I958] FIDELITY TO LAW 637 to falsify the problem into a specious simplicity which leaves un touched the difficult issues where real dangers lie Third, let us suppose a judge bent on realizing through his decisions an objective that most ordinary citizens would regard as mistaken or evil. Would such a judge be likely to suspend the letter of the statute by openly invoking a" higher law"? Or would e be more likely to take refuge behind the maxim that"law is law"and explain his decision in such a way that it would appear to be demanded by the law itself? Fourth, neither Professor Hart nor I belong to anything that could be said in a significant sense to be a"minority group"in our respective countries. This has its advantages and disadvan tages to one aspiring to a philosophic view of law and government But suppose we were both transported to a country where our beliefs were anathemas, and where we, in turn, regarded the pre- vailing morality as thoroughly evil. No doubt in this situation we would have reason to fear that the law might be covertly manipu- lated to our disadvantage; I doubt if either of us would be appr hensive that its injunctions would be set aside by an appeal to a morality higher than law. If we felt that the law itself was our safest refuge, would it not be because even in the most per erted regimes there is a certain hesitancy about writing cruelties intolerances, and inhumanities into law? And is it not clear that this hesitancy itself derives, not from a separation of law and morals, but precisely from an identification of law with those de- mands of morality that are the most urgent and the most ob ously justifiable, which no man need be ashamed to profess? Fifth, over great areas where the judicial process functions, the danger of an infusion of immoral, or at least unwelcome, morality does not, I suggest, present a real issue. Here the danger is pre- cisely the opposite. For example, in the field of commercial law the British courts in recent years have, if I may say so, fallen into a"law-is-law"formalism that constitutes a kind of belated coun terrevolution against all that was accomplished by Mansfield.5 The matter has reached a stage approaching crisis as commercial cases are increasingly being taken to arbitration. The chief For an outstanding [I94I] A.C. 25I(I940).I Victoria Laundry, Ltd v Ne i personally would be inclined to put under the same headFIDELITY TO LAW to falsify the problem into a specious simplicity which leaves un￾touched the difficult issues where real dangers lie. Third, let us suppose a judge bent on realizing through his decisions an objective that most ordinary citizens would regard as mistaken or evil. Would such a judge be likely to suspend the letter of the statute by openly invoking a "higher law"? Or would he be more likely to take refuge behind the maxim that "law is law" and explain his decision in such a way that it would appear to be demanded by the law itself? Fourth, neither Professor Hart nor I belong to anything that could be said in a significant sense to be a "minority group" in our respective countries. This has its advantages and disadvan￾tages to one aspiring to a philosophic view of law and government. But suppose we were both transported to a country where our beliefs were anathemas, and where we, in turn, regarded the pre￾vailing morality as thoroughly evil. No doubt in this situation we would have reason to fear that the law might be covertly manipu￾lated to our disadvantage; I doubt if either of us would be appre￾hensive that its injunctions would be set aside by an appeal to a morality higher than law. If we felt that the law itself was our safest refuge, would it not be because even in the most per￾verted regimes there is a certain hesitancy about writing cruelties, intolerances, and inhumanities into law? And is it not clear that this hesitancy itself derives, not from a separation of law and morals, but precisely from an identification of law with those de￾mands of morality that are the most urgent and the most obvi￾ously justifiable, which no man need be ashamed to profess? Fifth, over great areas where the judicial process functions, the danger of an infusion of immoral, or at least unwelcome, morality does not, I suggest, present a real issue. Here the danger is pre￾cisely the opposite. For example, in the field of commercial law the British courts in recent years have, if I may say so, fallen into a "law-is-law" formalism that constitutes a kind of belated coun￾terrevolution against all that was accomplished by Mansfield.5 The matter has reached a stage approaching crisis as commercial cases are increasingly being taken to arbitration. The chief 5 For an outstanding example, see G. Scammell and Nephew, Ltd. v. Ouston, [I94I] A.C. 251 (1940). I personally would be inclined to put under the same head Victoria Laundry, Ltd. v. Newman Industries, Ltd., [I949] 2 K.B. 528 (C.A.). I958] 637