And the background question remains c)IfX has the same physical anatomy as you but a different psychological/social reality along race and gender lines-- imagine someone X who lived in a society without racism or sexism, where one'scolor"and one's genitalia don' t make a ignificant difference socially--could X still be you? Questions to consider: i Does one's answer to questions about ethical identity depend at all on one's view about diachronic identity/unity? Does it depend at all on one's answer to the question of precise individuation? i What determines whether a particular trait is central to ones selfhood or not? Is choosing to make a trait central/peripheral enough to make it so? i Rorty and Wong suggest that some philosophers who attempt to describe"ethical"identity-what the core traits of the self really are-are in fact making normative recommendations about what our identity should be. Yet rorty and Wong are themselves attempting to describe" ethical"identity Is their view also normative? If so, what are they (implicitly or explicitly)recommending should be central to identity? If not, how do they avoid normativity? i If we cannot change by will central aspects of our ethical identity then what is the point of making recommendations about what our core identities should be? i Do you agree with Appiah that there are significant differences between the centrality of race and the centrality of gende to the self? If so, what explains the difference in our attitudes? What explains the difference in our attitudes towards the centrality of sex and biological race? i Is sex more objective/biologically real than race? Does the Fausto-Sterling essay provide a basis for thinking that sex is a social category? Do it provide a basis for thinking that gender is a social category? Is race more a social category than gender or sex? Why or why not? i Do you think there are differences in the importance men and women place on the sexual features of their body with respect to their identity? Do you think there are differences in the importance people of different races place on the racial features of their body with respect to their identity i Allowing for the sake of argument that"we"do make gender(or sex)more central to our identity than race, how should we answer the normative question? Should we aim to make gender(or sex)less central? (Why or why not? )Should we aim to make race more central? ( Why or why not? Should we aim to make both irrelevant? (Why or why not? )Is that possible?( Why or why not?)And the background question remains: c) If X has the same physical anatomy as you but a different psychological/social reality along race and gender lines-­ imagine someone X who lived in a society without racism or sexism, where one's "color" and one's genitalia don't make a significant difference socially--could X still be you? Questions to consider: ï Does one's answer to questions about ethical identity depend at all on one's view about diachronic identity/unity? Does it depend at all on one's answer to the question of precise individuation? ï What determines whether a particular trait is central to one's selfhood or not? Is choosing to make a trait central/peripheral enough to make it so? ï Rorty and Wong suggest that some philosophers who attempt to describe "ethical" identity­what the core traits of the self really are­are in fact making normative recommendations about what our identity should be. Yet Rorty and Wong are themselves attempting to describe "ethical" identity. Is their view also normative? If so, what are they (implicitly or explicitly) recommending should be central to identity? If not, how do they avoid normativity? ï If we cannot change by will central aspects of our ethical identity, then what is the point of making recommendations about what our core identities should be? ï Do you agree with Appiah that there are significant differences between the centrality of race and the centrality of gender to the self? If so, what explains the difference in our attitudes? What explains the difference in our attitudes towards the centrality of sex and biological race? ï Is sex more objective/biologically real than race? Does the Fausto-Sterling essay provide a basis for thinking that sex is a social category? Do it provide a basis for thinking that gender is a social category? Is race more a social category than gender or sex? Why or why not? ï Do you think there are differences in the importance men and women place on the sexual features of their body with respect to their identity? Do you think there are differences in the importance people of different races place on the racial features of their body with respect to their identity? ï Allowing for the sake of argument that "we" do make gender (or sex) more central to our identity than race, how should we answer the normative question? Should we aim to make gender (or sex) less central? (Why or why not?) Should we aim to make race more central? (Why or why not?) Should we aim to make both irrelevant? (Why or why not?) Is that possible? (Why or why not?)