the self. Could a self that shifted from being psychol ogically/ socially organized"like a woman"to bein would destroy psychological/social principle that shifting to a different gender would result in a kind of incoherence th psychologically/socially organized"like a man"over time still remain coherent and organized? Could your actions and attitudes have been organized differently along gender lines right from the start(and it still be you)? (We should also ask the background factual question whether there really is a difference in how men and women are psychologically/socially ized!!) Although Appiah seems to be addressing these last questions--relevant to Thesis 2, his argument focuses on quite different examples, more relevant to Thesis 3. His main point seems to be that one can undergo a sex-change and plausibly claim afterwards to be a different"ethical person" from before(p. 497). He contrasts this with the case of race one cannot, he maintains, undergo a"biological race"change and truly claim to be a different person from before. (Note that to undergo a race change" one need not have one's appearance altered one might simply move to another culture which interprets the bodily markers of race differently. He concludes that" racial"ethical identities are"less conceptually central to who one than gender ethical identities. "(p. 497 But it is not clear why the change matters in one case but not the other. Moreover, we should ask why his intuitions about these cases of sex-change and race/color-change are relevant to the question Appiah started with. He wanted to know whether he(AA), who is in fact a man, could have been the same self but a woman(because socialized differently ) This concerns Thesis 2. On the face of it, facts about AA's anatomy--and Thesis 3--are not at issue here, since he has allowed that sex need not"match"gender. What Appiah's examples seem to show is not that a gender shift from masculine to feminine(or vv. or can destroy the self, but that a change in one's genitalia from male to female(or v.v. )can destroy the self. This latter claim is to the point only if one assumes that attitudes towards one's genital ia are partly constitutive of gender; yet earlier gender was explained just in terms of femininity/masculinity and social role. How exactly is Thesis 2 related to Thesis 3? Although Appiah did not include genitalia as relevant in his brief explication of gender, it is clearly at issue for him: in asking, "Would that still be me? "about an imagined Aa who went through a sex-change and was socialized as a woman, he suggests that the answer would depend on"how central my being-a-man-my social masculinity and, perhaps, my possession of the biological appurtenances of maleness-is, as we would ordinarily say, to my identity. "(p. 495) So Appiah's point can be summed up by saying that it is normally the case(in the"modern West")that one's self-one's ethical identity"-makes central an understanding of one,'s body as male or female; but does not make central an understanding of one,'s body as racially marked. In fact, his argument is more relevant to the question whether sex central to the self, not gender:. Returning to the Rorty and Wong framework, Appiah is maintaining that at least some of the somatic(bodily ) facts that determine our core sense of self are facts about genitalia; whereas the somatic facts about skin color(etc )arent as central. Do you agree? Isn't it plausible that there is significant variation here? Some people may take their sexual anatomy to be central to who they are and find it unimaginable that they--the self they now are--could exist without the sort of anatomy they have, and others may not. And some may take their racial morphology to be central and others may not Is Appiah saying that some are right about what is central to who they are and others are wrong? Note that there are several dimensions to the question a)If X had a different physical anatomy (either sexually or racially )than you have now, but almost everything else (psychologically and socially )about X were the same as for you, could X be you? b)If X had a different physical anatomy(either sexually or racially) than you have now, and if that difference made a difference to X's psychological and social realityOso that X began to feel and act like someone of a different race or sex than you have now, and was treated by others accordingly Could X be you?psychological/social principle that shifting to a different gender would result in a kind of incoherence that would destroy the self. Could a self that shifted from being psychologically/socially organized "like a woman" to being psychologically/socially organized "like a man" over time still remain coherent and organized? Could your actions and attitudes have been organized differently along gender lines right from the start (and it still be you)? (We should also ask the background factual question whether there really is a difference in how men and women are psychologically/socially organizedÖ!!) Although Appiah seems to be addressing these last questions--relevant to Thesis 2, his argument focuses on quite different examples, more relevant to Thesis 3. His main point seems to be that one can undergo a sex-change and plausibly claim afterwards to be a different "ethical person" from before (p. 497). He contrasts this with the case of race: one cannot, he maintains, undergo a "biological race" change and truly claim to be a different person from before. (Note that to undergo a "race change" one need not have one's appearance altered: one might simply move to another culture which interprets the bodily markers of race differently.) He concludes that "racial" ethical identities are "less conceptually central to who one is than gender ethical identities." (p. 497) But it is not clear why the change matters in one case but not the other. Moreover, we should ask why his intuitions about these cases of sex-change and race/color-change are relevant to the question Appiah started with. He wanted to know whether he (AA), who is in fact a man, could have been the same self but a woman (because socialized differently). This concerns Thesis 2. On the face of it, facts about AA's anatomy--and Thesis 3--are not at issue here, since he has allowed that sex need not "match" gender. What Appiah's examples seem to show is not that a gender shift from masculine to feminine (or v.v.) or can destroy the self, but that a change in one's genitalia from male to female (or v.v.) can destroy the self. This latter claim is to the point only if one assumes that attitudes towards one's genitalia are partly constitutive of gender; yet earlier gender was explained just in terms of femininity/masculinity and social role. How exactly is Thesis 2 related to Thesis 3? Although Appiah did not include genitalia as relevant in his brief explication of gender, it is clearly at issue for him: in asking, "Would that still be me?" about an imagined AA who went through a sex-change and was socialized as a woman, he suggests that the answer would depend on "how central my being-a-man­my social masculinity and , perhaps, my possession of the biological appurtenances of maleness­is, as we would ordinarily say, to my identity." (p. 495). So Appiah's point can be summed up by saying that it is normally the case (in the "modern West") that one's self­one's "ethical identity"­makes central an understanding of one's body as male or female; but does not make central an understanding of one's body as racially marked. In fact, his argument is more relevant to the question whether sex is central to the self, not gender. Returning to the Rorty and Wong framework, Appiah is maintaining that at least some of the somatic (bodily) facts that determine our core sense of self are facts about genitalia; whereas the somatic facts about skin color (etc.) aren't as central. Do you agree? Isn't it plausible that there is significant variation here? Some people may take their sexual anatomy to be central to who they are and find it unimaginable that they--the self they now are--could exist without the sort of anatomy they have; and others may not. And some may take their racial morphology to be central, and others may not. Is Appiah saying that some are right about what is central to who they are and others are wrong? Note that there are several dimensions to the question: a) If X had a different physical anatomy (either sexually or racially) than you have now, but almost everything else (psychologically and socially) about X were the same as for you, could X be you? b) If X had a different physical anatomy (either sexually or racially) than you have now, and if that difference made a difference to X's psychological and social realityÖso that X began to feel and act like someone of a different race or sex than you have now, and was treated by others accordinglyÖcould X be you?