Author Query Sheet Manuscript Information Journal FCWH Acronym Volume and 7-4 issue Author name Zhang Manuscript 262035 No.(if applicable) AUTHOR:The following queries have arisen during the editing of your manuscript.Please answer the queries by making the necessary corrections on the CATS online corrections form.Once you have added all your corrections,please press the SUBMIT button. QUERY NO. QUERY DETAILS 1 the Chinese people...,including peaceful means',but only...unification be possible'-two closing and only one opening quote mark-please check 2 CCP Central Division of Archives and Historical Materials/Central Division of Archives and Historical Materials-are these the same?Assume they are (also see notes) 3 Ministry of Foreign Fairs-should it be Foreign Affairs
Author Query Sheet Manuscript Information Journal Acronym FCWH Volume and issue 7-4 Author name Zhang Manuscript No. (if applicable) 262035 AUTHOR: The following queries have arisen during the editing of your manuscript. Please answer the queries by making the necessary corrections on the CATS online corrections form. Once you have added all your corrections, please press the SUBMIT button. QUERY NO. QUERY DETAILS 1 2 3 ‘the Chinese people …, including peaceful means’, but only … unification be possible’ – two closing and only one opening quote mark – please check CCP Central Division of Archives and Historical Materials/Central Division of Archives and Historical Materials – are these the same? Assume they are (also see notes) Ministry of Foreign Fairs – should it be Foreign Affairs ?
FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 Cold War History Vol.7,No.4,November 2007,pp.509-528 oued 5 Constructing 'Peaceful Coexistence': China's Diplomacy toward the Geneva and Bandung Conferences,1954-55 10 Shu Guang Zhang 15 In the heyday of the Cold War,China remained confrontational toward the United States and other Western powers but at the same time seemed conciliatory toward Asian nations. This was largely reflected in Beijing's diplomacy of peaceful coexistence'and 'united front' at the Geneva and Bandung conferences.Based on recently declassified archives and 20 material in China and probing into the insights of China's foreign policy calculations in the mid-1950s,this article argues that,through actively participating in multilateral diplomacy,the Chinese leaders expected to construct an image of anormal state'and play a leading role in normalizing international politics in Asia. 25 'It is my view,Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)Mao Zedong proclaimed in Moscow on 18 November 1957,'that current situation is characteristic of the east wind prevailing over the west wind,that is,the forces of the socialist [camp] is prevailing over that of the imperialist [world]."Much a metaphysician himself,Mao 30 was using this traditional Chinese proverb to describe his take of the Cold War posture.His 'wind'metaphor entailed a dual implication:on the one hand,the East referring to the positive side in Chinese was overtaking the West,the negative side;on the other hand,the Asian Orientals were taking a lead over all Westerners.Mao's confidence derived partly from China's daring a dual with the mighty America in 35 Korea,Indochina and the Taiwan Strait but more so from Beijing's successful Shu Guang Zhang is distinguished visiting professor at Shanghai International Studies University and professor of international history at the University of Maryland.He is author of Deterrence and Strategic Culture:Chinese- 40 American Confrontations,1949-58,Mao's Military Romanticism:China and the Korean War,1950-53,and Economic Cold War:America's Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance,1949-1963.He also co-edited Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia.Correspondence to:Shu Guang Zhang,Shanghai International Studies University,Administrative Building,Room 603,550 Dalian Road (West),Shanghai,China 200083.Email:shgzh@shisu.edu.cn ISSN1468-2745(print)/ISsN1743-7962(online)/07/040509-20 2007 Taylor Francis D0L:10.1080/14682740701621846
Constructing ‘Peaceful Coexistence’: China’s Diplomacy toward the Geneva and Bandung Conferences, 1954–55 Shu Guang Zhang In the heyday of the Cold War, China remained confrontational toward the United States and other Western powers but at the same time seemed conciliatory toward Asian nations. This was largely reflected in Beijing’s diplomacy of ‘peaceful coexistence’ and ‘united front’ at the Geneva and Bandung conferences. Based on recently declassified archives and material in China and probing into the insights of China’s foreign policy calculations in the mid-1950s, this article argues that, through actively participating in multilateral diplomacy, the Chinese leaders expected to construct an image of a ‘normal state’ and play a leading role in normalizing international politics in Asia. ‘It is my view’, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Mao Zedong proclaimed in Moscow on 18 November 1957, ‘that current situation is characteristic of the east wind prevailing over the west wind, that is, the forces of the socialist [camp] is prevailing over that of the imperialist [world].’1 Much a metaphysician himself, Mao was using this traditional Chinese proverb to describe his take of the Cold War posture. His ‘wind’ metaphor entailed a dual implication: on the one hand, the East referring to the positive side in Chinese was overtaking the West, the negative side; on the other hand, the Asian Orientals were taking a lead over all Westerners. Mao’s confidence derived partly from China’s daring a dual with the mighty America in Korea, Indochina and the Taiwan Strait but more so from Beijing’s successful ISSN 1468-2745 (print)/ISSN 1743-7962 (online)/07/040509-20 q 2007 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14682740701621846 Shu Guang Zhang is distinguished visiting professor at Shanghai International Studies University and professor of international history at the University of Maryland. He is author of Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese– American Confrontations, 1949–58, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–53, and Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963. He also co-edited Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia. Correspondence to: Shu Guang Zhang, Shanghai International Studies University, Administrative Building, Room 603, 550 Dalian Road (West), Shanghai, China 200083. Email: shgzh@shisu.edu.cn FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 Cold War History Vol. 7, No. 4, November 2007, pp. 509–528 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 510 S.G.Zhang diplomatic outreach in Asia,primarily through the Geneva and Bandung conferences in 1954-55,during which China tried to construct a system of 'peaceful coexistence' in Asia so as to portray a benevolent image in the international politics. What persuaded the CCP to accept more a cooperative foreign policy than the 45 confrontational one?What type of peaceful coexistence'did Beijing try to construct in Asia?What exactly did the Chinese leaders expect to achieve?How would the more conciliatory members of the leadership reconcile with the more belligerent ones in the course of action?Existing literature has touched on these issues,for example,Chang and Zhang see'threat perceptions'as one of the driving forces while Chen Jian places 50 emphasis on the framing role of ideology,2 but there is room for more discussion. By focusing on China's diplomacy toward Geneva and Bandung,this article tries to reconcile constructivist arguments about normalizing rules of international politics and constructing a nation-state's identity in the world community'with the newly available historical evidence. 55 As the military conflict in Korea approached its end in the summer of 1953,the Chinese leadership found two top priorities in its immediate policy making:getting 60 prepared for the First Five Year Plan'at home,and reducing as much as possible the hostilities from abroad.On the latter,China was faced with two choices:either to continue its belligerent foreign policy,or to resort to a more conciliatory diplomacy. Although rhetorically celebrating China's 'great success'in beating the mighty imperialists'in Korea,Mao and his colleagues began to take a more realistic look at the 65 international environment that China found itself in and the strategic options that it might have. Framed in the ideological confrontations,the Chinese leaders came to believe,the Cold War would not invariably lead to a general war between the two superpowers. The major contradiction in today's world,Premier Zhou Enlai asserted in a meeting 70 with a group of senior Chinese diplomats on 5 June 1953,'is that of peace or war.' The protracted war in Korea,seen by Zhou as 'a three-year war with two-year negotiations,showed clearly that 'another world war has been put off,because 'the strength for peace has grown and America's difficulty has increased'.Therefore,Zhou pointed out,the Korean War entailed 'special implications'as far as the postwar world 75 was concerned:it has resolved for us many puzzles we encountered about international affairs;of which one was that a general war could be averted.5 As the war in Korea stalemated further,Mao also declared that'if it can not even win the war in Korea,how can the US provoke another world war?" The significant reduction in the danger of another world war,in the CCP 80 leadership's view,was a result of new changes in geopolitics.Before engaging in a head- on confrontation with one another,Mao Zedong had predicted earlier,the two superpowers had to compete for the vast land of'intermediate zones'which consisted of those formal colonies and 'semi-colonies'in Asia,Africa,and Latin America.?
diplomatic outreach in Asia, primarily through the Geneva and Bandung conferences in 1954–55, during which China tried to construct a system of ‘peaceful coexistence’ in Asia so as to portray a benevolent image in the international politics. What persuaded the CCP to accept more a cooperative foreign policy than the confrontational one? What type of ‘peaceful coexistence’ did Beijing try to construct in Asia? What exactly did the Chinese leaders expect to achieve? How would the more conciliatory members of the leadership reconcile with the more belligerent ones in the course of action? Existing literature has touched on these issues, for example, Chang and Zhang see ‘threat perceptions’ as one of the driving forces while Chen Jian places emphasis on the framing role of ideology,2 but there is room for more discussion. By focusing on China’s diplomacy toward Geneva and Bandung, this article tries to reconcile constructivist arguments about normalizing rules of international politics and constructing a nation-state’s identity in the world community3 with the newly available historical evidence.4 I As the military conflict in Korea approached its end in the summer of 1953, the Chinese leadership found two top priorities in its immediate policy making: getting prepared for the ‘First Five Year Plan’ at home, and reducing as much as possible the hostilities from abroad. On the latter, China was faced with two choices: either to continue its belligerent foreign policy, or to resort to a more conciliatory diplomacy. Although rhetorically celebrating China’s ‘great success’ in beating ‘the mighty imperialists’ in Korea, Mao and his colleagues began to take a more realistic look at the international environment that China found itself in and the strategic options that it might have. Framed in the ideological confrontations, the Chinese leaders came to believe, the Cold War would not invariably lead to a general war between the two superpowers. ‘The major contradiction in today’s world’, Premier Zhou Enlai asserted in a meeting with a group of senior Chinese diplomats on 5 June 1953, ‘is that of peace or war.’ The protracted war in Korea, seen by Zhou as ‘a three-year war with two-year negotiations’, showed clearly that ‘another world war has been put off’, because ‘the strength for peace has grown and America’s difficulty has increased’. Therefore, Zhou pointed out, the Korean War entailed ‘special implications’ as far as the postwar world was concerned: it ‘has resolved for us many puzzles we encountered about international affairs’, of which one was that a general war could be averted.5 As the war in Korea stalemated further, Mao also declared that ‘if it can not even win the war in Korea, how can the US provoke another world war?’6 The significant reduction in the danger of another world war, in the CCP leadership’s view, was a result of new changes in geopolitics. Before engaging in a headon confrontation with one another, Mao Zedong had predicted earlier, the two superpowers had to compete for the vast land of ‘intermediate zones’ which consisted of those formal colonies and ‘semi-colonies’ in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.7 FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 510 S. G. Zhang 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 Cold War History 511 In the 1950s,a 'second intermediate zone'began to emerge and set the two superpowers further apart.'As far as I can see,Mao told a delegation of the British Labour Party in Beijing in August 1954,[Washington's]first set of priorities still is to control the intermediate zone between Japan and Britain.America's goal was to bring 85 under its control all the nations within this 'vast'zone 'so as to bully them,control their economies,build military bases on their territories,and make sure that these nations will forever remain weak:s Along the same lines,Zhou had explained to his associates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 1953 that the Cold War politics had been further diversified and the two-dimensional confrontation between 90 Washington and Moscow had become 'four-dimensional':'war versus peace; democracy versus anti-democracy;imperialist countries versus colonial nations;and between the imperialists.The contradictions among all the capitalist countries began to gain currency.With the Cold War in full play,Zhou believed,the three groups of capitalist nations that Washington had relied on were falling apart:first,the 'vanguard' 95 nations including South Korea,Taiwan,and Indochina along with the Philippines, Greece,and Turkey proved 'unreliable';second,the core allies of West Europe were against any expansion of armed conflict,evident in their unwillingness to cooperate with the US in Korea;and,third,the rearmament of Japan and(West)Germany was a distant possibility,offering no immediate help. 100 What strategic implications would these new changes mean to China?The CCP leadership calculated that the new situation offered China both risks and opportunities.Fighting for the two 'intermediate zones,Mao asserted in August 1954,the US found China standing in the way of it taking complete control over the countries falling in the zones;as a result,US hostilities toward the People's Republic of 105 China(PRC)would surely be intensified and last for a long time.Along with its effort to create the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization(SEATO)and persistent support for Jiang Jieshi's harassment'of China's mainland,US advocacy for a continued international economic embargo against the PRC was strong evidence.'If a great power like the United States does not want peace,the CCP chairman stressed,we 110 won't have [a minute of]tranquillity,and no one else can have [a minute of] tranquillity:10On the hand,however,China faced no imminent danger of US invasion. The law of imperialist war,Zhou said in June 1953,'is that the weakest will be the first target of attack.'As long as China continued to build up its strength and influence,it was highly likely that the US may not dare to attack China.In order to win time to 115 become 'as strong as walls of bronze [Tonggiang tiebi],China should strike for peaceful coexistence in diplomacy. To this end,Zhou told senior Chinese diplomats in June 1953,the current focus of China's foreign policy was that we advocate resolving all international disputes through peaceful negotiations....We should practice peaceful coexistence and peaceful 120 competition among all different systems.This type of diplomacy was possible,he explained,[because]the US war threats will widen the gap between the US and the Western European countries and cause most of the nations in Asia,Middle East and
In the 1950s, a ‘second intermediate zone’ began to emerge and set the two superpowers further apart. ‘As far as I can see’, Mao told a delegation of the British Labour Party in Beijing in August 1954, ‘[Washington’s] first set of priorities still is to control the intermediate zone between Japan and Britain.’ America’s goal was to bring under its control all the nations within this ‘vast’ zone ‘so as to bully them, control their economies, build military bases on their territories, and make sure that these nations will forever remain weak’.8 Along the same lines, Zhou had explained to his associates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 1953 that the Cold War politics had been further diversified and the two-dimensional confrontation between Washington and Moscow had become ‘four-dimensional’: ‘war versus peace; democracy versus anti-democracy; imperialist countries versus colonial nations; and between the imperialists’. The contradictions among all the capitalist countries began to gain currency. With the Cold War in full play, Zhou believed, the three groups of capitalist nations that Washington had relied on were falling apart: first, the ‘vanguard’ nations including South Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina along with the Philippines, Greece, and Turkey proved ‘unreliable’; second, the core allies of West Europe were against any expansion of armed conflict, evident in their unwillingness to cooperate with the US in Korea; and, third, the rearmament of Japan and (West) Germany was a distant possibility, offering no immediate help.9 What strategic implications would these new changes mean to China? The CCP leadership calculated that the new situation offered China both risks and opportunities. Fighting for the two ‘intermediate zones’, Mao asserted in August 1954, the US found China standing in the way of it taking complete control over the countries falling in the zones; as a result, US hostilities toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would surely be intensified and last for a long time. Along with its effort to create the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and persistent support for Jiang Jieshi’s ‘harassment’ of China’s mainland, US advocacy for a continued international economic embargo against the PRC was strong evidence. ‘If a great power like the United States does not want peace’, the CCP chairman stressed, ‘we won’t have [a minute of] tranquillity, and no one else can have [a minute of] tranquillity.’10 On the hand, however, China faced no imminent danger of US invasion. ‘The law of imperialist war’, Zhou said in June 1953, ‘is that the weakest will be the first target of attack.’ As long as China continued to build up its strength and influence, it was highly likely that ‘the US may not dare to attack China’. In order to win time to become ‘as strong as walls of bronze [Tongqiang tiebi]’, China should strike for peaceful coexistence in diplomacy.11 To this end, Zhou told senior Chinese diplomats in June 1953, the current focus of China’s foreign policy was that ‘we advocate resolving all international disputes through peaceful negotiations.... We should practice peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition among all different systems’. This type of diplomacy was possible, he explained, ‘[because] the US war threats will widen the gap between the US and the Western European countries and cause most of the nations in Asia, Middle East and FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 Cold War History 511 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120
FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 512 S.G.Zhang North Africa to keep a distance from America...[the people's]voice for peace will sound stronger and stronger:12 While sticking to its anti-imperialism stance,Beijing felt the need to win international sympathy and support.Continuing to 'expose and criticize US 125 imperialism,the CCP hoped to demonstrate that the new regime was capable of acting benevolently and responsibly in international politics,so long as it preserved [ideological]principles.Attempting to exploit world opinion so as to 'shame' America,Beijing stressed the need to respect national sovereignty and non- interference in others'domestic affairs,which,the CCP propaganda asserted,was the 130 cornerstone of peaceful coexistence.As the US government could hardly stay away from others'affairs,China's adherence to 'non-intervention and non-interference' would help galvanize the peoples around the world,including the American people,to disfavour war or confrontation.It was imperative,Zhou Enlai pointed out at a meeting of the foreign ministry in June 1953,to persuade world opinion that 'we are 135 the ones who advocate to resolve all international disputes through peaceful consultation and negotiation,and the other side is the one who insists on the use of force or hostility in resolving [international]conflicts.Should military conflict occur, the US,as the 'perpetrator of war,would then be blamed rightly and squarely.3 The CCP also looked upon its pursuit of 'peaceful coexistence'as a weapon to 140 weaken US ties with its chief allies.Seeing its international position greatly enhanced as a result of its armed intervention in Korea,the CCP leadership believed that America's prestige and strength were strained.The US would encounter much greater difficulties than before in maintaining control of its allies and gaining influence over other non-communist countries.As France and Germany were,in particular,opposed 145 to belligerent US policies,Zhou explained in June 1953 that 'America's [European] allies have already been proven [to Washington]as unreliable.Moreover,America's attempt to round up support from the colonies and semi-colonies had so far been in vain,because these nations have merely waved flags and shouted battle cries'for Washington and hardly followed US policy.4 150 More specifically,Beijing believed that China's willingness to accept peaceful coexistence would enhance its chance to defeat the Western isolation of China. As international peace would forge an environment conducive to economic development,many capitalist countries including Britain,France,Germany,and Japan which had suffered greatly during World War II and remained anxious for their 155 own economic reconstruction,would find it highly desirable to trade with China.Zhou Enlai told his associates at the foreign ministry on 12 August 1954 that Western Europe has to look for a way out by finding a vast [foreign]market in its efforts to restore its economy,and the East-West trade certainly provides that outlet.The Western countries,Zhou continued,all understood that,given its 600 million population, 160 China has always been a very large market and thus to trade with China has enormous potential.To improve the PRC's relations with West European countries,'we will stress [world]peace in our political [propaganda]and foreign trade in our economic policy. These two weapons would hit America's central nerves.Because of its fear of peace
North Africa to keep a distance from America... [the people’s] voice for peace will sound stronger and stronger’.12 While sticking to its anti-imperialism stance, Beijing felt the need to win international sympathy and support. Continuing to ‘expose and criticize US imperialism’, the CCP hoped to demonstrate that the new regime was capable of acting benevolently and responsibly in international politics, so long as it preserved ‘[ideological] principles’. Attempting to exploit world opinion so as to ‘shame’ America, Beijing stressed the need to respect national sovereignty and noninterference in others’ domestic affairs, which, the CCP propaganda asserted, was the cornerstone of ‘peaceful coexistence’. As the US government could hardly stay away from others’ affairs, China’s adherence to ‘non-intervention and non-interference’ would help galvanize the peoples around the world, including the American people, to disfavour war or confrontation. It was imperative, Zhou Enlai pointed out at a meeting of the foreign ministry in June 1953, to persuade world opinion that ‘we are the ones who advocate to resolve all international disputes through peaceful consultation and negotiation, and the other side is the one who insists on the use of force or hostility in resolving [international] conflicts’. Should military conflict occur, the US, as the ‘perpetrator of war’, would then be blamed rightly and squarely.13 The CCP also looked upon its pursuit of ‘peaceful coexistence’ as a weapon to weaken US ties with its chief allies. Seeing its international position greatly enhanced as a result of its armed intervention in Korea, the CCP leadership believed that America’s prestige and strength were strained. The US would encounter much greater difficulties than before in maintaining control of its allies and gaining influence over other non-communist countries. As France and Germany were, in particular, opposed to belligerent US policies, Zhou explained in June 1953 that ‘America’s [European] allies have already been proven [to Washington] as unreliable’. Moreover, America’s attempt to round up support from the colonies and semi-colonies had so far been in vain, because these nations ‘have merely waved flags and shouted battle cries’ for Washington and hardly followed US policy.14 More specifically, Beijing believed that China’s willingness to accept peaceful coexistence would enhance its chance to defeat the Western isolation of China. As international peace would forge an environment conducive to economic development, many capitalist countries including Britain, France, Germany, and Japan which had suffered greatly during World War II and remained anxious for their own economic reconstruction, would find it highly desirable to trade with China. Zhou Enlai told his associates at the foreign ministry on 12 August 1954 that Western Europe ‘has to look for a way out by finding a vast [foreign] market in its efforts to restore its economy, and the East–West trade certainly provides that outlet’. The Western countries, Zhou continued, all understood that, ‘given its 600 million population, China has always been a very large market and thus to trade with China has enormous potential’. To improve the PRC’s relations with West European countries, ‘we will stress [world] peace in our political [propaganda] and foreign trade in our economic policy’. These two weapons would hit America’s central nerves. ‘Because of its fear of peace’, FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 512 S. G. Zhang 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160
FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 Cold War History 513 Zhou Enlai explained,'[the US]sticks to arms race and belligerent policies,and because of its fear of losing control in [economic]competition,it is afraid of the resumption of trade [between China and other countries].To advocate world peace and,at the same time,strive for international trade,China could 'form a united front 165 with the Western [European]countries'in order to sever the US policy of political isolation and economic embargo.15 A first step for China's diplomatic offensive,then,was to construct a new identity in Asia.To Mao,China could stress several benevolent,not belligerent,'images'in its persuasion campaigns with its Asian neighbours.First,China was a backward country, 170 thus having no capability to expand externally.Speaking to a delegation of the British Labour Party in August 1954,he made it clear that'China is an agrarian country and it will take China many years to get industrialized';and it was imperative that 'we must continue our efforts toward constructing a peaceful environment16 Second,China's economy was internally oriented,thus having no need to acquire external markets 175 through either economic or military means.To the same British delegation,Mao explained that China had 'only two [strategic]assets,namely,'a vast land and a huge population.Much the same as Russia,China was economically 'relying on domestic market,not foreign market'and had no incentive to expand.7 Third,China had the same experiences with many non-Western countries in the age of imperialism,thus 180 tolerating no more foreign bullies.Meeting with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on 19 October 1954,Mao pointed out that 'all the Orientals have in the past been bullied by Western imperialists'and 'we are emotionally attached to one another and have the same feelings toward self-defence.Although adopting different political and economic systems,'we have one thing in common,that is,we all must deal with 185 imperialism Fourth,China as a nation was culturally conciliatory and tolerant. Citing traditional Chinese philosopher Mentze's saying that 'diversity and difference represents the very nature of the world,Mao told Nehru that he completely agreed and thus would respect cultural,social,and political diversity.9 With this new image,China could participate in the norm-building of international 190 relations.Meeting with an Indian delegation in Beijing on New Year's Eve of 1953, Zhou pointed out that 'we have already established several basic principles in the Sino- Indian relations:they include mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression,non-interference in each other's internal affairs,equality and mutual benefit,and peaceful coexistence.20 These soon became Zhou's famous 'five principles' 195 of international relations.Meeting with Nehru in October 1954,Mao urged the Indian prime minister that the two countries should work together to 'popularize the five principles,so that,hopefully,they would become widely acceptable norms 'to govern all aspects of international relations:21 200 II A much celebrated effort of the Beijing diplomatic offensive was its participation in the Geneva Conference of 1954.At Geneva,the CCP aimed to demonstrate that the PRC
Zhou Enlai explained, ‘[the US] sticks to arms race and belligerent policies, and because of its fear of losing control in [economic] competition, it is afraid of the resumption of trade [between China and other countries].’ To advocate world peace and, at the same time, strive for international trade, China could ‘form a united front with the Western [European] countries’ in order to sever the US policy of political isolation and economic embargo.15 A first step for China’s diplomatic offensive, then, was to construct a new identity in Asia. To Mao, China could stress several benevolent, not belligerent, ‘images’ in its persuasion campaigns with its Asian neighbours. First, China was a backward country, thus having no capability to expand externally. Speaking to a delegation of the British Labour Party in August 1954, he made it clear that ‘China is an agrarian country and it will take China many years to get industrialized’; and it was imperative that ‘we must continue our efforts toward constructing a peaceful environment’.16 Second, China’s economy was internally oriented, thus having no need to acquire external markets through either economic or military means. To the same British delegation, Mao explained that China had ‘only two [strategic] assets’, namely, ‘a vast land and a huge population’. Much the same as Russia, China was economically ‘relying on domestic market, not foreign market’ and had no incentive to expand.17 Third, China had the same experiences with many non-Western countries in the age of imperialism, thus tolerating no more foreign bullies. Meeting with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on 19 October 1954, Mao pointed out that ‘all the Orientals have in the past been bullied by Western imperialists’ and ‘we are emotionally attached to one another and have the same feelings toward self-defence’. Although adopting different political and economic systems, ‘we have one thing in common, that is, we all must deal with imperialism’.18 Fourth, China as a nation was culturally conciliatory and tolerant. Citing traditional Chinese philosopher Mentze’s saying that ‘diversity and difference represents the very nature of the world’, Mao told Nehru that he completely agreed and thus would respect cultural, social, and political diversity.19 With this new image, China could participate in the norm-building of international relations. Meeting with an Indian delegation in Beijing on New Year’s Eve of 1953, Zhou pointed out that ‘we have already established several basic principles in the SinoIndian relations: they include mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence’.20 These soon became Zhou’s famous ‘five principles’ of international relations. Meeting with Nehru in October 1954, Mao urged the Indian prime minister that the two countries should work together to ‘popularize the five principles’, so that, hopefully, they would become widely acceptable norms ‘to govern all aspects of international relations’.21 II A much celebrated effort of the Beijing diplomatic offensive was its participation in the Geneva Conference of 1954. At Geneva, the CCP aimed to demonstrate that the PRC FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 Cold War History 513 165 170 175 180 185 190 195 200
FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 514 S.G.Zhang was a serious and responsible player in international politics.Beijing had explicitly supported Moscow's proposal of 28 September 1953 that a five-power (including China)conference be convened to resolve international conflicts in Asia.22 On 9 January 1954,Zhou Enlai called upon all 'the big powers'involved in the 205 military conflicts in Asia to 'consult'one another on how to restore peace.Later that month,Soviet Foreign Minister V.M.Molotov followed Zhou's call by proposing in Berlin that a five-power international conference be held to deal specifically with the conflicts in Korea.Echoed by Britain and France,the Molotov proposal brought China into a great-power conference on Korea and Indochina.23 210 Excited at being a participant in the process,Beijing expected to make an impact. With Mao's approval,Zhou immediately began a thorough preparation for the conference.In early March,Zhou supervised the drafting of the key document 'Our Estimation of the Geneva Conference and Preliminary Instructions on Our Preparation This document pointed out that 'the United States,France and Britain 215 disagree with each other,especially on the Indochina issue,and they have great difficulty in reconciling their views';the internal conflicts of the Western bloc could be further 'exploited to our advantage.The instructions then directed that 'our delegation at Geneva should take all possible initiatives and seize every chance to contact the British,the French,and the neutral [countries]..[so as]to make our 220 positions for a settlement and preference for peace known and understood by them. The document directed that the Chinese delegation should try hard to generate positive outcomes.To this end,'we should concentrate on the issues which contain no big differences of opinion and try to accomplish at least a tentative agreement on them.We shall not allow the conference to the end without any result.24 Shortly after 225 the Chinese delegation was formed in April,the CCP's central leadership charged Zhou Enlai,the head of the delegation to exercise 'active diplomacy'at Geneva in order to break the US policy of political isolation of and economic embargo against China.Their primary mission was to make every possible effort to reach agreements 'so as to set a precedent for solving international problems through big-power 230 consultations25 The Geneva team worked 'day and night making all kinds of preparations'for the PRC's first attendance at an international conference.As spokesman for the Chinese delegation,for example,Huang Hua practised his press releases and question-and- answer handling at a mock press conference in accordance with international 235 standards'before doing it in front of world media.Anxious to achieve a substantive result at Geneva,in early April Zhou made a special trip to Moscow to consult the Soviet leaders on the upcoming talks.During their three meetings with Zhou,both Khrushchev and Molotov expressed low expectations of the Geneva Conference.Zhou, however,argued differently:That China,[North]Korea,and Vietnam can jointly 240 participate in this international conference is in itself an unexpected event and one of our [diplomatic]victories.It will be a bigger success if we can take this opportunity to express our positions and principles on all the issues and offer explanations on certain questions so as to resolve some disputes.26
was a serious and responsible player in international politics. Beijing had explicitly supported Moscow’s proposal of 28 September 1953 that a five-power (including China) conference be convened to resolve international conflicts in Asia.22 On 9 January 1954, Zhou Enlai called upon all ‘the big powers’ involved in the military conflicts in Asia to ‘consult’ one another on how to restore peace. Later that month, Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov followed Zhou’s call by proposing in Berlin that a five-power international conference be held to deal specifically with the conflicts in Korea. Echoed by Britain and France, the Molotov proposal brought China into a great-power conference on Korea and Indochina.23 Excited at being a participant in the process, Beijing expected to make an impact. With Mao’s approval, Zhou immediately began a thorough preparation for the conference. In early March, Zhou supervised the drafting of the key document ‘Our Estimation of the Geneva Conference and Preliminary Instructions on Our Preparation’. This document pointed out that ‘the United States, France and Britain disagree with each other, especially on the Indochina issue, and they have great difficulty in reconciling their views’; the internal conflicts of the Western bloc could be further ‘exploited to our advantage’. The instructions then directed that ‘our delegation at Geneva should take all possible initiatives and seize every chance to contact the British, the French, and the neutral [countries]... [so as] to make our positions for a settlement and preference for peace known and understood by them’. The document directed that the Chinese delegation should try hard to generate positive outcomes. To this end, ‘we should concentrate on the issues which contain no big differences of opinion and try to accomplish at least a tentative agreement on them. We shall not allow the conference to the end without any result’.24 Shortly after the Chinese delegation was formed in April, the CCP’s central leadership charged Zhou Enlai, the head of the delegation to exercise ‘active diplomacy’ at Geneva in order to break the US policy of political isolation of and economic embargo against China. Their primary mission was to make every possible effort to reach agreements ‘so as to set a precedent for solving international problems through big-power consultations’.25 The Geneva team worked ‘day and night making all kinds of preparations’ for the PRC’s first attendance at an international conference. As spokesman for the Chinese delegation, for example, Huang Hua practised his press releases and question-andanswer handling at a mock press conference in accordance with ‘international standards’ before doing it in front of world media. Anxious to achieve a substantive result at Geneva, in early April Zhou made a special trip to Moscow to consult the Soviet leaders on the upcoming talks. During their three meetings with Zhou, both Khrushchev and Molotov expressed low expectations of the Geneva Conference. Zhou, however, argued differently: ‘That China, [North] Korea, and Vietnam can jointly participate in this international conference is in itself an unexpected event and one of our [diplomatic] victories. It will be a bigger success if we can take this opportunity to express our positions and principles on all the issues and offer explanations on certain questions so as to resolve some disputes.’26 FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 514 S. G. Zhang 205 210 215 220 225 230 235 240
FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 Cold War History 515 At a meeting with Indian ambassador to Beijing N.Raghavan on 19 April,Zhou also declared that China would do everything possible to ensure that the Geneva Conference must not fail.Although anticipating grave difficulties in reaching agreements on all the issues on the agenda,he said that 'whatever the Chinese 245 delegation will propose will be in the spirit of peace,justice,equality,opposition to aggression,and non-belligerency.What Beijing expected to convey through the venue of Geneva consisted of three messages: first,it is certain that the US will invade Asia;second,the most urgent issue that Asian nations and peoples must tackle is how to self-help,namely,how to get united 250 and be friendly to one another,oppose aggression,and not become a part of any military aggressive bloc;third,England,France and all other Western countries must understand that their only choice is to strike a good relationship with Asian nations so as to preserve some of their interest,and should they reject this opportunity and choose to take the road with the US,they will lose all of their interests and be spat on for ever by the Asian peoples. 255 Zhou urged India to watch closely how China would perform at Geneva and to give feedback and suggestions throughout.27 Since it was the first time for Beijing to take part in such a conference,Zhou told his aides just before heading for Geneva on 20 April that 'China is a major power [daguo]and [we]go to Geneva to attend 260 formally an international conference,thus getting on the international stage';China was ready put on 'a formally staged performance The PRC delegation of more than 200 arrived in Geneva on 24 April.The principals of the PRC delegation settled in luxurious accommodation at the Grand Mont-Fleur estate at Versoix.Priceless antiques and furnishings were shipped from China to ready 265 the stately rooms and corridors for the international spotlight.29 The peak of the PRC's active diplomacy at Geneva was Zhou's articulation of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.To challenge the US policy of 'using Asians to fight Asians,Zhou said at the third plenary session on Indochina on 12 May that: Asian countries must mutually respect each other's independence and sovereignty 270 and not interfere in each other's internal affairs;they must solve their disputes through peaceful negotiation and not through threats and military force;they must establish normal economic and cultural relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and disallow discrimination and limitation. Only in this way could the Asian countries avoid the neo-colonialist exploitation of the 275 unprecedented catastrophe of Asians fighting Asians and achieve peace and security.30 Zhou Enlai could not have done better in reiterating his 'five principles of peaceful coexistence,but encountered difficulties when coming to specific issues.On Korea, Beijing had little control over Pyongyang.The head of North Korean delegation Nam Il kept blasting US imperialism.Molotov did not want to start negotiating in a hurry' 280 so as to show that 'our side is not the one anxious to negotiate.3 Neither did the US delegate John Foster Dulles give China's conciliatory diplomacy any hope.32 There seemed to be hardly any chance for an agreement on Korea,a disappointed Zhou reported to Mao on 28 April,because 'the US does not want a solution,France is in no
At a meeting with Indian ambassador to Beijing N. Raghavan on 19 April, Zhou also declared that China would do everything possible to ensure that ‘the Geneva Conference must not fail’. Although anticipating grave difficulties in reaching agreements on all the issues on the agenda, he said that ‘whatever the Chinese delegation will propose will be in the spirit of peace, justice, equality, opposition to aggression, and non-belligerency’. What Beijing expected to convey through the venue of Geneva consisted of three messages: first, it is certain that the US will invade Asia; second, the most urgent issue that Asian nations and peoples must tackle is how to self-help, namely, how to get united and be friendly to one another, oppose aggression, and not become a part of any military aggressive bloc; third, England, France and all other Western countries must understand that their only choice is to strike a good relationship with Asian nations so as to preserve some of their interest, and should they reject this opportunity and choose to take the road with the US, they will lose all of their interests and be spat on for ever by the Asian peoples. Zhou urged India to watch closely how China would perform at Geneva and to give feedback and suggestions throughout.27 Since it was the first time for Beijing to take part in such a conference, Zhou told his aides just before heading for Geneva on 20 April that ‘China is a major power [daguo ] and [we] go to Geneva to attend formally an international conference, thus getting on the international stage’; China was ready put on ‘a formally staged performance’.28 The PRC delegation of more than 200 arrived in Geneva on 24 April. The principals of the PRC delegation settled in luxurious accommodation at the Grand Mont-Fleur estate at Versoix. Priceless antiques and furnishings were shipped from China to ready the stately rooms and corridors for the international spotlight.29 The peak of the PRC’s active diplomacy at Geneva was Zhou’s articulation of the ‘five principles of peaceful coexistence’. To challenge the US policy of ‘using Asians to fight Asians’, Zhou said at the third plenary session on Indochina on 12 May that: Asian countries must mutually respect each other’s independence and sovereignty and not interfere in each other’s internal affairs; they must solve their disputes through peaceful negotiation and not through threats and military force; they must establish normal economic and cultural relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and disallow discrimination and limitation. Only in this way could ‘the Asian countries avoid the neo-colonialist exploitation of the unprecedented catastrophe of Asians fighting Asians and achieve peace and security’.30 Zhou Enlai could not have done better in reiterating his ‘five principles of peaceful coexistence’, but encountered difficulties when coming to specific issues. On Korea, Beijing had little control over Pyongyang. The head of North Korean delegation Nam Il kept blasting US ‘imperialism’. Molotov did not want to start negotiating ‘in a hurry’ so as to show that ‘our side is not the one anxious to negotiate’.31 Neither did the US delegate John Foster Dulles give China’s conciliatory diplomacy any hope.32 There seemed to be hardly any chance for an agreement on Korea, a disappointed Zhou reported to Mao on 28 April, because ‘the US does not want a solution, France is in no FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 Cold War History 515 245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280
FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 516 S.G.Zhang position to talk about the Korean issue,and Britain is unwilling to speak on the issue. Meanwhile,France seemed 'anxious to get on to the Indochina issue'and thus,it was likely that Indochina would be discussed earlier than planned.33 To salvage the talks on Korea,Mao Zedong endorsed Zhou's proposal on 17 May to formulate a solution 285 that after all foreign forces were withdrawn from the Korean peninsula,a general election would be held and monitored by selected neutral governments.34 Although close to that of many sides,the Chinese proposition did not go very far.On 15 June, the session on Korea ended with no agreement.Dismayed at the result,however,Zhou believed that the Chinese scored by 'completely exposing US intentions to rupture the 290 negotiations at any cost35 The Chinese leaders were not surprised when France pushed for the talks on Indochina the day after Dienbienphu fell on 7 May.Beijing was determined to achieve a substantive agreement.Having genuinely followed Molotov's lead in the Korean sessions,Zhou was now ready to make a move on his own.36 To soften Paris'position, 295 on 28 May,he pressured Hanoi to release a total of 858 French soldiers captured at Dienbienphu.37 He calculated that the French would no longer hesitate to accept a peaceful solution to the Indochina problem,and the British would certainly lend their support.Without British and French cooperation,the US would eventually have to accept peace terms in Indochina.3 In addition to the formal sessions,Zhou had 300 frequent meetings with Soviet and North Vietnamese representatives(on 5,12,15,29 and 30 May,and 2 June)and private meetings with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden(on 14,20 and 27 May)and French Foreign Minister George Bidault(on 7 June), pushing for a 'mutually acceptable settlement'on Indochina.3 Beijing's expectation was close to realization at Geneva by mid-June 1954.The new 305 Mendes-France government of France proclaimed that it would agree to restore peace in Indochina on two conditions:a temporary partition of Vietnam,and self-determination and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia under the supervision of an international control commission.40 In a meeting with Zhou on 23 June,newly elected French Prime Minister Mendes-France also assured the Chinese premier that Paris would not support 310 any intended US efforts to build military bases in Indochina.Zhou undoubtedly liked the French attitude,but worried that the Viet Minh might not be accommodating. To persuade the Vietnamese,Zhou flew back to China and had a three-day meeting with Ho Chi Minh at Liuzhou,Guangxi,on 3-5 July.He explained to Ho that the Viet Minh was now at the crossroads of either continuing to fight or accepting peace now and 315 fighting later.It would be wise,Zhou stressed,for Ho to cease hostilities with the French and consolidate control now,and look for other opportunities later.We should do our best to support the Mendes Government,he said to Ho,'so that we can prevent the war- like elements in France from overthrowing [it].Specifically,Hanoi should be prepared to accept the proposed division of Vietnam at the 16th parallel or along the 9th Road 320 and ask for no more in Laos or Cambodia for now which,in his view,'would be certainly beneficial to both of us.With Zhou's promise of continuous Chinese aid,Ho took Zhou's advice and accepted the conditions.2 What Zhou achieved with Ho was also endorsed by Mao and the politburo on 7 July.3
position to talk about the Korean issue, and Britain is unwilling to speak on the issue’. Meanwhile, France seemed ‘anxious to get on to the Indochina issue’ and thus, it was ‘likely that Indochina would be discussed earlier than planned’.33 To salvage the talks on Korea, Mao Zedong endorsed Zhou’s proposal on 17 May to formulate a solution that after all foreign forces were withdrawn from the Korean peninsula, a general election would be held and monitored by selected neutral governments.34 Although close to that of many sides, the Chinese proposition did not go very far. On 15 June, the session on Korea ended with no agreement. Dismayed at the result, however, Zhou believed that the Chinese scored by ‘completely exposing US intentions to rupture the negotiations at any cost’.35 The Chinese leaders were not surprised when France pushed for the talks on Indochina the day after Dienbienphu fell on 7 May. Beijing was determined to achieve a substantive agreement. Having genuinely followed Molotov’s lead in the Korean sessions, Zhou was now ready to make a move on his own.36 To soften Paris’ position, on 28 May, he pressured Hanoi to release a total of 858 French soldiers captured at Dienbienphu.37 He calculated that the French would no longer hesitate to accept a peaceful solution to the Indochina problem, and the British would certainly lend their support. Without British and French cooperation, the US would eventually have to accept peace terms in Indochina.38 In addition to the formal sessions, Zhou had frequent meetings with Soviet and North Vietnamese representatives (on 5, 12, 15, 29 and 30 May, and 2 June) and private meetings with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden (on 14, 20 and 27 May) and French Foreign Minister George Bidault (on 7 June), pushing for a ‘mutually acceptable settlement’ on Indochina.39 Beijing’s expectation was close to realization at Geneva by mid-June 1954. The new Mendes-France government of France proclaimed that it would agree to restore peace in Indochina on two conditions: a temporary partition of Vietnam, and self-determination and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia under the supervision of an international control commission.40 In a meeting with Zhou on 23 June, newly elected French Prime Minister Mendes-France also assured the Chinese premier that Paris would not support any intended US efforts to build military bases in Indochina.41 Zhou undoubtedly liked the French attitude, but worried that the Viet Minh might not be accommodating. To persuade the Vietnamese, Zhou flew back to China and had a three-day meeting with Ho Chi Minh at Liuzhou, Guangxi, on 3–5 July. He explained to Ho that the Viet Minh was now at the crossroads of either continuing to fight or accepting peace now and fighting later. It would be wise, Zhou stressed, for Ho to cease hostilities with the French and consolidate control now, and look for other opportunities later. ‘We should do our best to support the Mendes Government’, he said to Ho, ‘so that we can prevent the warlike elements in France from overthrowing [it].’ Specifically, Hanoi should be prepared to accept the proposed division of Vietnam at the 16th parallel or along the 9th Road and ask for no more in Laos or Cambodia for now which, in his view, ‘would be certainly beneficial to both of us’. With Zhou’s promise of continuous Chinese aid, Ho took Zhou’s advice and accepted the conditions.42 What Zhou achieved with Ho was also endorsed by Mao and the politburo on 7 July.43 FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 516 S. G. Zhang 285 290 295 300 305 310 315 320
FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 Cold War History 517 Mao and the politburo also instructed Zhou to get Moscow's endorsement.Flying back to Geneva,Zhou stopped at Moscow on 10 July.Meeting with the top Kremlin leaders (Georgiy Malenkov,Kliment Voroshilov,Lazar Kaganovich,Anastas Mikoyan-Nikita Khrushchev was out of Moscow),he reached an agreement that 'if 325 we rejected Mendes'proposal,the US would seize the chance to replace the Mendes government with a more belligerent one,which would make the settlement of the Indochina conflict even more difficult:4 To ensure that Hanoi would not change its mind,on the evening of his arrival at Geneva on 12 July,Zhou had a long meeting with Hanoi's representative until midnight.Informing him of the consensus he had earlier 330 secured with Ho Chi Minh and the Soviet leaders,the Chinese premier stressed that [Hanoi]should seize the initiative to resolve the issue quickly,actively,and directly. To that end,the Chinese-Soviet-Vietnamese side should establish a few principles including:'trying to simplify the issues so as to avoid complicating the negotiations; focusing on France as the primary counterpart which requires considering the 335 possibility of its acceptance before raising any requests;and being willing to compromise by accepting slightly different arrangements toward an agreement as long as no primary interest endangered45 As a result of Zhou's efforts,the Chinese, Vietnamese and Soviet delegations jointly proclaimed their acceptance of the Mendes proposal and even counter-offered to designate the 16th parallel as demarcation line as 340 opposed to the French-proposed 18th parallel.That paved the way for the final signing of the Geneva Accords on Indochina on 21 July,providing for an immediate cease-fire in Indochina,a partition of Vietnam,and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia.This settlement satisfied the Chinese,since most of Vietnam was under the control of a friendly government and no foreign forces or military bases or military alliance' 345 would be placed in Laos and Cambodia.46 The PRC leaders seemed very pleased with the result and encouraged by the Geneva experiences.Even before the signing of the Geneva Accords,Mao already felt that China had succeeded diplomatically in Geneva.Speaking to an enlarged CCP politburo meeting on 7 July,the CCP chairman said that'in Geneva,we have adhered 350 to the slogan of peace,thereby portraying an image of being for peace;whereas the US refuses to adhere to such a slogan and thus forges an image of being for belligerency which makes no sense and can not be accepted.As more and more nations advocated peace,'we therefore can and will form collaborative relations with all of those willing to live in peace:47 On the way back to Beijing,when asked by his aides to reflect on 355 Geneva,Zhou also drew several interesting lessons.First,in negotiating a solution to international disputes,'as long as both sides have a good will and understand each other and no matter how complicated the issue is,there will be a path toward its solution.Second,'all the formal speeches and debates are read line by line from a prepared text [zhaoben xuanke],and speakers often indulge in exaggeration without 360 substance for the purpose of either saving face or propagandizing,but 'activities after a formal meeting including private contacts provide an opportunity for participants to have a frank exchange of views,probe into each other's intentions,put one's cards on the table,negotiate and bargain and reach detailed agreements,which are the practical
Mao and the politburo also instructed Zhou to get Moscow’s endorsement. Flying back to Geneva, Zhou stopped at Moscow on 10 July. Meeting with the top Kremlin leaders (Georgiy Malenkov, Kliment Voroshilov, Lazar Kaganovich, Anastas Mikoyan–Nikita Khrushchev was out of Moscow), he reached an agreement that ‘if we rejected Mendes’ proposal, the US would seize the chance to replace the Mendes government with a more belligerent one, which would make the settlement of the Indochina conflict even more difficult’.44 To ensure that Hanoi would not change its mind, on the evening of his arrival at Geneva on 12 July, Zhou had a long meeting with Hanoi’s representative until midnight. Informing him of the consensus he had earlier secured with Ho Chi Minh and the Soviet leaders, the Chinese premier stressed that ‘[Hanoi] should seize the initiative to resolve the issue quickly, actively, and directly’. To that end, the Chinese–Soviet–Vietnamese side should establish a few principles including: ‘trying to simplify the issues so as to avoid complicating the negotiations; focusing on France as the primary counterpart which requires considering the possibility of its acceptance before raising any requests; and being willing to compromise by accepting slightly different arrangements toward an agreement as long as no primary interest endangered’.45 As a result of Zhou’s efforts, the Chinese, Vietnamese and Soviet delegations jointly proclaimed their acceptance of the Mendes proposal and even counter-offered to designate the 16th parallel as demarcation line as opposed to the French-proposed 18th parallel. That paved the way for the final signing of the Geneva Accords on Indochina on 21 July, providing for an immediate cease-fire in Indochina, a partition of Vietnam, and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia. This settlement satisfied the Chinese, since most of Vietnam was under the control of a friendly government and ‘no foreign forces or military bases or military alliance’ would be placed in Laos and Cambodia.46 The PRC leaders seemed very pleased with the result and encouraged by the Geneva experiences. Even before the signing of the Geneva Accords, Mao already felt that China had succeeded diplomatically in Geneva. Speaking to an enlarged CCP politburo meeting on 7 July, the CCP chairman said that ‘in Geneva, we have adhered to the slogan of peace, thereby portraying an image of being for peace; whereas the US refuses to adhere to such a slogan and thus forges an image of being for belligerency which makes no sense and can not be accepted’. As more and more nations advocated peace, ‘we therefore can and will form collaborative relations with all of those willing to live in peace’.47 On the way back to Beijing, when asked by his aides to reflect on Geneva, Zhou also drew several interesting lessons. First, in negotiating a solution to international disputes, ‘as long as both sides have a good will and understand each other and no matter how complicated the issue is, there will be a path toward its solution’. Second, ‘all the formal speeches and debates are read line by line from a prepared text [zhaoben xuanke], and speakers often indulge in exaggeration without substance for the purpose of either saving face or propagandizing’, but ‘activities after a formal meeting including private contacts provide an opportunity for participants to have a frank exchange of views, probe into each other’s intentions, put one’s cards on the table, negotiate and bargain and reach detailed agreements, which are the practical FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 Cold War History 517 325 330 335 340 345 350 355 360
