has become a little cottage industry, so I will spare you the references A similar point applies to the game in Figure 3: the Nash equilibrium(did, D) is sup- ported by the assumption that, upon being reached, Player 2 becomes certain that Player 1 is irrational. The reason I mention it is that, in the Centipede game,(d1d2, D)is the only Nash equilibrium, so normal-form analysis already yields the"standard prediction"without having to rely on a potentially problematic extensive-form analysis. The game in Figure 3 does not have this feature, so it might be regarded as a better example(Phil Reny should be credited for this)has become a little cottage industry, so I will spare you the references. A similar point applies to the game in Figure 3: the Nash equilibrium (d1d2, D) is sup￾ported by the assumption that, upon being reached, Player 2 becomes certain that Player 1 is irrational. The reason I mention it is that, in the Centipede game, (d1d2, D) is the only Nash equilibrium, so normal-form analysis already yields the “standard prediction” without having to rely on a potentially problematic extensive-form analysis. The game in Figure 3 does not have this feature, so it might be regarded as a better example (Phil Reny should be credited for this). 6