Compliance-Based Theory theoretical perspective are not persuasive. On the other hand, the Article acknowledges that some of the views held by international law scholars are inconsisten with a theoretical model in which international law matters. it demonstrates to proponents of international law that we must devote greater attention to the compliance question, and we must rethink much of the discipline if we are to provide a coherent response to the claim that international law is irrelevant The Article proceeds as follows. Part lI discusses the most prominent theories of international law from both traditional legal scholarship and international relations erspectives. Part Ill presents the model of compliance. Any theory of compliance must come to terms with the fact that international law. however that terms is defined has virtually no enforcement mechanism. When a state violates international law there are few formal procedures through which other countries can invoke sanctions That is not to say, however, that the violation of international law is without cost. two costs are of central importance and will be the focus of this article. First, following a country's breach of an international obligation, other states may choose to impose some form of sanction. This may range from criticism of the offending state to economic or even military sanction. The second cost of violating an international obligation reputational. If a country violates international law, other states may refuse to enter into future agreements, may demand greater concessions when entering into such agreements, or may lose faith in the strength of existing agreements Part IV presents a detailed discussion of how reputational and direct sanctions affect states and how the magnitude of those sanctions changes depending on the circumstances of the violation. Part V develops some of the implications of the the explaining how it affects our understanding of treaties and customary international law and explaining why the definition of international law should be expanded. The interaction of this theory of compliance with other theories of international law is also explored. Finally, the Article discusses the fact that some of the traditional ODICS interest to international legal scholars are unlikely to be affected by international law, and calls for a refocusing of scholarship on other areas, where international law can have a greater impact. I. EXISTING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Compliance is central to international law and its role in regulating the interaction of nations. Unless international law provides an incentive toward oercion cosme franc k, apra noe l ao ice forwhy sheuld rss s icis upported b an tective structu ainst perceived self-interest, on the part of sovereign states? " See abram chayes antonia handler chayes. the new sovereignty: compliance WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 2-3: 29-108 (discussing the weakness of punitive sanctions for violation of international law)Compliance-Based Theory 5 theoretical perspective are not persuasive. On the other hand, the Article acknowledges that some of the views held by international law scholars are inconsistent with a theoretical model in which international law matters. It demonstrates to proponents of international law that we must devote greater attention to the compliance question, and we must rethink much of the discipline if we are to provide a coherent response to the claim that international law is irrelevant. The Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the most prominent theories of international law from both traditional legal scholarship and international relations perspectives. Part III presents the model of compliance. Any theory of compliance must come to terms with the fact that international law, however that terms is defined, has virtually no enforcement mechanism.11 When a state violates international law there are few formal procedures through which other countries can invoke sanctions.12 That is not to say, however, that the violation of international law is without cost. Two costs are of central importance and will be the focus of this Article. First, following a country’s breach of an international obligation, other states may choose to impose some form of sanction. This may range from criticism of the offending state to economic or even military sanction. The second cost of violating an international obligation is reputational. If a country violates international law, other states may refuse to enter into future agreements, may demand greater concessions when entering into such agreements, or may lose faith in the strength of existing agreements. Part IV presents a detailed discussion of how reputational and direct sanctions affect states and how the magnitude of those sanctions changes depending on the circumstances of the violation. Part V develops some of the implications of the theory, explaining how it affects our understanding of treaties and customary international law and explaining why the definition of international law should be expanded. The interaction of this theory of compliance with other theories of international law is also explored. Finally, the Article discusses the fact that some of the traditional topics of interest to international legal scholars are unlikely to be affected by international law, and calls for a refocusing of scholarship on other areas, where international law can have a greater impact. II. EXISTING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Compliance is central to international law and its role in regulating the interaction of nations. Unless international law provides an incentive toward 11 See Franck, supra note 7, at 707 (“Why should rules, unsupported by an effective structure of coercion comparable to a national police force, nevertheless elicit so much compliance, even against perceived self-interest, on the part of sovereign states?”). 12 See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 2-3; 29-108 (discussing the weakness of punitive sanctions for violation of international law)