上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源_Lesson 5_English materials_Bandung Conference.x

MATTHEW JONES A"Segregated"Asia?:Race,the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy,1954-1955 Writing in a March 1927 editorial for the Negro World,Amy Jacques Garvey conjectured that a "guilty conscience [had]begun to torture the white race. They foresee in awakened Asia the stern hand of retribution preparing to return measure for measure all that it has received.They are in the throes of a horrid nightmare....The cycle of civilization is shifting,and with it the battleground of the future.The age of the Atlantic has passed,the age of the Pacific is here." With the coming of Pacific dominance,the "superior force of Asiatic arms," aroused against Western influence,could eventually be turned against the United States.In such circumstances,Garvey asked,would fifteen million oppressed American Negroes "say that the Asiatics are wrong to demand racial equality,or will they sing,My country 'tis of thee,sweet land of liberty'?" Although there was a future possibility that the United States might offer a hand of friendship to China,she was not optimistic the racial divide between the white and nonwhite worlds could be bridged,concluding: It seems as if the inevitable must happen;Nordic arrogance refuses to treat with young Asia,and war clouds thicken,as the blacks of Africa and America and the yellow and brown peoples of Asia nurse a common resentment for being called inferior by white nations that spend their time exploiting and keeping them underfoot.' Such potent images of a united Asia,typically under Japanese leadership, forming a transnational alliance with disaffected African Americans found cur- rency in black internationalist writings during the interwar years.'One can also see how the war in the Far East of 1941-45 generated a new surge in these ideas,as concerns among white Americans mounted that Japan's ideology of “Asia for the Asians'”might create conditions where the peoples of a“liberated” 1.Amy Jacques Garvey,"Awakened Asia,"Negro World,19 March 1927.Reprinted in Voices of a Black Nation:Political Journalism in the Harlem Renaissance,ed.Theodore G.Vincent (San Francisco,1973),295-96. 2.See Marc Gallicchio,Tbe African American Encounter witb Japan and Cbina:Black Inter- nationalism in Asia,1895-1945 (Chapel Hill,NC,2000),210. DIPLOMATIC HisToRy,Vol.29,No.5 (November 2005).2005 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations(SHAFR).Published by Blackwell Publishing,Inc.,350 Main Street,Malden,MA,02148,USA and 96oo Garsington Road,Oxford OX4 2DQ,UK. 841

matthew jones A “Segregated” Asia?: Race, the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1954–1955 Writing in a March 1927 editorial for the Negro World, Amy Jacques Garvey conjectured that a “guilty conscience [had] begun to torture the white race. They foresee in awakened Asia the stern hand of retribution preparing to return measure for measure all that it has received. They are in the throes of a horrid nightmare. . . . The cycle of civilization is shifting, and with it the battleground of the future. The age of the Atlantic has passed, the age of the Pacific is here.” With the coming of Pacific dominance, the “superior force of Asiatic arms,” aroused against Western influence, could eventually be turned against the United States. In such circumstances, Garvey asked, would fifteen million oppressed American Negroes “say that the Asiatics are wrong to demand racial equality, or will they sing, ‘My country ’tis of thee, sweet land of liberty’?” Although there was a future possibility that the United States might offer a hand of friendship to China, she was not optimistic the racial divide between the white and nonwhite worlds could be bridged, concluding: It seems as if the inevitable must happen; Nordic arrogance refuses to treat with young Asia, and war clouds thicken, as the blacks of Africa and America and the yellow and brown peoples of Asia nurse a common resentment for being called inferior by white nations that spend their time exploiting and keeping them underfoot.1 Such potent images of a united Asia, typically under Japanese leadership, forming a transnational alliance with disaffected African Americans found cur￾rency in black internationalist writings during the interwar years.2 One can also see how the war in the Far East of 1941–45 generated a new surge in these ideas, as concerns among white Americans mounted that Japan’s ideology of “Asia for the Asians” might create conditions where the peoples of a “liberated” 841 Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 5 (November 2005). © 2005 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). Published by Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, 02148, USA and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK. 1. Amy Jacques Garvey, “Awakened Asia,” Negro World, 19 March 1927. Reprinted in Voices of a Black Nation: Political Journalism in the Harlem Renaissance, ed. Theodore G. Vincent (San Francisco, 1973), 295–96. 2. See Marc Gallicchio, The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Inter￾nationalism in Asia, 1895–1945 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000), 210

842:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY Asia were pitted against the humiliated European colonial powers,uneasily associated with the United States,in a struggle over the future of world civi- lization.3 According to Stanley Hornbeck,the longtime State Department adviser on Far Eastern affairs,world events were opening up not just"the chasm between Occident and Orient"but "the chasm of color."+That the pan-Asian "contagion"might spread to the African-American population (as several inva- sion fantasies of the Iozos published in Japan had predicted)was not entirely discounted by the U.S.authorities;in 1942,Secretary of War Henry L.Stimson, for example,believed that Japanese and Communist agitators were encourag- ing African-American demands for equality,and the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation was busy targeting Elijah Muhammad and the Black Muslims for their pro-Japanese sympathies.3 Over thirty years ago,in the middle of another Asian war which pitted "Occi- dentals"against "Orientals,"Harold Isaacs brought home the importance of race as a factor in the way the U.S.role in world affairs was perceived by a domestic and global audience.In the past few years,the multifaceted intersec- tion between race and U.S.foreign policy in the twentieth century has gener- ated an abundance of fresh scholarship.Studies have focused on the Cold War political pressures making for change in domestic civil rights policy,on the internationalism practiced by African Americans themselves,as they challenged colonialism and the apartheid regime in South Africa,and on the views of sig- nificant black leaders such as W.E.B.Du Bois.7 This article aims for a differ- ent perspective by looking at the ways preoccupations with race and color 3.The work of Christopher Thorne is essential here;see Allies of a Kind:The United States,Britain,and the War against Japan,1941-1945 (London,1978),5-12,175,291,359,539. See also John Dower,War witbout Mercy:Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York, I986. 4.Quoted in Christopher Thorne,The Issue of War:States,Societies and the Far Eastern Conflict of 1941-1945 (London,1985),178. 5.The points about Japanese propaganda and the Black Muslims are made in Dower, War witbout Mercy,174-75;for Japanese interwar invasion fantasies see Gallicchio,Africam American Encounter,58. 6.Harold R.Isaacs,"Race and Color in World Affairs,"Foreign Affairs 47 January 1969): 235-50.This is an article which is also included in the collection,George W.Shepherd,ed., Racial Influences on American Foreign Policy (New York,1970). 7.See Mary L.Dudziak,"Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,"Stanford Law Review 41 (November 1988):61-120;Dudziak,Cold War Civil Rigbts (London,2001);Azza Salama Layton,International Politics and Civil Rights Policies in the United States,1941-1960(Cambridge, MA,2000);Brenda Gayle Plummer,Rising Wind:Black Americans and U.S.Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill,NC,1996);Penny M.Von Eschen,Race against Empire:Black Amer- icans and Anticolonialism,1937-1957 (Ithaca,NY,1997);Gerald Horne,Black and Red:W.E.B. Du Bois and tbe Afro-American Response to the Cold War,1943-1963(Albany,NY,1986);Thomas Borstelmann,The Cold War and the Color Line:American Race Relations in the Global Arena (London,2001);Brenda Gayle Plummer,ed.,Windou on Freedom:Race,Civil Rights,and Foreign Affirs,1945-1988 (Chapel Hill,NC,2003);and,most recently,the pertinent and persuasive observations in Justin Hart,"Making Democracy Safe for the World:Race,Propaganda,and the Transformation of U.S.Foreign Policy during World War Two,"Pacific Historical Review 73 (February 2004):49-84

Asia were pitted against the humiliated European colonial powers, uneasily associated with the United States, in a struggle over the future of world civi￾lization.3 According to Stanley Hornbeck, the longtime State Department adviser on Far Eastern affairs, world events were opening up not just “the chasm between Occident and Orient” but “the chasm of color.”4 That the pan-Asian “contagion” might spread to the African-American population (as several inva￾sion fantasies of the 1920s published in Japan had predicted) was not entirely discounted by the U.S. authorities; in 1942, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, for example, believed that Japanese and Communist agitators were encourag￾ing African-American demands for equality, and the Federal Bureau of Investi￾gation was busy targeting Elijah Muhammad and the Black Muslims for their pro-Japanese sympathies.5 Over thirty years ago, in the middle of another Asian war which pitted “Occi￾dentals” against “Orientals,” Harold Isaacs brought home the importance of race as a factor in the way the U.S. role in world affairs was perceived by a domestic and global audience.6 In the past few years, the multifaceted intersec￾tion between race and U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century has gener￾ated an abundance of fresh scholarship. Studies have focused on the Cold War political pressures making for change in domestic civil rights policy, on the internationalism practiced by African Americans themselves, as they challenged colonialism and the apartheid regime in South Africa, and on the views of sig￾nificant black leaders such as W. E. B. Du Bois.7 This article aims for a differ￾ent perspective by looking at the ways preoccupations with race and color 842 : diplomatic history 3. The work of Christopher Thorne is essential here; see Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941–1945 (London, 1978), 5–12, 175, 291, 359, 539. See also John Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York, 1986). 4. Quoted in Christopher Thorne, The Issue of War: States, Societies and the Far Eastern Conflict of 1941–1945 (London, 1985), 178. 5. The points about Japanese propaganda and the Black Muslims are made in Dower, War without Mercy, 174–75; for Japanese interwar invasion fantasies see Gallicchio, African American Encounter, 58. 6. Harold R. Isaacs, “Race and Color in World Affairs,” Foreign Affairs 47 ( January 1969): 235–50. This is an article which is also included in the collection, George W. Shepherd, ed., Racial Influences on American Foreign Policy (New York, 1970). 7. See Mary L. Dudziak, “Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,” Stanford Law Review 41 (November 1988): 61–120; Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights (London, 2001); Azza Salama Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights Policies in the United States, 1941–1960 (Cambridge, MA, 2000); Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996); Penny M. Von Eschen, Race against Empire: Black Amer￾icans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957 (Ithaca, NY, 1997); Gerald Horne, Black and Red: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War, 1943–1963 (Albany, NY, 1986); Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (London, 2001); Brenda Gayle Plummer, ed., Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1988 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2003); and, most recently, the pertinent and persuasive observations in Justin Hart, “Making Democracy Safe for the World: Race, Propaganda, and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy during World War Two,” Pacific Historical Review 73 (February 2004): 49–84

A“Segregated'”Asia::843 informed American thinking and behavior about the U.S.position in Asia during the mid-195os,as recurring images and fears of potential racial conflict were applied to a new set of circumstances.By these means,it is possible to provide an extra layer of analysis to some of the more traditional approaches toward examining Sino-American confrontation across the decade.As Matthew Connelly has reminded us,alongside the anti-Communist fixations of the Cold War,the Eisenhower administration was often fearful of the emergence of North-South and more general racial tensions when it surveyed the interna- tional scene.The worldviews of individuals such as John Foster Dulles,it should be recalled,were shaped during the interwar years when pessimistic views of demographic trends in the West and a coming transnational race war were given wide currency.For Dulles,at times China could become "a big yellow blot on the map,"as he described it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1955." The idea of being "swamped"by an overwhelming Asian tide was never very far beneath the surface of the Western imagination.In one revealing minute composed in May 1953,Churchill vented his objections to the use of the"Amer- ican expression Asian"in the Foreign Office telegrams he had seen.Instead,the prime minister asserted that the term "Asiatic more correctly describes the vast and divergent communities of Asia,"and then added with unease:"Asian would look as if we were trying to bring them all together."On this occasion,it had to be explained to Churchill that "Asiatic"was "regarded in Asia as having a derogatory connotation"and hence its use had been discouraged,Foreign Office instructions having been issued in 1o5o to substitute the phrase "Asian" 8.Throughout this article,words denoting categories such as "white,""nonwhite,"and "Asian"are generally used without quotation marks for ease of style,but this should not be taken as unawareness about the sharply contested nature of such terms,or the "racial certain- ties"they tend to imply:in this I find sympathy with the approach of Matthew Frye Jacobson, Wbiteness of a Different Color:European Immigrants and the Alcbemy of Race (Cambridge,MA, I998),1X. 9.Matthew Connelly,"Taking off the Cold War Lens:Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence,"American Historical Review io5 (June 2000): 739-69.See also Matthew Connelly,A Diplomatic Revolution:Algeria's Figbt for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York,2002). 1o.Connelly,"Taking off the Cold War Lens,"752-53.Dulles was certainly "color con- scious"insofar as he identified himself as part of white,"Anglo-Saxon"civilization.In 1939, he wrote of the possibility of developing an "organic relationship"between the "democratic and Anglo-Saxon peoples"as a solution to the problems of peace and world order,while five ely e erce p maemelypleny thing which Anglo-Saxons would regard as fundamentally sound and inspiring."See Dulles to Curtis,II January 1939,f.23-4,MSS Curtis 13,and Dulles to Curtis,19 September 1944. f.36,MSS Curtis 31,Lionel Curtis Papers,Western Manuscripts Collection,Bodleian Library, Oxford.I am indebted to Inderjeet Parmar for drawing my attention to the existence of this correspondence. II.See Dulles statement to Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Formosa Treaty,24 January 1955,Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series),vol. VII,84th Cong.,ist sess.,1955(Washington,DC,1978),113

informed American thinking and behavior about the U.S. position in Asia during the mid-1950s, as recurring images and fears of potential racial conflict were applied to a new set of circumstances.8 By these means, it is possible to provide an extra layer of analysis to some of the more traditional approaches toward examining Sino-American confrontation across the decade. As Matthew Connelly has reminded us, alongside the anti-Communist fixations of the Cold War, the Eisenhower administration was often fearful of the emergence of North-South and more general racial tensions when it surveyed the interna￾tional scene.9 The worldviews of individuals such as John Foster Dulles, it should be recalled, were shaped during the interwar years when pessimistic views of demographic trends in the West and a coming transnational race war were given wide currency.10 For Dulles, at times China could become “a big yellow blot on the map,” as he described it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1955. 11 The idea of being “swamped” by an overwhelming Asian tide was never very far beneath the surface of the Western imagination. In one revealing minute composed in May 1953, Churchill vented his objections to the use of the “Amer￾ican expression Asian” in the Foreign Office telegrams he had seen. Instead, the prime minister asserted that the term “Asiatic more correctly describes the vast and divergent communities of Asia,” and then added with unease: “Asian would look as if we were trying to bring them all together.” On this occasion, it had to be explained to Churchill that “Asiatic” was “regarded in Asia as having a derogatory connotation” and hence its use had been discouraged, Foreign Office instructions having been issued in 1950 to substitute the phrase “Asian” A “Segregated” Asia? : 843 8. Throughout this article, words denoting categories such as “white,” “nonwhite,” and “Asian” are generally used without quotation marks for ease of style, but this should not be taken as unawareness about the sharply contested nature of such terms, or the “racial certain￾ties” they tend to imply; in this I find sympathy with the approach of Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, MA, 1998), ix. 9. Matthew Connelly, “Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence,” American Historical Review 105 ( June 2000): 739–69. See also Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York, 2002). 10. Connelly, “Taking off the Cold War Lens,” 752–53. Dulles was certainly “color con￾scious” insofar as he identified himself as part of white, “Anglo-Saxon” civilization. In 1939, he wrote of the possibility of developing an “organic relationship” between the “democratic and Anglo-Saxon peoples” as a solution to the problems of peace and world order, while five years later noted his pessimism about the outcome of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference “largely because the different Russian philosophy makes it extremely difficult to produce any￾thing which Anglo-Saxons would regard as fundamentally sound and inspiring.” See Dulles to Curtis, 11 January 1939, f.23–4, MSS Curtis 13, and Dulles to Curtis, 19 September 1944, f.36, MSS Curtis 31, Lionel Curtis Papers, Western Manuscripts Collection, Bodleian Library, Oxford. I am indebted to Inderjeet Parmar for drawing my attention to the existence of this correspondence. 11. See Dulles statement to Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Formosa Treaty, 24 January 1955, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. VII, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955 (Washington, DC, 1978), 113

844:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY instead."The image that was immediately invoked for many Americans in the Iosos by the term "Asia,"as Isaacs highlighted in an influential study of the period,was of "an undifferentiated crush of humanity,""a dread blur of mystery and fearfulness,associated with vast numbers,with barbarism,and with disease."What was also clear,moreover,was that Asia was restive and in ferment,consumed by the drive for self-determination and independence,with "dark peoples determined to assert themselves."With the struggle against communism now fully engaged,Asia was increasingly viewed as a source of future danger to the United States,adherents to this "apocalyptic"perspective making such free associations as:"Soviet imperialism plus Chinese imperialism, overwhelming combinations of Asian populations;Western civilization is out- numbered,white civilization is outnumbered,and could go under." As Americans contemplated their role and policies in Asia during the 1o5os, two features that contributed to racial factors playing such a significant part in the still-recent Far Eastern war of 1941-45 were once again present.The first was that the United States faced another nonwhite adversary,the People's Republic of China(PRC),animated by an ideology that stressed anti- imperialism and the expulsion of a corrosive Western influence from Asia,the latter representing a point of continuity with the wartime message propagated by the Japanese.With few exceptions,this fundamental point has tended to be neglected as diplomatic historians have concentrated more on the traditional geopolitical and strategic aspects of the conflict with China.'s In the first few years after Pearl Harbor,China had been regarded by the United States as a key ally in the struggle against Japan,not least as this relationship could mitigate the degree to which the war in Asia represented a clash between East and West,or white and nonwhite peoples.By the Iosos,Washington was once more in search of Asian friends and allies,this time in their struggle against the mainland Communist Chinese usurpers.Though the geopolitical need to construct a military ring of containment around China was paramount,a sub- sidiary (and often overlooked)purpose of this search was to counteract any impression that this was once again a "civilizational"confrontation between the 12.See Churchill minute for Strang,M.120/53,I May 1953,Swinton to Churchill,No. 21/53,18 May 1953,PREM 11/518,U.K.National Archives (UKNA),Kew,London;the prime minister was not impressed:"I fear I can not agree.Pray discuss this with me";Churchill note,28 May 1953,PREM I1/518,UKNA.During the same period,Chester Bowles,the U.S. ambassador to India,was also noting how the word"Asiatic"was now"taken as a kind of insult" in the region;see Chester Bowles,Ambassador Reports (London,1954),97. 13.Harold R.Isaacs,Scratcbes on Our Minds:American Views of China and India (New York, 198o;originally published 1958),54-55. 14.Ibid.,58. I5.On the mixing of the imagery of the“yellow”and“red”perils in the language of the Eisenhower administration see Gordon Chang,Friends and Enemies:The United States,China, and tbe Soviet Union,1948-1972 (Stanford,CA,1990),170-74.Bruce Cumings has also high- lighted the racial imagery employed by Americans during the Korean War;see,for example, Tbe Origins of the Korean War,Volume Il:Tbe Roaring of tbe Cataract,1947-1950 (Princeton, J,199o,694-96

instead.12 The image that was immediately invoked for many Americans in the 1950s by the term “Asia,” as Isaacs highlighted in an influential study of the period, was of “an undifferentiated crush of humanity,” “a dread blur of mystery and fearfulness, associated with vast numbers, with barbarism, and with disease.” What was also clear, moreover, was that Asia was restive and in ferment, consumed by the drive for self-determination and independence, with “dark peoples determined to assert themselves.”13 With the struggle against communism now fully engaged, Asia was increasingly viewed as a source of future danger to the United States, adherents to this “apocalyptic” perspective making such free associations as: “Soviet imperialism plus Chinese imperialism, overwhelming combinations of Asian populations; Western civilization is out￾numbered, white civilization is outnumbered, and could go under.”14 As Americans contemplated their role and policies in Asia during the 1950s, two features that contributed to racial factors playing such a significant part in the still-recent Far Eastern war of 1941–45 were once again present. The first was that the United States faced another nonwhite adversary, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), animated by an ideology that stressed anti￾imperialism and the expulsion of a corrosive Western influence from Asia, the latter representing a point of continuity with the wartime message propagated by the Japanese. With few exceptions, this fundamental point has tended to be neglected as diplomatic historians have concentrated more on the traditional geopolitical and strategic aspects of the conflict with China.15 In the first few years after Pearl Harbor, China had been regarded by the United States as a key ally in the struggle against Japan, not least as this relationship could mitigate the degree to which the war in Asia represented a clash between East and West, or white and nonwhite peoples. By the 1950s, Washington was once more in search of Asian friends and allies, this time in their struggle against the mainland Communist Chinese usurpers. Though the geopolitical need to construct a military ring of containment around China was paramount, a sub￾sidiary (and often overlooked) purpose of this search was to counteract any impression that this was once again a “civilizational” confrontation between the 844 : diplomatic history 12. See Churchill minute for Strang, M.120/53, 1 May 1953, Swinton to Churchill, No. 21/53, 18 May 1953, PREM 11/518, U.K. National Archives (UKNA), Kew, London; the prime minister was not impressed: “I fear I can not agree. Pray discuss this with me”; Churchill note, 28 May 1953, PREM 11/518, UKNA. During the same period, Chester Bowles, the U.S. ambassador to India, was also noting how the word “Asiatic” was now “taken as a kind of insult” in the region; see Chester Bowles, Ambassador Reports (London, 1954), 97. 13. Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds: American Views of China and India (New York, 1980; originally published 1958), 54–55. 14. Ibid., 58. 15. On the mixing of the imagery of the “yellow” and “red” perils in the language of the Eisenhower administration see Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 (Stanford, CA, 1990), 170–74. Bruce Cumings has also high￾lighted the racial imagery employed by Americans during the Korean War; see, for example, The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950 (Princeton, NJ, 1990), 694–96

A“Segregated”Asia::845 West and Asia,with the Americans carrying the banner for Western and white imperialism. In their quest for influence on the Asian scene,the United States was ham- pered,in a second feature of continuity from its wartime experience,by ties with the European colonial powers.During the Iosos,Washington often saw its anticolonial credentials undermined by the support it felt compelled to offer European-controlled areas faced with Communist threats and pressures,while the PRC lost little opportunity to push home such double standards in their own search for influence among Asian nationalist movements.6 It was widely recognized that the United States faced a demanding challenge if it wanted to convince Asian nationalist leaders of its good intentions.In May 1951,one of the important National Security Council (NSC)48 series of policy papers on the area warned that Asian resentment tended to be directed at talk of Western- style democracy,when this had so often in the past been associated with colonial oppression and white privilege:"The United States faces a formidable political and propaganda task in establishing relations with Asia on a basis of mutual confidence and common interest,and in influencing the intense nation- alism to take a direction harmonious with the interests of the Free World."7 For Americans,alignment with"the West"as a distinct entity could not be easily avoided,and this dilemma was raised in its most volatile form when it came to the issue of race,where the U.S.domestic record was a serious handicap.For Asian societies emerging from colonial rule,racial discrimination had been an intrinsic component of Western imperial domination,and the area continued to be acutely sensitive as new governments sought recognition and equality of status and treatment by the major powers.At a press conference in Cairo in June 1953,Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru took the opportunity to remind his audience that "the strongest urge still in Asia and Africa is basically the nationalist urge against foreign domination.But together with that I may associate of course the urge against racial domination."9 Following her trip to India in 1954,Eleanor Roosevelt reported that"we have against us their feeling that we,because our skins are white,necessarily look down upon all peoples whose skins are yellow or black or brown.This thought is never out of their minds [and]they always asked me pointedly...about our treatment of minori- ties in our country."To many Asian observers,American talk of leadership of 16.See,for example,the essays in David Ryan and Victor Pungong,eds.,The United States and Decolonization:Power and Freedom (London,2000). 17.NSC 48/5,"U.S.Objectives,Policies and Courses of Action in Asia,"17 May 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS),1951(Washington,DC,1977),pt.1, 6:44 18.See,for example,Philip Mason,Patterns of Dominance (London,1971),33-38;Hugh Tinker,Race,Conflict and the International Order:From Empire to United Nations (London,1977), 17-22. 19.Nehru statement,25 June 1953,Ravinder Kumar and H.Y.Sharada Prasad,eds., Selected Works of Jawabarlal Nebru,2d series,vol.22 (New Delhi,1998),82. 20.Eleanor Roosevelt,India and the Awakening East (London,1954),91

West and Asia, with the Americans carrying the banner for Western and white imperialism. In their quest for influence on the Asian scene, the United States was ham￾pered, in a second feature of continuity from its wartime experience, by ties with the European colonial powers. During the 1950s, Washington often saw its anticolonial credentials undermined by the support it felt compelled to offer European-controlled areas faced with Communist threats and pressures, while the PRC lost little opportunity to push home such double standards in their own search for influence among Asian nationalist movements.16 It was widely recognized that the United States faced a demanding challenge if it wanted to convince Asian nationalist leaders of its good intentions. In May 1951, one of the important National Security Council (NSC) 48 series of policy papers on the area warned that Asian resentment tended to be directed at talk of Western￾style democracy, when this had so often in the past been associated with colonial oppression and white privilege: “The United States faces a formidable political and propaganda task in establishing relations with Asia on a basis of mutual confidence and common interest, and in influencing the intense nation￾alism to take a direction harmonious with the interests of the Free World.”17 For Americans, alignment with “the West” as a distinct entity could not be easily avoided, and this dilemma was raised in its most volatile form when it came to the issue of race, where the U.S. domestic record was a serious handicap. For Asian societies emerging from colonial rule, racial discrimination had been an intrinsic component of Western imperial domination, and the area continued to be acutely sensitive as new governments sought recognition and equality of status and treatment by the major powers.18 At a press conference in Cairo in June 1953, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru took the opportunity to remind his audience that “the strongest urge still in Asia and Africa is basically the nationalist urge against foreign domination. But together with that I may associate of course the urge against racial domination.”19 Following her trip to India in 1954, Eleanor Roosevelt reported that “we have against us their feeling that we, because our skins are white, necessarily look down upon all peoples whose skins are yellow or black or brown. This thought is never out of their minds [and] they always asked me pointedly . . . about our treatment of minori￾ties in our country.”20 To many Asian observers, American talk of leadership of A “Segregated” Asia? : 845 16. See, for example, the essays in David Ryan and Victor Pungong, eds., The United States and Decolonization: Power and Freedom (London, 2000). 17. NSC 48/5, “U.S. Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia,” 17 May 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1951 (Washington, DC, 1977), pt. 1, 6:44. 18. See, for example, Philip Mason, Patterns of Dominance (London, 1971), 33–38; Hugh Tinker, Race, Conflict and the International Order: From Empire to United Nations (London, 1977), 17–22. 19. Nehru statement, 25 June 1953, Ravinder Kumar and H. Y. Sharada Prasad, eds., Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 2d series, vol. 22 (New Delhi, 1998), 82. 20. Eleanor Roosevelt, India and the Awakening East (London, 1954), 91

846:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY the (invariably capitalized)"Free World"rang hollow in the face of the dis- crimination and violence endured by many African Americans,and as massive resistance in the South to the Supreme Court's Brown ruling of 1954 began to gather pace." After the so-called loss of China to communism in 1949,successive admin- istrations in Washington experienced deep anxiety that further setbacks were likely if Asian hearts and minds were not won over to the Western position. The frustrating stalemate in Korea,followed by the emergence of a Commu- nist state in North Vietnam in 1954,added to the sense that the United States, and the message it was carrying,was not only on the defensive,but steadily losing ground.Amid speculation that McCarthyism had brought the interna- tional image of the United States to a low point,in the summer of 1o53 the NSC asked for studies on the subject to be compiled.The results made for some uncomfortable reading,with links with the older European colonial powers seen as a major problem,and suspicion of American imperialism considered "the single most adverse influence on American prestige";in its analysis of the Far East,the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB)reported the prevalence of "racial sensitivity and antipathy to [the]Western powers,"as well as the "per- sistent belief,despite U.S.professions to contrary,that [the]U.S.regards Asiatic people as inferior,that [the]U.S.tends to patronize Asia,and that U.S.peoples and practices do not accord Asiatic governments genuinely equal status with [the]Western powers."3 These issues were particularly pronounced when it came to relations with India,often considered the most significant non-Communist power in Asia, and where for Indians,as Chester Bowles,the U.S.ambassador,wrote to John Foster Dulles in March 1953,"in forming individual and national attitudes toward world affairs the color question is the most basic of all."+From the record of U.S.diplomacy in the Middle East,Asia,and South Africa,it was easy to draw the lesson that the U.S.government,as at home,identified with the interests of whites over nonwhites.In February 1955,the U.S.charge d'affaires in New Delhi was telling the New York Tintes correspondent Cy Sulzberger that anti-American feeling in India derived from: 21.See,for example,Dudziak,Cold War Civil Rights,118-19;also Frenise A.Logan, "Racism and U.S.-Indian Relations,1947-1953:Views in the Indian Press,"Pacific Historical Review 54 (February 1985):71-79. 22.See Christina Klein,Cold War Orientalism:Asia in the Middlebrou Imagination, 1945-196r (Berkeley,CA,2003),27-28. 23.Study prepared by the OCB,"Reported Decline in U.S.Prestige Abroad,"23 Sep- tember 1953,in FRUS,1952-54 (Washington,DC,1983),pt.1,1:1466-47,1489-90,1531. 24.This was also,Bowles believed,the reason why most Indians looked "with strong sym- pathy toward other Asian people including the Chinese"and "admit to [a]certain twisted, secret,pleasurable reaction when they hear that their fellow Asians,the Chinese,are success- fully holding off the Americans in Korea."See Bowles to Dulles,20 March 1953.folder 243, box 94,Chester Bowles Papers,Sterling Memorial Library,Yale University,New Haven, Connecticut

the (invariably capitalized) “Free World” rang hollow in the face of the dis￾crimination and violence endured by many African Americans, and as massive resistance in the South to the Supreme Court’s Brown ruling of 1954 began to gather pace.21 After the so-called loss of China to communism in 1949, successive admin￾istrations in Washington experienced deep anxiety that further setbacks were likely if Asian hearts and minds were not won over to the Western position. The frustrating stalemate in Korea, followed by the emergence of a Commu￾nist state in North Vietnam in 1954, added to the sense that the United States, and the message it was carrying, was not only on the defensive, but steadily losing ground.22 Amid speculation that McCarthyism had brought the interna￾tional image of the United States to a low point, in the summer of 1953 the NSC asked for studies on the subject to be compiled. The results made for some uncomfortable reading, with links with the older European colonial powers seen as a major problem, and suspicion of American imperialism considered “the single most adverse influence on American prestige”; in its analysis of the Far East, the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) reported the prevalence of “racial sensitivity and antipathy to [the] Western powers,” as well as the “per￾sistent belief, despite U.S. professions to contrary, that [the] U.S. regards Asiatic people as inferior, that [the] U.S. tends to patronize Asia, and that U.S. peoples and practices do not accord Asiatic governments genuinely equal status with [the] Western powers.”23 These issues were particularly pronounced when it came to relations with India, often considered the most significant non-Communist power in Asia, and where for Indians, as Chester Bowles, the U.S. ambassador, wrote to John Foster Dulles in March 1953, “in forming individual and national attitudes toward world affairs the color question is the most basic of all.”24 From the record of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East, Asia, and South Africa, it was easy to draw the lesson that the U.S. government, as at home, identified with the interests of whites over nonwhites. In February 1955, the U.S. chargé d’affaires in New Delhi was telling the New York Times correspondent Cy Sulzberger that anti-American feeling in India derived from: 846 : diplomatic history 21. See, for example, Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 118–19; also Frenise A. Logan, “Racism and U.S.-Indian Relations, 1947–1953: Views in the Indian Press,” Pacific Historical Review 54 (February 1985): 71–79. 22. See Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961 (Berkeley, CA, 2003), 27–28. 23. Study prepared by the OCB, “Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad,” 23 Sep￾tember 1953, in FRUS, 1952–54 (Washington, DC, 1983), pt. 1, 1:1466–47, 1489–90, 1531. 24. This was also, Bowles believed, the reason why most Indians looked “with strong sym￾pathy toward other Asian people including the Chinese” and “admit to [a] certain twisted, secret, pleasurable reaction when they hear that their fellow Asians, the Chinese, are success￾fully holding off the Americans in Korea.” See Bowles to Dulles, 20 March 1953, folder 243, box 94, Chester Bowles Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

A“Segregated”Asia2:847 I.Racisu:the American white domination attitude. 2.Iuperialisi:the white man was the imperialist in Asia.We supported the French in Indochina and Chiang as a dummy against Mao.We are the all-powerful representative of the white West.'s As Christina Klein has contended,these accumulated anxieties,that a negative policy of containment was inadequate in the face of the insidious Communist threat in Asia,found cultural and aesthetic expression in an "imaginary of integration,"where differences between peoples could be bridged through the empathy,commitment,and engagement of ordinary Americans with a world emerging from colonialism.The compelling need to avoid any appearance of racism,to discard any association with the language and attitudes of im- perialism,and to bring about the political and economic integration of non-Communist Asia formed important strands in the policy and rhetorical approaches of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.6 Examining Washington's attempts to organize the collective defense of Southeast Asia during 1954,and the subsequent reactions induced by the gath- ering of twenty-nine Asian and African states at Bandung in 1955,help to show how these concerns,and the subject of race,lay beneath much official Ameri- can thinking in this period.*7 Throughout the early 1osos,U.S.policymakers referred repeatedly to the need to avoid any impression being given to Asian 25.Diary entry for 8 February 1955,C.L.Sulzberger,The Last of the Giants (New York, 1970),132.U.S.officials were also aware that the Soviet Union,due to its supposed part-Asian "racial"characteristics,possessed clear advantages in appealing to a non-European audience; in 1955,the CIA's assistant director of national estimates can be found arguing that "West- erners have too often acted in a tactless and overbearing manner.They don't forget the Kipling concept of 'lesser breeds.'The Communists are very astute in their approach.They have created the impression that they do not look upon these people as 'backward'or 'underdevel- oped,'phrases we have too often used.The struggle between the Soviets and U.S.and Western Europe,together with the racial and geographic background of the Soviets,have made it pos- sible for the Soviets to get themselves accepted as non-Europeans,as fellow Asians."See "Reasons for the Impact of the Soviet Orbit's Military,Economic and Cultural Drive in the Middle East,South and Southeast Asia,"Sherman Kent memorandum for Allen Dulles,29 November 1955,folder 9,box Ioo,Allen Dulles Papers,Seeley Mudd Library,Princeton University,Princeton,New Jersey. 26.Klein,Cold War Orientalism,37-49.Note also Andrew Rotter's view that"white Amer- ican policymakers...saw Indians and other dark-skinned people as racial Others,in funda- mental ways different from and inferior to whites.Because racial differences were felt so deeply by whites,race thinking conditioned foreign policy decisions.American policymakers after 1947 seldom said they were making policy for racial reasons.It would not have been fashion- able to do so....And yet,there is indirect but compelling evidence that American officials were thinking in racial terms when they made policy toward Latin America,Asia and Africa"; see Andrew J.Rotter,Comrades at Odds:The United States and India,1947-1964 (Ithaca,NY, 200o,154 27.American reactions to the Bandung Conference have also been traced by Cary Fraser. This article differs in the important links it draws with other contemporary developments, including the formation of SEATO,the conclusions it reaches regarding Bandung's signifi- cance for pan-Asianism,and the array of perspectives and sources it employs;see Cary Fraser, "An American Dilemma:Race and Realpolitik in the American Response to the Bandung Con- ference,1955,"in Plummer,Window on Freedom,115-40

1. Racism: the American white domination attitude. 2. Imperialism: the white man was the imperialist in Asia. We supported the French in Indochina and Chiang as a dummy against Mao. We are the all-powerful representative of the white West.25 As Christina Klein has contended, these accumulated anxieties, that a negative policy of containment was inadequate in the face of the insidious Communist threat in Asia, found cultural and aesthetic expression in an “imaginary of integration,” where differences between peoples could be bridged through the empathy, commitment, and engagement of ordinary Americans with a world emerging from colonialism. The compelling need to avoid any appearance of racism, to discard any association with the language and attitudes of im￾perialism, and to bring about the political and economic integration of non-Communist Asia formed important strands in the policy and rhetorical approaches of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.26 Examining Washington’s attempts to organize the collective defense of Southeast Asia during 1954, and the subsequent reactions induced by the gath￾ering of twenty-nine Asian and African states at Bandung in 1955, help to show how these concerns, and the subject of race, lay beneath much official Ameri￾can thinking in this period.27 Throughout the early 1950s, U.S. policymakers referred repeatedly to the need to avoid any impression being given to Asian A “Segregated” Asia? : 847 25. Diary entry for 8 February 1955, C. L. Sulzberger, The Last of the Giants (New York, 1970), 132. U.S. officials were also aware that the Soviet Union, due to its supposed part-Asian “racial” characteristics, possessed clear advantages in appealing to a non-European audience; in 1955, the CIA’s assistant director of national estimates can be found arguing that “West￾erners have too often acted in a tactless and overbearing manner. They don’t forget the Kipling concept of ‘lesser breeds.’ The Communists are very astute in their approach. They have created the impression that they do not look upon these people as ‘backward’ or ‘underdevel￾oped,’ phrases we have too often used. The struggle between the Soviets and U.S. and Western Europe, together with the racial and geographic background of the Soviets, have made it pos￾sible for the Soviets to get themselves accepted as non-Europeans, as fellow Asians.” See “Reasons for the Impact of the Soviet Orbit’s Military, Economic and Cultural Drive in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia,” Sherman Kent memorandum for Allen Dulles, 29 November 1955, folder 9, box 100, Allen Dulles Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. 26. Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 37–49. Note also Andrew Rotter’s view that “white Amer￾ican policymakers . . . saw Indians and other dark-skinned people as racial Others, in funda￾mental ways different from and inferior to whites. Because racial differences were felt so deeply by whites, race thinking conditioned foreign policy decisions. American policymakers after 1947 seldom said they were making policy for racial reasons. It would not have been fashion￾able to do so. . . . And yet, there is indirect but compelling evidence that American officials were thinking in racial terms when they made policy toward Latin America, Asia and Africa”; see Andrew J. Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964 (Ithaca, NY, 2000), 154. 27. American reactions to the Bandung Conference have also been traced by Cary Fraser. This article differs in the important links it draws with other contemporary developments, including the formation of SEATO, the conclusions it reaches regarding Bandung’s signifi- cance for pan-Asianism, and the array of perspectives and sources it employs; see Cary Fraser, “An American Dilemma: Race and Realpolitik in the American Response to the Bandung Con￾ference, 1955,” in Plummer, Window on Freedom, 115–40

848:D IP LO MAT IC HISTORY opinion that security arrangements in the Far East were being built around an exclusive all-white grouping,involving the principal Western powers with inter- ests or colonial possessions in the region.The early meetings of the ANZUS alliance,bringing together the United States,Australia,and New Zealand,had already,noted the U.S.ambassador to Thailand in February 1953,aroused"an undercurrent [of]concern [that the]major Western Powers [are]determined [to]exercise some kind of White man's monopoly over [the]defense [of]South- east Asia."The regional planning adviser in the State Department's Far East Bureau,Charlton Ogburn,emphasized the dangers of organizing defense efforts "behind the backs of the Asians,"while there was no explanation,so far as I can see,that we can offer the Asians of our reasons for developing special and exclusive relationships with the other Western powers in their part of the world that will not allay or even mitigate the sense of affront and of injury with which they must regard such a development ..the plain fact is that any exclusively Western joint action in Asia must carry with it the implication that we do not take the Asians very seriously and in fact regard them as inferior.We shall not be able to avoid this impli- cation because that is indeed our attitude.*9 One of the reasons why both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations were so adamantly opposed to any extension of ANZUS to include Britain was the belief,as U.S.Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith put it in August 1953,that this would be further represented in Asia as "either a revival of western imperialism'or an instrument of 'white supremacy.'"3 Prompted by the Indochina crisis of 1954 into reconsidering their prior opposition to sponsoring the formation of a wider security pact to cover South- east Asia,Eisenhower,Dulles,and other senior officials were convinced that by including friendly Asian states in any new alliance grouping the stigma of asso- ciation with Western imperialism could be avoided.3 The racial dimension to 28.Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton)to Department of State,18 February 1953,FRUS, 1952-54 (Washington,DC,1984),pt.I,12:274. 29.Memorandum by the Far East Regional Planning Adviser to the Assistant Secretary for the Far East,2I January 1953,ibid.,260-62. 30.See Acheson to Truman,30 July 1952,ibid.,16o;memorandum of conversation between Acheson,Casey,and Spender,II November 1952,ibid.,238;Bedell Smith to Wilson, 2I August 1953,ibid.,335.A similar point is also made in Henry W.Brands,Jr,"From ANZUS to SEATO:United States Strategic Policy towards Australia and New Zealand, 1952-1954,"International History Review 9 (May 1987):261-63.During the discussions over the formation of ANZUS in early 1951,John Foster Dulles,then acting as a consultant to the State Department,had hoped to provide for Philippine inclusion,so that the alliance did not appear as a"closed club for Anglo-Saxons";see W.David McIntyre,Background to the ANZUS Pact:Policy-Making,Strategy and Diplomacy,1945-55 (London,1995),334. 31.Asian participation might also counter the charge that the United States shared the common Western colonial practice of assigning races to martial or nonmartial categories, assuming that,as Kiernan put it,"Generally speaking,the lighter the skin,the sharper the sword."See Victor Gordon Kiernan,The Lords of Human Kind:European Attitudes towards the Outside World in the Imperial Age (London,1969),315

opinion that security arrangements in the Far East were being built around an exclusive all-white grouping, involving the principal Western powers with inter￾ests or colonial possessions in the region. The early meetings of the ANZUS alliance, bringing together the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, had already, noted the U.S. ambassador to Thailand in February 1953, aroused “an undercurrent [of ] concern [that the] major Western Powers [are] determined [to] exercise some kind of White man’s monopoly over [the] defense [of ] South￾east Asia.”28 The regional planning adviser in the State Department’s Far East Bureau, Charlton Ogburn, emphasized the dangers of organizing defense efforts “behind the backs of the Asians,” while there was no explanation, so far as I can see, that we can offer the Asians of our reasons for developing special and exclusive relationships with the other Western powers in their part of the world that will not allay or even mitigate the sense of affront and of injury with which they must regard such a development . . . the plain fact is that any exclusively Western joint action in Asia must carry with it the implication that we do not take the Asians very seriously and in fact regard them as inferior. We shall not be able to avoid this impli￾cation because that is indeed our attitude.29 One of the reasons why both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations were so adamantly opposed to any extension of ANZUS to include Britain was the belief, as U.S. Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith put it in August 1953, that this would be further represented in Asia as “either a revival of ‘western imperialism’ or an instrument of ‘white supremacy.’”30 Prompted by the Indochina crisis of 1954 into reconsidering their prior opposition to sponsoring the formation of a wider security pact to cover South￾east Asia, Eisenhower, Dulles, and other senior officials were convinced that by including friendly Asian states in any new alliance grouping the stigma of asso￾ciation with Western imperialism could be avoided.31 The racial dimension to 848 : diplomatic history 28. Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to Department of State, 18 February 1953, FRUS, 1952–54 (Washington, DC, 1984), pt. 1, 12:274. 29. Memorandum by the Far East Regional Planning Adviser to the Assistant Secretary for the Far East, 21 January 1953, ibid., 260–62. 30. See Acheson to Truman, 30 July 1952, ibid., 160; memorandum of conversation between Acheson, Casey, and Spender, 11 November 1952, ibid., 238; Bedell Smith to Wilson, 21 August 1953, ibid., 335. A similar point is also made in Henry W. Brands, Jr., “From ANZUS to SEATO: United States Strategic Policy towards Australia and New Zealand, 1952–1954,” International History Review 9 (May 1987): 261–63. During the discussions over the formation of ANZUS in early 1951, John Foster Dulles, then acting as a consultant to the State Department, had hoped to provide for Philippine inclusion, so that the alliance did not appear as a “closed club for Anglo-Saxons”; see W. David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945–55 (London, 1995), 334. 31. Asian participation might also counter the charge that the United States shared the common Western colonial practice of assigning races to martial or nonmartial categories, assuming that, as Kiernan put it, “Generally speaking, the lighter the skin, the sharper the sword.” See Victor Gordon Kiernan, The Lords of Human Kind: European Attitudes towards the Outside World in the Imperial Age (London, 1969), 315

A“Segregated”Asia::849 these concerns over what finally emerged as the Manila Pact,or the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization(SEATO)as it became more popularly known soon after its formation in September 1954,was apparent throughout.During talks with the British over the scheme for collective defense in April 1954,it was noted that there was "agreement that neither by composition nor otherwise should the arrangements be developed so that they would be regarded as a white coalition."One subsequent message discussed and approved by Eisenhower ran:"The United States will not agree to a 'white man's party'to determine the problems of the Southeast Asian nations."3 Congressional leaders,during meetings in early May with the president and his senior officials,urged that Asian participation was essential to curb suspicions that the white powers alone wanted to settle the affairs of Asia.In June 1954,there were deep reservations among U.S.officials about the wisdom of convening discreet five-power talks on Southeast Asian defense in Washington involving the United States,Britain, France,Australia,and New Zealand.Such doubts were confirmed when the news leaked,and protests followed from friendly Asian states over their omis- sion.Thai diplomats called the talks"another example of the archaic idea of the white man's burden,"while the Philippine ambassador noted that public opinion at home would see the gathering as "evidence that the Western Powers were still 'drawing a color line'in Asia."35 The response of the Eisenhower administration was to move quickly to approach Thailand and the Philippines,two solid American allies already,with the offer of membership in a regional security pact in the hope that local Asian criticisms could be deflected.As the president remarked to the NSC in May 1954,"Small or not,such nations as Thailand at least provided the semblance of Asian participation."Yet there was a strong reluctance to go any further. Dulles,for all his concern about the appearance of a white line up was,in fact, anxious that India not join any new security pact for the region.Not only did the secretary of state believe that an invitation to India would lead to calls from within the United States for the addition of Nationalist China,but he also har- bored deep reservations over Nehru's reliability and lack of steadfastness when faced with the Communist threat.7 Dulles was hardly alone among senior U.S. 32.Memorandum of conversation by the director of the Office of British Commonwealth and North European Affairs,16 April 1954,FRUS,1952-54,pt.1,12:427 33.Memorandum of discussion,7 May 1954,ibid.,457 n9. 34.See"Secretary's Briefing for Members of Congress,"5 May 1954,Subject series,box 9,John Foster Dulles Papers,Dwight David Eisenhower Library,Abilene,Kansas(DDEL). 35.Memorandum of conversation by the officer in charge of Thai and Malayan Affairs, 27 May 1954,ibid.,519,and see 52o n2;memorandum of conversation between Romulo and Murphy held 3 June 1954,o9I Indo-China,Chairman's File,box 1o,RG 218,U.S.National Archives (USNA),College Park,Maryland. 36.Memorandum of discussion at 195th meeting of the NSC,6 May 1954.FRUS, 1952-54,pPtI,12455. 37.See,for example,record of discussion between Dulles and Eden,13 April 1954. ZP3/2G,FO 371/125123,UKNA;also see Rotter,Comrades at Odds,219,which highlights

these concerns over what finally emerged as the Manila Pact, or the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) as it became more popularly known soon after its formation in September 1954, was apparent throughout. During talks with the British over the scheme for collective defense in April 1954, it was noted that there was “agreement that neither by composition nor otherwise should the arrangements be developed so that they would be regarded as a white coalition.”32 One subsequent message discussed and approved by Eisenhower ran: “The United States will not agree to a ‘white man’s party’ to determine the problems of the Southeast Asian nations.”33 Congressional leaders, during meetings in early May with the president and his senior officials, urged that Asian participation was essential to curb suspicions that the white powers alone wanted to settle the affairs of Asia.34 In June 1954, there were deep reservations among U.S. officials about the wisdom of convening discreet five-power talks on Southeast Asian defense in Washington involving the United States, Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand. Such doubts were confirmed when the news leaked, and protests followed from friendly Asian states over their omis￾sion. Thai diplomats called the talks “another example of the archaic idea of the white man’s burden,” while the Philippine ambassador noted that public opinion at home would see the gathering as “evidence that the Western Powers were still ‘drawing a color line’ in Asia.”35 The response of the Eisenhower administration was to move quickly to approach Thailand and the Philippines, two solid American allies already, with the offer of membership in a regional security pact in the hope that local Asian criticisms could be deflected. As the president remarked to the NSC in May 1954, “Small or not, such nations as Thailand at least provided the semblance of Asian participation.”36 Yet there was a strong reluctance to go any further. Dulles, for all his concern about the appearance of a white line up was, in fact, anxious that India not join any new security pact for the region. Not only did the secretary of state believe that an invitation to India would lead to calls from within the United States for the addition of Nationalist China, but he also har￾bored deep reservations over Nehru’s reliability and lack of steadfastness when faced with the Communist threat.37 Dulles was hardly alone among senior U.S. A “Segregated” Asia? : 849 32. Memorandum of conversation by the director of the Office of British Commonwealth and North European Affairs, 16 April 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, pt. 1, 12:427. 33. Memorandum of discussion, 7 May 1954, ibid., 457 n9. 34. See “Secretary’s Briefing for Members of Congress,” 5 May 1954, Subject series, box 9, John Foster Dulles Papers, Dwight David Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (DDEL). 35. Memorandum of conversation by the officer in charge of Thai and Malayan Affairs, 27 May 1954, ibid., 519, and see 520 n2; memorandum of conversation between Romulo and Murphy held 3 June 1954, 091 Indo-China, Chairman’s File, box 10, RG 218, U.S. National Archives (USNA), College Park, Maryland. 36. Memorandum of discussion at 195th meeting of the NSC, 6 May 1954, FRUS, 1952–54, pt. 1, 12:455. 37. See, for example, record of discussion between Dulles and Eden, 13 April 1954, ZP3/2G, FO 371/125123, UKNA; also see Rotter, Comrades at Odds, 219, which highlights

850:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY figures in holding these feelings.In September 1953,the Republican leader in the Senate,William F.Knowland,having undertaken an Asian tour,vented his conviction to acting Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury,that Nehru "posed as the leader of Asia,but in fact he did not represent Korea or Formosa or Thai- land or Malaya or Pakistan.The most he could be said to speak for was India itself,Burma and Indonesia,which was practically Communist anyway."Know- land had "no use for those who sat on the fence.If war did break out in Asia, India would be quickly swamped beneath the Communist waves.By contrast, the British view was that Indian influence in Southeast Asia was too great to be so easily discounted,and hence Nehru had to be assiduously courted;as Salis- bury ventured to Knowland,"The right policy was to make as much use of India as possible,while recognising that orientals were not the same as us in outlook."38 Part of the problem was the premise that underlay any new security arrangements:while the Eisenhower administration envisaged an alliance whose raison d'etre was built around the need to deter further Communist advances, the British,for example,initially thought more in terms of a pact that would offer guarantees to ensure post-Geneva regional stability.39 The American determination to go ahead quickly with the new pact with just Thailand and the Philippines as members from the region itself spread much anxiety among British officials."Nobody here regards Siam and the Philippines as truly representative of Asian opinion,"Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden told the British ambassador in Washington in April 1954."If we do not make [a]real effort to include at least Burma I fear the whole of this scheme may be prejudiced,which I should deplore."Associating some of the so-called Colombo powers(India,Indonesia,Burma,Ceylon,and Pakistan)with the pro- posed Southeast Asian pact,Eden later explained to Dulles at Geneva,"would be a considerable gain,and would be a reply to the Chinese Communist cry of 'Asia for the Asians.'"Nehru had,however,already indicated that it was probably too late for such remedial action with a speech delivered in the Lok Sabba on 24 April which had denounced "American statements which come near to assuming protection,or declaring a kind of Monroe Doctrine,unilaterally over the countries of South East Asia."+The belated addition of Pakistan to the ranks of Asian states eventually willing to join SEATO only seemed to make matters worse,joining as it did primarily to enhance its own security the gendered attributes of effeminate weakness assigned to Indian males in popular American stereotyping of the period. 38.See conversation between Knowland and Salisbury,3o September 1953,FE/53/go,FO 8oo/784,UKNA. 39.See Roger Dingman,"John Foster Dulles and the Creation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization in 1954,"International History Review 11(August 1989):460. 40.Foreign Office to Washington (Eden to Makins),No.1696,19 April 1954,FE/54/21, FO 8o0/785,UKNA. 41.Geneva Conference (U.K.delegation)to Foreign Office (from Eden),No.86,I May 1954,PREM 11/649,UKNA. 42.New York Times,25 April 1954

figures in holding these feelings. In September 1953, the Republican leader in the Senate, William F. Knowland, having undertaken an Asian tour, vented his conviction to acting Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury, that Nehru “posed as the leader of Asia, but in fact he did not represent Korea or Formosa or Thai￾land or Malaya or Pakistan. The most he could be said to speak for was India itself, Burma and Indonesia, which was practically Communist anyway.” Know￾land had “no use for those who sat on the fence. If war did break out in Asia, India would be quickly swamped beneath the Communist waves.” By contrast, the British view was that Indian influence in Southeast Asia was too great to be so easily discounted, and hence Nehru had to be assiduously courted; as Salis￾bury ventured to Knowland, “The right policy was to make as much use of India as possible, while recognising that orientals were not the same as us in outlook.”38 Part of the problem was the premise that underlay any new security arrangements: while the Eisenhower administration envisaged an alliance whose raison d’etre was built around the need to deter further Communist advances, the British, for example, initially thought more in terms of a pact that would offer guarantees to ensure post-Geneva regional stability.39 The American determination to go ahead quickly with the new pact with just Thailand and the Philippines as members from the region itself spread much anxiety among British officials. “Nobody here regards Siam and the Philippines as truly representative of Asian opinion,” Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden told the British ambassador in Washington in April 1954. “If we do not make [a] real effort to include at least Burma I fear the whole of this scheme may be prejudiced, which I should deplore.”40 Associating some of the so-called Colombo powers (India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, and Pakistan) with the pro￾posed Southeast Asian pact, Eden later explained to Dulles at Geneva, “would be a considerable gain, and would be a reply to the Chinese Communist cry of ‘Asia for the Asians.’”41 Nehru had, however, already indicated that it was probably too late for such remedial action with a speech delivered in the Lok Sabha on 24 April which had denounced “American statements which come near to assuming protection, or declaring a kind of Monroe Doctrine, unilaterally over the countries of South East Asia.”42 The belated addition of Pakistan to the ranks of Asian states eventually willing to join SEATO only seemed to make matters worse, joining as it did primarily to enhance its own security 850 : diplomatic history the gendered attributes of effeminate weakness assigned to Indian males in popular American stereotyping of the period. 38. See conversation between Knowland and Salisbury, 30 September 1953, FE/53/90, FO 800/784, UKNA. 39. See Roger Dingman, “John Foster Dulles and the Creation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization in 1954,” International History Review 11 (August 1989): 460. 40. Foreign Office to Washington (Eden to Makins), No. 1696, 19 April 1954, FE/54/21, FO 800/785, UKNA. 41. Geneva Conference (U.K. delegation) to Foreign Office (from Eden), No. 86, 1 May 1954, PREM 11/649, UKNA. 42. New York Times, 25 April 1954