上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源_Lesson 1_English materials_little chance

JOHN W.GARVER Little Chance REVOLUTIONS AND IDEOLOGIES If we view the PRC as a revolutionary state,we must conclude that there was little chance for U.S.-PRC comity in the early years of the PRC.The early PRC was not just another state pursuing its interests in the same fashion as other states.It was a state brought into being by a powerful social revolutionary movement.As such,it shared much in common with other revolutionary movements and states. There is a robust literature on revolutions,revolutionary movements, and states.One central characteristic identified by virtually all schools of interpretation is a strong role for ideology.An ideology.whether that of Rousseau,Marx,or the Prophet Mohammed,plays a vital role in successful social revolutions.It inspires and mobilizes people to bear the sacrifices inevitably associated with rebellion,it explains why destruction of the old order and the creation of a new order is necessary,it justifies the sacrifices entailed by the revolutionary struggle,and it legitimizes the new structures of power created by the victorious revolution.Successful revolutions re- quire ideologies;without a powerful revolutionary creed the revolutionary challenge is likely to be crushed or co-opted. Revolutions also require leaders dedicated to the revolutionary ideal. The field of psychohistory has explored the peculiar fit between the person- alities of great individuals and the requirements of history in their particular time and place.Successful revolutions require leaders who are completely dedicated to the revolutionary cause,who are willing to persist in the struggle even in the face of seemingly insurmountable difficulties and set- backs,who are willing to die for the cause and who have no qualms about the sacrifice of human life entailed in the victory of the revolution.Deep conviction,a dedication rooted in the very elements of the leader's personal- ity.is required if the revolution is to succeed.Without a Cromwell,a Robespierre,a Khomeini,or a Mao Zedong the revolution will probably fail.With a zealous leader,its chances for success are much greater. Virtually everything we have leared about Mao since his death confirms his intense ideological conviction.Mao early on dedicated his life to revolu- tionary struggle,and over the decades he inflicted immense costs on both his enemies and his allies for the sake of the revolution.Mao's faith did not fade after 1949.In the mid-1950s,when he saw China retreating from the DIPLOMATIC HIsToRY,Vol.21.No.1 (Winter 1997).1997 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations(SHAFR).Published by Blackwell Publishers,350 Main Street, Malden,MA,02148.USA,and 108 Cowley Road,Oxford,OX4 1JF,UK. 87

J O H N W. G A R V E R Little Chance R E V O L U T I O N S A N D I D E O L O G I E S If we view the PRC as a revolutionary state, we must conclude that there was little chance for U.S.-PRC comity in the early years of the PRC. The early PRC was not just another state pursuing its interests in the same fashion as other states. It was a state brought into being by a powerful social revolutionary movement. As such, it shared much in common with other revolutionary movements and states. There is a robust literature on revolutions, revolutionary movements, and states. One central characteristic identified by virtually all schools of interpretation is a strong role for ideology. An ideology, whether that of Rousseau, Marx, or the Prophet Mohammed, plays a vital role in successful social revolutions. It inspires and mobilizes people to bear the sacrifices inevitably associated with rebellion, it explains why destruction of the old order and the creation of a new order is necessary, it justifies the sacrifices entailed by the revolutionary struggle, and it legitimizes the new structures of power created by the victorious revolution. Successful revolutions re￾quire ideologies; without a powerful revolutionary creed the revolutionary challenge is likely to be crushed or co-opted. Revolutions also require leaders dedicated to the revolutionary ideal. The field of psychohistory has explored the peculiar fit between the person￾alities of great individuals and the requirements of history in their particular time and place. Successful revolutions require leaders who are completely dedicated to the revolutionary cause, who are willing to persist in the struggle even in the face of seemingly insurmountable difficulties and set￾backs, who are willing to die for the cause and who have no qualms about the sacrifice of human life entailed in the victory of the revolution. Deep conviction, a dedication rooted in the very elements of the leader’s personal￾ity, is required if the revolution is to succeed. Without a Cromwell, a Robespierre, a Khomeini, or a Mao Zedong the revolution will probably fail. With a zealous leader, its chances for success are much greater. Virtually everything we have leared about Mao since his death confirms his intense ideological conviction. Mao early on dedicated his life to revolu￾tionary struggle, and over the decades he inflicted immense costs on both his enemies and his allies for the sake of the revolution. Mao’s faith did not fade after 1949. In the mid-1950s, when he saw China retreating from the DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter 1997). q 1997 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK. 87

88:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY revolutionary ideal and toward bureaucratism,he threw the nation into the Great Leap Forward.When that failed to revitalize the revolution and punctured the ideological zeal of most of his comrades,Mao then threw China into the cataclysm of the Cultural Revolution.Millions died,but Mao remained convinced that such costs were necessary for the creation of a better future.After the setbacks of the Great Leap Forward,most of Mao's comrades modified their ideological zeal,moving the attainment of commu- nism into the indefinite future.Not Mao.To his dying days he exercised his immense power to keep China on his imagined track to the future. The impact of individual personality depends on the political system in which that particular individual functions.In a system in which power is effectively shared or in which there are effective institutional checks on the power of individual leaders,the impact of individual personality may be limited.Where power is highly concentrated and unchecked,individual idiosyncrasies may have a direct and substantial effect on national policy. This was the case in the early PRC.At the Seventh CCP Congress in 1945. that party was"Bolshevized"with Mao Zedong serving as China's"Stalin." Factions were finally suppressed,and a cult of personality was fostered around Mao.The CCP would not retreat from this ultra-centralization of power until the mid-1950s.As the CCP marched to victory in 1949,Mao's prestige grew further.His thought had been proved correct by the test of history.On issues of broad orientation,Mao's power was absolute in the early years of the PRC.The extent of Mao's power was demonstrated by the October 1950 decision to intervene in the Korean War.This was a decision of huge import for the PRC.Moreover,according to one recent authoritative investigation of that decision,Mao initally stood virtually alone in favoring intervention.Only Peng Dehuai-then the commander of the relatively unimportant First Field Army-supported Mao on this issue. Apparently all the CCP's other top leaders feared the difficulties and costs of war with the United States.Yet Mao's view prevailed. Ideology is not like a coat that is easily changed with a changing environ- ment.At least when beliefs are deeply rooted in the personality structures of individuals-as with Mao-they may be altered only painfully and with difficulty.Recognition that fundamental precepts for which immense sacri- fices have been made are wrong is very difficult.When confronted with discrepant evidence contradicting core beliefs,it is much easier for people to reinterpret the evidence than to alter their core beliefs,which typically prove remarkably resistant to change in the face of discordant data.Viewed from this perspective,the cognitive precondition for Mao's late 1960s choice of comity with the United States was his belief that the USSR was no longer socialist.Confronted with evidence that the USSR under Khru- shchev wanted to keep China weak and dependent-just as the imperialist powers did-Mao did not drop the basic Leninist belief about the link between capitalism and imperialism.Instead,he reinterpreted the evidence and concluded that the Soviet Union was no longer socialist!Once he had

88 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y revolutionary ideal and toward bureaucratism, he threw the nation into the Great Leap Forward. When that failed to revitalize the revolution and punctured the ideological zeal of most of his comrades, Mao then threw China into the cataclysm of the Cultural Revolution. Millions died, but Mao remained convinced that such costs were necessary for the creation of a better future. After the setbacks of the Great Leap Forward, most of Mao’s comrades modified their ideological zeal, moving the attainment of commu￾nism into the indefinite future. Not Mao. To his dying days he exercised his immense power to keep China on his imagined track to the future. The impact of individual personality depends on the political system in which that particular individual functions. In a system in which power is effectively shared or in which there are effective institutional checks on the power of individual leaders, the impact of individual personality may be limited. Where power is highly concentrated and unchecked, individual idiosyncrasies may have a direct and substantial effect on national policy. This was the case in the early PRC. At the Seventh CCP Congress in 1945, that party was “Bolshevized” with Mao Zedong serving as China’s “Stalin.” Factions were finally suppressed, and a cult of personality was fostered around Mao. The CCP would not retreat from this ultra-centralization of power until the mid-1950s. As the CCP marched to victory in 1949, Mao’s prestige grew further. His thought had been proved correct by the test of history. On issues of broad orientation, Mao’s power was absolute in the early years of the PRC. The extent of Mao’s power was demonstrated by the October 1950 decision to intervene in the Korean War. This was a decision of huge import for the PRC. Moreover, according to one recent authoritative investigation of that decision, Mao initally stood virtually alone in favoring intervention. Only Peng Dehuai – then the commander of the relatively unimportant First Field Army – supported Mao on this issue. Apparently all the CCP’s other top leaders feared the difficulties and costs of war with the United States. Yet Mao’s view prevailed. Ideology is not like a coat that is easily changed with a changing environ￾ment. At least when beliefs are deeply rooted in the personality structures of individuals – as with Mao – they may be altered only painfully and with difficulty. Recognition that fundamental precepts for which immense sacri- fices have been made are wrong is very difficult. When confronted with discrepant evidence contradicting core beliefs, it is much easier for people to reinterpret the evidence than to alter their core beliefs, which typically prove remarkably resistant to change in the face of discordant data. Viewed from this perspective, the cognitive precondition for Mao’s late 1960s choice of comity with the United States was his belief that the USSR was no longer socialist. Confronted with evidence that the USSR under Khru￾shchev wanted to keep China weak and dependent – just as the imperialist powers did – Mao did not drop the basic Leninist belief about the link between capitalism and imperialism. Instead, he reinterpreted the evidence and concluded that the Soviet Union was no longer socialist! Once he had

Little Chance 89 performed this cognitive acrobatic,by 1963,alignment with the United States against the USSR no longer created dissonance.If the USA and the USSR were both imperialist powers,China's alignment between them was merely a matter of strategic advantage.Prior to the uncoupling of the USSR and socialism,however,Mao's Leninist ideology required that the PRC tilt to the side of the USSR. Various theoreticians of revolution have noted that there is a common progression of stages in these phenomena.After relatively moderate begin- nings,they radicalize rapidly.The revolutionary elite divides into moder- ates and radicals,the radicals eventually prevail,and power is finally joined to virtue in an all-out effort to usher in the new heaven-on-earth.These efforts lead to exhaustion,and according to some interpretations,to guilt, laying the basis for Thermidor,deradicalization,and ultimately a routini- zation of society.We need not be too concerned with applying the classic periodization of revolution to China's experience.The relevant point here is that in the late 1940s and early 1950s,the Chinese Revolution was just entering its heady radical stage.Much water had to flow under the bridge before many Chinese revolutionaries would be ready to put aside the pur- suit of the ideals for which the revolution was made and concern themselves with mundane matters such as feeding the populace.Until the ideological fervor of the Chinese Revolution had burned itself out,and until the cognitive uncoupling between"socialism"and "the USSR"had been accomplished by Mao's discovery of the "restoration of capitalism"in the Soviet Union,it would have been virtually impossible for the early PRC to act in a manner blatantly contradictory to the revolutionary ideology by remaining neutral in the epic struggle then under way between imperialism and socialism. THE IDEOLOGY OF REVOLUTIONARY CHINA Mao's particular ideology was Marxism-Leninism.Like many others of his generation,he imbibed this anti-Western yet "scientific"philosophy in the heady days of the May 4th Movement following the Bolshevik Revolu- tion and the Versailles treaty.One of the core elements of the Leninism embraced by Mao was anti-imperialism.Imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism.It was imperialism emanating from the advanced capitalist countries that was oppressing China,Mao concluded.What was required was the complete liberation of China from imperialism. This required the systematic destruction of the instruments of impe- rialist influence and exploitation within China.All Western holdings in China were thus expropriated via bureaucratic squeeze.All Western-linked cultural institutions were closed down.All Western military presence in China was eradicated.The treaties upon which Western interests in China had been based were unilaterally and abruptly abrogated.China's "libera- tion"from "imperialism"also meant the elimination or repression of social individuals,groups,and classes who were linked to foreign interests either by past activities or by the dictates of Marxist-Leninist theory.First to go

Little Chance : 89 performed this cognitive acrobatic, by 1963, alignment with the United States against the USSR no longer created dissonance. If the USA and the USSR were both imperialist powers, China’s alignment between them was merely a matter of strategic advantage. Prior to the uncoupling of the USSR and socialism, however, Mao’s Leninist ideology required that the PRC tilt to the side of the USSR. Various theoreticians of revolution have noted that there is a common progression of stages in these phenomena. After relatively moderate begin￾nings, they radicalize rapidly. The revolutionary elite divides into moder￾ates and radicals, the radicals eventually prevail, and power is finally joined to virtue in an all-out effort to usher in the new heaven-on-earth. These efforts lead to exhaustion, and according to some interpretations, to guilt, laying the basis for Thermidor, deradicalization, and ultimately a routini￾zation of society. We need not be too concerned with applying the classic periodization of revolution to China’s experience. The relevant point here is that in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Chinese Revolution was just entering its heady radical stage. Much water had to flow under the bridge before many Chinese revolutionaries would be ready to put aside the pur￾suit of the ideals for which the revolution was made and concern themselves with mundane matters such as feeding the populace. Until the ideological fervor of theChinese Revolution had burned itself out, and until the cognitive uncoupling between “socialism” and “the USSR” had been accomplished by Mao’s discovery of the “restoration of capitalism” in the Soviet Union, it would have been virtually impossible for the early PRC to act in a manner blatantly contradictory to the revolutionary ideology by remaining neutral in the epic struggle then under way between imperialism and socialism. T H E I D E O L O G Y O F R E V O L U T I O N A R Y C H I N A Mao’s particular ideology was Marxism-Leninism. Like many others of his generation, he imbibed this anti-Western yet “scientific” philosophy in the heady days of the May 4th Movement following the Bolshevik Revolu￾tion and the Versailles treaty. One of the core elements of the Leninism embraced by Mao was anti-imperialism. Imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism. It was imperialism emanating from the advanced capitalist countries that was oppressing China, Mao concluded. What was required was the complete liberation of China from imperialism. This required the systematic destruction of the instruments of impe￾rialist influence and exploitation within China. All Western holdings in China were thus expropriated via bureaucratic squeeze. All Western-linked cultural institutions were closed down. All Western military presence in China was eradicated. The treaties upon which Western interests in China had been based were unilaterally and abruptly abrogated. China’s “libera￾tion” from “imperialism” also meant the elimination or repression of social individuals, groups, and classes who were linked to foreign interests either by past activities or by the dictates of Marxist-Leninist theory. First to go

90:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY were the landlords,the compradore bourgeoisie,along with sundry counter- revolutionaries.Next came the bourgeoisie generally. This vast campaign to root out Western influence from China derived from the CCP's ideological analysis of China's situation.Such a campaign was necessary,from the CCP's perspective,not because of any immediate threat from the United States or the West but in order to overturn the long- established pattern of relations existing between China and the West,a pattern of relations based,it should be noted,on a large body of interna- tional law and agreements.From this perspective,the question arises of whether it was politically realistic to expect the United States to be other than hostile to the PRC,to be willing to overlook the CCP's vigorous moves against U.S.interests and reach an accommodation with the PRC.In fact, the United States did precisely this,but before we explore that question we must conclude our investigation of Mao and the CCP's ideology. There was a strong link between the CCP's drive to destroy Western influences in China and the anti-U.S.orientation of early PRC foreign policy.Could the CCP have mobilized popular hatred of Western influences within China while maintaining proper relations with the United States? This is precisely what happened in the 1970s.But we should be wary of concluding that because something occurred in the 1970s it could have occurred two decades earlier.By the 1970s,the previously vast Western presence in China had long since been eradicated.Mao had also redefined the class nature of the USSR,discovering that it was bourgeois rather than proletarian.Most importantly,by 1970 the ideological conviction that had driven the revolution in its early stages was beginning to fade;cynicism and disillusion were setting in.This meant that a disjuncture between ideology and behavior created less dissonance in elite and mass minds. Mao,of course,"creatively developed"Marxism-Leninism to accord with the interests of the Chinese Revolution.One of the fundamental tenets of Mao's Sinicization of Marxism-Leninism was the concept of a vast "inter- mediate zone"lying between the capitalist and the socialist worlds.Mao followed Lenin and Stalin in believing that there existed a fundamental contradiction between the socialist state (or states)and the imperialist capi- talist states.The imperialist states were inevitably hostile to the socialist states.Mao"developed"Lenin and Stalin by teaching that before the impe- rialist states could attack the socialist states the imperialists needed to con- solidate their control over the intermediate zone made up of colonial and semi-colonial,developing,or Third World countries.It followed,according to Mao,that the best way to defend the socialist states was by strengthening the anti-imperialist struggles of the intermediate zone.The revolutionary struggles of the intermediate zone thus constituted the first line of defense of the socialist countries. This theme of the "intermediate zone"runs like a red thread through Mao's thought.It emerged during Mao's 1940 debates with the Comintern over the efficacy of a tighter CCP-KMT united front and large-scale offen-

90 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y were the landlords, the compradore bourgeoisie, along with sundry counter￾revolutionaries. Next came the bourgeoisie generally. This vast campaign to root out Western influence from China derived from the CCP’s ideological analysis of China’s situation. Such a campaign was necessary, from the CCP’s perspective, not because of any immediate threat from the United States or the West but in order to overturn the long￾established pattern of relations existing between China and the West, a pattern of relations based, it should be noted, on a large body of interna￾tional law and agreements. From this perspective, the question arises of whether it was politically realistic to expect the United States to be other than hostile to the PRC, to be willing to overlook the CCP’s vigorous moves against U.S. interests and reach an accommodation with the PRC. In fact, the United States did precisely this, but before we explore that question we must conclude our investigation of Mao and the CCP’s ideology. There was a strong link between the CCP’s drive to destroy Western influences in China and the anti-U.S. orientation of early PRC foreign policy. Could the CCP have mobilized popular hatred of Western influences within China while maintaining proper relations with the United States? This is precisely what happened in the 1970s. But we should be wary of concluding that because something occurred in the 1970s it could have occurred two decades earlier. By the 1970s, the previously vast Western presence in China had long since been eradicated. Mao had also redefined the class nature of the USSR, discovering that it was bourgeois rather than proletarian. Most importantly, by 1970 the ideological conviction that had driven the revolution in its early stages was beginning to fade; cynicism and disillusion were setting in. This meant that a disjuncture between ideology and behavior created less dissonance in elite and mass minds. Mao, of course, “creatively developed” Marxism-Leninism to accord with the interests of the Chinese Revolution. One of the fundamental tenets of Mao’s Sinicization of Marxism-Leninism was the concept of a vast “inter￾mediate zone” lying between the capitalist and the socialist worlds. Mao followed Lenin and Stalin in believing that there existed a fundamental contradiction between the socialist state (or states) and the imperialist capi￾talist states. The imperialist states were inevitably hostile to the socialist states. Mao “developed” Lenin and Stalin by teaching that before the impe￾rialist states could attack the socialist states the imperialists needed to con￾solidate their control over the intermediate zone made up of colonial and semi-colonial, developing, or Third World countries. It followed, according to Mao, that the best way to defend the socialist states was by strengthening the anti-imperialist struggles of the intermediate zone. The revolutionary struggles of the intermediate zone thus constituted the first line of defense of the socialist countries. This theme of the “intermediate zone” runs like a red thread through Mao’s thought. It emerged during Mao’s 1940 debates with the Comintern over the efficacy of a tighter CCP-KMT united front and large-scale offen-

Little Chance 91 sives by the Eighth Route Army against Japanese forces in China;it figured prominently in Chinese foreign policy in the early and late(though not the mid)1950s,was enshrined in Lin Biao's 1965 essay on People's War,and reemerged in Mao's waning years in his Three Worlds Theory.Even after Mao had concluded that the USSR was not socialist and lumped Soviet revisionism together with U.S.imperialism in the superpower "First World,"he still saw the revolutionary struggles of the "Third World"as constituting the cutting edge of world progress. The concept of the intermediate zone had substantial significance for the PRC's foreign relations.It meant that by helping foreign revolutionary movements and states in the intermediate zone,the PRC was defending itself.The U.S.imperialists,or later the Soviet hegemonists,were less likely to attack China if the Korean,Vietnamese,Algerian,Congolese,etc. anti-imperialist forces were advancing.The concept of the intermediate zone dissolves the oft-cited conundrum of contradiction between national security and ideological solidarity.Although the CCP never supported all foreign revolutionary movements in all times and all places,when it did render such support,it typically saw such support as merging the interests of China's revolutionary state and foreign revolutionary movements.Strong foreign revolutionary movements were China's own first line of defense. Another component of Mao's thinking about the global revolutionary process was that the socialist countries were the natural,sincere friend of the revolutionary struggles of the intermediate zone.While imperialist na- tions might sometimes find it expedient to give assistance to such struggles- as the United States did during the Japan-U.S.war-this assistance always had ulterior motives.Its purpose was to maintain and strengthen the mecha- nisms of imperialist domination and exploitation.Only the socialist coun- tries were not motivated by imperialist objectives.Although Mao had long been critical of the Comintern's"mistakes"regarding the Chinese Revolu- tion,he nonetheless saw a fundamental sincerity,sympathy,and identity of interests in PRC-USSR relations.While Stalin gave greater or less support to the Chinese revolutionary movement depending on the immediate re- quirements of Soviet diplomacy.he was,Mao believed,fundamentally sym- pathetic to the Chinese Revolution and its victory.The USSR,unlike the USA,would welcome and support the extrication of China from the global system of imperialism. Here again we return to Lenin's concept of imperialism.Imperialism was by definition a phenomenon of capitalism.Since socialist economies were not driven by profit-seeking accumulation of capital,countries with such economies could not be imperialist.It also followed that such countries had no interest in maintaining the system of imperialist domination and exploita- tion of countries in the intermediate zone,such as China.Indeed,socialist and intermediate zone countries had a common interest in weakening imperi- alism.With the founding of the PRC,Mao and his comrades acted on these beliefs

Little Chance : 91 sives by the Eighth Route Army against Japanese forces in China; it figured prominently in Chinese foreign policy in the early and late (though not the mid) 1950s, was enshrined in Lin Biao’s 1965 essay on People’s War, and reemerged in Mao’s waning years in his Three Worlds Theory. Even after Mao had concluded that the USSR was not socialist and lumped Soviet revisionism together with U.S. imperialism in the superpower “First World,” he still saw the revolutionary struggles of the “Third World” as constituting the cutting edge of world progress. The concept of the intermediate zone had substantial significance for the PRC’s foreign relations. It meant that by helping foreign revolutionary movements and states in the intermediate zone, the PRC was defending itself. The U.S. imperialists, or later the Soviet hegemonists, were less likely to attack China if the Korean, Vietnamese, Algerian, Congolese, etc. anti-imperialist forces were advancing. The concept of the intermediate zone dissolves the oft-cited conundrum of contradiction between national security and ideological solidarity. Although the CCP never supported all foreign revolutionary movements in all times and all places, when it did render such support, it typically saw such support as merging the interests of China’s revolutionary state and foreign revolutionary movements. Strong foreign revolutionary movements were China’s own first line of defense. Another component of Mao’s thinking about the global revolutionary process was that the socialist countries were the natural, sincere friend of the revolutionary struggles of the intermediate zone. While imperialist na￾tions might sometimes find it expedient to give assistance to such struggles – as the United States did during the Japan-U.S. war – this assistance always had ulterior motives. Its purpose was to maintain and strengthen the mecha￾nisms of imperialist domination and exploitation. Only the socialist coun￾tries were not motivated by imperialist objectives. Although Mao had long been critical of the Comintern’s “mistakes” regarding the Chinese Revolu￾tion, he nonetheless saw a fundamental sincerity, sympathy, and identity of interests in PRC-USSR relations. While Stalin gave greater or less support to the Chinese revolutionary movement depending on the immediate re￾quirements of Soviet diplomacy, he was, Mao believed, fundamentally sym￾pathetic to the Chinese Revolution and its victory. The USSR, unlike the USA, would welcome and support the extrication of China from the global system of imperialism. Here again we return to Lenin’s concept of imperialism. Imperialism was by definition a phenomenon of capitalism. Since socialist economies were not driven by profit-seeking accumulation of capital, countries with such economies could not be imperialist. It also followed that such countries had no interest in maintaining the system of imperialist domination and exploita￾tion of countries in the intermediate zone, such as China. Indeed, socialist and intermediate zone countries had a common interest in weakening imperi￾alism. With the founding of the PRC, Mao and his comrades acted on these beliefs

92:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM Earlier we raised the question of whether things might have been differ- ent had a far-sighted and dispassionate U.S.policy attempted to accommo- date the early PRC.When the lost chance hypothesis emerged in the 1970s, the internal documents of the U.S.government dealing with China policy circa 1949 had not yet been declassified.As other essays in this symposium will discuss,the declassification of these archives in the early 1980s led to a reinterpretation of U.S.policy.It now became apparent that U.S.policy,at least as defined by the Truman administration,was much more sophisti- cated than it had previously seemed.Between the end of 1948 and early 1950,the administration tried to minimize conflict with the emerging Communist-led China in order to draw it away from the USSR,thereby furthering the overriding U.S.objective of minimizing Soviet influence in the Far East.Throughout 1949 the administration agonized over Taiwan, but by the end of the year it had decided to sacrifice Taiwan too.In other words,the United States,it turned out,had followed essentially the policy the lost chance theorists would have had it follow. China's new leaders perceived the outlines of U.S.policy at this juncture and were not interested in the U.S.offer of accommodation.Throughout the latter half of 1949,the CCP's leaders worked to build cordial,coopera- tive relations with the USSR.One of the determining factors in that effort was Stalin's deep suspicions regarding the class character and political orien- tation of Mao Zedong's CCP.These suspicions can be traced back to dis- agreements over CCP policy between Mao and Stalin in the 1930s,were exacerbated by Tito's 1948 defection,and were fed throughout the post- 1945 period by the reports of Stalin's personal representative to Mao Zedong.I.V.Kovalev.Mao and his comrades were very sensitive to Stalin's suspicions and bent over backward to reassure him of the CCP's loyalty and political correctness.A key litmus test of this was the CCP/PRC's orienta- tion toward the United States and Great Britain.In order to reassure Stalin, Mao's representatives promised that the new China would be in no hurry to open relations with the imperialist powers. China's leaders in 1949 understood that they had the option of accommo- dation with the United States-that the Truman administration sought such an outcome.They deliberately rejected that path and decided instead to bring the PRC into a close and comprehensive alliance with the USSR in the global struggle well under way by 1949.As the PRC representative to the UN debates in 1950 Wu Xiuquan explained in his memoir,U.S.efforts to arrange an accommodation between the United States and the new China were simply an imperialist plot to divide the revolutionary camp.The CCP decided to throw China's full weight into the global balance on the side of the world's anti-imperialist forces. The way to secure the new proletarian state in China,Mao and his comrades concluded,was by full alliance with the USSR and other socialist

92 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y T H E G L O B A L S T R U G G L E A G A I N S T I M P E R I A L I S M Earlier we raised the question of whether things might have been differ￾ent had a far-sighted and dispassionate U.S. policy attempted to accommo￾date the early PRC. When the lost chance hypothesis emerged in the 1970s, the internal documents of the U.S. government dealing with China policy circa 1949 had not yet been declassified. As other essays in this symposium will discuss, the declassification of these archives in the early 1980s led to a reinterpretation of U.S. policy. It now became apparent that U.S. policy, at least as defined by the Truman administration, was much more sophisti￾cated than it had previously seemed. Between the end of 1948 and early 1950, the administration tried to minimize conflict with the emerging Communist-led China in order to draw it away from the USSR, thereby furthering the overriding U.S. objective of minimizing Soviet influence in the Far East. Throughout 1949 the administration agonized over Taiwan, but by the end of the year it had decided to sacrifice Taiwan too. In other words, the United States, it turned out, had followed essentially the policy the lost chance theorists would have had it follow. China’s new leaders perceived the outlines of U.S. policy at this juncture and were not interested in the U.S. offer of accommodation. Throughout the latter half of 1949, the CCP’s leaders worked to build cordial, coopera￾tive relations with the USSR. One of the determining factors in that effort was Stalin’s deep suspicions regarding the class character and political orien￾tation of Mao Zedong’s CCP. These suspicions can be traced back to dis￾agreements over CCP policy between Mao and Stalin in the 1930s, were exacerbated by Tito’s 1948 defection, and were fed throughout the post- 1945 period by the reports of Stalin’s personal representative to Mao Zedong, I. V. Kovalev. Mao and his comrades were very sensitive to Stalin’s suspicions and bent over backward to reassure him of the CCP’s loyalty and political correctness. A key litmus test of this was the CCP/PRC’s orienta￾tion toward the United States and Great Britain. In order to reassure Stalin, Mao’s representatives promised that the new China would be in no hurry to open relations with the imperialist powers. China’s leaders in 1949 understood that they had the option of accommo￾dation with the United States – that the Truman administration sought such an outcome. They deliberately rejected that path and decided instead to bring the PRC into a close and comprehensive alliance with the USSR in the global struggle well under way by 1949. As the PRC representative to the UN debates in 1950 Wu Xiuquan explained in his memoir, U.S. efforts to arrange an accommodation between the United States and the new China were simply an imperialist plot to divide the revolutionary camp. The CCP decided to throw China’s full weight into the global balance on the side of the world’s anti-imperialist forces. The way to secure the new proletarian state in China, Mao and his comrades concluded, was by full alliance with the USSR and other socialist

Little Chance 93 countries to assist the revolutionary,anti-imperialist struggles of the interme- diate zone.Chinese support for the Vietnamese revolution led by Ho Chi Minh began virtually as soon as the PLA reached Vietnam's borders.It was large scale and decisive.China likewise facilitated Kim Il Sung's projected revolutionary war of national liberation in Korea,transferring fifty thou- sand ethnically Korean veterans of the PLA,expediting the delivery of large amounts of armaments to North Korea,and giving a critical sign-off in May 1950 to Stalin's approval of Kim's war plans.We still do not know the full contents of the discussions between Mao,Stalin,Kim Il Sung,and Ho Chi Minh at this juncture.One recent,authoritative study concluded that Stalin encouraged a revolutionary offensive in Asia as a way of weakening Western strength in Europe and sought Chinese involvement in that offensive as a way of locking the PRC into the Soviet camp.Simultaneously,Stalin care- fully restricted Soviet responsibility for this offensive. As Mao explained in Moscow a few years later (in 1957),the global correlation of forces was rapidly shifting in favor of the progressive camp. German and Japanese imperialism had been thoroughly defeated.A global socialist camp had emerged with China squarely in that camp.Western colonialism was collapsing.and the peoples of the intermediate zone were awakening politically.Conditions were favorable for a revolutionary offen- sive.If pushed hard enough,imperialism would collapse throughout a large part of the globe.From Mao's perspective it was not a choice of national security or ideological solidarity.For Mao the route to the security of the PRC was through solidarity with other revolutionary forces.Thus,even as it was consolidating its control over China in late 1949 the CCP was initiat- ing large-scale assistance to revolutionary movements in Vietnam,Korea, and other Asian countries. THE DERADICALIZATION OF REVOLUTIONS There is a fairly substantial body of theory dealing with the process though which revolutions lose their radical nature.Regarding the socializa- tion of revolutionary states to the norms of the Westphalian system of nation-states,one of the most important contributions is a recent one by David Armstrong.2 This study concluded that the contemporary interstate order rests on a set of shared assumptions,rules,and practices regarding the sovereignty of nation-states.Those common beliefs are challenged by ideo- logically driven revolutionary states that advance alternative notions of a universal community of mankind.Gradually,however,the revolutionary state's challenge to the Westphalian order imposes costs on that state.Over 1.Sergei N.Goncharov.John W.Lewis,and Xue Litai,Uncertain Partners:Stalin,Mao,and the Korean War(Stanford,1993). 2.David Armstrong.Revolution and World Order:The Revolutionary State in International Society (Oxford.England,1993)

Little Chance : 93 countries to assist the revolutionary, anti-imperialist struggles of the interme￾diate zone. Chinese support for the Vietnamese revolution led by Ho Chi Minh began virtually as soon as the PLA reached Vietnam’s borders. It was large scale and decisive. China likewise facilitated Kim Il Sung’s projected revolutionary war of national liberation in Korea, transferring fifty thou￾sand ethnically Korean veterans of the PLA, expediting the delivery of large amounts of armaments to North Korea, and giving a critical sign-off in May 1950 to Stalin’s approval of Kim’s war plans. We still do not know the full contents of the discussions between Mao, Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and Ho Chi Minh at this juncture. One recent, authoritative study concluded that Stalin encouraged a revolutionary offensive in Asia as a way of weakening Western strength in Europe and sought Chinese involvement in that offensive as a way of locking the PRC into the Soviet camp. Simultaneously, Stalin care￾fully restricted Soviet responsibility for this offensive.1 As Mao explained in Moscow a few years later (in 1957), the global correlation of forces was rapidly shifting in favor of the progressive camp. German and Japanese imperialism had been thoroughly defeated. A global socialist camp had emerged with China squarely in that camp. Western colonialism was collapsing, and the peoples of the intermediate zone were awakening politically. Conditions were favorable for a revolutionary offen￾sive. If pushed hard enough, imperialism would collapse throughout a large part of the globe. From Mao’s perspective it was not a choice of national security or ideological solidarity. For Mao the route to the security of the PRC was through solidarity with other revolutionary forces. Thus, even as it was consolidating its control over China in late 1949 the CCP was initiat￾ing large-scale assistance to revolutionary movements in Vietnam, Korea, and other Asian countries. T H E D E R A D I C A L I Z A T I O N O F R E V O L U T I O N S There is a fairly substantial body of theory dealing with the process though which revolutions lose their radical nature. Regarding the socializa￾tion of revolutionary states to the norms of the Westphalian system of nation-states, one of the most important contributions is a recent one by David Armstrong.2 This study concluded that the contemporary interstate order rests on a set of shared assumptions, rules, and practices regarding the sovereignty of nation-states. Those common beliefs are challenged by ideo￾logically driven revolutionary states that advance alternative notions of a universal community of mankind. Gradually, however, the revolutionary state’s challenge to the Westphalian order imposes costs on that state. Over 1. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, 1993). 2. David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (Oxford, England, 1993)

94:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY time,those costs will gradually socialize the once-revolutionary state to the Westphalian order.Regarding China,Armstrong concludes,it was only during the early 1970s that,under the impact of rising external threats, PRC views and practices began to shift toward an accommodation with the Westphalian perspective. Prior to that point,an accommodation between the PRC and the USA was possible only if the United States was prepared to withdraw from Asia and watch passively as Chinese power,supported and encouraged by the USSR,was used to assist the revolutionary movements in country after country.There were advocates of such a course-Henry Wallace's Progres- sive party during the 1948 election,for example,or the British government, which felt Western assets should be concentrated on the vital European front where the Soviet threat was greatest.Such people as Wallace failed,of course,because their beliefs clashed with those of a large majority of the American people and political elite. Even if we imagine that U.S.policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s had been directed by the likes of Henry Wallace and the United States had consequently not undertaken a policy of anti-Communist interventionism in Asia,it requires a major leap of faith to conclude that such a course would have led to comity between the early PRC and the United States.U.S occupation of Japan would have been adequate to convince Mao that U.S. imperialism remained a threat to the new China.Even if we set aside the question of Japan and imagine that the United States had retreated to the mid-Pacific Ocean (which is,of course,what the United States had fought the war with Japan to avoid),it is difficult to envision even a modicum of comity between an embittered and isolationist America and a young revolu- tionary Chinese state that was using its power to liberate the peoples of Asia from the shackles of Western imperialism and neo-colonialism.Moreover, had the United States withdrawn from East and Southeast Asia,the history of that region would have been radically different.The global wave of the Communist faith would have expanded much further before it crested and began to recede

94 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y time, those costs will gradually socialize the once-revolutionary state to the Westphalian order. Regarding China, Armstrong concludes, it was only during the early 1970s that, under the impact of rising external threats, PRC views and practices began to shift toward an accommodation with the Westphalian perspective. Prior to that point, an accommodation between the PRC and the USA was possible only if the United States was prepared to withdraw from Asia and watch passively as Chinese power, supported and encouraged by the USSR, was used to assist the revolutionary movements in country after country. There were advocates of such a course – Henry Wallace’s Progres￾sive party during the 1948 election, for example, or the British government, which felt Western assets should be concentrated on the vital European front where the Soviet threat was greatest. Such people as Wallace failed, of course, because their beliefs clashed with those of a large majority of the American people and political elite. Even if we imagine that U.S. policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s had been directed by the likes of Henry Wallace and the United States had consequently not undertaken a policy of anti-Communist interventionism in Asia, it requires a major leap of faith to conclude that such a course would have led to comity between the early PRC and the United States. U.S. occupation of Japan would have been adequate to convince Mao that U.S. imperialism remained a threat to the new China. Even if we set aside the question of Japan and imagine that the United States had retreated to the mid-Pacific Ocean (which is, of course, what the United States had fought the war with Japan to avoid), it is difficult to envision even a modicum of comity between an embittered and isolationist America and a young revolu￾tionary Chinese state that was using its power to liberate the peoples of Asia from the shackles of Western imperialism and neo-colonialism. Moreover, had the United States withdrawn from East and Southeast Asia, the history of that region would have been radically different. The global wave of the Communist faith would have expanded much further before it crested and began to recede