; Van der Merwe(n 6)76ff.portion of the farm - Lorentz of portion ‘A’ and Van Boeschoten of portion ‘B’. The agreement further provided that ‘if Lorentz lays out a township on his portion, Van Boeschoten shall have one-half of the net profits arising from the sale of such township payable from time to time as each lot or erf is sold . . .’. The same right was stipulated in favour of Lorentz over the portion registered in Van Boeschoten’s name. It is important to note that, according to the agreement, these rights were also to operate in favour of the two parties’ ‘heirs, executors and assigns’. The agreement was contained in a notarial deed which was registered against the title deeds of the respective properties and also of further subdivisions thereof. Melle (the respondent in the case) was one of Van Boeschoten’s successors-in-title. She intended to sell her portion to a company for the purposes of establishing a township thereon. Obviously she wanted to ensure that the purchaser would not be obliged to pay over half the profits which might accrue to it from the establishment of a township. She therefore approached the court for a declaratory order that the township clause only created personal rights in favour of Lorentz and Van Boeschoten (and their ‘heirs, executors and assigns’). The rights accordingly had no real effect in the sense that they could also bind later purchasers such as the company to which she intended to sell her portion. The court a quo granted the order. The present case was an appeal against the decision of the court a quo. On appeal the appellant argued that the agreement and subsequent registration of the notarial deed did in fact create real rights in the form of praedial servitudes. They therefore bound all successors-in-title of the original parties, including later purchasers of the land. This argument compelled the court to analyse the principles relating to the creation of servitudes in South African law.30 On the basis of this analysis the court rejected the argument that praedial servitudes were created in casu. The court concluded that the rights created were merely personal:31 The right [and obligation] under consideration, so it appears to me, is essentially a personal one sounding in money . . . [T]he conditional obligation to pay attaches of necessity not to the land [which is not burdened] but merely to the owner thereof. His rights are curtailed but not in relation to the enjoyment of the land in a physical sense. The mere fact that these rights were by mistake registered against the title deeds of the properties could not convert them into real rights. According to the court this was a case where ‘the sanctity of the register’ had to yield to the need for deleting the incorrect registration of contingent personal rights.32 Comments on the Lorentz case have generally been favourable.33 It has even been described as 30At 1049-1051. 31At 1052D-E. 32At 1054F. 33See, for example, H.J. Delport and N.J.J. Olivier Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2nd ed.) Juta and Co., Cape Town (1985) 542; Van der Merwe (n. 6) 76ff