上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源_Lesson 7_English materials_jcws.2006.8.3

The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union 中 Chen Jian n 10 March 1959 an anti-Chinese and anti-Communist popu- lar revolt erupted in Lhasa,the capital of Tibet,which had been under the reign of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)since 1951.One week later, the 14h Dalai Lama,Tibet's political and spiritual leader,fled the capital to avoid a Chinese crackdown.In the meantime,the revolt in Lhasa rapidly esca- lated into a full-scale rebellion.The authorities in Beijing kept the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA)in Tibet on the defensive for ten days,but on 20 March they ordered the army to crush the rebellion.The CCP also hur- riedly transferred more PLA units to Tibet from other parts of China. In subsequent weeks,the PLA ruthlessly mopped up the resistance in Lhasa and many other parts of Tibet.On 28 March,Zhou Enlai,the premier of the People's Republic of China(PRC),formally announced the dissolution of the Kashag(the Tibetan local government),putting political power in Tibet into the hands of the "Preparatory Committee of the Tibet Autono- mous Region."Zhou also called on the people of Tibet to"unite"in"seeking to construct a democratic and socialist new Tibet."2 Three days later,on 31 March,the Dalai Lama and his followers crossed the border to take refuge in northern India.By the end of May 1959,as many as 7,000 Tibetan refu- gees had entered India to seek asylum there,causing serious tension in Sino- Indian relations-relations that until 1959 had been characterized by friend- ship and high-level cooperation.In the fall of 1959,two clashes between Chi- nese and Indian garrisons erupted along the border,and the long-existing yet hitherto well-controlled Chinese-Indian territorial disputes immediately 1.Until late 1961,however,the Chinese were unable to suppress other rebellions in Tibet. 2.See Zhou's remarks in Remmin ribao [People's Dailyl,28 March 1959,p.1.Real power in Tibet lay with a"Military Control Committee"established on 23 March 1959. Journal of Cold War Studies Vol.8,No.3,Summer 2006,pp.54-101 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 54

54 CThe Tn Jibianetan Rebellion of 1959 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union ✣ Chen Jian On 10 March 1959 an anti-Chinese and anti-Communist popu￾lar revolt erupted in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, which had been under the reign of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since 1951. One week later, the 14th Dalai Lama, Tibet’s political and spiritual leader, ºed the capital to avoid a Chinese crackdown. In the meantime, the revolt in Lhasa rapidly esca￾lated into a full-scale rebellion. The authorities in Beijing kept the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Tibet on the defensive for ten days, but on 20 March they ordered the army to crush the rebellion. The CCP also hur￾riedly transferred more PLA units to Tibet from other parts of China. In subsequent weeks, the PLA ruthlessly mopped up the resistance in Lhasa and many other parts of Tibet.1 On 28 March, Zhou Enlai, the premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), formally announced the dissolution of the Kashag (the Tibetan local government), putting political power in Tibet into the hands of the “Preparatory Committee of the Tibet Autono￾mous Region.” Zhou also called on the people of Tibet to “unite” in “seeking to construct a democratic and socialist new Tibet.”2 Three days later, on 31 March, the Dalai Lama and his followers crossed the border to take refuge in northern India. By the end of May 1959, as many as 7,000 Tibetan refu￾gees had entered India to seek asylum there, causing serious tension in Sino￾Indian relations—relations that until 1959 had been characterized by friend￾ship and high-level cooperation. In the fall of 1959, two clashes between Chi￾nese and Indian garrisons erupted along the border, and the long-existing yet hitherto well-controlled Chinese-Indian territorial disputes immediately 1. Until late 1961, however, the Chinese were unable to suppress other rebellions in Tibet. 2. See Zhou’s remarks in Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], 28 March 1959, p. 1. Real power in Tibet lay with a “Military Control Committee” established on 23 March 1959. Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 2006, pp. 54–101 © 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 made international headlines.What is more surprising,though,is that the PLA's suppression of the rebellion in Tibet not only caused a souring of Sino- Indian relations but also sparked acrimony and recriminations with the Soviet Union.The two Communist allies criticized each other's policies toward Tibet and India.Consequently,the events of 1959 along the Sino-Indian bor- der were,in some sense,the beginning of the collapse of the "great Sino- Soviet solidarity”that was once claimed to be“indissoluble”and“eternal,” pushing the global Cold War into a new and different stage. Why did a large-scale rebellion erupt in Tibet in the spring of 1959?How did Beijing's leaders,particularly Mao Zedong,perceive the rebellion?What were the PRC's strategies to cope with the rebellion and defuse the crisis with India?Why did the Tibetan rebellion not only cause Beijing's disputes and conflicts with New Delhi but also deepen and accelerate its split with Mos- cow?By drawing on newly available Chinese-language sources,this article will offer some preliminary answers to these questions. Historical Background The Tibetan rebellion began in March 1959,but the seeds of it had been sown a decade earlier,when Chinese Communist forces entered and occupied Tibet.To understand the environment in which the rebellion was shaped,we must first briefly review the historical development of China's relations with Tibet,especially during the PRC's first ten years. The relationship between China proper and Tibet was long and tortuous. One of the earliest Chinese-Tibetan contacts occurred during the Tang Dy- nasty(618-907)in the seventh century when King Songtsen Gampo unified Tibet and received a Chinese princess as a bride.Both China and Tibet were under the rule of the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty in the thirteenth and four- teenth centuries.3 The Ming Dynasty(1368-1644),despite conferring many honorary titles on prominent members of the Tibetan elite,made no substan- tial effort to extend Chinese administrative control to Tibetan territory.Not until the Qing or Manchu Dynasty (1644-1911)did the imperial court in Beijing exert more formal control over Tibet,especially after the Qian Long Emperor(c.1735-1795)stationed two Qing imperial envoys (amban),with the protection of Qing garrisons,in Lhasa.In addition,the Qing,through political and military maneuvering,brought several Tibetan-inhabited border 3.China's official history of Sino-Tibetan relations claims that Tibet became a part of China during Yuan times.See,for example,Dangdai zhongguo de xizang [Contemporary China's Tibet](Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue,1991),Vol.1,pp.40-43;and Wang Gui et al.,Xizang lishi diwei bian [A Discussion on Tibet's Historical Position](Beijing:Minzu,1995),ch.4. 55

made international headlines. What is more surprising, though, is that the PLA’s suppression of the rebellion in Tibet not only caused a souring of Sino￾Indian relations but also sparked acrimony and recriminations with the Soviet Union. The two Communist allies criticized each other’s policies toward Tibet and India. Consequently, the events of 1959 along the Sino-Indian bor￾der were, in some sense, the beginning of the collapse of the “great Sino￾Soviet solidarity” that was once claimed to be “indissoluble” and “eternal,” pushing the global Cold War into a new and different stage. Why did a large-scale rebellion erupt in Tibet in the spring of 1959? How did Beijing’s leaders, particularly Mao Zedong, perceive the rebellion? What were the PRC’s strategies to cope with the rebellion and defuse the crisis with India? Why did the Tibetan rebellion not only cause Beijing’s disputes and conºicts with New Delhi but also deepen and accelerate its split with Mos￾cow? By drawing on newly available Chinese-language sources, this article will offer some preliminary answers to these questions. Historical Background The Tibetan rebellion began in March 1959, but the seeds of it had been sown a decade earlier, when Chinese Communist forces entered and occupied Tibet. To understand the environment in which the rebellion was shaped, we must ªrst brieºy review the historical development of China’s relations with Tibet, especially during the PRC’s ªrst ten years. The relationship between China proper and Tibet was long and tortuous. One of the earliest Chinese-Tibetan contacts occurred during the Tang Dy￾nasty (618–907) in the seventh century when King Songtsen Gampo uniªed Tibet and received a Chinese princess as a bride. Both China and Tibet were under the rule of the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty in the thirteenth and four￾teenth centuries.3 The Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), despite conferring many honorary titles on prominent members of the Tibetan elite, made no substan￾tial effort to extend Chinese administrative control to Tibetan territory. Not until the Qing or Manchu Dynasty (1644–1911) did the imperial court in Beijing exert more formal control over Tibet, especially after the Qian Long Emperor (c. 1735–1795) stationed two Qing imperial envoys (amban), with the protection of Qing garrisons, in Lhasa. In addition, the Qing, through political and military maneuvering, brought several Tibetan-inhabited border 55 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 3. China’s ofªcial history of Sino-Tibetan relations claims that Tibet became a part of China during Yuan times. See, for example, Dangdai zhongguo de xizang [Contemporary China’s Tibet] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1991), Vol. 1, pp. 40–43; and Wang Gui et al., Xizang lishi diwei bian [A Discussion on Tibet’s Historical Position] (Beijing: Minzu, 1995), ch. 4

Chen Jian areas under the jurisdiction of Sichuan and Yunnan Provinces,thus creating a distinction between"Political Tibet"and"Ethnographic Tibet.In general, the Qing policy toward Tibet significantly strengthened the connections be- tween China proper and Tibet and reinforced the Chinese conviction that Tibet was part of China.Entering the nineteenth century,with the decline of the Qing in the wake of the Western incursions into China,the authority of the Qing-appointed ambans gradually waned,and Tibet increasingly became autonomous,reducing Chinese hegemony over Tibet to nothing more than a symbol.3 The 1911 revolution destroyed the Qing Dynasty and led to the estab- lishment of the Republic of China(ROC).Throughout the Republican peri- od (1911-1949),the successive governments were too weak and too busy with more urgent matters to pay attention to the Tibet issue.As a result,until 1949,when the CCP defeated the Nationalists in the civil war and planned to send troops to“liberate”"Tibet,,the“Land of Snows”enjoyed the status of a de facto independent polity.However,no ROC government had ever given up China's claim of sovereignty over Tibet,and the government in Lhasa made no real effort to turn Tibet's de facto independence into a de jure status that would be recognized by the international community.s As the Chinese Communists neared final victory in the Chinese civil war, Mao Zedong and the CCP leadership began to prepare for the"liberation of Tibet."7 On 6 August 1949,Mao instructed Peng Dehuai,commander of the PLA's First Field Army,"When you attack Lanzhou you should pay special at- tention to protecting the Panchen [Lama]and the Tibetans living in Gansu and Qinghai,so that you will be prepared to settle the Tibet issue."In a tele- 4."Political Tibet"usually refers to the area that has been continuously ruled by the government in Lhasa,and "ethnographic Tibet"refers to the Tibetan-inhabited regions in the Chinese provinces of Qinghai,Gansu,Sichuan,and Yunnan.See Melvyn C.Goldstein,The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China,Tibet and the Dalai Lama(Berkeley:University of Califomia Press,1997),pp.x-xi. 5.See ibid.,ch.1. 6.For an illuminating,detailed discussion of Tibet's internal and extemal developments during the Republican period,see Melvyn C.Goldstein,A History of Modern Tibet,1913-1951:The Demise of the Lamaist State(Berkeley:The University of California Press,1989).For an account reflecting the Chinese view,see Dangdai zhongguo de xizhang,pp.64-74. 7.Tibet did not occupy an important position in CCP strategic thinking and policymaking until after 1949.During the early stage of the Chinese Communist revolution,Mao Zedong's own perception of Tibet's future relationship with China seemed vague.In an interview with American joumalist Edgar Snow in July 1936,for example,Mao reportedly said that Tibet,together with Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang"will form autonomous republics attached to the China federation"after"the People's Revo- lution has been victorious."Edgar Snow,Red Star over China(New York:Grove Weidenfeld,1968), p.444.But the idea of a"China federation"disappeared completely in Mao's and the CCP leadership's design of the“new China”in the late I940s 8.Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Collection of Mao Zedong's Military Papers].(Beijing:Junshi kexue, 1993),Vol.5,p.655. 56

areas under the jurisdiction of Sichuan and Yunnan Provinces, thus creating a distinction between “Political Tibet” and “Ethnographic Tibet.”4 In general, the Qing policy toward Tibet signiªcantly strengthened the connections be￾tween China proper and Tibet and reinforced the Chinese conviction that Tibet was part of China. Entering the nineteenth century, with the decline of the Qing in the wake of the Western incursions into China, the authority of the Qing-appointed ambans gradually waned, and Tibet increasingly became autonomous, reducing Chinese hegemony over Tibet to nothing more than a symbol.5 The 1911 revolution destroyed the Qing Dynasty and led to the estab￾lishment of the Republic of China (ROC). Throughout the Republican peri￾od (1911–1949), the successive governments were too weak and too busy with more urgent matters to pay attention to the Tibet issue. As a result, until 1949, when the CCP defeated the Nationalists in the civil war and planned to send troops to “liberate” Tibet, the “Land of Snows” enjoyed the status of a de facto independent polity. However, no ROC government had ever given up China’s claim of sovereignty over Tibet, and the government in Lhasa made no real effort to turn Tibet’s de facto independence into a de jure status that would be recognized by the international community.6 As the Chinese Communists neared ªnal victory in the Chinese civil war, Mao Zedong and the CCP leadership began to prepare for the “liberation of Tibet.”7 On 6 August 1949, Mao instructed Peng Dehuai, commander of the PLA’s First Field Army, “When you attack Lanzhou you should pay special at￾tention to protecting the Panchen [Lama] and the Tibetans living in Gansu and Qinghai, so that you will be prepared to settle the Tibet issue.”8 In a tele- 56 Chen Jian 4. “Political Tibet” usually refers to the area that has been continuously ruled by the government in Lhasa, and “ethnographic Tibet” refers to the Tibetan-inhabited regions in the Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan. See Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. x–xi. 5. See ibid., ch. 1. 6. For an illuminating, detailed discussion of Tibet’s internal and external developments during the Republican period, see Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1989). For an account reºecting the Chinese view, see Dangdai zhongguo de xizhang, pp. 64–74. 7. Tibet did not occupy an important position in CCP strategic thinking and policymaking until after 1949. During the early stage of the Chinese Communist revolution, Mao Zedong’s own perception of Tibet’s future relationship with China seemed vague. In an interview with American journalist Edgar Snow in July 1936, for example, Mao reportedly said that Tibet, together with Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang “will form autonomous republics attached to the China federation” after “the People’s Revo￾lution has been victorious.” Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1968), p. 444. But the idea of a “China federation” disappeared completely in Mao’s and the CCP leadership’s design of the “new China” in the late 1940s. 8. Mao Zedong junshi wenji [Collection of Mao Zedong’s Military Papers], (Beijing: Junshi kexue, 1993), Vol. 5, p. 655

The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 gram dated 23 November 1949,Mao set"fall or winter of next year"as the target date for"the completion of the settlement of the Tibet issue."In subse- quent months,even when Mao was visiting the Soviet Union to meet Josif Stalin(from December 1949 to February 1950),CCP officials sought to de- vise a strategy that would allow them to solve the"Tibet issue"quickly.From the beginning,Mao and his colleagues believed"it is impossible to settle the Tibet issue without using military force.In the meantime,Chinese leaders also were convinced that"although liberating Tibet is a military issue,and therefore a certain number of military forces should be used,it is primarily a political issue in an overall sense."Realizing the complexity of Tibet's inter- nal conditions and external environment,Mao and his fellow CCP leaders found it necessary and possible to combine military operations with sophisti- cated diplomatic and "united front"work,especially toward Tibet's political and monastic elites.(Tibet's pre-1949 sociopolitical structure was character- ized by a form of feudal theocracy,with the Dalai Lama serving as both a sec- ular andan ecclesiastical ruler.)Mao's original plan was that the"military in- tervention in Tibet should begin in mid-April [1950]"and that"by October the whole of Tibet should be occupied."3 Mao's eagerness to settle the "Tibet issue"in the shortest possible time was based on several key assumptions and considerations.First,when devising a strategy toward Tibet,Mao and his comrades took for granted that Tibet was part of China and that"liberating"the region was a crucial step they must take in order to complete China's unification.In internal discussions and in conversations with Soviet leaders,Mao and his colleagues argued that the "liberation of Tibet"was as important as the"liberation of Taiwan"and that if 9.Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic](Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1987),Vol.1,pp.152-153 (hereinafter referred to as Mao wengao). 10.Ibid. 11."Deng Xiaoping's Speech at the Meeting of the Commanders of the PLA's 18th Army,15 January 1950."in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet,Zhonggong xizang danghi dashi ji. 1949-1994 [Important Events in CCP History in Tibet,1949-1994](Lhasa:Xizang renmin,1995). pp.4-5;and The CCP Committee of the PLA's 18th Army,"Instructions on Marching into Tibet"(1 February 1950),in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet,Heping jiefang xizang [The Peaceful Liberation of Tibet](Lhasa:Xizang renmin 1995).pp.59-60. 12.Jianguo yilai Liu Shaogi wengao [Liu Shaoqi's Manuscripts since the Formation of the People's Re- public](Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1998),p.2;Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan [Mao Zedong's Selected Works on Tibetan Affairs](Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian and Zhongguo zangxue, 2001).pp.9-10;and CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet,Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji.pp.7-8. 13.Mao wengao,Vol.1,p.208.The CCP leaders decided that the PLA's military intervention in Tibet should be carried out mainly from the southwest(from Sichuan and Xikang Provinces),and that oper- ations from the northwest(from Qinghai and Xinjiang)should play only a supplementary and sup- porting role. 57

gram dated 23 November 1949, Mao set “fall or winter of next year” as the target date for “the completion of the settlement of the Tibet issue.”9 In subse￾quent months, even when Mao was visiting the Soviet Union to meet Josif Stalin (from December 1949 to February 1950), CCP ofªcials sought to de￾vise a strategy that would allow them to solve the “Tibet issue” quickly. From the beginning, Mao and his colleagues believed “it is impossible to settle the Tibet issue without using military force.”10 In the meantime, Chinese leaders also were convinced that “although liberating Tibet is a military issue, and therefore a certain number of military forces should be used, it is primarily a political issue in an overall sense.”11 Realizing the complexity of Tibet’s inter￾nal conditions and external environment, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders found it necessary and possible to combine military operations with sophisti￾cated diplomatic and “united front” work, especially toward Tibet’s political and monastic elites. (Tibet’s pre-1949 sociopolitical structure was character￾ized by a form of feudal theocracy, with the Dalai Lama serving as both a sec￾ular and an ecclesiastical ruler.)12 Mao’s original plan was that the “military in￾tervention in Tibet should begin in mid-April [1950]” and that “by October the whole of Tibet should be occupied.”13 Mao’s eagerness to settle the “Tibet issue” in the shortest possible time was based on several key assumptions and considerations. First, when devising a strategy toward Tibet, Mao and his comrades took for granted that Tibet was part of China and that “liberating” the region was a crucial step they must take in order to complete China’s uniªcation. In internal discussions and in conversations with Soviet leaders, Mao and his colleagues argued that the “liberation of Tibet” was as important as the “liberation of Taiwan” and that if 57 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 9. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1987), Vol. 1, pp. 152–153 (hereinafter referred to as Mao wengao). 10. Ibid. 11. “Deng Xiaoping’s Speech at the Meeting of the Commanders of the PLA’s 18th Army, 15 January 1950,” in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji, 1949–1994 [Important Events in CCP History in Tibet, 1949–1994] (Lhasa: Xizang renmin, 1995), pp. 4–5; and The CCP Committee of the PLA’s 18th Army, “Instructions on Marching into Tibet” (1 February 1950), in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Heping jiefang xizang [The Peaceful Liberation of Tibet] (Lhasa: Xizang renmin 1995), pp. 59–60. 12. Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao [Liu Shaoqi’s Manuscripts since the Formation of the People’s Re￾public] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1998), p. 2; Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan [Mao Zedong’s Selected Works on Tibetan Affairs] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian and Zhongguo zangxue, 2001), pp. 9–10; and CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Zhonggong xizang dangshi dashi ji, pp. 7–8. 13. Mao wengao, Vol. 1, p. 208. The CCP leaders decided that the PLA’s military intervention in Tibet should be carried out mainly from the southwest (from Sichuan and Xikang Provinces), and that oper￾ations from the northwest (from Qinghai and Xinjiang) should play only a supplementary and sup￾porting role

Chen Jian either of these two tasks went unfulfilled the mission of the Chinese revolu- tion would not be completed.4 This issue became even more crucial when Mao proclaimed that the formation of the PRC meant that"we the Chinese people have stood up."Mao and the CCP saw the reassertion of China's sov- ereignty in Tibet as a critical test case for the new Communist regime's credi- bility and legitimacy before the Chinese people and indeed the whole world. Another reason that Mao wanted a quick solution to the Tibet issue is that he understood the region's strategic importance to China.In internal de- liberations,CCP leaders consistently demonstrated an appreciation of Tibet's strategic value.PLA commanders noted that "Tibet is located in China's southwest border area,neighboring India,Nepal,and Bhutan and serving as China's strategic gate in the southwest direction....Both the British and the U.S.imperialists have long cast greedy eyes on Tibet,so Tibet's position in [China's]national defense is extremely important.Mao echoed these senti- ments,arguing that"although Tibet does not have a large population,its in- ternational [strategic]position is extremely important.Therefore,we must occupy it and transform it into a people's democratic Tibet. The CCP's decision to use military force to occupy Tibet was also based on the assumption that the international environment was conducive to such a strategy.Despite Tibet's de facto independent status from 1911 to 1950,the international community had never formally recognized it as an independent state.In discussing the PLA's military plans for the occupation of Tibet,Mao told his comrades that"because Britain,India and Pakistan have now all rec- ognized us [the PRC],it is an auspicious time for [our]military intervention in Tibet."s The CCP leaders believed that using military force to occupy Tibet would not cause serious international repercussions and would certainly not spur foreign powers to send troops to Tibet. CCP officials and PLA commanders realized that their military forces were overwhelmingly superior to those of the Tibetans,and they assumed that by combining resolute military action with shrewd diplomatic and "united front"strategies,the Tibet issue could be swiftly resolved.In a detailed report on"the situation in Tibet,"completed in May 1950,the Tibet Issue Research Office under the PLA's Southwest Military Region pointed out that Tibetan 14.See,for example,Shi Zhe,"With Mao and Stalin:The Reminiscences of Mao's Interpreter,"Chi- nese Historians,Vol.5.No.1 (Spring 1992),p.41;and Jianguo yilai Liu Shaogi wengao,Vol.1,p.2. 15.Mao Zedong,"The Chinese People Have Stood Up"(21 September 1949),in Mao wengao,Vol.1, Pp.4-8. 16.The CCP Committee of the PLA's 18th Army,"Instructions on Marching into Tibet,"pp.59-60. 17.Mao wengao,Vol.1,p.208. 18.bid,p.226. 19.The CCP Committee of the PLA's 18th Army,"Instructions on Marching into Tibet,"p.60. 58

either of these two tasks went unfulªlled the mission of the Chinese revolu￾tion would not be completed.14 This issue became even more crucial when Mao proclaimed that the formation of the PRC meant that “we the Chinese people have stood up.”15 Mao and the CCP saw the reassertion of China’s sov￾ereignty in Tibet as a critical test case for the new Communist regime’s credi￾bility and legitimacy before the Chinese people and indeed the whole world. Another reason that Mao wanted a quick solution to the Tibet issue is that he understood the region’s strategic importance to China. In internal de￾liberations, CCP leaders consistently demonstrated an appreciation of Tibet’s strategic value. PLA commanders noted that “Tibet is located in China’s southwest border area, neighboring India, Nepal, and Bhutan and serving as China’s strategic gate in the southwest direction. . . . Both the British and the U.S. imperialists have long cast greedy eyes on Tibet, so Tibet’s position in [China’s] national defense is extremely important.”16 Mao echoed these senti￾ments, arguing that “although Tibet does not have a large population, its in￾ternational [strategic] position is extremely important. Therefore, we must occupy it and transform it into a people’s democratic Tibet.”17 The CCP’s decision to use military force to occupy Tibet was also based on the assumption that the international environment was conducive to such a strategy. Despite Tibet’s de facto independent status from 1911 to 1950, the international community had never formally recognized it as an independent state. In discussing the PLA’s military plans for the occupation of Tibet, Mao told his comrades that “because Britain, India and Pakistan have now all rec￾ognized us [the PRC], it is an auspicious time for [our] military intervention in Tibet.”18 The CCP leaders believed that using military force to occupy Tibet would not cause serious international repercussions and would certainly not spur foreign powers to send troops to Tibet.19 CCP ofªcials and PLA commanders realized that their military forces were overwhelmingly superior to those of the Tibetans, and they assumed that by combining resolute military action with shrewd diplomatic and “united front” strategies, the Tibet issue could be swiftly resolved. In a detailed report on “the situation in Tibet,” completed in May 1950, the Tibet Issue Research Ofªce under the PLA’s Southwest Military Region pointed out that Tibetan 58 Chen Jian 14. See, for example, Shi Zhe, “With Mao and Stalin: The Reminiscences of Mao’s Interpreter,” Chi￾nese Historians, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1992), p. 41; and Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao, Vol. 1, p. 2. 15. Mao Zedong, “The Chinese People Have Stood Up” (21 September 1949), in Mao wengao, Vol. 1, pp. 4–8. 16. The CCP Committee of the PLA’s 18th Army, “Instructions on Marching into Tibet,” pp. 59–60. 17. Mao wengao, Vol. 1, p. 208. 18. Ibid., p. 226. 19. The CCP Committee of the PLA’s 18th Army, “Instructions on Marching into Tibet,” p. 60

The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 troops were not well trained and that their military equipment was largely outdated.20 When CCP leaders and PLA officers were devising concrete strat- egies and tactics for the planned military operations,their main concern was how to maintain logistical supplies for their own troops,not how to crush re- sistance by the Tibetans.2 Mao was fully aware of the long-standing rivalry between the Dalai Lama in Lhasa and the Panchen Lama in Rikaze.From the beginning,the Chinese authorities sought to gain the cooperation and sup- port of the Panchen Lama in order to confer legitimacy on the CCP's "libera- tion”of Tibet..22 Yet despite Mao's urging,the PLA was unable to complete its prepara- tions for the planned incursion into Tibet by the late summer of 1950.In ad- dition,the PLA's First Field Army reported that no proper roads led to Tibet from the northwest.(The road across the Tanggula Pass was not constructed until 1954.)CCP leaders therefore decided that the PLA would march south- west(from Sichuan)into Tibet.23 In early August 1950 the PLA's Southwest Military Region and the Eighteenth Army(which was assigned the task of en- tering and occupying Tibet)conducted a series of planning meetings that re- sulted in the strategy of occupying Chamdo (or Qamdo),the southwest entry point into Tibet and the deployment site of the main force of the Tibetan army,by the end of 1950.2 Mao endorsed the plan,but he regarded the oper- ation as far more than a purely military undertaking.He pointed out that "now India has issued a statement to acknowledge that Tibet is part of Chi- nese territory but hopes that the issue can be solved in a peaceful way rather than through military means."He also noted that"originally Britain did not allow the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing,and now it has allowed the delegation to do so."Mao thus emphasized that if the PLA could destroy the Tibetan army's main force and occupy Chamdo,"it is possible that the Ti- betan delegation will come to Beijing to pursue a peaceful solution [of the Tibet issue]through negotiation."He stressed that"we should carry out the 20.Ji Youquan,Baixue:Jiefang xizang jishi [White Snow:A Factual Record of the Liberation of Tibet] (Beijing:Zhongguo wuzi,1993),pp.32-33. 21.See,for example,Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan,pp.38-39,40-41.See also CCP South- west Bureau and PLA Southwest Military Region,"Instructions on Guaranteeing the Logistical Sup- plies for Marching into Tibet"(9 February 1950),in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet,Heping jiefang xizang.pp.62-63. 22.See,for example,Mao wengao,Vol.1.p.450;and Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan,p.19. 23.Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun diyi yazhanjun wenxian xuanbian [Selected Documents of the First Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army](Beijing:Jiefangjun,2000).Vol.2.pp.713- 714,716-717;and Mao wengao,Vol.1,pp.475-477. 24.Ji,Baixue,pp.143-144.See also PLA Southwest Military Region,"Orders on Initiating the Chamdo Campaign"(26 August 1950),in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Heping jiefang xizang.pp.87-88. 59

troops were not well trained and that their military equipment was largely outdated.20 When CCP leaders and PLA ofªcers were devising concrete strat￾egies and tactics for the planned military operations, their main concern was how to maintain logistical supplies for their own troops, not how to crush re￾sistance by the Tibetans.21 Mao was fully aware of the long-standing rivalry between the Dalai Lama in Lhasa and the Panchen Lama in Rikaze. From the beginning, the Chinese authorities sought to gain the cooperation and sup￾port of the Panchen Lama in order to confer legitimacy on the CCP’s “libera￾tion” of Tibet.22 Yet despite Mao’s urging, the PLA was unable to complete its prepara￾tions for the planned incursion into Tibet by the late summer of 1950. In ad￾dition, the PLA’s First Field Army reported that no proper roads led to Tibet from the northwest. (The road across the Tanggula Pass was not constructed until 1954.) CCP leaders therefore decided that the PLA would march south￾west (from Sichuan) into Tibet.23 In early August 1950 the PLA’s Southwest Military Region and the Eighteenth Army (which was assigned the task of en￾tering and occupying Tibet) conducted a series of planning meetings that re￾sulted in the strategy of occupying Chamdo (or Qamdo), the southwest entry point into Tibet and the deployment site of the main force of the Tibetan army, by the end of 1950.24 Mao endorsed the plan, but he regarded the oper￾ation as far more than a purely military undertaking. He pointed out that “now India has issued a statement to acknowledge that Tibet is part of Chi￾nese territory but hopes that the issue can be solved in a peaceful way rather than through military means.” He also noted that “originally Britain did not allow the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing, and now it has allowed the delegation to do so.” Mao thus emphasized that if the PLA could destroy the Tibetan army’s main force and occupy Chamdo, “it is possible that the Ti￾betan delegation will come to Beijing to pursue a peaceful solution [of the Tibet issue] through negotiation.” He stressed that “we should carry out the 59 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 20. Ji Youquan, Baixue: Jiefang xizang jishi [White Snow: A Factual Record of the Liberation of Tibet] (Beijing: Zhongguo wuzi, 1993), pp. 32–33. 21. See, for example, Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 38–39, 40–41. See also CCP South￾west Bureau and PLA Southwest Military Region, “Instructions on Guaranteeing the Logistical Sup￾plies for Marching into Tibet” (9 February 1950), in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Heping jiefang xizang, pp. 62–63. 22. See, for example, Mao wengao, Vol. 1, p. 450; and Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan, p. 19. 23. Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun diyi yazhanjun wenxian xuanbian [Selected Documents of the First Field Army of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army] (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 2000), Vol. 2, pp. 713– 714, 716–717; and Mao wengao, Vol. 1, pp. 475–477. 24. Ji, Baixue, pp. 143–144. See also PLA Southwest Military Region, “Orders on Initiating the Chamdo Campaign” (26 August 1950), in CCP History Material Collection Committee in Tibet, Heping jiefang xizang, pp. 87–88

Chen Jian policy of striving for the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing while at the same time reducing Nehru's fear [of us]."25 The PLA's military attack on Chamdo that began on 6 October and lasted for two weeks resulted in a decisive victory.The Chinese forces routed the ineptly commanded and poorly prepared Tibetan troops.Because the Tibetans had almost no reserve force between Chamdo and Lhasa,the door to Tibet's capital city was already open for the PLA.6 With the Tibetans no longer in a position to wage any effective military resistance,Chinese leaders shifted the emphasis of their strategy to negotiat- ing with the Dalai Lama and the Kashag in Lhasa.2 From the beginning,the CCP made clear that a prerequisite for any peaceful solution of the Tibet issue was Lhasa's acceptance of Tibet as an integral part of the PRC.Chinese officials also emphasized that in the long run Tibet would have to be trans- formed into a"people's democratic"society-a phrase that in the Maoist dis- course meant destroying Tibet's traditional political,economic,and social structures and replacing them with socialist ones.But to ensure that a peace- ful settlement in Tibet could be achieved,Mao was willing to accept a series of key compromises,including temporarily allowing the feudal economy and polity to exist in Tibet,in exchange for the Dalai Lama's acknowledgment of Chinese sovereignty. The Tibetan government had no means of military resistance,and its ap- peals for help to the international community-including the United Na- tions,the United States,India,and Britain-failed to elicit any response.2 Consequently,the Tibetans had no choice but to send a delegation to Beijing in the spring of 1951.29 On 23 May 1951 the Tibetan negotiators in Beijing signed the "Seventeen-Point Agreement,"which began with the statement that "the Tibetan people shall unite and drive imperialist forces from Tibet and shall re- 25.Mao wengao,Vol.1,pp.475-477. 26.For a detailed account of the Chamdo military campaign,see Goldstein,A History of Modern Ti- bet,ch.18.For an official Chinese account,see Han Huanzhi et al.,Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of the Contemporary Chinese Armyl,Vol.1(Beijing:Zhongguo shehui kexue,1990),Pp.212-215. 27.The Dalai Lama left Lhasa on 19 December 1950 and was then staying at Yadong.a small town close to the Tibetan-Indian border. 28.For an informative discussion,see Goldstein,A History of Modern Tibet,chs.19-20;and Qiang Zhai,The Dragon,the Lion,and the Eagle:Chinese-British-American Relations,1949-1958(Kent,OH: Kent State University Press,1994),ch.3. 29.The Tibetan government had tried to hold the negotiations at a"neutral location,"but Beijing firmly rejected any such effort.Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai repeatedly emphasized that the negotia- tions had to take place in Beijing and that the Tibetan delegation would have to travel there.See,for example,Mao wengao,Vol.1,p.369;and Li Ping et al,eds.,Zhou Enlai nianpu,1949-1976 [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai,1949-1976](Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1997),Vol.1. p.43. 60

policy of striving for the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing while at the same time reducing Nehru’s fear [of us].”25 The PLA’s military attack on Chamdo that began on 6 October and lasted for two weeks resulted in a decisive victory. The Chinese forces routed the ineptly commanded and poorly prepared Tibetan troops. Because the Tibetans had almost no reserve force between Chamdo and Lhasa, the door to Tibet’s capital city was already open for the PLA.26 With the Tibetans no longer in a position to wage any effective military resistance, Chinese leaders shifted the emphasis of their strategy to negotiat￾ing with the Dalai Lama and the Kashag in Lhasa.27 From the beginning, the CCP made clear that a prerequisite for any peaceful solution of the Tibet issue was Lhasa’s acceptance of Tibet as an integral part of the PRC. Chinese ofªcials also emphasized that in the long run Tibet would have to be trans￾formed into a “people’s democratic” society—a phrase that in the Maoist dis￾course meant destroying Tibet’s traditional political, economic, and social structures and replacing them with socialist ones. But to ensure that a peace￾ful settlement in Tibet could be achieved, Mao was willing to accept a series of key compromises, including temporarily allowing the feudal economy and polity to exist in Tibet, in exchange for the Dalai Lama’s acknowledgment of Chinese sovereignty. The Tibetan government had no means of military resistance, and its ap￾peals for help to the international community—including the United Na￾tions, the United States, India, and Britain—failed to elicit any response.28 Consequently, the Tibetans had no choice but to send a delegation to Beijing in the spring of 1951.29 On 23 May 1951 the Tibetan negotiators in Beijing signed the “Seventeen-Point Agreement,” which began with the statement that “the Tibetan people shall unite and drive imperialist forces from Tibet and shall re- 60 Chen Jian 25. Mao wengao, Vol. 1, pp. 475–477. 26. For a detailed account of the Chamdo military campaign, see Goldstein, A History of Modern Ti￾bet, ch. 18. For an ofªcial Chinese account, see Han Huanzhi et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Affairs of the Contemporary Chinese Army], Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1990), pp. 212–215. 27. The Dalai Lama left Lhasa on 19 December 1950 and was then staying at Yadong, a small town close to the Tibetan-Indian border. 28. For an informative discussion, see Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, chs. 19–20; and Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949–1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), ch. 3. 29. The Tibetan government had tried to hold the negotiations at a “neutral location,” but Beijing ªrmly rejected any such effort. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai repeatedly emphasized that the negotia￾tions had to take place in Beijing and that the Tibetan delegation would have to travel there. See, for example, Mao wengao, Vol. 1, p. 369; and Li Ping et al., eds., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949–1976 [A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1997), Vol. 1, p. 43

The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 turn to the big family of the Motherland-the People's Republic of China." The Chinese government,for its part,agreed that it would maintain"the es- tablished status,functions,and powers of the Dalai Lama,"refrain from alter- ing Tibet's feudal and theocratic political,economic,and social systems,and adopt"various reforms"in Tibet only if the Tibetan people so demanded and only after consultation with "the leading personnel of Tibet."The Dalai Lama,who had been in Yadong,a border town near India,since late 1950, approved the agreement and returned to Lhasa on 17 August 1951.That fall, PLA units moved into Lhasa and many other parts of Tibet without encoun- tering resistance. The Path toward Rebellion The Seventeen-Point Agreement opened a new era in Beijing's relations with Tibet.The agreement,by all appearances,laid out a series of mutually accept- able principles that defined Tibet's relationship with the PRC.The Tibetans were obliged to accept China's claim to sovereignty over the "Land of Snows," thus joining the"big family"of the Chinese motherland.The PRC,in turn, was supposed to treat Tibet differently from other"minority regions,"includ- ing Xinjiang.Most important of all,the CCP promised not to carry out sweeping social and political changes in Tibet for a certain period.In the in- terim,the Communist regime would respect and coexist with Tibet's existing political,social,and monastic systems. Although the Seventeen-Point Agreement was seemingly based on equal- ity,the commitments undertaken by the two sides were in fact highly un- equal.The Tibetans'commitment to accept Tibet as an integral part of the PRC was permanent and irreversible,whereas the PRC's commitment to re- spect and coexist with Tibet's existing political,social,and monarchic systems was conditional and provisional.To many Tibetans,especially the political and monastic elites,the signing of the Seventeen-Point Agreement and the coming of the Chinese Communists held out a future of great uncertainty. Not surprisingly,almost immediately after the PLA entered Tibet,ten- sions developed between the Chinese Communists and many Tibetans.Al- though the PLA followed Mao's instructions and sought to avoid provoca- tions,the presence of several thousand Chinese Communist soldiers in Lhasa and its surrounding areas imposed a great burden on the limited local re- 30.For the text of the"Seventeen-Point Agreement"("Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet"),see Tsering Shakya,The Dragon in the Land of Snows:A History of Modern Tibet since 1947 (New York:Columbia University Press,1999),pp.449-452. 61

turn to the big family of the Motherland—the People’s Republic of China.” The Chinese government, for its part, agreed that it would maintain “the es￾tablished status, functions, and powers of the Dalai Lama,” refrain from alter￾ing Tibet’s feudal and theocratic political, economic, and social systems, and adopt “various reforms” in Tibet only if the Tibetan people so demanded and only after consultation with “the leading personnel of Tibet.”30 The Dalai Lama, who had been in Yadong, a border town near India, since late 1950, approved the agreement and returned to Lhasa on 17 August 1951. That fall, PLA units moved into Lhasa and many other parts of Tibet without encoun￾tering resistance. The Path toward Rebellion The Seventeen-Point Agreement opened a new era in Beijing’s relations with Tibet. The agreement, by all appearances, laid out a series of mutually accept￾able principles that deªned Tibet’s relationship with the PRC. The Tibetans were obliged to accept China’s claim to sovereignty over the “Land of Snows,” thus joining the “big family” of the Chinese motherland. The PRC, in turn, was supposed to treat Tibet differently from other “minority regions,” includ￾ing Xinjiang. Most important of all, the CCP promised not to carry out sweeping social and political changes in Tibet for a certain period. In the in￾terim, the Communist regime would respect and coexist with Tibet’s existing political, social, and monastic systems. Although the Seventeen-Point Agreement was seemingly based on equal￾ity, the commitments undertaken by the two sides were in fact highly un￾equal. The Tibetans’ commitment to accept Tibet as an integral part of the PRC was permanent and irreversible, whereas the PRC’s commitment to re￾spect and coexist with Tibet’s existing political, social, and monarchic systems was conditional and provisional. To many Tibetans, especially the political and monastic elites, the signing of the Seventeen-Point Agreement and the coming of the Chinese Communists held out a future of great uncertainty. Not surprisingly, almost immediately after the PLA entered Tibet, ten￾sions developed between the Chinese Communists and many Tibetans. Al￾though the PLA followed Mao’s instructions and sought to avoid provoca￾tions, the presence of several thousand Chinese Communist soldiers in Lhasa and its surrounding areas imposed a great burden on the limited local re- 61 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 30. For the text of the “Seventeen-Point Agreement” (“Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet”), see Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 449–452

Chen Jian sources (and food supplies in particular)and caused a surge of inflation in Lhasa.3 The conservatives among Tibet's political and monastic elites,who had never been happy with the Seventeen-Point Agreement,tried to exploit popular discontent to squeeze concessions from the Chinese Communists.In late March and early April 1952 the newly formed "People's Representatives" organized a series of demonstrations and protests against the Chinese Com- munist presence in Tibet.32 Mao and his fellow CCP leaders regarded the turmoil in Lhasa as a warn- ing signal.They adopted a dual-track policy to handle the situation.On the one hand,they instructed the CCP's "Tibet Work Committee"to put pres- sure on the Dalai Lama and force him to dissolve the "People's Representa- tives"and dismiss Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi,the two Tibetan officials (Silons,or Prime Ministers)who the Chinese Communists believed were be- hind the recent turmoil.3 On the other hand,Mao emphasized that the Chi- nese Communists should not hastily push for reforms and changes in Tibet but should work patiently with the local Tibetan elites while at the same time laying the groundwork for future reforms.In a long inner-CCP instruction ti- tled "Concerning Policies toward the Work in Tibet,"which was drafted by Mao himself,the Chinese leader acknowledged that "we lack a material basis in Tibet,and,in terms of social power,they [Tibetan elites]are stronger than we are,a situation that will not change in the near future."He argued that "for the time being [we should]leave everything [in Lhasa and Tibet]as it is, let this situation drag on,and not take up these questions until our army is able to meet its own needs through production and wins the support of the masses a year or two from now."Mao believed that the CCP would face "two possibilities"in the future development of Tibet: One is that our united front policy toward the upper stratum,a policy of uniting with the many and isolating the few,will take effect and that the Tibetan people will gradually draw closer to us,so that the bad elements and the Tibetan troops will not dare to rebel.The other possibility is that the bad elements who believe we are weak and can be bullied around may lead the Tibetan troops to rebel and our army to counter-attack in self-defense and deal them a telling blow.Either will be favorable for us. 31.Mao and the CCP leaders were aware of the situation.See,for example,"The CCP Central Com- mittee's Instructions on the Work Issue in Tibet"(1 April 1951),in Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan,p.60;and Heping jiefang xizang.pp.139-140. 32.Shakya,The Dragon in the Land of Snows,pp.102-111;and Wang et al.,Xizang lishi diwei bian. Pp.504-508. 33.Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan,pp.67-79.Mao emphasized the necessity of "using the re- cent events to conduct a political counteroffensive."In particular,he wanted to force the Dalai Lama to agree that Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi should resign. 62

sources (and food supplies in particular) and caused a surge of inºation in Lhasa.31 The conservatives among Tibet’s political and monastic elites, who had never been happy with the Seventeen-Point Agreement, tried to exploit popular discontent to squeeze concessions from the Chinese Communists. In late March and early April 1952 the newly formed “People’s Representatives” organized a series of demonstrations and protests against the Chinese Com￾munist presence in Tibet.32 Mao and his fellow CCP leaders regarded the turmoil in Lhasa as a warn￾ing signal. They adopted a dual-track policy to handle the situation. On the one hand, they instructed the CCP’s “Tibet Work Committee” to put pres￾sure on the Dalai Lama and force him to dissolve the “People’s Representa￾tives” and dismiss Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi, the two Tibetan ofªcials (Silons, or Prime Ministers) who the Chinese Communists believed were be￾hind the recent turmoil.33 On the other hand, Mao emphasized that the Chi￾nese Communists should not hastily push for reforms and changes in Tibet but should work patiently with the local Tibetan elites while at the same time laying the groundwork for future reforms. In a long inner-CCP instruction ti￾tled “Concerning Policies toward the Work in Tibet,” which was drafted by Mao himself, the Chinese leader acknowledged that “we lack a material basis in Tibet, and, in terms of social power, they [Tibetan elites] are stronger than we are, a situation that will not change in the near future.” He argued that “for the time being [we should] leave everything [in Lhasa and Tibet] as it is, let this situation drag on, and not take up these questions until our army is able to meet its own needs through production and wins the support of the masses a year or two from now.” Mao believed that the CCP would face “two possibilities” in the future development of Tibet: One is that our united front policy toward the upper stratum, a policy of uniting with the many and isolating the few, will take effect and that the Tibetan people will gradually draw closer to us, so that the bad elements and the Tibetan troops will not dare to rebel. The other possibility is that the bad elements who believe we are weak and can be bullied around may lead the Tibetan troops to rebel and our army to counter-attack in self-defense and deal them a telling blow. Either will be favorable for us. 62 Chen Jian 31. Mao and the CCP leaders were aware of the situation. See, for example, “The CCP Central Com￾mittee’s Instructions on the Work Issue in Tibet” (1 April 1951), in Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan, p. 60; and Heping jiefang xizang, pp. 139–140. 32. Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows, pp. 102–111; and Wang et al., Xizang lishi diwei bian, pp. 504–508. 33. Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 67–79. Mao emphasized the necessity of “using the re￾cent events to conduct a political counteroffensive.” In particular, he wanted to force the Dalai Lama to agree that Lukhangwa and Lobsang Tashi should resign

The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 Mao asserted that"[now]apparently not only the two Silons but also the Dalai Lama and most of his clique are reluctant to accept the [Seventeen- Point]agreement and are unwilling to carry it out.As yet we do not have the material basis for this purpose [implementing the agreement]in terms of sup- port among the masses or in the upper stratum,to force its implementation will do more harm than good."But Mao believed that time was on the CCP's side: Things will be different in a few years.By then they [the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan elites]will have no choice but to carry out the agreement in full and re- organize the Tibetan troops.If the Tibetan troops start one or even several rebel- lions and are repulsed by our army each time,we will be all the more justified in reorganizing them. Mao concluded that "we should be prepared to make concessions,wait for conditions to become mature,prepare for taking the offensive in the future." Mao's directive encompassed a series of well-conceived strategies and tac- tics.He was evidently aware of the extraordinary obstacles the CCP and the PLA would have to overcome in order to incorporate the people and land of Tibet into the Chinese "socialist motherland."Therefore,he was willing to adopt a policy that was characterized by gradualism and included making multiple concessions to the Dalai Lama and the Kashag.This was a battle concerning the hearts of the Tibetan people that could not be won through military means.Indeed,in Mao's discussion of the Tibet issue,the chairman even touched upon such details as that"on our part [we should]concentrate on good deeds of production,trade,road-building,medical services and united front work so as to win over the masses."3 But these measures were no more than temporary tactics.The CCP chairman made clear that the strategic goal of Beijing's policies toward Tibet was the "complete implementation of the [Seventeen-Point]Agreement."For Mao,this meant not only that Tibet should become a part of China but also that through political,social,and eco- nomic reforms Tibet,like other parts of the PRC,eventually should be trans- formed into a socialist society. Mao repeatedly mentioned in his instructions to the CCP cadres in Tibet that although the emphasis of the CCP's policy should be on gradualism,the Party cadres should also be prepared to deal with serious crises provoked by "bad elements"in Tibet who would rebel against Chinese rule.A scenario of 34.CCP Central Committee (drafted by Mao Zedong),"Concerning the Policy of the Work in Ti- bet"(6 April 1952),in Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan,pp.61-64.For an English translation of most of the text,see Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing:Foreign Language Press,1977),Vol.5, Pp.73-76. 35.CCP Central Committee,"Concerning the Policy of the Work in Tibet,"p.63. 63

Mao asserted that “[now] apparently not only the two Silons but also the Dalai Lama and most of his clique are reluctant to accept the [Seventeen￾Point] agreement and are unwilling to carry it out. As yet we do not have the material basis for this purpose [implementing the agreement] in terms of sup￾port among the masses or in the upper stratum, to force its implementation will do more harm than good.” But Mao believed that time was on the CCP’s side: Things will be different in a few years. By then they [the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan elites] will have no choice but to carry out the agreement in full and re￾organize the Tibetan troops. If the Tibetan troops start one or even several rebel￾lions and are repulsed by our army each time, we will be all the more justiªed in reorganizing them. Mao concluded that “we should be prepared to make concessions, wait for conditions to become mature, prepare for taking the offensive in the future.”34 Mao’s directive encompassed a series of well-conceived strategies and tac￾tics. He was evidently aware of the extraordinary obstacles the CCP and the PLA would have to overcome in order to incorporate the people and land of Tibet into the Chinese “socialist motherland.” Therefore, he was willing to adopt a policy that was characterized by gradualism and included making multiple concessions to the Dalai Lama and the Kashag. This was a battle concerning the hearts of the Tibetan people that could not be won through military means. Indeed, in Mao’s discussion of the Tibet issue, the chairman even touched upon such details as that “on our part [we should] concentrate on good deeds of production, trade, road-building, medical services and united front work so as to win over the masses.”35 But these measures were no more than temporary tactics. The CCP chairman made clear that the strategic goal of Beijing’s policies toward Tibet was the “complete implementation of the [Seventeen-Point] Agreement.” For Mao, this meant not only that Tibet should become a part of China but also that through political, social, and eco￾nomic reforms Tibet, like other parts of the PRC, eventually should be trans￾formed into a socialist society. Mao repeatedly mentioned in his instructions to the CCP cadres in Tibet that although the emphasis of the CCP’s policy should be on gradualism, the Party cadres should also be prepared to deal with serious crises provoked by “bad elements” in Tibet who would rebel against Chinese rule. A scenario of 63 The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 34. CCP Central Committee (drafted by Mao Zedong), “Concerning the Policy of the Work in Ti￾bet” (6 April 1952), in Mao Zedong xizang gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 61–64. For an English translation of most of the text, see Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1977), Vol. 5, pp. 73–76. 35. CCP Central Committee, “Concerning the Policy of the Work in Tibet,” p. 63