government economic policies. Thus, quite apart from the substance of legal rules, there is a sharp difference between the ideologies underlying common and civil law, with the latter notably more comfortable with a centralized and activist government(Merryman, 1985) The more complex question is whether the sharp differences in origin and ideology translate into institutional differences that could affect economic outcomes today. I suggest that there are structural differences between common and civil law, most notably the greater degree of dicial independence in the former and the lower level of scrutiny of executive action in the latter that provide governments more scope for alteration of property and contract rights in civil law countries. The law-and-development literature to date, by focusing on differences in the substance of specific legal rules, has missed this larger picture I then report results of cross-country regression analyses showing an association between the common law and higher rates of real per capita growth in gross domestic product(GDP) also provide evidence, derived from Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson's(1995)concept of contract-intensive money, that citizens in common law countries demonstrate greater confidence in the mechanisms of property and contract enforcement than those in civil law countries Section II provides theoretical background by drawing a link between judicial independence and economic growth. Section Ill draws on the history of the common and civil law traditions to show that the two differ sharply in attitudes toward judicial independence and notes ongoing institutional effects. Section IV reports the results of cross-country growth regressions. Section V provides additional evidence that the association between the common law and growth is a consequence of the greater security of property and contract rights from government interference, and Section VI concludes4 government economic policies. Thus, quite apart from the substance of legal rules, there is a sharp difference between the ideologies underlying common and civil law, with the latter notably more comfortable with a centralized and activist government (Merryman, 1985). The more complex question is whether the sharp differences in origin and ideology translate into institutional differences that could affect economic outcomes today. I suggest that there are structural differences between common and civil law, most notably the greater degree of judicial independence in the former and the lower level of scrutiny of executive action in the latter, that provide governments more scope for alteration of property and contract rights in civil law countries. The law-and-development literature to date, by focusing on differences in the substance of specific legal rules, has missed this larger picture. I then report results of cross-country regression analyses showing an association between the common law and higher rates of real per capita growth in gross domestic product (GDP). I also provide evidence, derived from Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson’s (1995) concept of contract-intensive money, that citizens in common law countries demonstrate greater confidence in the mechanisms of property and contract enforcement than those in civil law countries. Section II provides theoretical background by drawing a link between judicial independence and economic growth. Section III draws on the history of the common and civil law traditions to show that the two differ sharply in attitudes toward judicial independence and notes ongoing institutional effects. Section IV reports the results of cross-country growth regressions. Section V provides additional evidence that the association between the common law and growth is a consequence of the greater security of property and contract rights from government interference, and Section VI concludes