Thesis 1: Most of us in the modern West have a descriptive(ethical)identity that situates our gender as more central than race, so on"our"(Western) understanding of what it is to be a self, gender is more important than Thesis 2: A replacement of one 's gender would make a new"ethical person"whereas the replacement of one's race Thesis 3: A sex-change results(can result?)in a new" ethical person", but a"race change"would not(cannot?) " Ethical Persons"and the self In order to make sense of these claims it will be useful to introduce a number of distinctions So to begin what is an ethical person"in the sense intended? i We seem to ordinarily use the term 'self to refer to a psychologically organized source of agency, perhaps something like a coherent personality; include within this a complex pattern of relations to others ( Including the various"aspects"of ethical identity that Rorty and Wong list. )Some bodies house no selves(e.g, if the body is in a permanent coma); other bodies house several selves(e.g, if the body has multiple personality disorder) i In order not to beg any questions about personal identity(what it is to be the same person over time), we should not assume that the concept of a self just is the concept of a person; perhaps personal identity is a matter of bodily continuity and yet the same person can coincide with many selves. However, let us assume for this discussion that you are a self. i Then one of Appiah's questions can be put this way: Can X and Y be the same self, if X is a man and Y is a woman? This might be considered either as a matter of time/replacement, or of possibility. Could the self you are now continue to exist and yet change its gender? Or would a new self be created? Would it have been possible for you to exist and be the self you are, and yet have been a different gender? In effect, is a selfs gender essential to it? Appiah's other question is: What bout race? Is it essential too? Sex/Gender, Biological race/Social race To answer these questions, we need still more distinctions i On Appiah's view, sexes are distinguished by familiar anatomical differences(internal and external genitalia)-we'll use he terms'male' and'female' to refer to sexes; genders are distinguished by social role and personality traits(such as masculinity and femininity )-we' ll use the terms 'men' andwomen' to refer to genders (p 495) It should be clear that sex does not determine gender one can be female and yet not be feminine, not function sociall as a woman etc Biological race consists of those features of the body that(supposedly) determine one's racial category; social race xperiences and way of life that those viewed as of a cor share. (See, p. 496 and 497, though the terms are mine Appiah argues that it is possible to be a male and yet have the 'ethical identityof a woman. E.g., It may be that in the case of transsexuals the gender of the self does not"match"the sex of the body for transsexuals, a"sex change"operation will in many cases leave the self intact, even if the sex is changed But we need to ask: given a self that is gendered as a woman, could that self become a man(or vv ) Under the envisioned conditions of psychological/social change, would the(woman) self be replaced by a new(man) self? Given the background understanding of ethical identity, what's at issue is whether gender is such a deep organizingThesis 1: Most of us in the modern West have a descriptive (ethical) identity that situates our gender as more central than race, so on "our" (Western) understanding of what it is to be a self, gender is more important than race. Thesis 2: A replacement of one's gender would make a new "ethical person" whereas the replacement of one's race would not. Thesis 3: A sex-change results (can result?) in a new "ethical person", but a "race change" would not (cannot?). "Ethical Persons" and the Self In order to make sense of these claims, it will be useful to introduce a number of distinctions. So to begin: what is an "ethical person" in the sense intended? ï We seem to ordinarily use the term 'self' to refer to a psychologically organized source of agency, perhaps something like a coherent personality; include within this a complex pattern of relations to others. (Including the various "aspects" of ethical identity that Rorty and Wong list.) Some bodies house no selves (e.g., if the body is in a permanent coma); other bodies house several selves (e.g., if the body has multiple personality disorder). ï In order not to beg any questions about personal identity (what it is to be the same person over time), we should not assume that the concept of a self just is the concept of a person; perhaps personal identity is a matter of bodily continuity and yet the same person can coincide with many selves. However, let us assume for this discussion that you are a self. ï Then one of Appiah's questions can be put this way: Can X and Y be the same self, if X is a man and Y is a woman? This might be considered either as a matter of time/replacement, or of possibility. Could the self you are now continue to exist and yet change its gender? Or would a new self be created? Would it have been possible for you to exist and be the self you are, and yet have been a different gender? In effect, is a self's gender essential to it? Appiah's other question is: What about race? Is it essential too? Sex/Gender, Biological race/Social race To answer these questions, we need still more distinctions. ï On Appiah's view, sexes are distinguished by familiar anatomical differences (internal and external genitalia)­we'll use the terms 'male' and 'female' to refer to sexes; genders are distinguished by social role and personality traits (such as masculinity and femininity)­we'll use the terms 'men' and 'women' to refer to genders. (p. 495) It should be clear that sex does not determine gender: one can be female and yet not be feminine, not function socially as a woman, etc. ï Biological race consists of those features of the body that (supposedly) determine one's racial category; social race consists of the experiences and way of life that those viewed as of a common race share. (See, p. 496 and 497, though the terms are mine) Appiah argues that it is possible to be a male and yet have the 'ethical identity' of a woman. E.g., It may be that in the case of transsexuals the gender of the self does not "match" the sex of the body; for transsexuals, a "sex change" operation will in many cases leave the self intact, even if the sex is changed. But we need to ask: given a self that is gendered as a woman, could that self become a man (or v.v.)? Under the envisioned conditions of psychological/social change, would the (woman) self be replaced by a new (man) self? Given the background understanding of ethical identity, what's at issue is whether gender is such a deep organizing