Rafael Ch et al. 1988-1996:FARC ascendancy.According to one widely in the correlation between tax performance and estimate,the FARC went from a presence in 173 the type and level of armed group presence;second. of the country's municipalities in 1985 to 622 by and following the historical shifts of the Colombian :000100006/L0LoL 1995(Echandia 2006.28).By the end of the period. war,this variation changes over time,a feature that the FARC and the ELN both enforced election will be exploited in the empirical specification to test boycotts in areas under their control and threat- our hypotheses and in the substantive interpretation of ened elected mayors and local council members results.19 ("FARC Prohiben Elecciones en 23 Municipios,' El Tiempo,October 23,1997).While some re- gional politicians supported paramilitaries'forma- Data tion during this period(Ronderos 2014,37),there Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our main out- is little evidence that paramilitary groups tried to come variables,used to test both the main empir- capture political institutions directly at the local ical relationships and the mechanisms described in level during this period. our testable hypotheses(Panel A).Outcomes include 1997-2002:Paramilitary expansion.In 1997,re- logged tax revenues per capita,proxies of cadastral per- gional paramilitary groups united under the formance,the land informality rate,and electoral out- umbrella group United Self-Defense Forces of comes.Tax revenues are highly skewed,with a long Colombia (AUC)and the war spread.By 2001, right tail of municipalities with substantially greater tax the AUC was powerful enough to convene a meet- revenues per capita than others.20 We therefore run our ing with nearly 100 politicians to formulate a con- estimation of the impact of violence on property tax certed effort to win elections at all levels,and to revenues per capita on logged values.21 support Alvaro Uribe's candidacy for president in Table 1 also describes the independent variables of 2002(known as the Santa Fe de Ralito pact).Com- interest(Panel B),namely the cumulative attacks per- pared to the paramilitaries,the FARC's influence petrated by each of the two main armed groups,dur- 4号 remained indirect during this period as the group ing each one of the four periods that mark the evo- eschewed official electoral politics,preferring to lution of Colombia's civil war,as described in the threaten municipal candidates that the group did Civil War Dynamics and Capture in Colombia sec- not approve of,or acting mayors. tion.22 Measuring the influence exercised by an armed ● 2003-2006:Paramilitary demobilization.In 2003, group over a specific location is extremely challenging. the Uribe administration negotiated a ceasefire Indicators of presence and nonviolent coercion over with paramilitary groups and eventually adopted a large set of municipalities cannot be systematically the Justice and Peace law,allowing paramilitary recorded in an objective way.Violence,on the other commanders to demobilize their troops in ex- hand,while more easily observed,is only imperfectly change for lenient sentences.Paramilitary demo- correlated with territorial dominance.For instance,it bilizations from 2003 to 2005 transformed the war may be the case that municipalities with low levels of into a contest between the state and remaining in- violence or no armed contestation represent an armed surgent groups(the FARC and ELN).The conflict group stronghold,where tax policies are likely to be with the FARC continued apace during this period, influenced. with no change in their capture strategy. However,nonviolent dominance is unlikely to occur 2007-2010:State resurgence.Having pushed the without any violence inflicted in the past,either as a FARC into peripheral areas by the end of 2006, way to legitimize influence with the citizenry or to oust the Colombian military and police redeployed any contesting(legal or illegal)group.It is thus reason- to major population centers and roads,improv- able to assume that the ability to inflict localized vio- ing measures of security.The weakened FARC lence over a relatively long period could be expected agreed to peace talks following the 2010 elec- to translate into influence in different ways.Moreover, tion of Uribe's Minister of Defense,Juan Manuel as all our results are robust to controlling for violence Santos.Former paramilitary groups morphed into by the other actor,we posit that municipalities with new organizations-including the Black Eagles, greater violence are more likely to be captured by the and drug-trafficking groups such as the Urabenos perpetrating armed group.?3 and the Rastrojos,which sometimes engaged in ac- tions against the FARC,the ELN,and the civil- ian population,though at much lower rates than 19Correlations are carried out at the department level since munic- in previous times. Taking into account these time periods,Figure 3 shows dard deviations above the mean. the department-level relationship between cumulative 21 The results are substantially the same when we add to the set of controls the log of the municipal population instead of using per attacks by armed groups and average property tax rev- enues in the following time period.There are two See Appendix A for detailed descriptions of all the variables and main takeaways:first,departments in Colombia vary measures. 23 A more stringent test is to focus on the subsample of places where violence by both groups is recorded,dropping the municipalities 18 There are 32 departments in Colombia.This administration level where one group does not engage in any violence at all during the is equivalent to US states. sample period.Even with the statistical power reduction implied by 1002Rafael Ch et al. 1988–1996: FARC ascendancy. According to one estimate, the FARC went from a presence in 173 of the country’s municipalities in 1985 to 622 by 1995 (Echandía 2006, 28). By the end of the period, the FARC and the ELN both enforced election boycotts in areas under their control and threat￾ened elected mayors and local council members (“FARC Prohíben Elecciones en 23 Municipios,” El Tiempo, October 23, 1997). While some re￾gional politicians supported paramilitaries’ forma￾tion during this period (Ronderos 2014, 37), there is little evidence that paramilitary groups tried to capture political institutions directly at the local level during this period. 1997–2002: Paramilitary expansion. In 1997, re￾gional paramilitary groups united under the umbrella group United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the war spread. By 2001, the AUC was powerful enough to convene a meet￾ing with nearly 100 politicians to formulate a con￾certed effort to win elections at all levels, and to support Álvaro Uribe’s candidacy for president in 2002 (known as the Santa Fe de Ralito pact). Com￾pared to the paramilitaries, the FARC’s influence remained indirect during this period as the group eschewed official electoral politics, preferring to threaten municipal candidates that the group did not approve of, or acting mayors. 2003–2006: Paramilitary demobilization. In 2003, the Uribe administration negotiated a ceasefire with paramilitary groups and eventually adopted the Justice and Peace law, allowing paramilitary commanders to demobilize their troops in ex￾change for lenient sentences. Paramilitary demo￾bilizations from 2003 to 2005 transformed the war into a contest between the state and remaining in￾surgent groups (the FARC and ELN). The conflict with the FARC continued apace during this period, with no change in their capture strategy. 2007–2010: State resurgence. Having pushed the FARC into peripheral areas by the end of 2006, the Colombian military and police redeployed to major population centers and roads, improv￾ing measures of security. The weakened FARC agreed to peace talks following the 2010 elec￾tion of Uribe’s Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos. Former paramilitary groups morphed into new organizations—including the Black Eagles, and drug-trafficking groups such as the Urabeños and the Rastrojos, which sometimes engaged in ac￾tions against the FARC, the ELN, and the civil￾ian population, though at much lower rates than in previous times. Taking into account these time periods, Figure 3 shows the department-level relationship between cumulative attacks by armed groups and average property tax rev￾enues in the following time period.18 There are two main takeaways: first, departments in Colombia vary 18 There are 32 departments in Colombia. This administration level is equivalent to US states. widely in the correlation between tax performance and the type and level of armed group presence; second, and following the historical shifts of the Colombian war, this variation changes over time, a feature that will be exploited in the empirical specification to test our hypotheses and in the substantive interpretation of results.19 Data Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our main out￾come variables, used to test both the main empir￾ical relationships and the mechanisms described in our testable hypotheses (Panel A). Outcomes include logged tax revenues per capita, proxies of cadastral per￾formance, the land informality rate, and electoral out￾comes. Tax revenues are highly skewed, with a long right tail of municipalities with substantially greater tax revenues per capita than others.20 We therefore run our estimation of the impact of violence on property tax revenues per capita on logged values.21 Table 1 also describes the independent variables of interest (Panel B), namely the cumulative attacks per￾petrated by each of the two main armed groups, dur￾ing each one of the four periods that mark the evo￾lution of Colombia’s civil war, as described in the Civil War Dynamics and Capture in Colombia sec￾tion.22 Measuring the influence exercised by an armed group over a specific location is extremely challenging. Indicators of presence and nonviolent coercion over a large set of municipalities cannot be systematically recorded in an objective way. Violence, on the other hand, while more easily observed, is only imperfectly correlated with territorial dominance. For instance, it may be the case that municipalities with low levels of violence or no armed contestation represent an armed group stronghold, where tax policies are likely to be influenced. However, nonviolent dominance is unlikely to occur without any violence inflicted in the past, either as a way to legitimize influence with the citizenry or to oust any contesting (legal or illegal) group. It is thus reason￾able to assume that the ability to inflict localized vio￾lence over a relatively long period could be expected to translate into influence in different ways. Moreover, as all our results are robust to controlling for violence by the other actor, we posit that municipalities with greater violence are more likely to be captured by the perpetrating armed group.23 19 Correlations are carried out at the department level since munic￾ipalities are the lowest administrative unit in our data. 20 The wealthiest municipalities had tax receipts as much as ten stan￾dard deviations above the mean. 21 The results are substantially the same when we add to the set of controls the log of the municipal population instead of using per capita tax revenue. 22 See Appendix A for detailed descriptions of all the variables and measures. 23 A more stringent test is to focus on the subsample of places where violence by both groups is recorded, dropping the municipalities where one group does not engage in any violence at all during the sample period. Even with the statistical power reduction implied by 1002 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000333