96:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY actually reflected the intellectual-psychological,political-institutional,and military-strategic ties between the CCP and Moscow in the pre-1949 years.Thus,the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 was not a momentary alignment based on the calculation of self-interest of the two nations.It was a continuation of the CCP-Moscow alliance that had existed secretly since the birth of the CCP in 1921. It is arguable that Mao and his colleagues started out as ardent Chinese nationalists early in the century.Once converted to Marxism-Leninism and a part of the Comintern,however,they distinguished themselves from other Chinese patriots and acquired a unique political identity.The core of the CCP's ideology was the theory of class struggle.As Stuart R.Schram points out,Mao was deeply intrigued by The Communist Manifesto,from which the essential message for him was "Jieji douzheng.jieji douzheng.jieji douzheng"(Class struggle,class struggle,and class struggle)!3 CCP leaders believed that people in all nations were divided into different sociopolitical classes and that the nation-state was only a tool of the ruling classes. Thus,they "recognizeld]the existence of only two 'nations,'the 'nation' of the capitalists and the 'nation'of the workers.At present the 'nation'of the workers exists only in the Soviet Union.Everywhere else we have the nation'of the capitalists."4 As a result,Mao and his generation of radicals disliked China as a“nation”ruled by the“state”of landlords and capitalists, "for all that which lay in the past [of Chinal was wrong and evil."In Mao's mind,China as a"nation-state"would deserve love and devotion only after the CCP revolution had succeeded,because "the decadence of the state,the suffering of humanity,and the darkness of society have all reached an extreme."Mao's revolutionary ideology was an antithesis to what the CCP called "bourgeois nationalism,"and he identified Lenin's Russia,not China, as"the number one civilized country in the world."Having refused to join many of his comrades in studying in the West,Mao decided to organize a delegation to go to Russia before Comintern agents came to China to help organize the CCP in 1921.5 It is abundantly clear that Mao and his comrades were attracted to a pro-Soviet position primarily because of their spiritual- ideological conversion,not as a result of their calculation of self-interest and material gain or loss.This explains why they remained loyal to the Moscow-led world revolution despite the scarcity of Soviet material aid to them,and the Jiangxi defeat,which is partially attributable to Comintern policy guidance in the 1920s and 1930s.6 3.Stuart R.Schram,ed..Mao's Road to Power:Revolutionary Writings,1912-1920 (New York.1992),xvii. 4.Quoted from Benjamin I.Schwartz.Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao(Cambridge. MA,1968).28 5.Schram.Mao's Road to Power:250.399.505. 6.Some scholars tend to use the scarcity of Soviet aid to the CCP as an explanation for Mao's alleged alienation from Moscow For instance,see John W.Garver,"The Soviet Union and the Xi'an Incident."Australian burnal of Chinese Affairs 26 (July 1991):145-75.For a criticism of this interpretation see Michael Sheng."Mao.Stalin,and the Formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front:1935-1937,"China Quarter/y 129 (March 1992):149-70.96 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y actually reflected the intellectual-psychological, political-institutional, and military-strategic ties between the CCP and Moscow in the pre-1949 years. Thus, the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 was not a momentary alignment based on the calculation of self-interest of the two nations. It was a continuation of the CCP-Moscow alliance that had existed secretly since the birth of the CCP in 1921. It is arguable that Mao and his colleagues started out as ardent Chinese nationalists early in the century. Once converted to Marxism-Leninism and a part of the Comintern, however, they distinguished themselves from other Chinese patriots and acquired a unique political identity. The core of the CCP’s ideology was the theory of class struggle. As Stuart R. Schram points out, Mao was deeply intrigued by The Communist Manifesto, from which the essential message for him was “Jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng” (Class struggle, class struggle, and class struggle)!3 CCP leaders believed that people in all nations were divided into different sociopolitical classes and that the nation-state was only a tool of the ruling classes. Thus, they “recognize[d] the existence of only two ‘nations,’ the ‘nation’ of the capitalists and the ‘nation’ of the workers. At present the ‘nation’ of the workers exists only in the Soviet Union. Everywhere else we have the ‘nation’ of the capitalists.”4 As a result, Mao and his generation of radicals disliked China as a “nation” ruled by the “state” of landlords and capitalists, “for all that which lay in the past [of China] was wrong and evil.” In Mao’s mind, China as a “nation-state” would deserve love and devotion only after the CCP revolution had succeeded, because “the decadence of the state, the suffering of humanity, and the darkness of society have all reached an extreme.” Mao’s revolutionary ideology was an antithesis to what the CCP called “bourgeois nationalism,” and he identified Lenin’s Russia, not China, as “the number one civilized country in the world.” Having refused to join many of his comrades in studying in the West, Mao decided to organize a delegation to go to Russia before Comintern agents came to China to help organize the CCP in 1921.5 It is abundantly clear that Mao and his comrades were attracted to a pro-Soviet position primarily because of their spiritual￾ideological conversion, not as a result of their calculation of self-interest and material gain or loss. This explains why they remained loyal to the Moscow-led world revolution despite the scarcity of Soviet material aid to them, and the Jiangxi defeat, which is partially attributable to Comintern policy guidance in the 1920s and 1930s.6 3. Stuart R. Schram, ed., Mao’s Road to Power, Revolutionary Writings, 1912–1920 (New York, 1992), xvii. 4. Quoted from Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, MA, 1968), 28. 5. Schram, Mao’s Road to Power, 250, 399, 505. 6. Some scholars tend to use the scarcity of Soviet aid to the CCP as an explanation for Mao’s alleged alienation from Moscow. For instance, see John W. Garver, “The Soviet Union and the Xi’an Incident,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 26 (July 1991): 145–75. For a criticism of this interpretation see Michael Sheng, “Mao, Stalin, and the Formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front: 1935–1937,” China Quarterly 129 (March 1992): 149–70