UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS JOURNALS DIGITAL PUBLISHING The Dwight D.Eisenhower Administration,Syngman Rhee,and the "Other"Geneva Conference of 1954 Author(s):Henry W.Brands,Jr. Reviewed work(s): Source:Pacific Historical Review,Vol.56,No.1 (Feb.,1987),pp.59-85 Published by:University of California Press Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3638826 Accessed:27/01/201322:04 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use,available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive.We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to Pacific Historical Review. STOR http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration, Syngman Rhee, and the "Other" Geneva Conference of 1954 Author(s): Henry W. Brands, Jr. Reviewed work(s): Source: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Feb., 1987), pp. 59-85 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3638826 . Accessed: 27/01/2013 22:04 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Pacific Historical Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Dwight D.Eisenhower Administration,Syngman Rhee, and the“Other'Geneva Conference of 1954 HENRY W.BRANDS,JR. The author is a member of the history department in Vanderbilt University. I shall go to Korea,"Dwight Eisenhower stated in the 1952 presidential campaign,and with this pledge his troubles began.Though Republicans had blamed the Korean War,or at least its mishandling,on the Democrats,Eisenhower,by making it a major issue in the campaign,took upon himself the burden of finding a solution to the war.With great diffi- culty,the new administration negotiated a ceasefire in July 1953,but this provided only a respite from,not a solution to, America's Korean problems.A definitive settlement required going to the source of the conflict on the peninsula:the political and ideological division of the country into North and South.This fact was recognized in the truce agreement, which called for a conference of both sides to negotiate the withdrawal of foreign forces and"the peaceful settlement of the Korean question." 1.On Eisenhower's Korea pledge,see Dwight D.Eisenhower,Mandate for Change,1953-1956(Garden City,N.Y.,1963),72-73;Sherman Adams,Firsthand Report (New York,1961),42-44;and Emmet John Hughes,The Ordeal of Power (New York,1963),32-35.The reference to the political conference is in paragraph 60. Pacific Historical Review 1987 by the Pacific Coast Branch American Historical Association 59 This condent downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration, Syngman Rhee, and the "Other" Geneva Conference of 1954 HENRY W. BRANDS, JR. The author is a member of the history department in Vanderbilt University. I shall go to Korea," Dwight Eisenhower stated in the 1952 presidential campaign, and with this pledge his troubles began. Though Republicans had blamed the Korean War, or at least its mishandling, on the Democrats, Eisenhower, by making it a major issue in the campaign, took upon himself the burden of finding a solution to the war. With great difficulty, the new administration negotiated a ceasefire in July 1953, but this provided only a respite from, not a solution to, America's Korean problems. A definitive settlement required going to the source of the conflict on the peninsula: the political and ideological division of the country into North and South. This fact was recognized in the truce agreement, which called for a conference of both sides to negotiate the withdrawal of foreign forces and "the peaceful settlement of the Korean question."' 1. On Eisenhower's Korea pledge, see Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, N.Y., 1963), 72-73; Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report (New York, 1961), 42-44; and EmmetJohn Hughes, The Ordeal of Power (New York, 1963), 32-35. The reference to the political conference is in paragraph 60, Pacific Historical Review ? 1987 by the Pacific Coast Branch American Historical Association 59 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
60 Pacific Historical Review By the time the conference began in Geneva in April 1954,however,Korea was no longer the most pressing issue of the Cold War,having been overshadowed by the deep- ening crisis in Indochina.The Korea conference occurred simultaneously with the more widely reported Indochina conference in the same city;the latter negotiations led to a redrawing of the map of Southeast Asia and indirectly to American participation in the Vietnam War,but the Korea conference ended in continued stalemate,with little changed and nothing settled.For these reasons,the Korea conference, relegated to second billing in its day,has been similarly ne- glected by historians.? With the recent opening of much of the documentary record,a reconsideration of this conference and the events leading up to it is in order,and for at least two reasons.First, decisions and developments of this period set the pattern for three decades of American relations with South Korea. Eisenhower and his advisers entered office hoping to relieve the United States of its Korean burden,or at least to lighten it;instead they managed to lock the United States into a com- mitment that Americans have often found uncomfortable, but from which they have never succeeded in extricating article IV of the truce agreement quoted in David Rees,Korea:The Limited War(Lon- don,1964),482.Though written twenty years ago,Rees's book remains in many re- spects the most useful account of the Korean War.Joseph C.Goulden's Korea:The Untold Story of the War (New York,1982)includes some fresh material,but the book does not quite fulfill the breathless promise of its subtitle.The best work on the early background of the war is Bruce Cumings,The Origins of the Korean War:Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes,1945-1947(Princeton,1981). 2.Most accounts of the Korean War end with the ceasefire of July 1953,men- tioning the Geneva conference,if at all,only in passing.See,for example:Rees, Korea,439;Goulden,Untold Story,648.Accounts of American-Korean relations display a similar neglect-for instance,Frank Baldwin,ed.,Without Parallel:The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945 (New York,1973);Tae-Hwan Kwak,ed., U.S.-Korean Relations,1882-1982 (Seoul,1982);Youngnok Koo and Dae-Sook Suh, eds.,Korea and the United States:A Century of Cooperation(Honolulu,1984);Sung-joo Han,ed.,After One Hundred Years:Continuity and Change in Korean-American Relations (Seoul,1982);and Gerald L.Curtis and Sung-joo Han,eds.,The U.S.-South Korean Alliance (Lexington,Mass.,1983). This condent downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
60 Pacific Historical Review By the time the conference began in Geneva in April 1954, however, Korea was no longer the most pressing issue of the Cold War, having been overshadowed by the deepening crisis in Indochina. The Korea conference occurred simultaneously with the more widely reported Indochina conference in the same city; the latter negotiations led to a redrawing of the map of Southeast Asia and indirectly to American participation in the Vietnam War, but the Korea conference ended in continued stalemate, with little changed and nothing settled. For these reasons, the Korea conference, relegated to second billing in its day, has been similarly neglected by historians.2 With the recent opening of much of the documentary record, a reconsideration of this conference and the events leading up to it is in order, and for at least two reasons. First, decisions and developments of this period set the pattern for three decades of American relations with South Korea. Eisenhower and his advisers entered office hoping to relieve the United States of its Korean burden, or at least to lighten it; instead they managed to lock the United States into a commitment that Americans have often found uncomfortable, but from which they have never succeeded in extricating article IV of the truce agreement quoted in David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London, 1964), 482. Though written twenty years ago, Rees's book remains in many respects the most useful account of the Korean War. Joseph C. Goulden's Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York, 1982) includes some fresh material, but the book does not quite fulfill the breathless promise of its subtitle. The best work on the early background of the war is Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton, 1981). 2. Most accounts of the Korean War end with the ceasefire of July 1953, mentioning the Geneva conference, if at all, only in passing. See, for example: Rees, Korea, 439; Goulden, Untold Story, 648. Accounts of American-Korean relations display a similar neglect-for instance, Frank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945 (New York, 1973); Tae-Hwan Kwak, ed., U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982 (Seoul, 1982); Youngnok Koo and Dae-Sook Suh, eds., Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation (Honolulu, 1984); Sung-joo Han, ed., After One Hundred Years: Continuity and Change in Korean-American Relations (Seoul, 1982); and Gerald L. Curtis and Sung-joo Han, eds., The U.S.-South Korean Alliance (Lexington, Mass., 1983). This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The“Other”Geneva Conference 61 themselves.Second,American relations with the Republic of Korea(ROK)-to use South Korea's official name-provide a valuable case study in the kind of superpower-client rela- tions that have been an abiding feature of the Cold War,es- pecially in Asia.Syngman Rhee,the South Korean president, depended on American support,and he knew it.But Rhee, like Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan and Ngo Dinh Diem and his successors in South Vietnam,also understood the degree to which American leaders believed that their country's credi- bility and prestige rested on America's willingness to defend him,and he played this advantage for all it was worth.It turned out to be worth a great deal. In the context of American-South Korean relations,the Geneva conference effectively began several weeks before the official opening date of April 26,1954.The first,and in some ways the most trying,task for the Eisenhower administration was to persuade Rhee to send delegates to the conference.In mid-February,the foreign ministers of the Big Four-the United States,the Soviet Union,Britain,and France-agreed at Berlin to a conference of interested parties at Geneva for the purpose of seeking the peaceful reunification of Korea and an end to the war in Indochina.No sooner had the com- munique from Berlin been issued than Rhee and his spokes- men began objecting vociferously to the proposed gathering, decrying both the conditions under which it had been called and the announced terms of negotiation,and threatening to boycott the conference. Rhee's reaction,in the opinion of American officials,was entirely in character.In the months before the armistice of 1953,Rhee had been extremely obstructive,fomenting opposition to the purposes of the UN forces in Korea and repeatedly hinting at unilateral action against the Commu- nists.Rhee's rhetoric and subversive activity had jeopardized the safety of American troops to such a degree that the Eisenhower administration seriously considered authorizing UN commander Mark Clark to conduct a military coup,ar- rest Rhee,and declare martial law throughout South Korea. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22.04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The "Other" Geneva Conference 61 themselves. Second, American relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK)-to use South Korea's official name-provide a valuable case study in the kind of superpower-client relations that have been an abiding feature of the Cold War, especially in Asia. Syngman Rhee, the South Korean president, depended on American support, and he knew it. But Rhee, like Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan and Ngo Dinh Diem and his successors in South Vietnam, also understood the degree to which American leaders believed that their country's credibility and prestige rested on America's willingness to defend him, and he played this advantage for all it was worth. It turned out to be worth a great deal. In the context of American-South Korean relations, the Geneva conference effectively began several weeks before the official opening date of April 26, 1954. The first, and in some ways the most trying, task for the Eisenhower administration was to persuade Rhee to send delegates to the conference. In mid-February, the foreign ministers of the Big Four-the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France-agreed at Berlin to a conference of interested parties at Geneva for the purpose of seeking the peaceful reunification of Korea and an end to the war in Indochina. No sooner had the communique from Berlin been issued than Rhee and his spokesmen began objecting vociferously to the proposed gathering, decrying both the conditions under which it had been called and the announced terms of negotiation, and threatening to boycott the conference. Rhee's reaction, in the opinion of American officials, was entirely in character. In the months before the armistice of 1953, Rhee had been extremely obstructive, fomenting opposition to the purposes of the UN forces in Korea and repeatedly hinting at unilateral action against the Communists. Rhee's rhetoric and subversive activity had jeopardized the safety of American troops to such a degree that the Eisenhower administration seriously considered authorizing UN commander Mark Clark to conduct a military coup, arrest Rhee, and declare martial law throughout South Korea. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
62 Pacific Historical Review Though this option had the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,it was opposed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who considered the political risks of such a move to outweigh any military advantages.The United States,after all,had spent billions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives pro- tecting Rhee's government;at this late date,the Eisenhower administration could hardly declare that he was not worth saving,or worse,that it would assist in his removal.Rejecting the coup plan,Dulles suggested soliciting Rhee's acquies- cence in an armistice with the promise of a security pact. At a meeting on May 30,1953,Eisenhower approved the recommendation.3 Even with the pledge of a treaty guaranteeing the secu- rity of the ROK,Rhee still did his best to subvert the truce negotiations.On June 18,he unilaterally solved the vexing problem of prisoner repatriation by allowing the "escape"of 25,000 North Korean POWs.Though Rhee's action was not unanticipated,it still infuriated American leaders,coming as it did at a crucial moment in the truce talks.However,there was little that could be done after the fact,and when the Communists appeared willing to overlook the incident and proceed to an armistice,Eisenhower contented himself with a stern warning to Rhee that similar action in the future would leave the ROK on its own. As a consequence of these actions,Rhee developed a 3.The contingency plan was labeled"Everready"and was described in a paper submitted by U.S.Eighth Army Commander Maxwell Taylor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 4,1953.See U.S.Dept.of State,Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954,Vol.XV:Korea(2 pts.,Washington,D.C.,1984),965-968.Also,memo- randum of State-JCS meeting,May 29,ibid.,1114-1119;memorandum for record, June 1,1953,ibid.,1126-1129.In addition,see Barton J.Bernstein,"The Origins of America's Commitments in Korea,"Foreign Service Journal,55(1978),10-13,34;and John Kotch,"The Origins of the American Security Commitment to Korea,"in Bruce Cumings,ed.,Child of Conflict:The Korean-American Relationship,1943-1953 (Seattle,1983),239-259. 4.Goulden,Untold Story,638-641;Eisenhower,Mandate for Change,185- 186;minutes of NSC meeting,June 18,1953,Foreign Relations,1952-1954,XV, 1,200-1.205. This condent downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
62 Pacific Historical Review Though this option had the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was opposed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who considered the political risks of such a move to outweigh any military advantages. The United States, after all, had spent billions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives protecting Rhee's government; at this late date, the Eisenhower administration could hardly declare that he was not worth saving, or worse, that it would assist in his removal. Rejecting the coup plan, Dulles suggested soliciting Rhee's acquiescence in an armistice with the promise of a security pact. At a meeting on May 30, 1953, Eisenhower approved the recommendation.3 Even with the pledge of a treaty guaranteeing the security of the ROK, Rhee still did his best to subvert the truce negotiations. On June 18, he unilaterally solved the vexing problem of prisoner repatriation by allowing the "escape" of 25,000 North Korean POWs. Though Rhee's action was not unanticipated, it still infuriated American leaders, coming as it did at a crucial moment in the truce talks. However, there was little that could be done after the fact, and when the Communists appeared willing to overlook the incident and proceed to an armistice, Eisenhower contented himself with a stern warning to Rhee that similar action in the future would leave the ROK on its own.4 As a consequence of these actions, Rhee developed a 3. The contingency plan was labeled "Everready" and was described in a paper submitted by U.S. Eighth Army Commander Maxwell Taylor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 4, 1953. See U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. XV: Korea (2 pts., Washington, D.C., 1984), 965-968. Also, memorandum of State-JCS meeting, May 29, ibid., 1114-1119; memorandum for record, June 1, 1953, ibid., 1126-1129. In addition, see BartonJ. Bernstein, "The Origins of America's Commitments in Korea," Foreign Service Journal, 55 (1978), 10-13, 34; and John Kotch, "The Origins of the American Security Commitment to Korea," in Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (Seattle, 1983), 239-259. 4. Goulden, Untold Story, 638-641; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 185- 186; minutes of NSC meeting, June 18, 1953, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, XV, 1,200-1,205. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The“Other'”Geneva Conference 63 reputation among American officials for extreme unpredic- tability.State Department analysts commented on his"mes- sianic sense of personal leadership,"compounded by in- cipient senility.Dulles's opinion of the septuagenarian Rhee was summarized in a memorandum to Eisenhower:"Presi- dent Rhee is old and feeble.He is highly nervous and moves from fits of great despondency to elation.His will is still powerful and he has three obsessions:(1)To continue in power;(2)To unite all of Korea under his leadership;(3)To give vent to his life-long hatred of the Japanese."5 Eisenhower's attitude toward Rhee included exaspera- tion,puzzlement,and a belief that Rhee posed almost as great a danger to American interests in Korea as the Com- munists.During the truce negotiations,Eisenhower several times told aide Sherman Adams that he wished the South Koreans would overthrow their president.A few days be- fore the armistice agreement was concluded,Eisenhower re- flected on Rhee in his diary: It is almost hopeless to write about the Korea-Rhee situation....It is impossible to attempt here to recite the long list in which Rhee has been completely uncooperative,even recalcitrant....Of course the fact remains that the probable enemy is the communists,but Rhee has been such an unsatisfactory ally that it is difficult indeed to avoid excoriating him in the strongest of terms. At a cabinet meeting at about the same time,Eisenhower commented on Rhee's unpredictability,adding a note from his own experience in Asia:"There's one thing I learned in the five years I served in the Army out there-we can never figure out the workings of the Oriental mind.You just can't tell how they will react."6 5.Intelligence Report (IR)6136 (Dec.23,1952)and IR 5933 (June 17,1952), Office of Intelligence Research(OIR),Department of State,Record Group 59, National Archives,Washington,D.C.(hereafter cited as RG 59,N.A.);Dulles to Eisenhower,Nov.26,1952,Foreign Relations,1952-1954,XV,693. 6.Adams,Firsthand,101;Eisenhower diary entry for July 24,1953,in Robert H. Ferrell,ed.,The Eisenhower Diaries (New York,1981),248. This condent downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The "Other" Geneva Conference 63 reputation among American officials for extreme unpredictability. State Department analysts commented on his "messianic sense of personal leadership," compounded by incipient senility. Dulles's opinion of the septuagenarian Rhee was summarized in a memorandum to Eisenhower: "President Rhee is old and feeble. He is highly nervous and moves from fits of great despondency to elation. His will is still powerful and he has three obsessions: (1) To continue in power; (2) To unite all of Korea under his leadership; (3) To give vent to his life-long hatred of the Japanese."' Eisenhower's attitude toward Rhee included exasperation, puzzlement, and a belief that Rhee posed almost as great a danger to American interests in Korea as the Communists. During the truce negotiations, Eisenhower several times told aide Sherman Adams that he wished the South Koreans would overthrow their president. A few days before the armistice agreement was concluded, Eisenhower reflected on Rhee in his diary: It is almost hopeless to write about the Korea-Rhee situation.... It is impossible to attempt here to recite the long list in which Rhee has been completely uncooperative, even recalcitrant. ... Of course the fact remains that the probable enemy is the communists, but Rhee has been such an unsatisfactory ally that it is difficult indeed to avoid excoriating him in the strongest of terms. At a cabinet meeting at about the same time, Eisenhower commented on Rhee's unpredictability, adding a note from his own experience in Asia: "There's one thing I learned in the five years I served in the Army out there-we can never figure out the workings of the Oriental mind. You just can't tell how they will react."'6 5. Intelligence Report (IR) 6136 (Dec. 23, 1952) and IR 5933 (June 17, 1952), Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as RG 59, N.A.); Dulles to Eisenhower, Nov. 26, 1952, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, XV, 693. 6. Adams, Firsthand, 101; Eisenhower diary entry forJuly 24, 1953, in Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New York, 1981), 248. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
64 Pacific Historical Review Rhee's apparent capriciousness worked greatly to his ad- vantage during the Geneva conference and the months pre- vious,as it had during the period leading up to the truce. The Eisenhower administration desired Rhee's support for, or at least acquiescence in,the conference as much as it had wanted his cooperation with the truce agreement.No one in the White House or the State Department considered the possibility of achieving a resolution of the Korean problem at Geneva to be very great;in a pre-conference strategy session, Dulles said that if he were making book on the possibility of the conference successfully reuniting Korea,he would have to give "considerable odds against."The importance of the conference,however,lay in the realm of public relations,or what the Eisenhower administration called "psychological warfare."If the conference,as expected,failed to resolve Korea's problems,the United States needed to be able to blame the failure on the Communists.The Communists, of course,would be trying to pin the blame on the United States;for them to be able to make a convincing case would be a damaging diplomatic defeat for the administration.' The psychological and diplomatic importance of Korea had been a major concern of the Eisenhower administra- tion since it entered office.To people like C.D.Jackson, Eisenhower's special assistant for psychological warfare, Korea offered an ideal opportunity for exploring what he described as"that twilight area where overt military and dip- lomatic action is inseparable from psychological warfare."At the time of the Korean ceasefire,Jackson's office had approved a comprehensive psychological-warfare program aimed at Korea,with the particular objectives of countering "post- armistice pessimism"in South Korea,encouraging ROK com- pliance with the armistice,promoting democracy "through discreet effort which recognizes Korea's right to choose its own institutions,and enlisting Rhee's support for the pro- 7.Memorandum of conversation,April 20,1954,U.S.Dept.of State,Foreign Relations of the United States,1952-1954,Vol.XVI:The Geneva Conference (Washing- ton,D.C,1981),122. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22.04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
64 Pacific Historical Review Rhee's apparent capriciousness worked greatly to his advantage during the Geneva conference and the months previous, as it had during the period leading up to the truce. The Eisenhower administration desired Rhee's support for, or at least acquiescence in, the conference as much as it had wanted his cooperation with the truce agreement. No one in the White House or the State Department considered the possibility of achieving a resolution of the Korean problem at Geneva to be very great; in a pre-conference strategy session, Dulles said that if he were making book on the possibility of the conference successfully reuniting Korea, he would have to give "considerable odds against." The importance of the conference, however, lay in the realm of public relations, or what the Eisenhower administration called "psychological warfare." If the conference, as expected, failed to resolve Korea's problems, the United States needed to be able to blame the failure on the Communists. The Communists, of course, would be trying to pin the blame on the United States; for them to be able to make a convincing case would be a damaging diplomatic defeat for the administration.7 The psychological and diplomatic importance of Korea had been a major concern of the Eisenhower administration since it entered office. To people like C. D. Jackson, Eisenhower's special assistant for psychological warfare, Korea offered an ideal opportunity for exploring what he described as "that twilight area where overt military and diplomatic action is inseparable from psychological warfare." At the time of the Korean ceasefire,Jackson's office had approved a comprehensive psychological-warfare program aimed at Korea, with the particular objectives of countering "postarmistice pessimism" in South Korea, encouraging ROK compliance with the armistice, promoting democracy "through discreet effort which recognizes Korea's right to choose its own institutions," and enlisting Rhee's support for the pro- 7. Memorandum of conversation, April 20, 1954, U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. XVI: The Geneva Conference (Washington, D.C., 1981), 122. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The“Other”Geneva Conference 65 posed political conference.Jackson and his colleagues did not expect their task to be easy,for the South Koreans seemed to be suffering from a case of collective manic de- pression."Korea has had a frustrating recent history,"stated one psychological-warfare report."Perhaps as a result of this,Korean aspirations,both personal and national,are gran- diose and often impossible of attainment.The resulting frus- trations induced by failure to achieve aspirations lead to mo- rose passivity,panic,or belligerence." As the Geneva conference approached,its importance to the United States increased daily,not for Korea's sake,but for the role it would play in the larger context of the Cold War. In the weeks before Geneva,the Eisenhower administration was attempting to line up support for military action in Indo- china,but with little success.The British,whose cooperation the administration presupposed vital to intervention,consid- ered Indochina a losing venture.Moreover,many people in Britain,remembering loose talk about the use of atomic weapons against the Chinese during the heavy fighting in Korea,considered the Americans trigger-happy.Whether British leaders agreed with this sentiment or not,it was some- thing they could not ignore.Neither,then,could the Eisen- hower administration.If there was to be any hope for united action in Indochina,the administration had to demonstrate that its fundamental goal in Asia was peace,and not the de- struction of Communist China,as many in Britain believed. Such a demonstration required a good showing at the Korea conference. And a good showing on Korea required the cooperation 8.Jackson to Robert Cutler,March 4,1953,box 2,Jackson Records,Eisenhower Library,Abilene,Kansas.United States Information Service(USIS)Country Plan: Korea,July 24,1953,box 4,ibid.Jackson landed his White House post largely on the basis of a World War II stint as Eisenhower's assistant for psychological warfare. Some detailed background on Jackson can be found in a lengthy obituary article of Sept.25,1964,in FYI,the house organ of Time,Inc.,where Jackson worked for many years.A copy of this article accompanies the Jackson Papers at the Eisenhower Library.See also Blanche Wiesen Cook,The Declassified Eisenhower (Garden City, N.Y.,1981),passim. This condent downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The "Other" Geneva Conference 65 posed political conference. Jackson and his colleagues did not expect their task to be easy, for the South Koreans seemed to be suffering from a case of collective manic depression. "Korea has had a frustrating recent history," stated one psychological-warfare report. "Perhaps as a result of this, Korean aspirations, both personal and national, are grandiose and often impossible of attainment. The resulting frustrations induced by failure to achieve aspirations lead to morose passivity, panic, or belligerence."8 As the Geneva conference approached, its importance to the United States increased daily, not for Korea's sake, but for the role it would play in the larger context of the Cold War. In the weeks before Geneva, the Eisenhower administration was attempting to line up support for military action in Indochina, but with little success. The British, whose cooperation the administration presupposed vital to intervention, considered Indochina a losing venture. Moreover, many people in Britain, remembering loose talk about the use of atomic weapons against the Chinese during the heavy fighting in Korea, considered the Americans trigger-happy. Whether British leaders agreed with this sentiment or not, it was something they could not ignore. Neither, then, could the Eisenhower administration. If there was to be any hope for united action in Indochina, the administration had to demonstrate that its fundamental goal in Asia was peace, and not the destruction of Communist China, as many in Britain believed. Such a demonstration required a good showing at the Korea conference. And a good showing on Korea required the cooperation 8. Jackson to Robert Cutler, March 4, 1953, box 2,Jackson Records, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. United States Information Service (USIS) Country Plan: Korea, July 24, 1953, box 4, ibid. Jackson landed his White House post largely on the basis of a World War II stint as Eisenhower's assistant for psychological warfare. Some detailed background on Jackson can be found in a lengthy obituary article of Sept. 25, 1964, in FYI, the house organ of Time, Inc., where Jackson worked for many years. A copy of this article accompanies the Jackson Papers at the Eisenhower Library. See also Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (Garden City, N.Y., 1981), passim. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
66 Pacific Historical Review of Rhee.The ROK president understood this fact,and he in- tended to make the Americans pay for his cooperation.No doubt Rhee was sincere in his expressions of his desire to re- unify his country;the independence and unity of Korea had been his goal since before World War I.However,he must also have realized that threats to resume the war,and other indications of what seemed to Americans to be irresponsi- bility and unpredictability,heightened his bargaining power. Such tactics had succeeded in gaining for him an American agreement to a bilateral security pact-no small concession by the Eisenhower administration since it flew in the face of American claims that the security of the ROK rested with the United Nations.Rhee's next objective was a buildup of South Korean armed forces,to the end of lessening his dependence on American troops for the security of the ROK,and with the longer-term goal,perhaps,of gaining the ability to attack the North with a reasonable chance of success.Rhee may have believed that,at some future date following the with- drawal of the Chinese from North Korea,Peking would not reintervene if ROK troops,unaccompanied by American forces,crossed the truce line.After all,in the warning Chou En-lai had issued in the autumn of 1950 when American units were beginning to cross the 38th parallel,the Chinese prime minister had specifically said that his government would not oppose the entry of ROK troops into the North, only American.In the spring of 1954,Rhee's forces had little offensive capability,but with American assistance,they might eventually acquire it. As soon as the Geneva conference was announced,Rhee's government had begun"heaping abuse"on the whole idea, according to Ellis Briggs,the American ambassador in Seoul. 9.Dulles attempted to finesse the apparent insult to the United Nations im- plicit in the bilateral treaty with South Korea by telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,"[O]f course...the United Nations Charter is also a treaty and its gen- eral terms are applicable to Korea,as to other parts of the world."(Kotch,"Origin of American Security Commitments,"259.)On Chou's warning,see Goulden,Untold Son,281. This condent downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
66 Pacific Historical Review of Rhee. The ROK president understood this fact, and he intended to make the Americans pay for his cooperation. No doubt Rhee was sincere in his expressions of his desire to reunify his country; the independence and unity of Korea had been his goal since before World War I. However, he must also have realized that threats to resume the war, and other indications of what seemed to Americans to be irresponsibility and unpredictability, heightened his bargaining power. Such tactics had succeeded in gaining for him an American agreement to a bilateral security pact-no small concession by the Eisenhower administration since it flew in the face of American claims that the security of the ROK rested with the United Nations. Rhee's next objective was a buildup of South Korean armed forces, to the end of lessening his dependence on American troops for the security of the ROK, and with the longer-term goal, perhaps, of gaining the ability to attack the North with a reasonable chance of success. Rhee may have believed that, at some future date following the withdrawal of the Chinese from North Korea, Peking would not reintervene if ROK troops, unaccompanied by American forces, crossed the truce line. After all, in the warning Chou En-lai had issued in the autumn of 1950 when American units were beginning to cross the 38th parallel, the Chinese prime minister had specifically said that his government would not oppose the entry of ROK troops into the North, only American. In the spring of 1954, Rhee's forces had little offensive capability, but with American assistance, they might eventually acquire it.9 As soon as the Geneva conference was announced, Rhee's government had begun "heaping abuse" on the whole idea, according to Ellis Briggs, the American ambassador in Seoul. 9. Dulles attempted to finesse the apparent insult to the United Nations implicit in the bilateral treaty with South Korea by telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "[O]f course ... the United Nations Charter is also a treaty and its general terms are applicable to Korea, as to other parts of the world." (Kotch, "Origin of American Security Commitments," 259.) On Chou's warning, see Goulden, Untold Story, 281. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The“Other'”Geneva Conference 67 Rhee,said Briggs,considered the conference "the unbap- tized off-spring resulting from the original sin,that is,the 1953 armistice agreement."Briggs saw "no clue"that Rhee would send representatives.He believed that Rhee would postpone a decision until the drift of American public opinion regarding the Geneva conference could be gauged.Briggs noted that the local press in Seoul had given broad coverage to reports of American congressional criticism of the Geneva conference:"it is apparent that Rhee is watching closely to see whether substantial American opinion might support his continuing to oppose the conference."10 The congressional criticism to which Briggs referred did indeed bear watching.When news of the Berlin agree- ment reached Washington,conservative Republicans de- clared that it amounted to de facto recognition of Peking. Homer Ferguson,head of the Republican policy committee in the Senate,predicted that the Geneva conference would be "of great propaganda value to Russia and to the Commu- nists generally."William Knowland,the Senate Republican leader and probably the most formidable of the congres- sional Asia-firsters,asserted darkly:"The American people will not consent to a Far Eastern Munich."Upon Dulles's re- turn from Berlin,a delegation of Republican legislators in- formed the secretary of state that they were washing their hands of the scheduled conference;the burden of Geneva would be upon the executive branch." However,American resistance to the Geneva conference was mostly of the sullen,passive sort,lacking the virulence that Rhee had hoped for.Accordingly,the ROK president began preparations for attending the conference,but on his own terms.On March 6,Rhee's foreign minister,Pyun Yung Tai,sent a letter to Dulles indicating that the ROK would 10.Briggs to State Dept.,Feb.20 and March 1,1954,Foreign Relations,1952- 1954,XVI,19-20,24-25.For ease of reading,understood words omitted in tele- graphic communications have been reinserted,here and below. 11.New York Times,Feb.20 and 23,1954. This condent downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The "Other" Geneva Conference 67 Rhee, said Briggs, considered the conference "the unbaptized off-spring resulting from the original sin, that is, the 1953 armistice agreement." Briggs saw "no clue" that Rhee would send representatives. He believed that Rhee would postpone a decision until the drift of American public opinion regarding the Geneva conference could be gauged. Briggs noted that the local press in Seoul had given broad coverage to reports of American congressional criticism of the Geneva conference: "it is apparent that Rhee is watching closely to see whether substantial American opinion might support his continuing to oppose the conference." o The congressional criticism to which Briggs referred did indeed bear watching. When news of the Berlin agreement reached Washington, conservative Republicans declared that it amounted to de facto recognition of Peking. Homer Ferguson, head of the Republican policy committee in the Senate, predicted that the Geneva conference would be "of great propaganda value to Russia and to the Communists generally." William Knowland, the Senate Republican leader and probably the most formidable of the congressional Asia-firsters, asserted darkly: "The American people will not consent to a Far Eastern Munich." Upon Dulles's return from Berlin, a delegation of Republican legislators informed the secretary of state that they were washing their hands of the scheduled conference; the burden of Geneva would be upon the executive branch." However, American resistance to the Geneva conference was mostly of the sullen, passive sort, lacking the virulence that Rhee had hoped for. Accordingly, the ROK president began preparations for attending the conference, but on his own terms. On March 6, Rhee's foreign minister, Pyun Yung Tai, sent a letter to Dulles indicating that the ROK would 10. Briggs to State Dept., Feb. 20 and March 1, 1954, Foreign Relations, 1952- 1954, XVI, 19-20, 24-25. For ease of reading, understood words omitted in telegraphic communications have been reinserted, here and below. 11. New York Times, Feb. 20 and 23, 1954. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
