上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源_Lesson 3_English materials_atomic diplomacy in the Korean War

The MIT Press Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War Author(s):Roger Dingman Reviewed work(s): Source:International Security,Vol.13,No.3(Winter,1988-1989),pp.50-91 Published by:The MIT Press Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538736 Accessed:27/01/201321:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use,available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive.We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to International Security. 29 STOR http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War Author(s): Roger Dingman Reviewed work(s): Source: International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter, 1988-1989), pp. 50-91 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538736 . Accessed: 27/01/2013 21:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Atomic Diplomacy Roger Dingman During the Korean War In January 1956,Life magazine published an article that purportedly explained how the Eisen- hower administration had ended the Korean War.Secretary of State John Foster Dulles revealed that he had conveyed an "unmistakable warning"to Beijing that the United States would use nuclear weapons against China if rapid progress toward a negotiated settlement was not made.He asserted that it was "a pretty fair inference"that this nuclear threat had worked. Dulles made this claim in defense of the notion that nuclear weapons were useful,indeed essential,tools of statecraft:When nuclear capability was combined with communication of intent to use it if necessary,deterrence- and even compellence-worked.1 Dulles spoke in response to partisan critics at the beginning of an election year,but his words influenced policy and history long after the 1956 contest ended.They defined the parameters of a debate about the political and diplomatic utility of nuclear weapons generally and the outcome of the Korean War in particular.2 However,the secretary of state's claim was doubly deceptive.It focused analysts'attention on the six months of Republican conflict management,to the neglect of the preceding two and one-half years of Democratic stewardship.Moreover,Dulles's claim prompted a debate over This essay was prepared for a conference on the study of nuclear weapons held at Columbia University with the support of the John D.and Catherine T.MacArthur Foundation.I am especially indebted to Roger M.Anders,Dennis Bilger,William H.Cunliffe,David Haight, Brigadier General John W.Huston,USAFR,and Edward Reese for archival guidance;to Robert Jervis,Franklin D.Mitchell,and colleagues at the School of Modern Asian Studies,Griffith University,Brisbane,Australia,for comments on earlier draft portions of the manuscript;and to the U.S.Naval War College and the Department of History,University of Southern California, for financing my travels to necessary archives.I alone bear responsibility for the arguments advanced herein Roger Dingman is Associate Professor of History at the University of Southern California.He has also served as Professor of Strategy at the U.S.Naval War College and is Distinguished Visiting Professor of History at the U.S.Air Force Academy for 1988-89. 1.James Shepley,"How Dulles Averted War,"Life,January 16,1956,pp.70-72ff. 2.Edward C.Keefer,"President Dwight D.Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War," Diplomatic History,Vol.10,No.3(Summer 1986),pp.267-268,summarizes the historiographical debate triggered by Dulles's claim.A recent restatement of Dulles's argument,based primarily upon published sources,is Daniel Calingaert,"Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War,"Journal of Strategic Studies,Vol.11,No.2 (June 1988),pp.177-202. International Security,Winter 1988/89 (Vol.13,No.3) 1988 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 50 This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

AtOmiC Diplomacy Roger Dingman During the Korean War In January 1956, Life magazine published an article that purportedly explained how the Eisen￾hower administration had ended the Korean War. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles revealed that he had conveyed an "unmistakable warning" to Beijing that the United States would use nuclear weapons against China if rapid progress toward a negotiated settlement was not made. He asserted that it was "a pretty fair inference" that this nuclear threat had worked. Dulles made this claim in defense of the notion that nuclear weapons were useful, indeed essential, tools of statecraft: When nuclear capability was combined with communication of intent to use it if necessary, deterrence￾and even compellence-worked.1 Dulles spoke in response to partisan critics at the beginning of an election year, but his words influenced policy and history long after the 1956 contest ended. They defined the parameters of a debate about the political and diplomatic utility of nuclear weapons generally and the outcome of the Korean War in particular.2 However, the secretary of state's claim was doubly deceptive. It focused analysts' attention on the six months of Republican conflict management, to the neglect of the preceding two and one-half years of Democratic stewardship. Moreover, Dulles's claim prompted a debate over This essay was prepared for a conference on the study of nuclear weapons held at Columbia University with the support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. I am especially indebted to Roger M. Anders, Dennis Bilger, William H. Cunliffe, David Haight, Brigadier General John W. Huston, USAFR, and Edward Reese for archival guidance; to Robert Jervis, Franklin D. Mitchell, and colleagues at the School of Modern Asian Studies, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia, for comments on earlier draft portions of the manuscript; and to the U.S. Naval War College and the Department of History, University of Southern California, for financing my travels to necessary archives. I alone bear responsibility for the arguments advanced herein. Roger Dingman is Associate Professor of History at the University of Southern California. He has also served as Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and is Distinguished Visiting Professor of History at the U.S. Air Force Academy for 1988-89. 1. James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," Life, January 16, 1956, pp. 70-72ff. 2. Edward C. Keefer, "President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War," Diplomatic History, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Summer 1986), pp. 267-268, summarizes the historiographical debate triggered by Dulles's claim. A recent restatement of Dulles's argument, based primarily upon published sources, is Daniel Calingaert, "Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 1988), pp. 177-202. International Security, Winter 1988/89 (Vol. 43, No. 3) ? 1988 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 50 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Atomic Diplomacy 51 the effects of Washington's atomic diplomacy that deflected attention from its substance and character.The result was to reinforce an essentially partisan interpretation of what occurred and to leave unconsidered more fundamental questions as to how,when,and why the United States tried to use nuclear weapons to its advantage in managing a limited war. This article attempts to answer those basic questions.It focuses on Wash- ington's attempts to derive political and diplomatic rather than tactical mili- tary advantage from the possession and deployment of nuclear weapons. What follows differs from earlier explorations of this subject in three vital respects.First,it reviews the entire war to demonstrate that atomic diplomacy was an element of American statecraft throughout the conflict and not just in its concluding months.Secondly,the story rests upon a deeper and broader documentary foundation than earlier treatments of this subject.The availability of previously top-secret documents from the papers of key indi- viduals,the several armed services,the State and Defense Departments,the National Security Council (NSC),and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) permits a more detailed analysis of Washington's attempts to use nuclear weapons as tools of conflict management.3 Finally,the examination goes beyond words to deeds.By tracing military and diplomatic actions as well as parsing political intentions,the narrative that follows seeks to provide fresh insight into the history of United States Korean War policies and the evolution of American thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons. Attitudes and Assumptions American statesman and military professionals brought three basic assump- tions about nuclear weapons to the task of conflict management during the Korean War.They believed that the United States enjoyed clear,but qualified nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.They assumed that such superi- ority ought,somehow,to be usable.They also thought that the combination 3.Two sorts of previously unavailable archival materials proved most useful in the development of this essay.The papers of senior U.S.Air Force and Atomic Energy Commission(AEC)officials, most notably those of General Curtis E.LeMay,General Hoyt S.Vandenberg,and AEC Chair- man Gordon A.Dean,include not only individual diaries but also official papers unavailable elsewhere.Many of the personal daily schedules of ranking officials-most notably those of Dean G.Acheson,Omar N.Bradley,J.Lawton Collins,Louis A.Johnson,and Hoyt S.Van- denberg-contain notations of visitors and telephone conversations.When used in conjunction with departmental documents,these materials facilitated detailed reconstruction of patterns of decision and action. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Atomic Diplomacy |51 the effects of Washington's atomic diplomacy that deflected attention from its substance and character. The result was to reinforce an essentially partisan interpretation of what occurred and to leave unconsidered more fundamental questions as to how, when, and why the United States tried to use nuclear weapons to its advantage in managing a limited war. This article attempts to answer those basic questions. It focuses on Wash￾ington's attempts to derive political and diplomatic rather than tactical mili￾tary advantage from the possession and deployment of nuclear weapons. What follows differs from earlier explorations of this subject in three vital respects. First, it reviews the entire war to demonstrate that atomic diplomacy was an element of American statecraft throughout the conflict and not just in its concluding months. Secondly, the story rests upon a deeper and broader documentary foundation than earlier treatments of this subject. The availability of previously top-secret documents from the papers of key indi￾viduals, the several armed services, the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council (NSC), and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) permits a more detailed analysis of Washington's attempts to use nuclear weapons as tools of conflict management.3 Finally, the examination goes beyond words to deeds. By tracing military and diplomatic actions as well as parsing political intentions, the narrative that follows seeks to provide fresh insight into the history of United States Korean War policies and the evolution of American thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons. Attitudes and Assumptions American statesman and military professionals brought three basic assump￾tions about nuclear weapons to the task of conflict management during the Korean War. They believed that the United States enjoyed clear, but qualified nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. They assumed that such superi￾ority ought, somehow, to be usable. They also thought that the combination 3. Two sorts of previously unavailable archival materials proved most useful in the development of this essay. The papers of senior U.S. Air Force and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) officials, most notably those of General Curtis E. LeMay, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and AEC Chair￾man Gordon A. Dean, include not only individual diaries but also official papers unavailable elsewhere. Many of the personal daily schedules of ranking officials-most notably those of Dean G. Acheson, Omar N. Bradley, J. Lawton Collins, Louis A. Johnson, and Hoyt S. Van￾denberg-contain notations of visitors and telephone conversations. When used in conjunction with departmental documents, these materials facilitated detailed reconstruction of patterns of decision and action. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 13:3 52 of restraint and resolve in atomic diplomacy during the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49 had worked and could prove effective in future crises.Because these three ideas profoundly influenced the decisions of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations,they deserve further explication. In June 1950,Washington had a clear but qualified nuclear advantage over Moscow.America had nearly three hundred atomic bombs in its stockpile, and more than two hundred sixty aircraft capable of putting them on Soviet targets.4 The Soviet Union had exploded its first nuclear device only ten months earlier and could strike the United States only by one-way bomber missions or by smuggling nuclear weapons into American harbors aboard merchant vessels.5 While both powers dramatically increased their nuclear stockpiles and improved their delivery systems during the Korean War,this balance favoring the United States did not change fundamentally between 1950and1953.6 But American decision-makers recognized that their nuclear superiority was qualified in two respects.First,despite flaws in enemy delivery capa- bilities,the grim truth was that Moscow's ability to strike the American heartland was growing.7 Secondly,Washington acknowledged real limita- tions in America's ability to put nuclear weapons on enemy targets.Although 4.David Alan Rosenberg,"U.S.Nuclear Stockpile 1945 to 1950,"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.38,No.5(May1982),p.26. 5.Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),Intelligence memorandum 323-SRC,August 25,1950, intelligence file,president's secretary's file (PSF),Box 250,Harry S Truman papers,Truman Library,Independence,Missouri (hereafter"Truman papers,HSTL"). 6.Executive Secretary,National Security Council(NSC),to Chairman,AEC,December 6,1950, NSC atomic weapons file,PSF,Box 202,Truman papers,HSTL;Briefing:Air Estimate of the Situation,1951-1954,U.S.Air Force Commanders'Conference,October 30,1951,item 168.7026- 9,Charles Cabell papers,Simpson Historical Research Center,Maxwell Air Force Base,Alabama (hereafter "Cabell papers").The briefing document puts Soviet nuclear strength at less than half the estimated American stockpile as of January 1951.New York Times,October 2,1951;Office of the Historian,Strategic Air Command (SAC),Development of Strategic Air Command,1946-1976 (Omaha:U.S.Air Force SAC,1976),Pp.20,27,33,35,38;Secretary of Defense to Executive Secretary,NSC,June 8,1953,Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (OSANSA) NSC subject file,atomic energy series,Box 1,Dwight D.Eisenhower papers,Dwight D.Eisen- hower Library,Abilene,Kansas;Office of the Historian,Strategic Air Command,Status of Strategic Air Command,January-June 1953,Volume 1,frame 0481,reel K4263,Office of Air Force History,Bolling Air Force Base,Maryland. 7.President Truman publicly acknowledged American vulnerability to Soviet attack in April 1951;Public Papers of the President,1951(Washington,D.C.:U.S.Government Printing Office [U.S.GPO],1965),pp.225-226.This series will hereafter be cited as Truman Public Papers,with dates and pages.By early 1953,President Eisenhower's advisers were debating the extent,not the possibility,of damage from Soviet nuclear strikes.See Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter"FRUS"),1952-1954,Volume 2,National Security Affairs (Washington,D.C.:U.S.GPO, 1984),pp.203,213-214,232-233. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 13:3 j 52 of restraint and resolve in atomic diplomacy during the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49 had worked and could prove effective in future crises. Because these three ideas profoundly influenced the decisions of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, they deserve further explication. In June 1950, Washington had a clear but qualified nuclear advantage over Moscow. America had nearly three hundred atomic bombs in its stockpile, and more than two hundred sixty aircraft capable of putting them on Soviet targets.4 The Soviet Union had exploded its first nuclear device only ten months earlier and could strike the United States only by one-way bomber missions or by smuggling nuclear weapons into American harbors aboard merchant vessels.5 While both powers dramatically increased their nuclear stockpiles and improved their delivery systems during the Korean War, this balance favoring the United States did not change fundamentally between 1950 and 1953.6 But American decision-makers recognized that their nuclear superiority was qualified in two respects. First, despite flaws in enemy delivery capa￾bilities, the grim truth was that Moscow's ability to strike the American heartland was growing.7 Secondly, Washington acknowledged real limita￾tions in America's ability to put nuclear weapons on enemy targets. Although 4. David Alan Rosenberg, "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile 1945 to 1950," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1982), p. 26. 5. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Intelligence memorandum 323-SRC, August 25, 1950, intelligence file, president's secretary's file (PSF), Box 250, Harry S Truman papers, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri (hereafter "Truman papers, HSTL"). 6. Executive Secretary, National Security Council (NSC), to Chairman, AEC, December 6, 1950, NSC atomic weapons file, PSF, Box 202, Truman papers, HSTL; Briefing: Air Estimate of the Situation, 1951-1954, U.S. Air Force Commanders' Conference, October 30, 1951, item 168.7026- 9, Charles Cabell papers, Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (hereafter "Cabell papers"). The briefing document puts Soviet nuclear strength at less than half the estimated American stockpile as of January 1951. New York Times, October 2, 1951; Office of the Historian, Strategic Air Command (SAC), Development of Strategic Air Command, 1946-1976 (Omaha: U.S. Air Force SAC, 1976), pp. 20, 27, 33, 35, 38; Secretary of Defense to Executive Secretary, NSC, June 8, 1953, Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (OSANSA), NSC subject file, atomic energy series, Box 1, Dwight D. Eisenhower papers, Dwight D. Eisen￾hower Library, Abilene, Kansas; Office of the Historian, Strategic Air Command, Status of Strategic Air Command, January-June 1953, Volume 1, frame 0481, reel K4263, Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland. 7. President Truman publicly acknowledged American vulnerability to Soviet attack in April 1951; Public Papers of the President, 1951 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1965), pp. 225-226. This series will hereafter be cited as Truman Public Papers, with dates and pages. By early 1953, President Eisenhower's advisers were debating the extent, not the possibility, of damage from Soviet nuclear strikes. See Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter "FRUS"), 1952-1954, Volume 2, National Security Affairs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1984), pp. 203, 213-214, 232-233. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Atomic Diplomacy 53 war plans called for launching an atomic blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union in the event of general war,not one nuclear-configured aircraft was deployed outside the continental United States when the Korean fighting began.s Strategic Air Command(SAC)planners estimated that it would take three months to bomb Moscow into submission,given the inadequacy of forward bases and overseas fuel supplies.9 By 1953 the probability of swifter,suc- cessful strikes against the Soviet Union had increased thanks to the intro- duction of jet bombers,the development of overseas bases,and the deploy- ment of aircraft carriers modified so as to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons.10 But the Pentagon did not have custody of any complete atomic bombs,and the State Department had not begun negotiations for their de- ployment to foreign soil.11 That meant that Washington had no immediately usable nuclear force near Korea. Despite these limitations,President Truman,President Eisenhower,many of their key advisers,and probably most politicians along with a majority of the general public believed that nuclear superiority ought to be usable.12 While the two presidents were sensitive to the moral dilemmas posed by the indis- criminate destructiveness of atomic weapons,both,as trained military men, placed them at the top of the hierarchy of usable force.Within days of the outbreak of fighting in Korea,both men alluded to the possibility of using atomic arms.13 By early July 1950,Pentagon staff officers and the commander 8.SAC,Development of SAC,pp.20-21;David Alan Rosenberg,"The Origins of Overkill," International Security,Vol.7,No.4(Spring 1983),pp.15-18,25. 9.Office of the Historian,Strategic Air Command,"History of the Strategic Air Command: January-June 1950,"Volume 2,chapter 7(declassified by author's Freedom of Information Act request);Major General S.E.Anderson,Director of Plans,U.S.Air Force,to Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington,April 11,1950,Box 100,Office of Secretary of the Air Force papers, Record Group (RG)330,U.S.National Archives (hereafter "NA"). 10.SAC,Development of SAC,pp.35,38;Status of Strategic Air Command,January-June 1953 Volume 1,frame 0502,reel K4263,Volume 7,frame 0946,reel K4264,Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base. 11.James Lay to Truman,December 5,1950,Secretary of Defense to Executive Secretary,NSC May 1,1951,NSC atomic file,PSF,Truman papers,HSTL;Atomic Energy Commission,"Weap- ons Custody and Use,"April 25,1961,AEC 867/49,file 1442,folder 2,Atomic Energy Secretariat papers,Department of Energy(hereafter AEC,"Weapons Custody and Use");Herbert B.Loper to Clinton P.Anderson,November 10,1960,"Memorandum on History of Atomic Weapons Custody,"Minutes,Box 5,Records of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy(JCAE),RG 128,NA (hereafter cited as "Loper memorandum"). 12.Carlton Savage to George Kennan,memorandum,"Preliminary Study of Attitudes of U.S. Population about U.S.Use of Atomic Bomb in War,"December 21,1949,Box 50,Paul Nitze file,Policy Planning Staff files,Department of State papers,RG 59,NA. 13.David E.Lilienthal,Journals:The Atomic Energy Years 1945-1950(New York:Harper and Row, 1964),p.391;Robert Ferrell,ed.,The Eisenhower Diaries (New York:Norton,1981),pp.175-176; FRUS,1950,Volume 7,Korea,pp.159-160. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Atomic Diplomacy |53 war plans called for launching an atomic blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union in the event of general war, not one nuclear-configured aircraft was deployed outside the continental United States when the Korean fighting began.8 Strategic Air Command (SAC) planners estimated that it would take three months to bomb Moscow into submission, given the inadequacy of forward bases and overseas fuel supplies.9 By 1953 the probability of swifter, suc￾cessful strikes against the Soviet Union had increased thanks to the intro￾duction of jet bombers, the development of overseas bases, and the deploy￾ment of aircraft carriers modified so as to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons.10 But the Pentagon did not have custody of any complete atomic bombs, and the State Department had not begun negotiations for their de￾ployment to foreign soil.11 That meant that Washington had no immediately usable nuclear force near Korea. Despite these limitations, President Truman, President Eisenhower, many of their key advisers, and probably most politicians along with a majority of the general public believed that nuclear superiority ought to be usable. 12 While the two presidents were sensitive to the moral dilemmas posed by the indis￾criminate destructiveness of atomic weapons, both, as trained military men, placed them at the top of the hierarchy of usable force. Within days of the outbreak of fighting in Korea, both men alluded to the possibility of using atomic arms.13 By early July 1950, Pentagon staff officers and the commander 8. SAC, Development of SAC, pp. 20-21; David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 15-18, 25. 9. Office of the Historian, Strategic Air Command, "History of the Strategic Air Command: January-June 1950," Volume 2, chapter 7 (declassified by author's Freedom of Information Act request); Major General S.E. Anderson, Director of Plans, U.S. Air Force, to Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington, April 11, 1950, Box 100, Office of Secretary of the Air Force papers, Record Group (RG) 330, U.S. National Archives (hereafter "NA"). 10. SAC, Development of SAC, pp. 35, 38; Status of Strategic Air Command, January-June 1953, Volume 1, frame 0502, reel K4263, Volume 7, frame 0946, reel K4264, Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base. 11. James Lay to Truman, December 5, 1950, Secretary of Defense to Executive Secretary, NSC, May 1, 1951, NSC atomic file, PSF, Truman papers, HSTL; Atomic Energy Commission, "Weap￾ons Custody and Use," April 25, 1961, AEC 867/49, file 1442, folder 2, Atomic Energy Secretariat papers, Department of Energy (hereafter AEC, "Weapons Custody and Use"); Herbert B. Loper tQ Clinton P. Anderson, November 10, 1960, "Memorandum on History of Atomic Weapons Custody," Minutes, Box 5, Records of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), RG 128, NA (hereafter cited as "Loper memorandum"). 12. Carlton Savage to George Kennan, memorandum, "Preliminary Study of Attitudes of U.S. Population about U.S. Use of Atomic Bomb in War," December 21, 1949, Box 50, Paul Nitze file, Policy Planning Staff files, Department of State papers, RG 59, NA. 13. David E. Lilienthal, Journals: The Atomic Energy Years 1945-1950 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 391; Robert Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 175-176; FRUS, 1950, Volume 7, Korea, pp. 159-160. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 13:354 in chief of the Pacific fleet surmised that,if the situation in Korea became desperate,Congress and the public would demand the use of atomic weap- 0ns.14 The change of administrations in January 1953 strengthened official Wash- ington's belief that nuclear weapons were usable tools of statecraft.The new secretary of state,John Foster Dulles,had argued in 1948 that the public would demand a resort to nuclear arms if the situation appeared to require their use.15 His May 1952 Life magazine article,entitled "A Policy of Bold- ness,"prefigured the Eisenhower administration's "New Look"strategy by championing reliance on nuclear weapons and strong alliances as deterrents to future communist aggression.16 Thus the question confronting American statesmen as the war neared its end,just as at its beginning,was not whether, but how and when,to employ nuclear weapons for conflict management. Democratic and Republican statesmen looked back to the dispatch of two squadrons of B-29s to Western Europe during the Berlin Blockade of 1948- 49 for guidance on how best to use American nuclear superiority.Although the press described the flight of these aircraft,similar to those that had dropped atomic bombs in 1945 but not actually configured to do so,as a training mission,their deployment was widely interpreted as a demonstra- tion of resolve in the face of Soviet pressure.17 In fact,President Truman and his diplomatic advisers practiced restraint at the same time,rejecting Penta- gon requests for custody of nuclear weapons and avoiding negotiating tactics that might back Moscow into a corner from which there was no face-saving escape.18 In the summer of 1948,American statesmen doubted that the B-29 deployment contributed directly to settlement of the Berlin Blockade crisis.19 14.Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet(CINCPACFLT Radford)to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO Sherman),080941Z,July 8,1950,enclosure to JCS 1776/25 in Ops TS Korea file,Box 34a, section 14,cases 41-60,Assistant Chief of Staff,Operations,U.S.Army papers,RG 319,NA; Cabell memorandum,"Action to Prevent a Dunkirk in Korea,shown to General Norstad,July 12,1950,TS 189327,Cabell papers. 15.James V.Forrestal diary,October 10,1948,cited in Avi Shlaim,The United States and the Berlin Blockade,1948-1949 (Berkeley:University of California Press,1983),p.359. 16.John Foster Dulles,"A Policy of Boldness,"Life,May 19,1952,pp.151-158;Stephen E. Ambrose,Eisenhower,Vol.2 (New York:Simon and Schuster,1984),pp.33-34. 17.New York Times,June 19,1948,July 16,18,26,28,1948;Shlaim,The United States and the Berlin Blockade,pp.235-239,337-341;Harry Borowski,A Hollow Threat:Strategic Air Power and Containment before Korea (Westport,Conn.:Greenwood,1982),pp.125-130. 18.Truman Public Papers,1948,p.415;AEC,"Weapons Custody and Use";Loper memorandum; Ronald Pruessen,John Foster Dulles:The Road to Power (New York:Free Press,1982),pp.376- 377. 19.Lilienthal,Journals,Vol.2,p.391;Robert Ferrell,ed.,Dear Bess (New York:Norton,1983), Pp.554-555. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 13:3 j 54 in chief of the Pacific fleet surmised that, if the situation in Korea became desperate, Congress and the public would demand the use of atomic weap￾ons. 14 The change of administrations in January 1953 strengthened official Wash￾ington's belief that nuclear weapons were usable tools of statecraft. The new secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, had argued in 1948 that the public would demand a resort to nuclear arms if the situation appeared to require their use.15 His May 1952 Life magazine article, entitled "A Policy of Bold￾ness," prefigured the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" strategy by championing reliance on nuclear weapons and strong alliances as deterrents to future communist aggression.16 Thus the question confronting American statesmen as the war neared its end, just as at its beginning, was not whether, but how and when, to employ nuclear weapons for conflict management. Democratic and Republican statesmen looked back to the dispatch of two squadrons of B-29s to Western Europe during the Berlin Blockade of 1948- 49 for guidance on how best to use American nuclear superiority. Although the press described the flight of these aircraft, similar to those that had dropped atomic bombs in 1945 but not actually configured to do so, as a training mission, their deployment was widely interpreted as a demonstra￾tion of resolve in the face of Soviet pressure.17 In fact, President Truman and his diplomatic advisers practiced restraint at the same time, rejecting Penta￾gon requests for custody of nuclear weapons and avoiding negotiating tactics that might back Moscow into a corner from which there was no face-saving escape.18 In the summer of 1948, American statesmen doubted that the B-29 deployment contributed directly to settlement of the Berlin Blockade crisis.19 14. Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT Radford) to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO Sherman), 080941Z, July 8, 1950, enclosure to JCS 1776/25 in Ops TS Korea file, Box 34a, section 14, cases 41-60, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, U.S. Army papers, RG 319, NA; Cabell memorandum, "Action to Prevent a Dunkirk in Korea," shown to General Norstad, July 12, 1950, TS 189327, Cabell papers. 15. James V. Forrestal diary, October 10, 1948, cited in Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 359. 16. John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," Life, May 19, 1952, pp. 151-158; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Vol. 2 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 33-34. 17. New York Times, June 19, 1948, July 16, 18, 26, 28,- 1948; Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, pp. 235-239, 337-341; Harry Borowski, A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment before Korea (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1982), pp. 125-130. 18. Truman Public Papers, 1948, p. 415; AEC, "Weapons Custody and Use"; Loper memorandum; Ronald Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York: Free Press, 1982), pp. 376- 377. 19. Lilienthal, Journals, Vol. 2, p. 391; Robert Ferrell, ed., Dear Bess (New York: Norton, 1983), pp. 554-555. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Atomic Diplomacy 55 But as time hazed over the particulars of this episode,they came to believe that atomic arms could be instruments of "force without war."20 Their cred- ibility might even exceed their actual capability if they were used,without overt threats,for purposes of deterrence rather than compellence.21 Thus American statesmen and soldiers brought to the Korean War the conviction that atomic arms,if properly employed,could be extremely valuable tools for conflict management. From Resolve to Restraint,June 1950-June 1951 During the first year of the war,a pattern in the use of nuclear weapons took shape in Washington.Forced repeatedly by battlefield circumstance to consider their tactical use in and around Korea,the Truman administration time and again turned away from such action.Driven by the same circum- stances to consider how atomic weapons might help manage the political and diplomatic aspects of the conflict,the administration came to appreciate their utility in dealing with its enemies,the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China(PRC);with its principal ally,Britain;and with its partisan foes at home.How and why President Truman and his senior advisers developed what might even be termed a strategy for the use of nuclear weapons can be seen by analyzing their behavior at four moments of crisis during the first year of the Korean conflict.Two of those moments came early in the fighting,in July 1950.A third followed at the end of November, when massive Chinese intervention confronted the United States with "an entirely new war."22 The fourth and most serious of these crises struck Washington in April 1951. FIRST USE:BOMBERS TO BRITAIN The possibility of using nuclear weapons tactically came up during President Truman's very first wartime meeting with his senior advisers at Blair House on Sunday evening,June 25,1950.The president raised the issue by asking Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt S.Vandenberg if American planes could "take out"Soviet bases near Korea.The general replied affirmatively,but said it 20.The phrase"force without war"is the title of a book by Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan (Washington,D.C.:Brookings,1978);Shlaim,The United States and the Berlin Blockade,p. 359. 21.John Lewis Gaddis,The Long Peace (New York:Oxford University Press,1987),pp.108-110. 22.FRUS,1950,Vol.7,Korea,p.1237. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Atomic Diplomacy |55 But as time hazed over the particulars of this episode, they came to believe that atomic arms could be instruments of "force without war."20 Their cred￾ibility might even exceed their actual capability if they were used, without overt threats, for purposes of deterrence rather than compellence.21 Thus American statesmen and soldiers brought to the Korean War the conviction that atomic arms, if properly employed, could be extremely valuable tools for conflict management. From Resolve to Restraint, June 1950-June 1951 During the first year of the war, a pattern in the use of nuclear weapons took shape in Washington. Forced repeatedly by battlefield circumstance to consider their tactical use in and around Korea, the Truman administration time and again turned away from such action. Driven by the same circum￾stances to consider how atomic weapons might help manage the political and diplomatic aspects of the conflict, the administration came to appreciate their utility in dealing with its enemies, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC); with its principal ally, Britain; and with its partisan foes at home. How and why President Truman and his senior advisers developed what might even be termed a strategy for the use of nuclear weapons can be seen by analyzing their behavior at four moments of crisis during the first year of the Korean conflict. Two of those moments came early in the fighting, in July 1950. A third followed at the end of November, when massive Chinese intervention confronted the United States with "an entirely new war."22 The fourth and most serious of these crises struck Washington in April 1951. FIRST USE: BOMBERS TO BRITAIN The possibility of using nuclear weapons tactically came up during President Truman's very first wartime meeting with his senior advisers at Blair House on Sunday evening, June 25, 1950. The president raised the issue by asking Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt S. Vandenberg if American planes could "take out" Soviet bases near Korea. The general replied affirmatively, but said it 20. The phrase "force without war" is the title of a book by Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1978); Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, p. 359. 21. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 108-110. 22. FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, Korea, p. 1237. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 13:3 56 would require atomic bombs.That response prompted Truman to order the preparation of plans for launching an atomic attack in the event the Soviet Union entered the fighting.23 During the next three weeks,however,the president and his advisers came to see more diplomatic and political than military utility in nuclear weapons.That perception grew out of developments surrounding the first engagements between American and North Korean forces.Washington in- tervened in Korea to defend the principle of collective security and America's leadership of the non-communist world.24 Policy-makers hoped for "resound- ing military success achieved by demonstrably overwhelming power."25 But neither bombing North Korea nor blocking key roads slowed the enemy juggernaut plunging southward.In their first encounters,it was American troops rather than Pyongyang's soldiers who retreated.26 Alarmed by these results,General Douglas MacArthur begged Washington to double the force at his disposal so that he might hold at least the southern tip of the Korean peninsula.27 But his superiors were not prepared to make definitive choices at this point.Meeting with the Cabinet on July 7,1950,the president groped for some way to "let the world know we mean business."Central Intelligence Agency(CIA)Director Roscoe Hillenkoetter proposed seeking United Na- tions sanction for use of the atomic bomb even if doing so could not guarantee that Moscow would restrain Pyongyang and Beijing.Although he remained skeptical of Soviet intentions,Truman declined to make so overt a threat. Downplaying the immediate danger,he insisted that the Soviets were "sev- enty percent bluffers."28 Then,making a Solomonic choice between the Pen- 23.Ibid.,pp.159-160.It should be noted that no one present voiced the slightest objection to the president's order. 24.Ernest R.May,"Lessons"of the Past (New York:Oxford University Press,1973),pp.75-78; William Stueck,Jr.,The Road to Confrontation (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 1981),pp.191-192,255-257. 25.FRLS,1950,Vol.7,Korea,p.278. 26.Roy K.Flint,"Task Force Smith and the 24th Division:Delay and Withdrawal,5-19 July 1950,"in Charles E.Heller and William A.Stofft,eds.,America's First Battles 1776-1965(Law- rence:University Press of Kansas,1986),pp.266-299;Clay Blair,Forgotten War:America in Korea 1950-1953(New York:Times Books,1987),pp.101-111. 27.D.Clayton James,The Years of MacArthur,Vol.3(Boston:Houghton Mifflin,1985),Pp.441- 442;James F.Schnabel and Robert J.Watson,The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,Volume 3,The Korean War,part I(Washington,D.C.:Joint Chiefs of Staf0CS],1978),pp.179-185. 28.Cabinet meeting notes,July 7,1950,Box 1,Matthew J.Connelly papers,Truman Library; "Memorandum on psychological use'of the Atomic bomb in Korea Conflict,"July 6,1950, This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 13:3 156 would require atomic bombs. That response prompted Truman to order the preparation of plans for launching an atomic attack in the event the Soviet Union entered the fighting.23 During the next three weeks, however, the president and his advisers came to see more diplomatic and political than military utility in nuclear weapons. That perception grew out of developments surrounding the first engagements between American and North Korean forces. Washington in￾tervened in Korea to defend the principle of collective security and America's leadership of the non-communist world.24 Policy-makers hoped for "resound￾ing military success achieved by demonstrably overwhelming power."25 But neither bombing North Korea nor blocking key roads slowed the enemy juggernaut plunging southward. In their first encounters, it was American troops rather than Pyongyang's soldiers who retreated.26 Alarmed by these results, General Douglas MacArthur begged Washington to double the force at his disposal so that he might hold at least the southern tip of the Korean peninsula.27 But his superiors were not prepared to make definitive choices at this point. Meeting with the Cabinet on July 7, 1950, the president groped for some way to "let the world know we mean business." Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Roscoe Hillenkoetter proposed seeking United Na￾tions sanction for use of the atomic bomb even if doing so could not guarantee that Moscow would restrain Pyongyang and Beijing. Although he remained skeptical of Soviet intentions, Truman declined to make so overt a threat. Downplaying the immediate danger, he insisted that the Soviets were "sev￾enty percent bluffers."28 Then, making a Solomonic choice between the Pen- 23. Ibid., pp. 159-160. It should be noted that no one present voiced the slightest objection to the president's order. 24. Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 75-78; William Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 191-192, 255-257. 25. FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, Korea, p. 278. 26. Roy K. Flint, "Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950," in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., America's First Battles 1776-1965 (Law￾rence: University Press of Kansas, 1986), pp. 266-299; Clay Blair, Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987), pp. 101-111. 27. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. 3 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), pp. 441- 442; James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume 3, The Korean War, part I (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 1978), pp. 179-185. 28. Cabinet meeting notes, July 7, 1950, Box 1, Matthew J. Connelly papers, Truman Library; "Memorandum on psychological use' of the Atomic bomb in Korea Conflict," July 6, 1950, This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Atomic Diplomacy 57 tagon's desire to call one hundred thousand men to arms and the Treasury's fear of the economic effects of full-scale mobilization,he let it be known that the Defense Department could exceed its current budget and use the draft.29 Two days later,the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS)postponed a decision on General MacArthur's troop request and set aside Chairman Omar Bradley's suggestion to put atomic weapons at MacArthur's disposal.30 Their choice reflected doubts about MacArthur's judgment,unwillingness to allow Korea to disrupt Europe-first strategic priorities,and hesitancy to use nuclear weap- ons in a manner that seemed less than likely to be decisive.31 They then decided that two of their number should visit General MacArthur in Tokyo and the battlefield in Korea before further decisions on force levels and deployments were made.32 In the interim,the Truman administration decided that nuclear strength must be used to demonstrate its determination to prevail in Korea.On July 8,1950,SAC Commander Curtis LeMay was ordered to repeat,in effect,the Berlin Blockade B-29 feint of 1948.33 The order grew out of General Vanden- berg's desire to do something to counter the impression of ineffectiveness conveyed by the meager results of American bombing in Korea.3 Sending aircraft to Britain carrying "Russian target materials"also implemented Pres- ident Truman's previously expressed desire for expedited planning for at- tacks against the Soviet Union.LeMay,hoping to improve the readiness of his force still further,proposed that the B-29s carry everything but the fis- sionable cores of nuclear weapons.35 If they did,and if this deployment was rounded out by the dispatch of ten nuclear-configured B-29s across the Pacific Hillenkoetter memorandum to the president,July 7,1950,intelligence file,PSF,Box 249,Truman papers,HSTL. 29.New York Times,July 8,1950. 30.Schnabel and Watson,JCS History,Vol.3,pp.185-186;July 9,1950 memorandum,Historical Record,June-July 1950 folder,Box 16,Matthew B.Ridgway papers,U.S.Army Military History Institute,Carlisle Barracks,Pennsylvania. 31.Ibid.;Gruenther to Bolte,July 9,1950,CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45),section 23,Joint Chiefs of Staff papers,RG 218,NA;James,MacArthur,Vol.3,p.443;Schnabel and Watson,JCS History, Vol.3,p.185. 32.Ibid.,Pp.185-186. 33.LeMay telecon with Commanding General,3rd Air Division,July 8,1950,summarized in LeMay diary,July 8,1950,Curtis E.LeMay papers,Library of Congress.(A telecon was an exchange of teletype messages,flashed upon a screen so that they might be viewed simulta- neously by more than one person. 34.Memorandum of Norstad-LeMay telephone conversation,July 2,1950,Box 7/10,Lauris Norstad papers,Modern Military Records Branch,NA. 35.LeMay diary,July 8,1950,LeMay papers."Russian target materials"presumably referred to maps and charts,prioritized target lists,radar scope information,etc. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Atomic Diplomacy |57 tagon's desire to call one hundred thousand men to arms and the Treasury's fear of the economic effects of full-scale mobilization, he let it be known that the Defense Department could exceed its current budget and use the draft.29 Two days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) postponed a decision on General MacArthur's troop request and set aside Chairman Omar Bradley's suggestion to put atomic weapons at MacArthur's disposal.30 Their choice reflected doubts about MacArthur's judgment, unwillingness to allow Korea to disrupt Europe-first strategic priorities, and hesitancy to use nuclear weap￾ons in a manner that seemed less than likely to be decisive.31 They then decided that two of their number should visit General MacArthur in Tokyo and the battlefield in Korea before further decisions on force levels and deployments were made.32 In the interim, the Truman administration decided that nuclear strength must be used to demonstrate its determination to prevail in Korea. On July 8, 1950, SAC Commander Curtis LeMay was ordered to repeat, in effect, the Berlin Blockade B-29 feint of 1948.33 The order grew out of General Vanden￾berg's desire to do something to counter the impression of ineffectiveness conveyed by the meager results of American bombing in Korea.34 Sending aircraft-o Britain carrying "Russian target materials" also implemented Pres￾ident Truman's previously expressed desire for expedited planning for at￾tacks against the Soviet Union. LeMay, hoping to improve the readiness of his force still further, proposed that the B-29s carry everything but the fis￾sionable cores of nuclear weapons.35 If they did, and if this deployment was rounded out by the dispatch of ten nuclear-configured B-29s across the Pacific Hillenkoetter memorandum to the president, July 7, 1950, intelligence file, PSF, Box 249, Truman papers, HSTL. 29. New York Times, July 8, 1950. 30. Schnabel and Watson, JCS History, Vol. 3, pp. 185-186; July 9, 1950 memorandum, Historical Record, June-July 1950 folder, Box 16, Matthew B. Ridgway papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 31. Ibid.; Gruenther to Bolte, July 9, 1950, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), section 23, Joint Chiefs of Staff papers, RG 218, NA; James, MacArthur, Vol. 3, p. 443; Schnabel and Watson, JCS History, Vol. 3, p. 185. 32. Ibid., pp. 185-186. 33. LeMay telecon with Commanding General, 3rd Air Division, July 8, 1950, summarized in LeMay diary, July 8, 1950, Curtis E. LeMay papers, Library of Congress. (A telecon was an exchange of teletype messages, flashed upon a screen so that they might be viewed simulta￾neously by more than one person.) 34. Memorandum of Norstad-LeMay telephone conversation, July 2, 1950, Box 7/10, Lauris Norstad papers, Modern Military Records Branch, NA. 35. LeMay diary, July 8, 1950, LeMay papers. "Russian target materials" presumably referred to maps and charts, prioritized target lists, radar scope information, etc. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 13:3 58 and the overseas prepositioning of tankers and support aircraft,the time needed to commence and wage atomic war against the Soviet Union would be dramatically reduced.36 The JCS gave only qualified approval to the medified proposal,probably out of fear that its nuclear aspect might create diplomatic difficulties.Initial British reactions confirmed that concern,for the Royal Air Force,arguing that the proposed deployment had "wide consequences"and might be re- garded as "an unfriendly act"by Moscow,refused to accede to the American request without prior agreement at the political level.37 By nightfall on July 9,1950,however,Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Lauris Norstad had persuaded Air Marshal Lord Tedder,who headed the British Joint Liaison Mission in Washington,to support the proposal;Norstad had also obtained clearance "at the highest level"to seek the approval of the British Chiefs of Staff for t.38 Much more significantly,Secretary of State Dean Acheson approved the deployment as a demonstration of resolve.While he may have shared Soviet expert Charles Bohlen's belief that "some measure"beyond military and economic mobilization was necessary to keep the Soviets from intervening in Korea or stirring up trouble elsewhere,39 Acheson was more immediately concerned to impress the British with America's determination to prevail in Korea.The secretary of state was unhappy with London's recognition of the PRC and its dissent from interposition of the United States Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait.40 Although he had been assured that Britain would not seek a return to the status quo ante in Korea by letting the PRC have Taiwan, he worried lest London promote a peace settlement requiring withdrawal of American forces from the peninsula.His doubts were not dispelled by talks with British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks on Sunday afternoon,July 9.41 The next day Acheson sent London a note that rejected paying a price for disengagement in Korea and called for Anglo-American solidarity on ques- 36.Ibid.,July10,1950. 37.General Joseph Lawton Collins daily schedule,July 9,1950,Box 40,Collins papers,Eisen- hower Library;Norstad to LeMay,July 9,1950;Commanding General 3rd Air Division to Chief of Staff,U.S.Air Force,091200Z,July 9,1950,Box 86,Hoyt S.Vandenberg papers,Library of Congress. 38.Chief of Staff,USAF,to Commanding General 3rd Air Division,092016Z July 9,1950; Norstad to LeMay,July 9,1950,Box 86,Vandenberg papers. 39.FRIS,1950,Vol.7,Korea,.Pp.326-327. 40.Ibid,Pp.330-331,340. 41.Ibid.,pp.331,337;Acheson daily 'schedule,July 9,1950,Box 45,Dean G.Acheson papers, Truman Library. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 13:3 | 58 and the overseas prepositioning of tankers and support aircraft, the time needed to commence and wage atomic war against the Soviet Union would be dramatically reduced.36 The JCS gave only qualified approval to the modified proposal, probably out of fear that its nuclear aspect might create diplomatic difficulties. Initial British reactions confirmed that concern, for the Royal Air Force, arguing that the proposed deployment had "wide consequences" and might be re￾garded as "an unfriendly act" by Moscow, refused to accede to the American request without prior agreement at the political level.37 By nightfall on July 9, 1950, however, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Lauris Norstad had persuaded Air Marshal Lord Tedder, who headed the British Joint Liaison Mission in Washington, to support the proposal; Norstad had also obtained clearance "at the highest level" to seek the approval of the British Chiefs of Staff for it.38 Much more significantly, Secretary of State Dean Acheson approved the deployment as a demonstration of resolve. While he may have shared Soviet expert Charles Bohlen's belief that "some measure" beyond military and economic mobilization was necessary to keep the Soviets from intervening in Korea or stirring up trouble elsewhere,39 Acheson was more immediately concerned to impress the British with America's determination to prevail in Korea. The secretary of state was unhappy with London's recognition of the PRC and its dissent from interposition of the United States Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait.40 Although he had been assured that Britain would not seek a return to the status quo ante in Korea by letting the PRC have Taiwan, he worried lest London promote a peace settlement requiring withdrawal of American forces from the peninsula. His doubts were not dispelled by talks with British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks on Sunday afternoon, July 9.41 The next day Acheson sent London a note that rejected paying a price for disengagement in Korea and called for Anglo-American solidarity on ques- 36. Ibid., July 10, 1950. 37. General Joseph Lawton Collins daily schedule, July 9, 1950, Box 40, Collins papers, Eisen￾hower Library; Norstad to LeMay, July 9, 1950; Commanding General 3rd Air Division to Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, 091200Z, July 9, 1950, Box 86, Hoyt S. Vandenberg papers, Library of Congress. 38. Chief of Staff, USAF, to Commanding General 3rd Air Division, 092016Z July 9, 1950; Norstad to LeMay, July 9, 1950, Box 86, Vandenberg papers. 39. FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, Korea, pp. 326-327. 40. Ibid., pp. 330-331, 340. 41. Ibid., pp. 331, 337; Acheson daily schedule, July 9, 1950, Box 45, Dean G. Acheson papers, Truman Library. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions