were stitched in China,ignoring the fact that the most value-added parts of the production process-design,marketing,research-take place in the US. Meanwhile,a recent flurry of legal activity in the form of unilateral blocks on imports, and of litigation at the World Trade Organization,might persuade a casual observer that there is a trade war under way. The news that European solar panel manufacturers were pressing for EU anti-dumping (against low-priced imports)and possibly "countervailing"(anti-subsidy)duties against competition from China,following the example of their US counterparts,confirmed that renewable energy has become one of the main theatres of international trade combat.It also underlines,given the length and complexity of modern global supply chains,what a tangled web we weave when first we seek a trade reprieve. When the US industry was granted anti-dumping and countervailing duties on solar cells earlier this year,Chinese companies apparently simply added a Taiwanese link to their supply chain to skirt them,sending solar wafers to Taiwan for processing,re-importing the resulting cells to the mainland for assembly into modules and then re-exporting them to the US.Accordingly,the European petition has had to be drawn much wider to encompass a larger part of the solar panel value chain,threatening the efficient and cost-effective manufacturing of a technology whose affordability is on trial. Any such intervention also risks creating friction elsewhere in the production process, especially given how many subsidies and tax credits are sloshing round the global renewables industry.The US solar cell tariffs promptly set off a trade dispute over polysilicon,the material used to make them.Chinese officials are now threatening anti-dumping duties against imports from America,citing US federal and state tax credits to polysilicon manufacturers. But Washington's moral standing is compromised,and its time and energy diverted,by the fact that its own trade defense armory contains a few weapons struggling to pass the Geneva conventions.Last year Washington lost key parts of a WTO case brought by Beijing addressing the US practice of imposing both anti-dumping and countervailing duties on the same imports.It has had to laboriously rewrite its own trade law in response to a US federal court ruling on the same issue.Only this year did Washington settle disputes with the EU and Japan dating back nearly a decade about "zeroing"-the US practice of ignoring unhelpful data when calculating anti-dumping duties. As it happens,the use of trade defense instruments has been remarkably limited since the beginning of the global financial crisis.Part of the credit should go to the very nature of globalization itself.Companies with operations spread across several countries are less likely to demand protection in case it hurts their own subsidiaries or contractors. But it is also due to the restraints progressively placed on countries'use of trade defense instruments by WTO rulings.The "Doha round"of trade talks may be dead,but the WTO's dispute settlement arm is still playing a valuable role. Trade defense instruments are policy tools of long standing,and their continued use in some form is inevitable.But they are clumsy utensils indeed to intervene in the minutely 1631were stitched in China , ignoring the fact that the most value-added parts of the production process-design , marketing , research-take place in the US. Meanwhile , a recent flurry of legal activity in the form of unilateral blocks on imports, and of litigation at the World Trade Organization , might persuade a casual observer that there is a trade war under way. The news that European solar panel manufacturers were pressing for EU anti-dumping (against low-priced imports) and possibly "countervailing" (anti-subsidy) duties against competition from China , following the example of their US counterparts, confirmed that renewable energy has become one of the main theatres of international trade combat. It also underlines, given the length and complexity of modern global supply chains, what a tangled web we weave when first we seek a trade reprieve. When the US industry was granted anti-dumping and countervailing duties on solar cells earlier this year, Chinese companies apparently simply added a Taiwanese link to their supply chain to skirt them , sending solar wafers to Taiwan for processing , re-importing the resulting cells to the mainland for assembly into modules and then re-exporting them to the US. Accordingly , the European petition has had to be drawn much wider to encompass a larger part of the solar panel value chain , threatening the efficient and cost-effective manufacturing of a technology whose affordability is on trial. Any such intervention also risks creating friction elsewhere in the production process, especially given how many subsidies and tax credits are sloshing round the global renewables industry. The US solar cell tariffs promptly set off a trade dispute over polysilicon , the material used to make them. Chinese officials are now threatening anti-dumping duties against imports from America , citing US federal and state tax credits to polysilicon manufacturers. But Washington's moral standing is compromised , and its time and energy diverted , by the fact that its own trade defense armory contains a few weapons struggling to pass the Geneva conventions. Last year Washington lost key parts of a WTO case brought by Beijing addressing the US practice of imposing both anti-dumping and countervailing duties on the same imports. It has had to laboriously rewrite its own trade law in response to a US federal court ruling on the same issue. Only this year did Washington se 1631