MICHAEL SHENG* The Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949 The pivotal component of the "lost chance"interpretation is the belief that Mao and his colleagues were Chinese nationalists whose nationalism came into conflict with Stalin's desire to enhance Soviet security at the expense of Chinese interests.Thus,to counterbalance the Soviet menace,the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)sent friendly overtures to the Americans,only to be rebuffed by those in Washington who pursued a single-minded pro-Guomindang (GMD)policy.Consequently,the CCP was forced to join hands with Moscow,and the United States lost a chance to strike a favorable balance in postwar Asia against the Soviet Union;the tragedies in Korea and Vietnam followed.1 I have demonstrated elsewhere that the CCP's friendly overtures toward the United States were never indications of a genuine desire to form an alliance with Washington against Moscow;instead,they were designed to make use of the American factor to defeat the GMD,or to mislead the Americans in order to delay or prevent possible U.S.intervention on behalf of the GMD.Therefore,the CCP not only carefully concealed its intimate relations with Moscow but also spread misinformation to suggest the CCP- Moscow disharmony.There was never a chance for the United States to win over the CCP as a potential ally against Moscow;it was only a myth.2 This essay intends to show that it was not Chinese nationalism,but "proletarian internationalism,"that shaped the CCP's relations with Mos- cow."Internationalism"was not a rhetorical"empty word,"as Mao put it;it The author wishes to thank the Faculty Research Fund of Southwest Missouri State Univer- sity for funding his research trip to Beijing in the summer of 1993. 1.For examples,see Joseph W.Esherick,ed..Lost Chance in China:The World War II Despatches of bhn Service (New York,1974):Barbara W Tuchman,"If Mao Had Come to Washington:An Essay in Alternatives,"Foreign Affairs51 (October 1972):44-64;and Donald S.Zagoria,"Containment and China."in Caging the Bear.ed.Charles Gati (Indianapolis. 1974),109-27. 2.See Michael M.Sheng."America's Lost Chance in China?A Reappraisal of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States before 1945,"Australian.burnal of Chinese Affairs 29(January 1993):135-57;idem,"Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States and the Myth of the 'Lost Chance,'1948-1950."Modern Asian Studies 28:3 (July 1994):475-502: and idem."The United States,the Chinese Communist Party.and the Soviet Union,1948- 1950:A Reappraisal,"Pacific Historical Review 63(November 1994):521-36. DIPLOMATIC HIsToRY,Vol.21.No.1 (Winter 1997).1997 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations(SHAFR).Published by Blackwell Publishers,350 Main Street, Malden,MA,02148.USA,and 108 Cowley Road,Oxford,OX4 1JF,UK. 95
M I C H A E L S H E N G * The Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949 The pivotal component of the “lost chance” interpretation is the belief that Mao and his colleagues were Chinese nationalists whose nationalism came into conflict with Stalin’s desire to enhance Soviet security at the expense of Chinese interests. Thus, to counterbalance the Soviet menace, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sent friendly overtures to the Americans, only to be rebuffed by those in Washington who pursued a single-minded pro-Guomindang (GMD) policy. Consequently, the CCP was forced to join hands with Moscow, and the United States lost a chance to strike a favorable balance in postwar Asia against the Soviet Union; the tragedies in Korea and Vietnam followed.1 I have demonstrated elsewhere that the CCP’s friendly overtures toward the United States were never indications of a genuine desire to form an alliance with Washington against Moscow; instead, they were designed to make use of the American factor to defeat the GMD, or to mislead the Americans in order to delay or prevent possible U.S. intervention on behalf of the GMD. Therefore, the CCP not only carefully concealed its intimate relations with Moscow but also spread misinformation to suggest the CCPMoscow disharmony. There was never a chance for the United States to win over the CCP as a potential ally against Moscow; it was only a myth.2 This essay intends to show that it was not Chinese nationalism, but “proletarian internationalism,” that shaped the CCP’s relations with Moscow. “Internationalism” was not a rhetorical “empty word,” as Mao put it; it *The author wishes to thank the Faculty Research Fund of Southwest Missouri State University for funding his research trip to Beijing in the summer of 1993. 1. For examples, see Joseph W. Esherick, ed., Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John Service (New York, 1974); Barbara W. Tuchman, “If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives,” Foreign Affairs 51 (October 1972): 44–64; and Donald S. Zagoria, “Containment and China,” in Caging the Bear, ed. Charles Gati (Indianapolis, 1974), 109–27. 2. See Michael M. Sheng, “America’s Lost Chance in China? A Reappraisal of Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States before 1945,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 29 (January 1993): 135–57; idem, “Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States and the Myth of the ‘Lost Chance,’ 1948–1950,” Modern Asian Studies 28:3 (July 1994): 475–502; and idem, “The United States, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Soviet Union, 1948– 1950: A Reappraisal,” Pacific Historical Review 63 (November 1994): 521–36. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter 1997). q 1997 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK. 95
96:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY actually reflected the intellectual-psychological,political-institutional,and military-strategic ties between the CCP and Moscow in the pre-1949 years.Thus,the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 was not a momentary alignment based on the calculation of self-interest of the two nations.It was a continuation of the CCP-Moscow alliance that had existed secretly since the birth of the CCP in 1921. It is arguable that Mao and his colleagues started out as ardent Chinese nationalists early in the century.Once converted to Marxism-Leninism and a part of the Comintern,however,they distinguished themselves from other Chinese patriots and acquired a unique political identity.The core of the CCP's ideology was the theory of class struggle.As Stuart R.Schram points out,Mao was deeply intrigued by The Communist Manifesto,from which the essential message for him was "Jieji douzheng.jieji douzheng.jieji douzheng"(Class struggle,class struggle,and class struggle)!3 CCP leaders believed that people in all nations were divided into different sociopolitical classes and that the nation-state was only a tool of the ruling classes. Thus,they "recognizeld]the existence of only two 'nations,'the 'nation' of the capitalists and the 'nation'of the workers.At present the 'nation'of the workers exists only in the Soviet Union.Everywhere else we have the nation'of the capitalists."4 As a result,Mao and his generation of radicals disliked China as a“nation”ruled by the“state”of landlords and capitalists, "for all that which lay in the past [of Chinal was wrong and evil."In Mao's mind,China as a"nation-state"would deserve love and devotion only after the CCP revolution had succeeded,because "the decadence of the state,the suffering of humanity,and the darkness of society have all reached an extreme."Mao's revolutionary ideology was an antithesis to what the CCP called "bourgeois nationalism,"and he identified Lenin's Russia,not China, as"the number one civilized country in the world."Having refused to join many of his comrades in studying in the West,Mao decided to organize a delegation to go to Russia before Comintern agents came to China to help organize the CCP in 1921.5 It is abundantly clear that Mao and his comrades were attracted to a pro-Soviet position primarily because of their spiritual- ideological conversion,not as a result of their calculation of self-interest and material gain or loss.This explains why they remained loyal to the Moscow-led world revolution despite the scarcity of Soviet material aid to them,and the Jiangxi defeat,which is partially attributable to Comintern policy guidance in the 1920s and 1930s.6 3.Stuart R.Schram,ed..Mao's Road to Power:Revolutionary Writings,1912-1920 (New York.1992),xvii. 4.Quoted from Benjamin I.Schwartz.Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao(Cambridge. MA,1968).28 5.Schram.Mao's Road to Power:250.399.505. 6.Some scholars tend to use the scarcity of Soviet aid to the CCP as an explanation for Mao's alleged alienation from Moscow For instance,see John W.Garver,"The Soviet Union and the Xi'an Incident."Australian burnal of Chinese Affairs 26 (July 1991):145-75.For a criticism of this interpretation see Michael Sheng."Mao.Stalin,and the Formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front:1935-1937,"China Quarter/y 129 (March 1992):149-70
96 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y actually reflected the intellectual-psychological, political-institutional, and military-strategic ties between the CCP and Moscow in the pre-1949 years. Thus, the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 was not a momentary alignment based on the calculation of self-interest of the two nations. It was a continuation of the CCP-Moscow alliance that had existed secretly since the birth of the CCP in 1921. It is arguable that Mao and his colleagues started out as ardent Chinese nationalists early in the century. Once converted to Marxism-Leninism and a part of the Comintern, however, they distinguished themselves from other Chinese patriots and acquired a unique political identity. The core of the CCP’s ideology was the theory of class struggle. As Stuart R. Schram points out, Mao was deeply intrigued by The Communist Manifesto, from which the essential message for him was “Jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng” (Class struggle, class struggle, and class struggle)!3 CCP leaders believed that people in all nations were divided into different sociopolitical classes and that the nation-state was only a tool of the ruling classes. Thus, they “recognize[d] the existence of only two ‘nations,’ the ‘nation’ of the capitalists and the ‘nation’ of the workers. At present the ‘nation’ of the workers exists only in the Soviet Union. Everywhere else we have the ‘nation’ of the capitalists.”4 As a result, Mao and his generation of radicals disliked China as a “nation” ruled by the “state” of landlords and capitalists, “for all that which lay in the past [of China] was wrong and evil.” In Mao’s mind, China as a “nation-state” would deserve love and devotion only after the CCP revolution had succeeded, because “the decadence of the state, the suffering of humanity, and the darkness of society have all reached an extreme.” Mao’s revolutionary ideology was an antithesis to what the CCP called “bourgeois nationalism,” and he identified Lenin’s Russia, not China, as “the number one civilized country in the world.” Having refused to join many of his comrades in studying in the West, Mao decided to organize a delegation to go to Russia before Comintern agents came to China to help organize the CCP in 1921.5 It is abundantly clear that Mao and his comrades were attracted to a pro-Soviet position primarily because of their spiritualideological conversion, not as a result of their calculation of self-interest and material gain or loss. This explains why they remained loyal to the Moscow-led world revolution despite the scarcity of Soviet material aid to them, and the Jiangxi defeat, which is partially attributable to Comintern policy guidance in the 1920s and 1930s.6 3. Stuart R. Schram, ed., Mao’s Road to Power, Revolutionary Writings, 1912–1920 (New York, 1992), xvii. 4. Quoted from Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, MA, 1968), 28. 5. Schram, Mao’s Road to Power, 250, 399, 505. 6. Some scholars tend to use the scarcity of Soviet aid to the CCP as an explanation for Mao’s alleged alienation from Moscow. For instance, see John W. Garver, “The Soviet Union and the Xi’an Incident,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 26 (July 1991): 145–75. For a criticism of this interpretation see Michael Sheng, “Mao, Stalin, and the Formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front: 1935–1937,” China Quarterly 129 (March 1992): 149–70
The Triumph of Internationalism 97 Influenced by the Maoist historiography in the post-Stalin era,many scholars in the West take it for granted that Mao advocated a "correct line' of rural strategy in opposition to Moscow's disastrous city-oriented strategy. and he was thus purged by Moscow's proxies known as the "returned students."It was not until 1935,so goes the conventional belief when the defeated CCP force lost its communication with Moscow,that the majority of CCP leaders supported Mao at the Zunyi conference,and the Mao leadership in the post-1935 era was thus politically and institutionally op- posed to Moscow.7 Recently released CCP materials,however,indicate that Mao was very much a part of the so-called left-deviation in the late 1920s and early 1930s,and Mao's rise to power in 1935 was a result of Moscow's promotion. For instance,when the so-called Li Lishan left-deviationist line was at its peak in the latter half of 1930,Mao led the 1st Army Corps to attack major cities,such as Ji'an,Nanchang,and Changsha.After the CCP had suffered a serious setback due to Li's ruthless policy.Moscow quickly removed Li as party chief in September.Because of the communication failure,however, Moscow's message did not reach Mao,and he thus continued to carry on Li's"adventurist"policy even after Moscow had condemned Li.At the end of 1930,Mao was still advocating a "final battle of class warfare"at home and abroad.Consequently,Mao was criticized at a CCP Center's meeting on 17 April 1931,where he admitted his "Li Lishan error."Nonetheless, Mao was not punished for following Li's policy,which was after all influ- enced by the Comintern radicalism of the "third period."Instead,Mao was promoted by Moscow as an alternate member of the Politburo.8 Mao's so-called demotion by the Comintern in the Jiangxi period was in fact a "sick leave"of Mao's own request in the fall of 1932,due to his disagreement with his comrades in the Jiangxi Central Bureau over a tactical matter.When Mao was having difficulties with his comrades at home,the Comintern intervened on his behalf,directing the CCP in March 1933 that the way in which Mao was treated"must be gentle and comrade-like,and Mao should be allowed to undertake a leading position."As a result,Mao's position was upgraded from an alternate to a full member of the Politburo in January 1934.9 Throughout 1934-35,Moscow consistently promoted Mao's reputation,which laid the foundation for his rise to power in 1935.Mao returned Moscow's favor with gratitude and enthusiasm.He made restoring 7.For examples,see John W Garver,"The Origins of the Second United Front:The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party"China Quarterly 113 (March 1988):29-59:and Harrison E.Salisbury.New Emperors,China in the Era of Mao and Deng (Boston,1992).84. 8.Mao Zedong nianpu [Chronology of Maol.ed.Document Research Office of the CCP Center(Beijing,1993),1:311-27,339-40. 9.Ibid.,377-91,398.420.Influenced by the myth of Mao's own making.it has been taken for granted in the West that Mao was removed from military command before January 1935 by the Comintern and its proxies due to his opposition to the "left-deviationist"policy line.See Garver."The Origins of the Second United Front";and Salisbury.New Emperor:84
The Triumph of Internationalism : 97 Influenced by the Maoist historiography in the post-Stalin era, many scholars in the West take it for granted that Mao advocated a “correct line” of rural strategy in opposition to Moscow’s disastrous city-oriented strategy, and he was thus purged by Moscow’s proxies known as the “returned students.” It was not until 1935, so goes the conventional belief, when the defeated CCP force lost its communication with Moscow, that the majority of CCP leaders supported Mao at the Zunyi conference, and the Mao leadership in the post-1935 era was thus politically and institutionally opposed to Moscow.7 Recently released CCP materials, however, indicate that Mao was very much a part of the so-called left-deviation in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and Mao’s rise to power in 1935 was a result of Moscow’s promotion. For instance, when the so-called Li Lishan left-deviationist line was at its peak in the latter half of 1930, Mao led the 1st Army Corps to attack major cities, such as Ji’an, Nanchang, and Changsha. After the CCP had suffered a serious setback due to Li’s ruthless policy, Moscow quickly removed Li as party chief in September. Because of the communication failure, however, Moscow’s message did not reach Mao, and he thus continued to carry on Li’s “adventurist” policy even after Moscow had condemned Li. At the end of 1930, Mao was still advocating a “final battle of class warfare” at home and abroad. Consequently, Mao was criticized at a CCP Center’s meeting on 17 April 1931, where he admitted his “Li Lishan error.” Nonetheless, Mao was not punished for following Li’s policy, which was after all influenced by the Comintern radicalism of the “third period.” Instead, Mao was promoted by Moscow as an alternate member of the Politburo.8 Mao’s so-called demotion by the Comintern in the Jiangxi period was in fact a “sick leave” of Mao’s own request in the fall of 1932, due to his disagreement with his comrades in the Jiangxi Central Bureau over a tactical matter. When Mao was having difficulties with his comrades at home, the Comintern intervened on his behalf, directing the CCP in March 1933 that the way in which Mao was treated “must be gentle and comrade-like, and Mao should be allowed to undertake a leading position.” As a result, Mao’s position was upgraded from an alternate to a full member of the Politburo in January 1934.9 Throughout 1934–35, Moscow consistently promoted Mao’s reputation, which laid the foundation for his rise to power in 1935. Mao returned Moscow’s favor with gratitude and enthusiasm. He made restoring 7. For examples, see John W. Garver, “The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party,” China Quarterly 113 (March 1988): 29–59; and Harrison E. Salisbury, New Emperors, China in the Era of Mao and Deng (Boston, 1992), 84. 8. Mao Zedong nianpu [Chronology of Mao], ed. Document Research Office of the CCP Center (Beijing, 1993), 1:311–27, 339–40. 9. Ibid., 377–91, 398, 420. Influenced by the myth of Mao’s own making, it has been taken for granted in the West that Mao was removed from military command before January 1935 by the Comintern and its proxies due to his opposition to the “left-deviationist” policy line. See Garver, “The Origins of the Second United Front”; and Salisbury, New Emperor, 84
98:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY radio communications between the CCP and Moscow a strategic priority and succeeded in the summer of 1936.Thereafter,Mao reported to Moscow every week on every important policy issue,and Moscow's directives were always closely heeded by Mao as well during the entire period of the Sino- Japanese war.10 Consequently,Stalin played an essential role in the CCP's policymaking process,and behind every major turn and twist in CCP policy a message from Moscow could be found.Mao's internationalistic outlook was evident when he stated at a party meeting in 1935 that "We are not an independent communist party,we are a branch of the Comintern,while our Chinese revolution is a part of the world revolution."1 "Ideology"alone.however,cannot explain why Mao's loyalty to Moscow sustained for decades before 1949,since one's "idea"would change in the real course of life journey.The Chinese Communists needed to feel worth- while to identify themselves as a part of the Moscow-led world revolution on a continuous basis.Nonetheless,the CCP's sense of being gratified cannot be measured by the quantity of Soviet material aid,just like chil- dren's affection for their parents cannot be determined by how many toys they get.Moscow's aid to the CCP came in three categories:psychological support,political guidance,and military assistance. Once the Chinese Communists committed themselves to their revolu- tion,they were against the whole world surrounding them.To sustain their hard-won struggle,they needed to know that they belonged to an interna- tional common cause and Moscow was on their side and ready to help them. Mao was fully aware of the crucial value of Moscow's psychological support to the CCP's morale.For instance,Mao made a speech at a rally on 30 November 1935,after the remaining CCP troops won a small battle in Shaanbei against the GMD local force.Mao claimed that the CCP's recent victory at home assisted "brothers"in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Mongolia (PRM).12 More than merely words of comfort,Mao's rhetoric actually conveyed his excitement over the receipt of Stalin's recent message.After the Jiangxi defeat,the CCP leadership was divided over where to locate their new base. Zhang Guotao wanted to go to western Sichuan,while Mao insisted on going to the Soviet-influenced northwest,close to either Xingjiang or Mon- golia.He reasoned that only with Soviet assistance could the CCP have a 10.For a more detailed discussion see Sheng."Mao.Stalin,"150-58;and idem,"Maoist Dualism and Chinese Communist Foreign Relations,1935-1949"(Ph.D.diss..York Univer- sity1991),21-196. 11.Huang Qijun,"The Process of Restoring Electronic Communication between the Party and the Comintern in 1935-36,"Dangshi Yanjiu 2 (1987):23.See also Sheng."Mao. Stalin,"159. 12.Mao Zedong wenji [The collection of Mao's writings](Beijing.1993).1:363-71.While the Chinese government of the time was resentful of Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia and refused to accept its independence.Mao had good reasons,as we will see,to feel blessed that Soviet control over Outer Mongolia was strengthened in the 1930s
98 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y radio communications between the CCP and Moscow a strategic priority and succeeded in the summer of 1936. Thereafter, Mao reported to Moscow every week on every important policy issue, and Moscow’s directives were always closely heeded by Mao as well during the entire period of the SinoJapanese war.10 Consequently, Stalin played an essential role in the CCP’s policymaking process, and behind every major turn and twist in CCP policy a message from Moscow could be found. Mao’s internationalistic outlook was evident when he stated at a party meeting in 1935 that “We are not an independent communist party, we are a branch of the Comintern, while our Chinese revolution is a part of the world revolution.”11 “Ideology” alone, however, cannot explain why Mao’s loyalty to Moscow sustained for decades before 1949, since one’s “idea” would change in the real course of life journey. The Chinese Communists needed to feel worthwhile to identify themselves as a part of the Moscow-led world revolution on a continuous basis. Nonetheless, the CCP’s sense of being gratified cannot be measured by the quantity of Soviet material aid, just like children’s affection for their parents cannot be determined by how many toys they get. Moscow’s aid to the CCP came in three categories: psychological support, political guidance, and military assistance. Once the Chinese Communists committed themselves to their revolution, they were against the whole world surrounding them. To sustain their hard-won struggle, they needed to know that they belonged to an international common cause and Moscow was on their side and ready to help them. Mao was fully aware of the crucial value of Moscow’s psychological support to the CCP’s morale. For instance, Mao made a speech at a rally on 30 November 1935, after the remaining CCP troops won a small battle in Shaanbei against the GMD local force. Mao claimed that the CCP’s recent victory at home assisted “brothers” in the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of Mongolia (PRM).12 More than merely words of comfort, Mao’s rhetoric actually conveyed his excitement over the receipt of Stalin’s recent message. After the Jiangxi defeat, the CCP leadership was divided over where to locate their new base. Zhang Guotao wanted to go to western Sichuan, while Mao insisted on going to the Soviet-influenced northwest, close to either Xingjiang or Mongolia. He reasoned that only with Soviet assistance could the CCP have a 10. For a more detailed discussion see Sheng, “Mao, Stalin,” 150–58; and idem, “Maoist Dualism and Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1935–1949” (Ph.D. diss., York University, 1991), 21–196. 11. Huang Qijun, “The Process of Restoring Electronic Communication between the Party and the Comintern in 1935–36,” Dangshi Yanjiu 2 (1987): 23. See also Sheng, “Mao, Stalin,” 159. 12. Mao Zedong wenji [The collection of Mao’s writings] (Beijing, 1993), 1:363–71. While the Chinese government of the time was resentful of Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia and refused to accept its independence, Mao had good reasons, as we will see, to feel blessed that Soviet control over Outer Mongolia was strengthened in the 1930s
The Triumph of Internationalism 99 future.Stalin endorsed Mao's choice and sent back Zhang Hao,who reached Mao's headquarters a few days before his speech.From then until the end of 1936,the CCP's priority was to realize the Stalin-approved strategy to create a new base in the northwest.Mao requested extensive military aid from the Soviets,including heavy artillery and airplanes.Mos- cow promised that Soviet military aid would be delivered from Mongolia after the CCP seized northern Ningxia.However,Mao's Ningxia campaign was defeated.Mao then sent out the Western Expedition Army to go to Xingjiang.since Moscow promised to deliver aid from there.The WEA was again defeated. The CCP was unable to reach far enough to get the Soviet aid;nonethe- less,the promise of massive aid turned out to be the most crucial "political capital"for the CCP to win over the GMD local forces under Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng.Zhang and Yang would not have allied them- selves secretly with the CCP had the CCP had no link with Moscow.The contemporaries all remembered that it was the CCP-GMD first united front with Moscow's blessing in the 1920s that laid the foundation for Jiang's military power in Guangdong.Why could not the Guangdong experience be repeated in the northwest with a Moscow-sponsored CCP-Zhang-Yang alliance?When the northwest strategy was militarily defeated by Jiang. Zhang and Yang kidnapped Jiang in December 1936,which served as a turning point for the establishment of the second CCP-GMD united front, and the CCP survived and grew in the following decade.The psychology of Soviet support not only sustained the CCP's morale,it also provided the Party invaluable political assets to strike a deal with other Chinese political and military forces at home.Without its Communist identity and Moscow connection,the CCP would have been reduced to the level of one more “warlord'”among many in China.ls Although massive Soviet military aid to the CCP did not come until the end of 1945,when the Red Army occupied Manchuria,Mao had sufficient reason to believe that Stalin was willing and prepared to aid the CCP,and that the Party could seek refuge under the Soviet umbrella whenever necessary. For instance,after the eruption of the German-Soviet war,Stalin suggested that in case of a Soviet-Japanese war,the CCP move to Outer Mongolia to receive Soviet military equipment and to engage the Japanese in southern Manchuria.The CCP leadership responded to Moscow's suggestion with enthusiasm.Zhou Enlai telegraphed Mao on 26 June 1941 that when the USSR was to be attacked by both Germany and Japan,the GMD would likely mount its pressure on the CCP.The Party,therefore,needed to be prepared to retreat into the USSR or the PRM.In order to prepare for this scenario,he suggested that the rank and file should start learning natural 13.The last two paragraphs are based on Mao's telegraphs and writings in 1935-36,Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Collection of Mao's military writings](Beijing.1993).1:398-655.See also Sheng."Mao,Stalin
The Triumph of Internationalism : 99 future. Stalin endorsed Mao’s choice and sent back Zhang Hao, who reached Mao’s headquarters a few days before his speech. From then until the end of 1936, the CCP’s priority was to realize the Stalin-approved strategy to create a new base in the northwest. Mao requested extensive military aid from the Soviets, including heavy artillery and airplanes. Moscow promised that Soviet military aid would be delivered from Mongolia after the CCP seized northern Ningxia. However, Mao’s Ningxia campaign was defeated. Mao then sent out the Western Expedition Army to go to Xingjiang, since Moscow promised to deliver aid from there. The WEA was again defeated. The CCP was unable to reach far enough to get the Soviet aid; nonetheless, the promise of massive aid turned out to be the most crucial “political capital” for the CCP to win over the GMD local forces under Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Zhang and Yang would not have allied themselves secretly with the CCP had the CCP had no link with Moscow. The contemporaries all remembered that it was the CCP-GMD first united front with Moscow’s blessing in the 1920s that laid the foundation for Jiang’s military power in Guangdong. Why could not the Guangdong experience be repeated in the northwest with a Moscow-sponsored CCP-Zhang-Yang alliance? When the northwest strategy was militarily defeated by Jiang, Zhang and Yang kidnapped Jiang in December 1936, which served as a turning point for the establishment of the second CCP-GMD united front, and the CCP survived and grew in the following decade. The psychology of Soviet support not only sustained the CCP’s morale, it also provided the Party invaluable political assets to strike a deal with other Chinese political and military forces at home. Without its Communist identity and Moscow connection, the CCP would have been reduced to the level of one more “warlord” among many in China.13 Although massive Soviet military aid to the CCP did not come until the end of 1945, when the Red Army occupied Manchuria, Mao had sufficient reason to believe thatStalin was willing and prepared to aid the CCP, and that the Party could seek refuge under the Soviet umbrella whenever necessary. For instance, after the eruption of the German-Soviet war, Stalin suggested that in case of a Soviet-Japanese war, the CCP move to Outer Mongolia to receive Soviet military equipment and to engage the Japanese in southern Manchuria. The CCP leadership responded to Moscow’s suggestion with enthusiasm. Zhou Enlai telegraphed Mao on 26 June 1941 that when the USSR was to be attacked by both Germany and Japan, the GMD would likely mount its pressure on the CCP. The Party, therefore, needed to be prepared to retreat into the USSR or the PRM. In order to prepare for this scenario, he suggested that the rank and file should start learning natural 13. The last two paragraphs are based on Mao’s telegraphs and writings in 1935–36, Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Collection of Mao’s military writings] (Beijing, 1993), 1:398–655. See also Sheng, “Mao, Stalin
100:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY science,the Russian language,and modern military technology.Mao fully endorsed Zhou's proposal,adding that the cadres of Manchurian origin be called upon to receive special training.14 Although such a Japanese attack on the USSR never took place,it was clear and comforting to Mao that Stalin was prepared to arm the CCP and to provide the CCP refuge if necessary. Mao was speaking the truth at a Party Center meeting in 1945 that it was not that the Soviet Union did not want to assist the CCP,it was that circum- stances had prevented Soviet aid from reaching the CCP.When the time came,Mao declared,Soviet military aid would arrive.He was right.After the Red Army occupied Manchuria,Stalin turned over the arsenal of the Japanese Guandong Army to the CCP and assisted it in taking over the entire region,from where the CCP was to sweep the whole mainland.15 Contrary to the conventional wisdom that Moscow's advice to the CCP was often disastrous in consequence and that Mao's resistance against Stalin's will saved the CCP,new documents suggest that Mao was often too radical to be tactful and that Stalin's cautious and tactful advice pre- vented Mao's ruthlessness from ruining the Party.Mao and his colleagues actually followed Stalin's political and military guidance throughout the pre-1949 era.For instance,when Mao and the whole CCP leadership were in a militant anti-GMD mood in 1935-36,it was Moscow's frequent in- structions that led the CCP to abandon the civil war approach and em- brace the united front policy.16 In the fall of 1940.Mao sensed that the CCP-GMD coalition had been doomed,and a civil war was inevitable.He thus planned a massive military attack on the GMD,and he also drafted an "explosive declaration"(zhadan xuanyan)to announce what he called "national-revolutionary war"against both the Japanese and the GMD and the final split with Jiang.When it was reported to Moscow,however, Stalin intervened to stop Mao's dangerous move,and Mao called off his planning accordingly.When the "New Fourth Army Incident"took place early in 1941,Mao again jumped the gun and planned for a final split with the GMD.It was again left to Moscow to persuade the CCP that the best course was to maintain the united front with the GMD.Mao backed down again.17 Immediately after Japan's surrender in August 1945,Mao planned for an all-out civil war against the GMD and ordered the seizure of Shang- hai,Wuhan,Tianjin,etc.,while rejecting Jiang's invitation for peace nego- 14.Zhou Enlai nianpu [Chronology of Zhoul (Beijing.1989).509.Some scholars tend to believe that Stalin intended to sacrifice the CCP's armed force for the sake of Soviet interest, and Mao resisted Stalin's attempt.See John W Garver,Chinese-Soviet Relations,1937-1945:The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New York,1988),57-68. 15.A great number of new documents indicate that Soviet military aid to the CCP in Manchuria was massive,that CCP-USSR cooperation in Manchuria in 1945-46 was extensive, and that Mao's strategic planning was made and changed according to Soviet advice.A detailed discussion on this topic will be presented elsewhere. 16.For a detailed discussion see Sheng."Mao.Stalin." 17.For a detailed description of the process see Sheng."Maoist Dualism,"110-14
100 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y science, the Russian language, and modern military technology. Mao fully endorsed Zhou’s proposal, adding that the cadres of Manchurian origin be called upon to receive special training.14 Although such a Japanese attack on the USSR never took place, it was clear and comforting to Mao that Stalin was prepared to arm the CCP and to provide the CCP refuge if necessary. Mao was speaking the truth at a Party Center meeting in 1945 that it was not that the Soviet Union did not want to assist the CCP, it was that circumstances had prevented Soviet aid from reaching the CCP. When the time came, Mao declared, Soviet military aid would arrive. He was right. After the Red Army occupied Manchuria, Stalin turned over the arsenal of the Japanese Guandong Army to the CCP and assisted it in taking over the entire region, from where the CCP was to sweep the whole mainland.15 Contrary to the conventional wisdom that Moscow’s advice to the CCP was often disastrous in consequence and that Mao’s resistance against Stalin’s will saved the CCP, new documents suggest that Mao was often too radical to be tactful and that Stalin’s cautious and tactful advice prevented Mao’s ruthlessness from ruining the Party. Mao and his colleagues actually followed Stalin’s political and military guidance throughout the pre-1949 era. For instance, when Mao and the whole CCP leadership were in a militant anti-GMD mood in 1935–36, it was Moscow’s frequent instructions that led the CCP to abandon the civil war approach and embrace the united front policy.16 In the fall of 1940, Mao sensed that the CCP-GMD coalition had been doomed, and a civil war was inevitable. He thus planned a massive military attack on the GMD, and he also drafted an “explosive declaration” (zhadan xuanyan) to announce what he called “national-revolutionary war” against both the Japanese and the GMD and the final split with Jiang. When it was reported to Moscow, however, Stalin intervened to stop Mao’s dangerous move, and Mao called off his planning accordingly. When the “New Fourth Army Incident” took place early in 1941, Mao again jumped the gun and planned for a final split with the GMD. It was again left to Moscow to persuade the CCP that the best course was to maintain the united front with the GMD. Mao backed down again.17 Immediately after Japan’s surrender in August 1945, Mao planned for an all-out civil war against the GMD and ordered the seizure of Shanghai, Wuhan, Tianjin, etc., while rejecting Jiang’s invitation for peace nego- 14. Zhou Enlai nianpu [Chronology of Zhou] (Beijing, 1989), 509. Some scholars tend to believe that Stalin intended to sacrifice the CCP’s armed force for the sake of Soviet interest, and Mao resisted Stalin’s attempt. See John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New York, 1988), 57–68. 15. A great number of new documents indicate that Soviet military aid to the CCP in Manchuria was massive, that CCP-USSR cooperation in Manchuria in 1945–46 was extensive, and that Mao’s strategic planning was made and changed according to Soviet advice. A detailed discussion on this topic will be presented elsewhere. 16. For a detailed discussion see Sheng, “Mao, Stalin.” 17. For a detailed description of the process see Sheng, “Maoist Dualism,” 110–14
The Triumph of Internationalism 101 tiations.Only when Stalin fired two telegrams to Mao on 20 and 21 August 1945 was Mao persuaded to abandon the civil war planning and go to Chongquing to negotiate peace.Had Mao's recklessness prevailed,a CCP political and military setback would have been unavoidable.18 Normally,however,Stalin's advice did not come in the fashion of overrul- ing Mao's policy;instead,Mao would make policy proposals and send them to Moscow for consultation,while Stalin's advice tended to be general in nature,leaving Mao enough leeway to make detailed final decisions.The Mao-Stalin consultation and coordination were by and large constructive and harmonious.For instance,just before Stalin walked into the conference hall in Yalta to shake hands with Roosevelt and Churchill,he informed Mao of the upcoming summit and promised to send Mao the results of it later on.Stalin also let Mao know that the Red Army would come back to the Asian region in the near future.Immediately upon receiving Stalin's message,Mao in- structed Zhou Enlai,who was negotiating with the GMD under Patrick Hurley's mediation,to break down the talks in Chongqing and watch out for the next move of the Mei-Jiang (the U.S.and the GMD)alliance.19 When the CCP military started to take over the whole nation in 1948,Mao became eager to see Stalin in person to discuss issues relating to the soon-to-be Beijing government,and he cabled Stalin several times to arrange for such a visit. Although Mao's wish to visit Moscow did not come true until the end of 1949, Stalin sent I.V.Kovalev to China as his personal liaison,and he also sent Anastas Mikoyan to China early in 1949 to confer with Mao.Now we know that many important events of the time,such as the "Ward Case,"resulted from CCP-Moscow consultation and coordination.20 The frequency and substance of the Mao-Stalin secret policy consulta- tion in the pre-1950 period are vividly illustrated by seven telegrams of the two men in 10-17 January 1949.Immediately after receiving the Chinese government's request for international mediation in the Chinese civil war, Stalin sent Mao a telegram on 10 January.He told Mao that the GMD peace move "was inspired by the Americans,"and then he gave Mao the full content of the Soviet government response to the GMD request,asking Mao to offer "a more expedient answer"in case that Mao disagreed with it. The essence of Stalin's proposed response to the GMD was that the CCP must be informed of,and agreeable to,the conditions of peace negotiations 18.At the time.as Stalin pointed out,the CCP could not politically afford to take the blame for initiating a civil war:and militarily.the CCP was still much weaker than its enemy.A willful Mao in the post-Stalin era,however,disregarded the facts and contended that Stalin was so conservative in 1945 that he prevented the CCP from making revolution.Mao's conten- tion has been taken for granted by many scholars in the West.For more discussion 19.See Mao tel.to Zhou Enlai,3 February 1945,Zhonggong zhongyang kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian [Selected documents of the party center on the anti-Japanese united front](Beijing.1985).3:790.See also Sheng."The United States,"528. 20.See Bo Yibo,Ruogang zhongda jueze yu shijian de huigu [Recollection of several important policies and events](Beijing.1991).36-37.See also Sheng."The United States,"528-31
The Triumph of Internationalism : 101 tiations. Only when Stalin fired two telegrams to Mao on 20 and 21 August 1945 was Mao persuaded to abandon the civil war planning and go to Chongquing to negotiate peace. Had Mao’s recklessness prevailed, a CCP political and military setback would have been unavoidable.18 Normally, however, Stalin’s advice did not come in the fashion of overruling Mao’s policy; instead, Mao would make policy proposals and send them to Moscow for consultation, while Stalin’s advice tended to be general in nature, leaving Mao enough leeway to make detailed final decisions. The Mao-Stalin consultation and coordination were by and large constructive and harmonious. For instance, just before Stalin walked into the conference hall in Yalta to shake hands with Roosevelt and Churchill, he informedMao of the upcoming summit and promised to send Mao the results of it later on. Stalin also letMao know that the Red Army would come back to theAsian region in the near future. Immediately upon receiving Stalin’s message, Mao instructed Zhou Enlai, who was negotiating with the GMD under Patrick Hurley’s mediation, to break down the talks in Chongqing and watch out for the next move of the Mei-Jiang (the U.S. and the GMD) alliance.19 When the CCP military started to take over the whole nation in1948, Mao became eager to see Stalin in person to discuss issues relating to the soon-to-be Beijing government, and he cabled Stalin several times to arrange for such a visit. Although Mao’s wish to visit Moscow did not come true until the end of 1949, Stalin sent I. V. Kovalev to China as his personal liaison, and he also sent Anastas Mikoyan to China early in 1949 to confer with Mao. Now we know that many important events of the time, such as the “Ward Case,” resulted from CCP-Moscow consultation and coordination.20 The frequency and substance of the Mao-Stalin secret policy consultation in the pre-1950 period are vividly illustrated by seven telegrams of the two men in 10–17 January 1949. Immediately after receiving the Chinese government’s request for international mediation in the Chinese civil war, Stalin sent Mao a telegram on 10 January. He told Mao that the GMD peace move “was inspired by the Americans,” and then he gave Mao the full content of the Soviet government response to the GMD request, asking Mao to offer “a more expedient answer” in case that Mao disagreed with it. The essence of Stalin’s proposed response to the GMD was that the CCP must be informed of, and agreeable to, the conditions of peace negotiations 18. At the time, as Stalin pointed out, the CCP could not politically afford to take the blame for initiating a civil war; and militarily, the CCP was still much weaker than its enemy. A willful Mao in the post-Stalin era, however, disregarded the facts and contended that Stalin was so conservative in 1945 that he prevented the CCP from making revolution. Mao’s contention has been taken for granted by many scholars in the West. For more discussion 19. See Mao tel. to Zhou Enlai, 3 February 1945, Zhonggong zhongyang kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian [Selected documents of the party center on the anti-Japanese united front] (Beijing, 1985), 3:790. See also Sheng, “The United States,” 528. 20. See Bo Yibo, Ruogang zhongda jueze yu shijian de huigu [Recollection of several important policies and events] (Beijing, 1991), 36–37. See also Sheng, “The United States,” 528–31
102:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY before the Soviet government would offer its "good office."Then,Stalin advised Mao what to say when he was approached by the GMD.Stalin told Mao that the CCP's precondition for negotiations was the exclusion of the GMD "war criminals who provoked the civil war,"and that the CCP was "in favor of direct negotiations with the GMD without any foreign media- tors."especially"those foreign powers which have played a role in the civil war against the Chinese People's Liberation Army with their armed forces and navy."Stalin was obviously pointing his finger at the United States and Great Britain.To make his position unequivocal,Stalin followed up with another telegram the next day,telling Mao that his policy proposal was "designed to undermine the peace negotiations,"because the GMD"would not agree to hold peace negotiations without the mediation of foreign coun- tries,especially the United States.""Consequently,"Stalin concluded,"the peace overtures from the GMD and the U.S.would be in vain,and you would be able to continue your victorious war of liberation."21 Mao,however,appeared to be unwilling to negotiate with the GMD at all.In his telegram to Stalin on 12 January 1950.Mao was not the least bit hesitant about giving Stalin his version of what the Soviet response to the GMD ought to be.In essence,he wanted Stalin to reject the GMD request for mediation outright.Mao even told Stalin that if the Soviet Union agreed to mediate in principle,despite the impossible preconditions attached,"it would convince the United States,Britain,and France that it is appropriate for them to participate in the mediation while at the same time providing the GMD with a pretext to accuse us of being warmongers."In conclusion, Mao told Comrade Stalin that "the balance of class power in China has already experienced a fundamental change.We do not need to take a politi- cally evasive action again." In response,Stalin sent Mao a telegram on 14 January,arguing that an outright rejection meant that "you put your trump card on the table and give away an important weapon-the banner of peace-to the GMD,"and that also would give the United States an excuse for armed intervention against the CCP.Despite a slight sense of being annoyed,the basic tone of Stalin's message was more persuasive than controversial and argumentative. He altered his proposed response of the CCP to the GMD to include Mao's idea that foreign mediation was not needed,and he offered Mao detailed advice on what the CCP should do if the GMD either rejected or accepted the CCP terms.He even went out of his way to reassure Mao that his policy proposal was "a piece of advice only,which should not bind you to any- thing,"and that his response to the GMD "will be in accordance with your Mao's]opinion."Mao responded to Stalin's telegram on the same day, stating that he "completely agreeld]with"Stalin.He also informed Stalin 21.This and the following two paragraphs are based on seven telegrams between Mao and Stalin,available in Chinese Historians 7(Spring-Fall 1994):163-72
102 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y before the Soviet government would offer its “good office.” Then, Stalin advised Mao what to say when he was approached by the GMD. Stalin told Mao that the CCP’s precondition for negotiations was the exclusion of the GMD “war criminals who provoked the civil war,” and that the CCP was “in favor of direct negotiations with the GMD without any foreign mediators,” especially “those foreign powers which have played a role in the civil war against the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with their armed forces and navy.” Stalin was obviously pointing his finger at the United States and Great Britain. To make his position unequivocal, Stalin followed up with another telegram the next day, telling Mao that his policy proposal was “designed to undermine the peace negotiations,” because the GMD “would not agree to hold peace negotiations without the mediation of foreign countries, especially the United States.” “Consequently,” Stalin concluded, “the peace overtures from the GMD and the U.S. would be in vain, and you would be able to continue your victorious war of liberation.”21 Mao, however, appeared to be unwilling to negotiate with the GMD at all. In his telegram to Stalin on 12 January 1950, Mao was not the least bit hesitant about giving Stalin his version of what the Soviet response to the GMD ought to be. In essence, he wanted Stalin to reject the GMD request for mediation outright. Mao even told Stalin that if the Soviet Union agreed to mediate in principle, despite the impossible preconditions attached, “it would convince the United States, Britain, and France that it is appropriate for them to participate in the mediation while at the same time providing the GMD with a pretext to accuse us of being warmongers.” In conclusion, Mao told Comrade Stalin that “the balance of class power in China has already experienced a fundamental change. We do not need to take a politically evasive action again.” In response, Stalin sent Mao a telegram on 14 January, arguing that an outright rejection meant that “you put your trump card on the table and give away an important weapon – the banner of peace – to the GMD,” and that also would give the United States an excuse for armed intervention against the CCP. Despite a slight sense of being annoyed, the basic tone of Stalin’s message was more persuasive than controversial and argumentative. He altered his proposed response of the CCP to the GMD to include Mao’s idea that foreign mediation was not needed, and he offered Mao detailed advice on what the CCP should do if the GMD either rejected or accepted the CCP terms. He even went out of his way to reassure Mao that his policy proposal was “a piece of advice only, which should not bind you to anything,” and that his response to the GMD “will be in accordance with your [Mao’s] opinion.” Mao responded to Stalin’s telegram on the same day, stating that he “completely agree[d] with” Stalin. He also informed Stalin 21. This and the following two paragraphs are based on seven telegrams between Mao and Stalin, available in Chinese Historians 7 (Spring–Fall 1994): 163–72
The Triumph of Internationalism 103 that he had just announced eight conditions for negotiations with the GMD. the first of which was Stalin's invention:the punishment and exclusion of the "war criminals."The next day,Stalin sent Mao a brief message,stating that the CCP "has already started its 'peace'campaign.The issue should now be considered resolved."The type of equal partnership reflected in these Mao-Stalin communications would certainly strengthen the CCP- Moscow links. Due to such strong and extensive links between the CCP and Moscow,it is understandable that Mao and his colleagues identified the Soviet interest with the Party's interest,which,from the CCP perspective,was also identi- cal to the Chinese national interest.Not only did Mao repeatedly state that the Soviet Union represented the interest of Chinese people and the people all around the world he also actually viewed the Chinese interest through a Soviet lens,and acted accordingly.For instance,after the Sino-Japanese war erupted in 1937,a possible alliance between China and the United States or Britain against Japan would be in the nation's best interest.Mao considered it desirable to form such an alliance when Stalin was pursuing collective security with the Western democracies under the banner of an "interna- tional anti-fascist united front."Mao's thinking was totally reversed,how- ever,when Moscow signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Soviet-Japanese agreement.Mao consequently opposed any possible move toward the forma- tion of a Sino-American-British alignment.In the fall of 1940,the general public and the Chinese government were happy to see the growth of Japanese-American tension and the tough U.S.policy toward Japan.Mao, however,was deeply troubled by the"darkest scenario"of a Sino-American alliance,which,in his mind,would crush the CCP and attack the USSR after Japan's defeat.Thus,the CCP opposed U.S.participation in the world conflict and the Chinese government's inclination to form an anti-Japanese alliance with the United States.Mao preferred an "independent"and pro- tracted war against Japan in which the Party could build up its strength. Nonetheless,this was changed again as soon as the German-Soviet war erupted and Moscow again called for an anti-fascist united front in June 1941.2 Since the CCP viewed world politics through a "class-struggle"lens and identified the Chinese(read the CCP)interest with that of the USSR,Mao and his colleagues formed a "two-camp"vision immediately after the war ended.In Mao's mind,the Soviet-American alliance during the war was just like the CCP-GMD united front;therefore,once the old enemy was gone,the conflict between the old allies was inevitable.Thus,the Party leadership unequivocally concluded in the "Directive on the Strategy of Struggle Against the U.S.and Jiang"on 28 November 1945 that "The 22.See Mao tel.to Zhou Enlai,25 October 1940,Wannan shibian:Zhiliao xuanbian [The New Fourth Army Incident:Collection of materials](Beijing.1982),34-36.See also Sheng. "America's Lost Chance."143-46
The Triumph of Internationalism : 103 that he had just announced eight conditions fornegotiations with the GMD, the first of which was Stalin’s invention: the punishment and exclusion of the “war criminals.” The next day, Stalin sent Mao a brief message, stating that the CCP “has already started its ‘peace’ campaign. The issue should now be considered resolved.” The type of equal partnership reflected in these Mao-Stalin communications would certainly strengthen the CCPMoscow links. Due to such strong and extensive links between the CCP and Moscow, it is understandable that Mao and his colleagues identified the Soviet interest with the Party’s interest, which, from the CCP perspective, was also identical to the Chinese national interest. Not only did Mao repeatedly state that the Soviet Union represented the interest of Chinese people and the people all around the world he also actually viewed the Chinese interest through a Soviet lens, and acted accordingly. Forinstance, after the Sino-Japanese war erupted in 1937, a possible alliance between China and the United States or Britain against Japan would be in the nation’s best interest. Mao considered it desirable to form such an alliance when Stalin was pursuing collective security with the Western democracies under the banner of an “international anti-fascist united front.” Mao’s thinking was totally reversed, however, when Moscow signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Soviet-Japanese agreement. Mao consequently opposed any possible move toward the formation of a Sino-American-British alignment. In the fall of 1940, the general public and the Chinese government were happy to see the growth of Japanese-American tension and the tough U.S. policy toward Japan. Mao, however, was deeply troubled by the “darkest scenario” of a Sino-American alliance, which, in his mind, would crush the CCP and attack the USSR after Japan’s defeat. Thus, the CCP opposed U.S. participation in the world conflict and the Chinese government’s inclination to form an anti-Japanese alliance with the United States. Mao preferred an “independent” and protracted war against Japan in which the Party could build up its strength. Nonetheless, this was changed again as soon as the German-Soviet war erupted and Moscow again called for an anti-fascist united front in June 1941.22 Since the CCP viewed world politics through a “class-struggle” lens and identified the Chinese (read the CCP) interest with that of the USSR, Mao and his colleagues formed a “two-camp” vision immediately after the war ended. In Mao’s mind, the Soviet-American alliance during the war was just like the CCP-GMD united front; therefore, once the old enemy was gone, the conflict between the old allies was inevitable. Thus, the Party leadership unequivocally concluded in the “Directive on the Strategy of Struggle Against the U.S. and Jiang” on 28 November 1945 that “The 22. See Mao tel. to Zhou Enlai, 25 October 1940, Wannan shibian: Zhiliao xuanbian [The New Fourth Army Incident: Collection of materials] (Beijing, 1982), 34–36. See also Sheng, “America’s Lost Chance,” 143–46
104:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY central problem in the postwar world is the struggle between the U.S.and the Soviet Union.The reflection of this struggle in China is the struggle between Jiang and the CCP."The directive advised the Party to keep a distance from the USSR "in appearance,"while cooperating with Soviet policy secretly,since"in substance"the CCP's and Moscow's struggles were one and the same.To further confuse the Americans in the last stage of the CCP military campaign in 1949,the CCP sent out disinformation to suggest the Party's good will to the United States,as well as the CCP-Moscow disharmony.Stalin was doing the same:On the one hand,he ordered the Soviet embassy to leave Nanjing and to go to Guangzhou just before the CCP took over the capital.On the other,not only did Stalin send Mikoyan to China and receive a CCP secret mission led by Lui Shaoqi,he also put the Soviet military in the Far East on full combat alert in May 1949,when the CCP fired on the British gunboat Amethyst and a British-American military intervention against the CCP seemed likely.23 Clearly,a military and political alliance had existed between the CCP and the USSR before the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in October 1949.The inti- mate but secret CCP-Moscow relations before 1949 signified the triumph of Leninist internationalism on the part of both Mao and Stalin.America's "lost chance"in China is a myth partially attributable to the CCP-Moscow's secret conduct and disinformation technique. 23.See Shi Zhe,Shi Zhe huiyilu [Shi Zhe memoirs](Beijing.1991).394:and Sergei N. Goncharov,"Interview:Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong."burnal of Northeast Asian Studies4 (1991):47.See also Sheng."The United States,"525-27:and idem."Chinese Communist Policy.”486-92
104 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y central problem in the postwar world is the struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The reflection of this struggle in China is the struggle between Jiang and the CCP.” The directive advised the Party to keep a distance from the USSR “in appearance,” while cooperating with Soviet policy secretly, since “in substance” the CCP’s and Moscow’s struggles were one and the same. To further confuse the Americans in the last stage of the CCP military campaign in 1949, the CCP sent out disinformation to suggest the Party’s good will to the United States, as well as the CCP-Moscow disharmony. Stalin was doing the same: On the one hand, he ordered the Soviet embassy to leave Nanjing and to go to Guangzhou just before the CCP took over the capital. On the other, not only did Stalin send Mikoyan to China and receive a CCP secret mission led by Lui Shaoqi, he also put the Soviet military in the Far East on full combat alert in May 1949, when the CCP fired on the British gunboat Amethyst and a British-American military intervention against the CCP seemed likely.23 Clearly, a military and political alliance had existed between the CCP and the USSR before the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949. The intimate but secret CCP-Moscow relations before 1949 signified the triumph of Leninist internationalism on the part of both Mao and Stalin. America’s “lost chance” in China is a myth partially attributable to the CCP-Moscow’s secret conduct and disinformation technique. 23. See Shi Zhe, Shi Zhe huiyilu [Shi Zhe memoirs] (Beijing, 1991), 394; and Sergei N. Goncharov, “Interview: Stalin’s Dialogue with Mao Zedong,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 4 (1991): 47. See also Sheng, “The United States,” 525–27; and idem, “Chinese Communist Policy,” 486–92