Alex Gourevitch protect.It identifies the guiding interest of the right oppression.That the right comprises permissions to use not as an interest (only)in creating fair contracts or in some effective means is a defining feature of the radical distributive justice narrowly conceived but,rather,as argument.After all,for the right to strike to protect the an interest in claiming freedom against its illegitimate interest that justifies it,it must be shaped in ways that limitation.Workers have an interest in not facing cer- permit the right's exercise in ways that actually pro tain kinds of coercive restraints against their access to tect that interest.That follows directly from the liberty- property,in not being subject to unfair ways of forcing based justification of the right.So.on this account,there them to work,in not being required to accept various would be no strict prohibition on the use of coercive kinds of labor contracts,and in not being dominated strike tactics like sit-downs and mass pickets.3 in the workplace.These are elements of the same in- A fourth virtue of the radical approach follows from terest that workers have in self-determination,or in the third.If the radical right to strike does not contain enjoying those liberties that allow them to have the internal to its justification,the same restraints on the personal and political autonomy they ought to.This is means strikers may use,there is still the question of the full sense in which the radical view is more respon- why the right to strike would have moral priority over sive to the facts of oppression than other accounts.This other basic liberties in the case of labor disputes.On further means that the radical argument is compatible the radical view.the important point is not just that with,or at least in the neighborhood of,any number there is economic oppression but that the economic op- of egalitarian theories of justice-such as those argu- pression that workers faced is in part created and sus- ing for property-owning democracy or for workplace tained by the legal articulation and protection of those democracy and free time32-that are concerned with basic economic and civil liberties.Workers find them- these wider forms of unfreedom.It is,for the same rea selves oppressed because of the way property rights. son,compatible with a wide range of socialist and other contractual liberties,corporate authority,tax and la- left-wing criticisms of power and unfreedom in capital- bor law create and maintain that oppression.If that is ist workplaces(e.g.,Arnold 2017;Ezorsky 2007;Weeks the case,then the normal justification of those liberties 2011). which is supposed to establish their basicness'and thus The third virtue of the radical approach is that it priority is weak.Their priority is normally explained gives a distinct explanation for the shape of the right to by the thought that,ideally speaking,the protection strike.Recall that the liberal and the social democratic of those liberties creates more or less non-oppressive, approaches can have a tendency to explain the shape of non-exploitative relations of social cooperation.34 In that right by reference either to(a)the basic liberties of reality,their legal protection achieves the opposite actual liberal societies,or(b)the liberties one enjoys in Meanwhile,the right to strike,as a way of reducing an ideal constitution,or (c)through a mixture of both that oppression has a stronger claim to be protecting a arguments.That form of reasoning imparts a particu- zone of activity that actually serves the aims of justice lar shape to the right:it must respect the basic liberties itself-of coercing people into relations of less oppres- with which it comes in conflict.On the best version of sive social cooperation.That is why the right to strike the social democratic view,that methodological error is would have priority over some of these basic economic avoided.But it is present in any version of the argument and civil liberties,like property rights,freedom of con- in which the shape of the legal right to strike one ought tract,and freedom of association. S5.501g to enjoy is the same as or similar to the right workers For the foregoing reasons,we can see why the right to exercise when suffering economic injustice.But on the strike as a right to resist oppression resolves the open- right to resist oppression view,the shape of the right ing dilemma in a forceful and distinctive way.Work- is explained exclusively by reference to the liberty in- ers may use coercive strike tactics,like sit-downs and terest it is supposed to protect under conditions of op- mass pickets,because those are necessary means for pression.The right is justified instrumentally,by ref- erence to the fact that strikes are generally effective means for resisting the oppression to which workers 33 Perhaps other tactics would also be ex ante permitted,like sabo- are subject.And,further,the right is justified by ref- tage,intimidation of replacements,or boss-napping.Those are more controversial because they are closer to violence,rather than just co- erence to the interest workers have in using their own ercive interference of others'basic liberties.So I bracket them for collective power to reduce and resist that oppression. now because they are unnecessary to the argument.But they would Under conditions of oppression,that use of collective need to be considered downstream. power is one of the primary ways workers can give ex- 34 It could be argued that these basic liberties could be entrenched pression to the demand for self-determination.But that in a non-oppressive way.Therefore,they have moral priority in the aspect of the justification also depends upon strikes be- sense that.under those non-oppressive conditions,workers would be required to respect the law.I cannot say here fully why I doubt ing generally effective means for resisting oppression that line.Briefly,I think we would be speaking about such different since otherwise they would just be collective acts of conceptions of the basic economic liberties,their interrelationships and their institutional role in creating a non-class-based system of self-delusion or symbolic gestures of resistance but not economic cooperation,that it would be a mistake to call these the acts self-determination.For that to be the case,the right same basic economic liberties.That aside,for the purposes of this ar- L to strike must include the use of at least some of the ticle,the urgent point is that all known institutional interpretations of means that make strikes effective for those subject to those basic economic liberties produces the class-based oppression against which the right to strike is claimed and,in that context,the right to strike does enjoy moral priority,both to the basic liberties and There is a very large literature here,but to cite just a few:Stanczyk the various legal iterations of them.I thank a reviewer for pressing 2012;Anderson 2017:Rose 2016;O'Neill and Williamson 2012. me on this point. 914Alex Gourevitch protect. It identifies the guiding interest of the right not as an interest (only) in creating fair contracts or in distributive justice narrowly conceived but, rather, as an interest in claiming freedom against its illegitimate limitation. Workers have an interest in not facing cer￾tain kinds of coercive restraints against their access to property, in not being subject to unfair ways of forcing them to work, in not being required to accept various kinds of labor contracts, and in not being dominated in the workplace. These are elements of the same in￾terest that workers have in self-determination, or in enjoying those liberties that allow them to have the personal and political autonomy they ought to. This is the full sense in which the radical view is more respon￾sive to the facts of oppression than other accounts. This further means that the radical argument is compatible with, or at least in the neighborhood of, any number of egalitarian theories of justice—such as those argu￾ing for property-owning democracy or for workplace democracy and free time32—that are concerned with these wider forms of unfreedom. It is, for the same rea￾son, compatible with a wide range of socialist and other left-wing criticisms of power and unfreedom in capital￾ist workplaces (e.g., Arnold 2017; Ezorsky 2007;Weeks 2011). The third virtue of the radical approach is that it gives a distinct explanation for the shape of the right to strike. Recall that the liberal and the social democratic approaches can have a tendency to explain the shape of that right by reference either to (a) the basic liberties of actual liberal societies, or (b) the liberties one enjoys in an ideal constitution, or (c) through a mixture of both arguments. That form of reasoning imparts a particu￾lar shape to the right: it must respect the basic liberties with which it comes in conflict. On the best version of the social democratic view, that methodological error is avoided.But it is present in any version of the argument in which the shape of the legal right to strike one ought to enjoy is the same as or similar to the right workers exercise when suffering economic injustice. But on the right to resist oppression view, the shape of the right is explained exclusively by reference to the liberty in￾terest it is supposed to protect under conditions of op￾pression. The right is justified instrumentally, by ref￾erence to the fact that strikes are generally effective means for resisting the oppression to which workers are subject. And, further, the right is justified by ref￾erence to the interest workers have in using their own collective power to reduce and resist that oppression. Under conditions of oppression, that use of collective power is one of the primary ways workers can give ex￾pression to the demand for self-determination.But that aspect of the justification also depends upon strikes be￾ing generally effective means for resisting oppression, since otherwise they would just be collective acts of self-delusion or symbolic gestures of resistance but not acts self-determination.For that to be the case, the right to strike must include the use of at least some of the means that make strikes effective for those subject to 32 There is a very large literature here, but to cite just a few: Stanczyk 2012; Anderson 2017; Rose 2016; O’Neill and Williamson 2012. oppression.That the right comprises permissions to use some effective means is a defining feature of the radical argument. After all, for the right to strike to protect the interest that justifies it, it must be shaped in ways that permit the right’s exercise in ways that actually pro￾tect that interest. That follows directly from the liberty￾based justification of the right. So, on this account, there would be no strict prohibition on the use of coercive strike tactics like sit-downs and mass pickets.33 A fourth virtue of the radical approach follows from the third. If the radical right to strike does not contain, internal to its justification, the same restraints on the means strikers may use, there is still the question of why the right to strike would have moral priority over other basic liberties in the case of labor disputes. On the radical view, the important point is not just that there is economic oppression but that the economic op￾pression that workers faced is in part created and sus￾tained by the legal articulation and protection of those basic economic and civil liberties. Workers find them￾selves oppressed because of the way property rights, contractual liberties, corporate authority, tax and la￾bor law create and maintain that oppression. If that is the case, then the normal justification of those liberties, which is supposed to establish their ‘basicness’ and thus priority is weak. Their priority is normally explained by the thought that, ideally speaking, the protection of those liberties creates more or less non-oppressive, non-exploitative relations of social cooperation.34 In reality, their legal protection achieves the opposite. Meanwhile, the right to strike, as a way of reducing that oppression has a stronger claim to be protecting a zone of activity that actually serves the aims of justice itself—of coercing people into relations of less oppres￾sive social cooperation. That is why the right to strike would have priority over some of these basic economic and civil liberties, like property rights, freedom of con￾tract, and freedom of association. For the foregoing reasons,we can see why the right to strike as a right to resist oppression resolves the open￾ing dilemma in a forceful and distinctive way. Work￾ers may use coercive strike tactics, like sit-downs and mass pickets, because those are necessary means for 33 Perhaps other tactics would also be ex ante permitted, like sabo￾tage, intimidation of replacements, or boss-napping. Those are more controversial because they are closer to violence, rather than just co￾ercive interference of others’ basic liberties. So I bracket them for now because they are unnecessary to the argument. But they would need to be considered downstream. 34 It could be argued that these basic liberties could be entrenched in a non-oppressive way. Therefore, they have moral priority in the sense that, under those non-oppressive conditions, workers would be required to respect the law. I cannot say here fully why I doubt that line. Briefly, I think we would be speaking about such different conceptions of the basic economic liberties, their interrelationships, and their institutional role in creating a non-class-based system of economic cooperation, that it would be a mistake to call these the same basic economic liberties. That aside, for the purposes of this ar￾ticle, the urgent point is that all known institutional interpretations of those basic economic liberties produces the class-based oppression against which the right to strike is claimed and, in that context, the right to strike does enjoy moral priority, both to the basic liberties and the various legal iterations of them. I thank a reviewer for pressing me on this point. 914 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000321