round trivial things rather than things that really matter L. Rorty and wong Rorty and Wong are interested in what we will call"ethical"identity. On their view: A person's identity is constituted by a configuration of central traits. In characterizing identity by the structure of central traits, we do not mean to imply that these traits remain constant throughout an individual's lifetime or that they individuate a person, or that they serve as referential reidentifiers. We are focusing on traits that typically make a systematic difference to the course of a persons life, to the habit-forming and action-guiding social categories in which she is placed, to the way that she acts, reacts, and interacts. (p. 19, my italics) How should we understand the notion of"centrality"they are relying on? There are three main dimensions, each independent of the other(p. 20 i Ramification: how broadly the trait is manifested in the person 's life and how much depends on it(both socially and individually) i Dominance: how strong or persistent the trait is i Appropriation: how important one takes the trait to be Shyness might be ramified and dominant, but not appropriated Self-control may be ramified and appropriated but not dominant a willingness to forgive others may be appropriated, but not ramified or dominant Aspects of "ethical"identity(pp 21-25) i Somatic, proprioceptive, and kinaesthetic dispositions, e.g., deft/awkward, flexible/stiff, tall/short. excitable/calm i Social role identity, e.g., casting in"social dramas Shyness, aggression, generosity i Central temperamental or psychological traits, e. g as"the villain", scapegoat, father figure i Socially defined group identity, e. g, race, class, age, gender, ethnicity i Ideal identity, e. g, sense of ideal self, internalization of role models What aspects of"ethical"identity are central to an individual seems to depend at least in part on their culture. In some cultures social identities(one's"proper role"in the culture)are at the core of a person 's identity; in other cultures not Nonetheless, philosophers tend to debate the question what aspects of ethical identity are central to defining who we are What exactly is this debate about? Is it a debate about the structure of the self? Or about local cultural norms? Or about how we ought to think of ourselves? Ill. Appiah: Race and gender asaspects"of identity Appiah distinguishes"metaphysical" from"ethical"questions about a persons identity. If, when I ask: " What makes Sally Sally? I am looking for a special feature I have and a twin Sally-someone very like me but not really me--would lack, this would be a"metaphysical"project in Appiah's sense If I am trying to determine what set of core traits and values"make tick",i.e, that explain what I do and why, this is an"ethical "project in Appiah,s sense. (Note that Sally and twin-Sally may have the same ethical identity the very same values, goals, etc, structure their lives.) Interestingly, Appiah seems to think that it is not entirely an open question what an individual'sethical identity " consists in; at least, it is not entirely a matter of individual choice. He argues that"our"concept of the self-specifying that the elevant"we"includes those of us"in the modern West"(p. 497)-makes gender a central component of ethical identity and race less central. One way of reading this claim is thataround trivial things rather than things that really matter. II. Rorty and Wong Rorty and Wong are interested in what we will call "ethical" identity. On their view: A person's identity is constituted by a configuration of central traits. In characterizing identity by the structure of central traits, we do not mean to imply that these traits remain constant throughout an individual's lifetime or that they individuate a person, or that they serve as referential reidentifiers. We are focusing on traits that typically make a systematic difference to the course of a person's life, to the habit-forming and action-guiding social categories in which she is placed, to the way that she acts, reacts, and interacts. (p. 19, my italics) How should we understand the notion of "centrality" they are relying on? There are three main dimensions, each independent of the other (p. 20): ï Ramification: how broadly the trait is manifested in the person's life and how much depends on it (both socially and individually). ï Dominance: how strong or persistent the trait is. ï Appropriation: how important one takes the trait to be. Examples: Shyness might be ramified and dominant, but not appropriated. Self-control may be ramified and appropriated but not dominant. A willingness to forgive others may be appropriated, but not ramified or dominant. Aspects of "ethical" identity (pp. 21-25) ï Somatic, proprioceptive, and kinaesthetic dispositions, e.g., deft/awkward, flexible/stiff, tall/short, excitable/calm. ï Central temperamental or psychological traits, e.g., shyness, aggression, generosity. ï Social role identity, e.g., casting in "social dramas" as "the villain", scapegoat, father figure. ï Socially defined group identity, e.g., race, class, age, gender, ethnicity. ï Ideal identity, e.g., sense of ideal self, internalization of role models. What aspects of "ethical" identity are central to an individual seems to depend at least in part on their culture. In some cultures social identities (one's "proper role" in the culture) are at the core of a person's identity; in other cultures not. Nonetheless, philosophers tend to debate the question what aspects of ethical identity are central to defining who we are. What exactly is this debate about? Is it a debate about the structure of the self? Or about local cultural norms? Or about how we ought to think of ourselves? III. Appiah: Race and Gender as "aspects" of identity Appiah distinguishes "metaphysical" from "ethical" questions about a person's identity. If, when I ask: "What makes Sally Sally?" I am looking for a special feature I have and a twin Sally­someone very like me but not really me--would lack, this would be a "metaphysical" project in Appiah's sense. If I am trying to determine what set of core traits and values "make me tick", i.e., that explain what I do and why, this is an "ethical" project in Appiah's sense. (Note that Sally and twin-Sally may have the same ethical identity: the very same values, goals, etc., structure their lives.) Interestingly, Appiah seems to think that it is not entirely an open question what an individual's "ethical identity" consists in; at least, it is not entirely a matter of individual choice. He argues that "our" concept of the self­specifying that the relevant "we" includes those of us "in the modern West" (p. 497)­makes gender a central component of ethical identity, and race less central. One way of reading this claim is that