VOL 87 NO.5 PALFREY AND PRISBREY:PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENTS uld hav 48 102 FRANCS. Specific instructions for experiment 2: ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES: Experiment 2 QUESTIONSny questions? ANSWER diffe Begin experiment 2 ife ins ctions for of tokens equal to the last digit of his or her and except now everyone in a groupre ID#.Go over screen display and history dis- ceives 15 F RANCS times the nu be play. Tell subjects to refrain from pressing spenders in his or h [Hand out guiz splay on.] .Again.everyone has been reassigned to a new group with a new set of participants.Here [Correct quiz answers and read correct an- swers aloud. EARNINGS TABLE FOR EXPERIMENT 3 Your spending decision Others Your earnings (in FRANCS) 0 +your token value Exar references ose everyone else in your group spends Why Free Ride an oodsSae 45+ De 195+72312 FRANCS.If you had spent Cooperation in Public Goods Ex [Begin experiment 3.] 85(4 率书来来车水来来率有动 Fictitious Play:A Statistical Study of Mul Specific instructions for experiment 4: the san iment 4 1 Brookshire,D.S.;Coursey,D.L.and [Pay subjects in private in separate room and dismiss them one at a time. VOL 87 NO. 5 PALFREY AND PRISBREY: PUBUC GOODS EXPERIMENTS m 39 + 72 = 120 FRANCS. If you had spent five tokens you would have earned 15 -t- 39 -F 48 = 102 FRANCS. ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES: Are there any questions? [ ANSWER QUESTIONS] [Two practice rounds. Tell them not to press any keys unless you tell them to. In round 1 have each subject spend the number of tokens equal to the last digit of his or her ID#. In round 2 have each subject KEEP the number of tokens equal to the last digit of his or her ID#. Go over screen display and history dis￾play. Tell subjects to refrain from pressing keys for no reason.] [Keep screen display on.] [Hand out quiz.] [Correct quiz answers and read correct an￾swers aloud.] [Answer any additional questions.] -' [Begin experiment 1.] Specific instructions for experiment 2: Experiment 2 is the same as experiment 1 except you now have been regrouped with a completely different set of participants. [Begin experiment 2.] ' ' Specific instructions for experiment 3: Experiment 3 is the same as experiments 1 and 2, except now everyone in a group re￾ceives 15 FRANCS times the number of spenders in his or her group. Again, in addi￾tion, nonspenders also receive their token val￾ues. Again, everyone has been reassigned to a new group with a new set of participants. Here is your new payoff table. [CHANGE BOARD; EXPLAIN] Your spending decision EARNINGS TABt^ FOR EXPERIMENT 3 Others Your eamings (in HiANCS) N toketis Ntokens Ntokens Ntokens Ntokens Ntokens Ntokens Ntokens Ntokens Ntokens 1^*15) + (9*your token value) 15 + (N*\5) + (8*your token value) 30 + {N*\5) + (7*your token value) 45 + (N*15) + (6*your token value) 60 + (yV*15) + (5*your token value) 75 + (N*15) + (4*your token value) 90 + (N*\5) + {3*your token value) 105 + (A/*15) + {2*your token value) 120 + (A'* 15) + your token value 135 + Example: Suppose everyone else in your group spends 13 tokens in aU and you spend four tokens and your token value was 12. You would earn 60 -1- 195 -h 60 = 315 FRANCS. If you had spent three tokens you would have earned 45 -»- 195 + 12 = 312 FRANCS. If you had spent five tokens you would have earned 75 + 195 + 48 = 318 FRANCS. [Begin experiment 3.] Specific instructions for experiment 4: Experiment 4 is the same as experiment 3, except you have been regrouped again. [Begin experiment 4.] [Pay subjects in private in separate room and dismiss them one at a time.] REFERENCES Andreoni, James. "Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experi￾ments." Journal of Public Economics., De￾cember 1988, i7(3), pp. 291-304. "Cooperation in Public Goods Ex￾periments: Kindness or Confusion?" Amer￾ican Economic Review, September 1995, 55(4), pp. 891-904. Boylan, Richard T. and El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. "Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Mul￾tiple Economic Experiments." Games and Economic Behavior, April 1993, 5(2), pp. 205-22. Brookshire, D. S.; Coursey, D. L. and Redington, D. B. * 'Special Interests and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods