The Triumph of Internationalism 97 Influenced by the Maoist historiography in the post-Stalin era,many scholars in the West take it for granted that Mao advocated a "correct line' of rural strategy in opposition to Moscow's disastrous city-oriented strategy. and he was thus purged by Moscow's proxies known as the "returned students."It was not until 1935,so goes the conventional belief when the defeated CCP force lost its communication with Moscow,that the majority of CCP leaders supported Mao at the Zunyi conference,and the Mao leadership in the post-1935 era was thus politically and institutionally op- posed to Moscow.7 Recently released CCP materials,however,indicate that Mao was very much a part of the so-called left-deviation in the late 1920s and early 1930s,and Mao's rise to power in 1935 was a result of Moscow's promotion. For instance,when the so-called Li Lishan left-deviationist line was at its peak in the latter half of 1930,Mao led the 1st Army Corps to attack major cities,such as Ji'an,Nanchang,and Changsha.After the CCP had suffered a serious setback due to Li's ruthless policy.Moscow quickly removed Li as party chief in September.Because of the communication failure,however, Moscow's message did not reach Mao,and he thus continued to carry on Li's"adventurist"policy even after Moscow had condemned Li.At the end of 1930,Mao was still advocating a "final battle of class warfare"at home and abroad.Consequently,Mao was criticized at a CCP Center's meeting on 17 April 1931,where he admitted his "Li Lishan error."Nonetheless, Mao was not punished for following Li's policy,which was after all influ- enced by the Comintern radicalism of the "third period."Instead,Mao was promoted by Moscow as an alternate member of the Politburo.8 Mao's so-called demotion by the Comintern in the Jiangxi period was in fact a "sick leave"of Mao's own request in the fall of 1932,due to his disagreement with his comrades in the Jiangxi Central Bureau over a tactical matter.When Mao was having difficulties with his comrades at home,the Comintern intervened on his behalf,directing the CCP in March 1933 that the way in which Mao was treated"must be gentle and comrade-like,and Mao should be allowed to undertake a leading position."As a result,Mao's position was upgraded from an alternate to a full member of the Politburo in January 1934.9 Throughout 1934-35,Moscow consistently promoted Mao's reputation,which laid the foundation for his rise to power in 1935.Mao returned Moscow's favor with gratitude and enthusiasm.He made restoring 7.For examples,see John W Garver,"The Origins of the Second United Front:The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party"China Quarterly 113 (March 1988):29-59:and Harrison E.Salisbury.New Emperors,China in the Era of Mao and Deng (Boston,1992).84. 8.Mao Zedong nianpu [Chronology of Maol.ed.Document Research Office of the CCP Center(Beijing,1993),1:311-27,339-40. 9.Ibid.,377-91,398.420.Influenced by the myth of Mao's own making.it has been taken for granted in the West that Mao was removed from military command before January 1935 by the Comintern and its proxies due to his opposition to the "left-deviationist"policy line.See Garver."The Origins of the Second United Front";and Salisbury.New Emperor:84.The Triumph of Internationalism : 97 Influenced by the Maoist historiography in the post-Stalin era, many scholars in the West take it for granted that Mao advocated a “correct line” of rural strategy in opposition to Moscow’s disastrous city-oriented strategy, and he was thus purged by Moscow’s proxies known as the “returned students.” It was not until 1935, so goes the conventional belief, when the defeated CCP force lost its communication with Moscow, that the majority of CCP leaders supported Mao at the Zunyi conference, and the Mao leadership in the post-1935 era was thus politically and institutionally op￾posed to Moscow.7 Recently released CCP materials, however, indicate that Mao was very much a part of the so-called left-deviation in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and Mao’s rise to power in 1935 was a result of Moscow’s promotion. For instance, when the so-called Li Lishan left-deviationist line was at its peak in the latter half of 1930, Mao led the 1st Army Corps to attack major cities, such as Ji’an, Nanchang, and Changsha. After the CCP had suffered a serious setback due to Li’s ruthless policy, Moscow quickly removed Li as party chief in September. Because of the communication failure, however, Moscow’s message did not reach Mao, and he thus continued to carry on Li’s “adventurist” policy even after Moscow had condemned Li. At the end of 1930, Mao was still advocating a “final battle of class warfare” at home and abroad. Consequently, Mao was criticized at a CCP Center’s meeting on 17 April 1931, where he admitted his “Li Lishan error.” Nonetheless, Mao was not punished for following Li’s policy, which was after all influ￾enced by the Comintern radicalism of the “third period.” Instead, Mao was promoted by Moscow as an alternate member of the Politburo.8 Mao’s so-called demotion by the Comintern in the Jiangxi period was in fact a “sick leave” of Mao’s own request in the fall of 1932, due to his disagreement with his comrades in the Jiangxi Central Bureau over a tactical matter. When Mao was having difficulties with his comrades at home, the Comintern intervened on his behalf, directing the CCP in March 1933 that the way in which Mao was treated “must be gentle and comrade-like, and Mao should be allowed to undertake a leading position.” As a result, Mao’s position was upgraded from an alternate to a full member of the Politburo in January 1934.9 Throughout 1934–35, Moscow consistently promoted Mao’s reputation, which laid the foundation for his rise to power in 1935. Mao returned Moscow’s favor with gratitude and enthusiasm. He made restoring 7. For examples, see John W. Garver, “The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party,” China Quarterly 113 (March 1988): 29–59; and Harrison E. Salisbury, New Emperors, China in the Era of Mao and Deng (Boston, 1992), 84. 8. Mao Zedong nianpu [Chronology of Mao], ed. Document Research Office of the CCP Center (Beijing, 1993), 1:311–27, 339–40. 9. Ibid., 377–91, 398, 420. Influenced by the myth of Mao’s own making, it has been taken for granted in the West that Mao was removed from military command before January 1935 by the Comintern and its proxies due to his opposition to the “left-deviationist” policy line. See Garver, “The Origins of the Second United Front”; and Salisbury, New Emperor, 84