EVELYN GOH Nixon,Kissinger,and the "Soviet Card"in the U.S. Opening to China,I97I-1974* The dramatic reconciliation with the People's Republic of China in 1972 stands as one of Richard Nixon's greatest achievements as the thirty-seventh president of the United States.While previous administrations had attempted minor modifications of the policy of containment and isolation of China,Nixon managed to negotiate a top-level reconciliation that would lead to normaliza- tion of relations in 1979.This rapprochement ended more than twenty years of Sino-American hostility and represented the most significant strategic shift of the Cold War era.It was intimately connected to U.S.relations with its super- power rival and the Nixon administration's general policy of detente.In the writings of Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger-the key primary accounts of the policy change until recently-the central logic of the U.S.-China rapprochement was "triangular relations."Within the context of the Sino-Soviet split,this entailed the opening of relations between the United States and China,bringing China into the realm of great power relations as a third vital power separate from the Soviet Union. The utility of triangular politics was derived from the expectation,accord- ing to Kissinger,that "in a subtle triangle of relations between Washington, Beijing and Moscow,we improve the possibilities of accommodations with each as we increase our options toward both."The aim of pursuing better relations with both the PRC and the Soviet Union accorded with Nixon's professed strat- egy of detente,to reduce international tensions and American overseas defense The author would like to thank Rosemary Foot,Alastair Iain Johnston,Jeffrey Engel, Robert Schulzinger,and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. I.Recent works reveal important deliberations and limited moves to alter China policy during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations,which were unsuccessful because of the con- straints of anti-Communist and racist perceptions,the Vietnam War,and the fact that the Chinese were not ready to respond to American moves.See Noam Kochavi,A Conflict Per- petuated:Cbina Policy during the Kennedy Years(Westport,CT,2002);Victor S.Kaufman,Con- fronting Communism:US and Britisb Policies toward China (Columbia,MO,2001):Evelyn Goh, Constructing the US Rapprocbement with Cbina,1961-1974:From Red Menace to Tacit Ally (New York,2005). 2.Speech written for Nelson Rockefeller,July 1968,quoted in Henry Kissinger,Wbite House Years(Boston,1979),165.For an analysis of triangular diplomacy from 1969 to 1972, see Raymond L.Ghartoff,Detente and Confrontation:American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington,DC,1994),chaps.6-8. DIPLOMATIC HIsToRY,Vol.29,No.3 (June 2005).2o05 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations(SHAFR).Published by Blackwell Publishing,Inc.,350 Main Street,Malden,MA,o2148,USA and 96oo Garsington Road,Oxford OX4 2DQ,UK. 475
evelyn goh Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974* The dramatic reconciliation with the People’s Republic of China in 1972 stands as one of Richard Nixon’s greatest achievements as the thirty-seventh president of the United States. While previous administrations had attempted minor modifications of the policy of containment and isolation of China, Nixon managed to negotiate a top-level reconciliation that would lead to normalization of relations in 1979. 1 This rapprochement ended more than twenty years of Sino-American hostility and represented the most significant strategic shift of the Cold War era. It was intimately connected to U.S. relations with its superpower rival and the Nixon administration’s general policy of détente. In the writings of Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger—the key primary accounts of the policy change until recently—the central logic of the U.S.-China rapprochement was “triangular relations.” Within the context of the Sino-Soviet split, this entailed the opening of relations between the United States and China, bringing China into the realm of great power relations as a third vital power separate from the Soviet Union. The utility of triangular politics was derived from the expectation, according to Kissinger, that “in a subtle triangle of relations between Washington, Beijing and Moscow, we improve the possibilities of accommodations with each as we increase our options toward both.”2 The aim of pursuing better relations with both the PRC and the Soviet Union accorded with Nixon’s professed strategy of détente, to reduce international tensions and American overseas defense 475 Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 3 (June 2005). © 2005 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). Published by Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, 02148, USA and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK. *The author would like to thank Rosemary Foot, Alastair Iain Johnston, Jeffrey Engel, Robert Schulzinger, and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. 1. Recent works reveal important deliberations and limited moves to alter China policy during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, which were unsuccessful because of the constraints of anti-Communist and racist perceptions, the Vietnam War, and the fact that the Chinese were not ready to respond to American moves. See Noam Kochavi, A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy during the Kennedy Years (Westport, CT, 2002); Victor S. Kaufman, Confronting Communism: US and British Policies toward China (Columbia, MO, 2001); Evelyn Goh, Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From Red Menace to Tacit Ally (New York, 2005). 2. Speech written for Nelson Rockefeller, July 1968, quoted in Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), 165. For an analysis of triangular diplomacy from 1969 to 1972, see Raymond L. Ghartoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC, 1994), chaps. 6–8
476:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY commitments in the post-Vietnam era.Publicly,the goal was a "stable structure of peace,"which would be forged through "creative diplomacy,"and “coexistence”and“accommodation”with adversaries.3 In private,Kissinger's objective was to increase American maneuverability,and to carve out a pre- eminent position for Washington as the "balancer"at the pivot of the new triangle by maintaining better relations with each side than they did with each other.+ The immediate opportunity for creating the triangular balance of power was afforded by the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict,and the likelihood that Moscow might launch a broader attack on China.Then,Beijing's urgent requirement for a countervailing force persuaded it to put aside ideology,to contemplate at least temporary compromise on Taiwan,and to turn to new rela- tions with the United States.s This was also the opportunity for Washington to exploit concretely the Sino-Soviet schism to its geopolitical advantage.By playing the "China card"-exercising its option potentially to complicate matters for Moscow at its eastern front-the United States could exert pressure on the Soviets for greater responsiveness in the superpower detente process and in trying to find a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.5 The rapprochement has often been perceived in terms of how the United States played the China card to gain leverage over the Soviet Union.Yet,the logic of triangular relations suggests that there would have been a parallel "Soviet card"being played by the United States toward China,and a "U.S.card" that was played within the Sino-Soviet relationship.?From the American vantage point,the other side of the triangle-how Washington used the Soviet threat and Soviet-American relations as bargaining tools with Beijing-has seen little research to date.Until recently,the lack of documentary material has forced scholars to focus on the broad strategic context in their analyses of the triangular relationship among the United States,the Soviet Union,and China from the Nixon period onward. Recently declassified U.S.documents now allow us to investigate how,and to what effect,the Soviet card was played in Nixon and Kissinger's negotiations 3.Richard Nixon,"Second Annual Report to the Congress on U.S.Foreign Policy," 2/25/71,Public Papers of tbe Presidents:Ricbard Nixon [PPP:RN]197I (Washington,DC,1972), 220-22. 4.Kissinger,Wbite House Years,1076;Kissinger,Years of Upbeaval (London,1982),705. 5.John W.Garver,China's Decision for Rapprocbement with the United States,1968-1971 (Boulder,CO,1982);Yang Kuisong,"The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969:From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,"Cold Wir History 1,no.I (August 2000):21-52; Robert S.Ross,Negotiating Cooperation:The United States and Cbina,1969-1989(Stanford,CA, I995,1-52. 6.See Patrick Tyler,A Great Wall:Six Presidents and Cbina (New York,1999),62-63. 7.The best volume examining the different sides of the strategic triangle is Robert Ross,ed.,China,the United States,and tbe Soviet Union:Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War (New York,1993).However,the authors concentrate on exploring the general impacts of the strategic context on dyads in the triangle,rather than on the details of bilateral bargaining
commitments in the post-Vietnam era. Publicly, the goal was a “stable structure of peace,” which would be forged through “creative diplomacy,” and “coexistence” and “accommodation” with adversaries.3 In private, Kissinger’s objective was to increase American maneuverability, and to carve out a preeminent position for Washington as the “balancer” at the pivot of the new triangle by maintaining better relations with each side than they did with each other.4 The immediate opportunity for creating the triangular balance of power was afforded by the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict, and the likelihood that Moscow might launch a broader attack on China. Then, Beijing’s urgent requirement for a countervailing force persuaded it to put aside ideology, to contemplate at least temporary compromise on Taiwan, and to turn to new relations with the United States.5 This was also the opportunity for Washington to exploit concretely the Sino-Soviet schism to its geopolitical advantage. By playing the “China card”—exercising its option potentially to complicate matters for Moscow at its eastern front—the United States could exert pressure on the Soviets for greater responsiveness in the superpower détente process and in trying to find a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.6 The rapprochement has often been perceived in terms of how the United States played the China card to gain leverage over the Soviet Union. Yet, the logic of triangular relations suggests that there would have been a parallel “Soviet card” being played by the United States toward China, and a “U.S. card” that was played within the Sino-Soviet relationship.7 From the American vantage point, the other side of the triangle—how Washington used the Soviet threat and Soviet-American relations as bargaining tools with Beijing—has seen little research to date. Until recently, the lack of documentary material has forced scholars to focus on the broad strategic context in their analyses of the triangular relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China from the Nixon period onward. Recently declassified U.S. documents now allow us to investigate how, and to what effect, the Soviet card was played in Nixon and Kissinger’s negotiations 476 : diplomatic history 3. Richard Nixon, “Second Annual Report to the Congress on U.S. Foreign Policy,” 2/25/71, Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard Nixon [PPP: RN] 1971 (Washington, DC, 1972), 220–22. 4. Kissinger, White House Years, 1076; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London, 1982), 705. 5. John W. Garver, China’s Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968–1971 (Boulder, CO, 1982); Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History 1, no. 1 (August 2000): 21–52; Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989 (Stanford, CA, 1995), 1–52. 6. See Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China (New York, 1999), 62–63. 7. The best volume examining the different sides of the strategic triangle is Robert Ross, ed., China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War (New York, 1993). However, the authors concentrate on exploring the general impacts of the strategic context on dyads in the triangle, rather than on the details of bilateral bargaining
Nixon,Kissinger,and the "Soviet Card"in the U.S.Opening to China,1971-1974:477 with Chinese leaders in the early 1o7os.Works based on this new material,par- ticularly the books by James Mann and Patrick Tyler,have revealed the extent to which the idea of the Soviet Union as a shared enemy fueled the new Sino- American relationship.Mann notes that "[w]hile American and Chinese offi- cials gave toasts to friendship,they talked increasingly of their common enemy," and by 1974,Kissinger and the new premier Deng Xiaoping"could barely say hello to each other without swapping lines about the Russians." The analysis here concentrates on the process of private bargaining that took place between Nixon and Kissinger and the Chinese leaders and their repre- sentatives during the first four years of the opening to China,which eventually led to the state of affairs described by Mann.It explores how the triangular strategic context was portrayed and played to advantage to advance the White House's position and to persuade Chinese leaders about the type of new relationship the United States and China ought to pursue.The aim is to understand and assess the nature and value of the Soviet card to the Nixon administration in the development of Sino-American relations. Given this focus on Sino-American relations,this article offers neither a parallel study of the impact of the China card on Soviet-American relations nor conclusions about the success or otherwise of triangular politics per se. However,concentrating on Sino-American relations does allow us to con- textualize triangular politics within the dynamics of bilateral relations.In this regard,declassified records demonstrate the critical importance of an under- standing on Taiwan,struck at the beginning during Kissinger's first secret trip to Beijing in July 1971,in facilitating the U.S.-China rapprochement.At these initial talks,Kissinger assured Premier Zhou Enlai that the U.S.government did not advocate either a“two Chinas'”ora“one Taiwan one China”solution; that it did not support the Taiwan independence movement;and that it would gradually withdraw U.S.troops on Taiwan as the war in Vietnam ended and as relations with China improved.The Chinese side compromised by not insist- ing on U.S.recognition for the PRC prior to Nixon's visit to China,in part because of Kissinger's secret assurance that the Nixon administration would normalize relations with the PRC during the first half of Nixon's second term in office.'This understanding on Taiwan was necessary in allowing the talks to proceed.In the realm of triangular politics,the temporary agreement on Taiwan initially facilitated the White House play of the Soviet card in developing Sino- American relations,but as Beijing perceived that Washington was less prepared to deliver on the process of normalization as time went by,Taiwan increasingly 8.Tyler,A Great Wall,107-79:James Mann,About Face:A History of America's Curious Rela- tionship witb China,From Nixon to Clinton (New York,1998),56. 9.Kissinger to Zhou,memcon,7/9/71,Box 851,National Security Files [NSF],Nixon Presidential Material [NPM],National Archives [NA]. 10.Kissinger to Zhou,memcon,7/1o/71,Box 851,NSF,NPM,p.19.For a fuller dis- cussion on the dispensation on Taiwan,see Goh,Constructing the US Rapprocbement with China, chap.8
with Chinese leaders in the early 1970s. Works based on this new material, particularly the books by James Mann and Patrick Tyler, have revealed the extent to which the idea of the Soviet Union as a shared enemy fueled the new SinoAmerican relationship. Mann notes that “[w]hile American and Chinese offi- cials gave toasts to friendship, they talked increasingly of their common enemy,” and by 1974, Kissinger and the new premier Deng Xiaoping “could barely say hello to each other without swapping lines about the Russians.”8 The analysis here concentrates on the process of private bargaining that took place between Nixon and Kissinger and the Chinese leaders and their representatives during the first four years of the opening to China, which eventually led to the state of affairs described by Mann. It explores how the triangular strategic context was portrayed and played to advantage to advance the White House’s position and to persuade Chinese leaders about the type of new relationship the United States and China ought to pursue. The aim is to understand and assess the nature and value of the Soviet card to the Nixon administration in the development of Sino-American relations. Given this focus on Sino-American relations, this article offers neither a parallel study of the impact of the China card on Soviet-American relations nor conclusions about the success or otherwise of triangular politics per se. However, concentrating on Sino-American relations does allow us to contextualize triangular politics within the dynamics of bilateral relations. In this regard, declassified records demonstrate the critical importance of an understanding on Taiwan, struck at the beginning during Kissinger’s first secret trip to Beijing in July 1971, in facilitating the U.S.-China rapprochement. At these initial talks, Kissinger assured Premier Zhou Enlai that the U.S. government did not advocate either a “two Chinas” or a “one Taiwan one China” solution; that it did not support the Taiwan independence movement; and that it would gradually withdraw U.S. troops on Taiwan as the war in Vietnam ended and as relations with China improved.9 The Chinese side compromised by not insisting on U.S. recognition for the PRC prior to Nixon’s visit to China, in part because of Kissinger’s secret assurance that the Nixon administration would normalize relations with the PRC during the first half of Nixon’s second term in office.10 This understanding on Taiwan was necessary in allowing the talks to proceed. In the realm of triangular politics, the temporary agreement on Taiwan initially facilitated the White House play of the Soviet card in developing SinoAmerican relations, but as Beijing perceived that Washington was less prepared to deliver on the process of normalization as time went by, Taiwan increasingly Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974 : 477 8. Tyler, A Great Wall, 107–79; James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New York, 1998), 56. 9. Kissinger to Zhou, memcon, 7/9/71, Box 851, National Security Files [NSF], Nixon Presidential Material [NPM], National Archives [NA]. 10. Kissinger to Zhou, memcon, 7/10/71, Box 851, NSF, NPM, p. 19. For a fuller discussion on the dispensation on Taiwan, see Goh, Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, chap. 8
478:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY resurfaced as a serious constraint in bilateral relations that undermined the effectiveness of the Soviet card. Kissinger has written that he did not have to wield any card to try to influ- ence China's foreign-policy decisions;the PRC simply cooperated with the United States out of an obvious convergence of interests engendered by Chinese fears of the Soviet Union."In contrast,this analysis shows that Nixon and Kissinger felt it necessary to devote considerable effort to playing the Soviet card during the rapprochement in order to persuade the Chinese leaders to develop closer ties with Washington.This was done by emphasizing the Soviet threat to the PRC;by explaining that the United States perceived Soviet mili- tarism as a menace to international stability and U.S.security;and by offering Beijing various means of support in preparing for a Soviet attack.There were three phases in the process.The first was the initial opening from Kissinger's secret preparatory trip to Beijing in July 197I to the summit in February 1972, during which he and Nixon professed a balanced approach to both the Soviet Union and China,but subtly tilted toward the Chinese.The second phase was from mid-1972 to Kissinger's fifth trip to Beijing in February 1973,when he consciously tried to compensate for the developing Soviet-American detente by playing up the Soviet threat to China and the need for deeper Sino-American strategic relations.The final phase,from mid-1973 to 1974 saw Kissinger battling increasing Chinese skepticism and constraints imposed by domestic political problems,not only by emphasizing Moscow's belligerent intentions toward Beijing,but by offering the Chinese leaders what amounted to a secret alliance. 197I TO EARLY 1972:PARALLEL DETENTE WITH A TILT TOWARD CHINA Kissinger made two preparatory trips to Beijing in 1971-the infamous secret visit in July,and a publicized one in October.These were followed by an advance trip by his deputy Alexander Haig in January 1972,ahead of Nixon's summit in February.In their talks with the Chinese leaders,the Americans pre- sented their foreign-policy strategy as consisting of three key elements:it was realist and based on the assessment of national interest;it was not aimed at fos- tering conflict among the major powers and would thus be even-handed;but it was antihegemonic and so would favor a strong PRC which could help to act as counterweight against the Soviet Union.In the process,they played the Soviet card in two ways.First,wielding a "stick,"they firmly assured Beijing that Washington would continue to pursue detente with its superpower rival, implying that China would have to do its part to keep up the Sino-American side of the triangle.Second,they played up the Soviet threat so as to justify the II.From Kissinger's realist systemic interest-driven account,the card,if it existed,was automatic-it "played itself"-Diplomacy (New York,1994),729
resurfaced as a serious constraint in bilateral relations that undermined the effectiveness of the Soviet card. Kissinger has written that he did not have to wield any card to try to influence China’s foreign-policy decisions; the PRC simply cooperated with the United States out of an obvious convergence of interests engendered by Chinese fears of the Soviet Union.11 In contrast, this analysis shows that Nixon and Kissinger felt it necessary to devote considerable effort to playing the Soviet card during the rapprochement in order to persuade the Chinese leaders to develop closer ties with Washington. This was done by emphasizing the Soviet threat to the PRC; by explaining that the United States perceived Soviet militarism as a menace to international stability and U.S. security; and by offering Beijing various means of support in preparing for a Soviet attack. There were three phases in the process. The first was the initial opening from Kissinger’s secret preparatory trip to Beijing in July 1971 to the summit in February 1972, during which he and Nixon professed a balanced approach to both the Soviet Union and China, but subtly tilted toward the Chinese. The second phase was from mid-1972 to Kissinger’s fifth trip to Beijing in February 1973, when he consciously tried to compensate for the developing Soviet-American détente by playing up the Soviet threat to China and the need for deeper Sino-American strategic relations. The final phase, from mid-1973 to 1974, saw Kissinger battling increasing Chinese skepticism and constraints imposed by domestic political problems, not only by emphasizing Moscow’s belligerent intentions toward Beijing, but by offering the Chinese leaders what amounted to a secret alliance. 1971 to early 1972: parallel détente with a tilt toward china Kissinger made two preparatory trips to Beijing in 1971—the infamous secret visit in July, and a publicized one in October. These were followed by an advance trip by his deputy Alexander Haig in January 1972, ahead of Nixon’s summit in February. In their talks with the Chinese leaders, the Americans presented their foreign-policy strategy as consisting of three key elements: it was realist and based on the assessment of national interest; it was not aimed at fostering conflict among the major powers and would thus be even-handed; but it was antihegemonic and so would favor a strong PRC which could help to act as counterweight against the Soviet Union. In the process, they played the Soviet card in two ways. First, wielding a “stick,” they firmly assured Beijing that Washington would continue to pursue détente with its superpower rival, implying that China would have to do its part to keep up the Sino-American side of the triangle. Second, they played up the Soviet threat so as to justify the 478 : diplomatic history 11. From Kissinger’s realist systemic interest-driven account, the card, if it existed, was automatic—it “played itself”—Diplomacy (New York, 1994), 729
Nixon,Kissinger,and the "Soviet Card"in the U.S.Opening to China,1971-1974:479 need for closer U.S.-China relations and cooperation,while offering the “carrot'”of a covert tilt toward China. From the beginning,Kissinger and Nixon sought to manage,at least rhetor- ically,Chinese expectations about the implications the Sino-American opening would have for U.S.relations with its superpower rival.They emphasized to the Chinese leaders at the opening stages of the rapprochement that Washing- ton would be even-handed in developing both U.S.-PRC and U.S.-USSR rela- tions.Thus,Nixon informed Zhou that even as the United States was absolutely not looking to collude with the USSR against China,neither was it seeking a Sino-American condominium against the Soviets.Moreover,rather than seeking a destabilizing Sino-Soviet war,Washington hoped for better relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC.Zhou reciprocated the rhetoric, replying that China did not have "the least opposition"to improved Soviet- American relations.'3 Yet even-handedness vis-a-vis Moscow and Beijing did not mean equal exchanges.As Kissinger's staff expressed it,the United States needed to make clear to China that it would not move to an "overt pro-PRC policy"because it had too much "big concrete business"to do with the Soviets.'+The truth was, in contrast to concrete superpower negotiations about arms reduction and control and other major global strategic issues,China's strategic influence was relatively confined to Asia,and the contacts between Washington and Beijing were new and still had to overcome basic political differences. Moreover,Kissinger was candid about the possible negative impacts of Soviet-American negotiations on the Chinese.In the wake of the announce- ment of Kissinger's secret July trip to Beijing,the Soviets responded to the Sino- American rapprochement by being more forthcoming about the U.S.-USSR summit and other negotiations such as those over Berlin.Kissinger hastened to reassure Zhou that the Nixon administration did not negotiate with the Soviets for the purpose of freeing Soviet hands to concentrate on the East.But he stressed Washington's intention nevertheless to "pursue our interest with Moscow while we try to improve our dialogue with Peking"and warned that the United States could not be "held accountable"if this complicated China's 12.Memcon,2/23/72,Box 87,President's Office Files [POF],NPM,p.20;Kissinger to Zhou,memcon,20/1o/71,Box 851,NSF,NPM,p.3;Memcon,2/25/72,Box 87,POF,NPM, p.6.The principle that"any nation can be a friend of the US without being someone else's enemy"was Nixon's deliberate public line on the opening to China-see television address, 715/71,PPP:RN1971,819. 13.Memcon,22/2/72,Box 87,POF,NPM,p.18;also Zhou to Kissinger,memcon, Io/2o/71,p.2I. 14.National Security Council [NSC]briefing paper,"Polo II-Soviet Union,"o/7/71, Box 851,NSF,NPM,p.14.See also Kissinger-Zhou memcon,7/1o/71,12.10-6pm,Box 851, NSF,NPM,p.36.Indeed,prior to Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing,Nixon urged his adviser to "talk up"SALT and the Soviet proposal for Five-Power nuclear disarmament talks when he met the Chinese leaders-NSC briefing paper,"Polo-Review of US and PRC Views on Other Great Powers,"6/21/71,Box 850,NSF,NPM,p.6
need for closer U.S.-China relations and cooperation, while offering the “carrot” of a covert tilt toward China. From the beginning, Kissinger and Nixon sought to manage, at least rhetorically, Chinese expectations about the implications the Sino-American opening would have for U.S. relations with its superpower rival. They emphasized to the Chinese leaders at the opening stages of the rapprochement that Washington would be even-handed in developing both U.S.-PRC and U.S.-USSR relations. Thus, Nixon informed Zhou that even as the United States was absolutely not looking to collude with the USSR against China, neither was it seeking a Sino-American condominium against the Soviets. Moreover, rather than seeking a destabilizing Sino-Soviet war, Washington hoped for better relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC.12 Zhou reciprocated the rhetoric, replying that China did not have “the least opposition” to improved SovietAmerican relations.13 Yet even-handedness vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing did not mean equal exchanges. As Kissinger’s staff expressed it, the United States needed to make clear to China that it would not move to an “overt pro-PRC policy” because it had too much “big concrete business” to do with the Soviets.14 The truth was, in contrast to concrete superpower negotiations about arms reduction and control and other major global strategic issues, China’s strategic influence was relatively confined to Asia, and the contacts between Washington and Beijing were new and still had to overcome basic political differences. Moreover, Kissinger was candid about the possible negative impacts of Soviet-American negotiations on the Chinese. In the wake of the announcement of Kissinger’s secret July trip to Beijing, the Soviets responded to the SinoAmerican rapprochement by being more forthcoming about the U.S.-USSR summit and other negotiations such as those over Berlin. Kissinger hastened to reassure Zhou that the Nixon administration did not negotiate with the Soviets for the purpose of freeing Soviet hands to concentrate on the East. But he stressed Washington’s intention nevertheless to “pursue our interest with Moscow while we try to improve our dialogue with Peking” and warned that the United States could not be “held accountable” if this complicated China’s Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974 : 479 12. Memcon, 2/23/72, Box 87, President’s Office Files [POF], NPM, p. 20; Kissinger to Zhou, memcon, 20/10/71, Box 851, NSF, NPM, p. 3; Memcon, 2/25/72, Box 87, POF, NPM, p. 6. The principle that “any nation can be a friend of the US without being someone else’s enemy” was Nixon’s deliberate public line on the opening to China—see television address, 7/15/71, PPP: RN 1971, 819. 13. Memcon, 22/2/72, Box 87, POF, NPM, p. 18; also Zhou to Kissinger, memcon, 10/20/71, p. 21. 14. National Security Council [NSC] briefing paper, “Polo II—Soviet Union,” 10/7/71, Box 851, NSF, NPM, p. 14. See also Kissinger-Zhou memcon, 7/10/71, 12.10-6pm, Box 851, NSF, NPM, p. 36. Indeed, prior to Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing, Nixon urged his adviser to “talk up” SALT and the Soviet proposal for Five-Power nuclear disarmament talks when he met the Chinese leaders—NSC briefing paper, “Polo—Review of US and PRC Views on Other Great Powers,” 6/21/71, Box 850, NSF, NPM, p. 6
480:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY problems.'5 The subtext was aimed at maintaining the new strategic triangle: "We are making some progress with the Soviets,and you Chinese should be sure that you keep up with us and improve relations with us,so that we don't get ahead of you in relations with the Russians."16 While it was true that Washington sought good relations with both Moscow and Beijing,it did not necessarily wish for better Sino-Soviet relations.Accord- ing to Kissinger's model of triangular politics,while the United States did not seek a Sino-Soviet war,it did require some frigidity in Sino-Soviet relations because the pivotal American position would be beneficial only so long as the Chinese and Soviets regarded each other as a greater threat than the Ameri- cans.Thus,in their dialogues,Nixon and Kissinger sought to persuade the Chinese leaders that while Moscow harbored ill intent toward them,Washing- ton was China's firm friend. During the early talks,the Americans quickly realized that Beijing's key secu- rity concern revolved around superpower collusion to encircle China.At their opening meeting,Kissinger made sure to assure Zhou at the outset that the United States would never collude with other countries against the PRC.7 He added the remarkable statements that,because-apart from the Taiwan issue which he fully expected to be resolved in the near future-the United States and China had "no conflicting interests at all"in great power relations,the United States would be"your supporter and not your opponent."As evidence, Nixon sent his assurance that Washington would not take any "major steps" affecting Chinese interests without prior discussion with Beijing,and that he was prepared to provide information regarding Soviet-American negotiations to alleviate Chinese concerns.Moreover,the Nixon administration was pre- pared to make with Beijing any arms control agreement it concluded with Moscow.The Chinese politely declined these offers.s Despite their perceived fear of the Soviets,the Chinese leaders were rela- tively taciturn on the subject in the early meetings:in July 197I,Zhou referred only obliquely to"our northern neighbour"and "the other superpower,"but did not initiate any further discussion on the issue."9 Kissinger put Zhou's ret- icence down to a sense of "face."During the October trip,although Zhou had placed the Soviet Union last on a list of six key issues on the substantive agenda for the talks and declared that Beijing was not opposed to U.S.-USSR relations, Kissinger was convinced that the Chinese were displaying bravado in the face 15.Memcon,Io/22/71,p.3o;Kissinger to Nixon,"My October China Visit:Discussions of the Issues,"Box 851,NSF,NPM,p.29.Zhou's phlegmatic response was that"it does not natter.” 16.Winston Lord oral history interview,in Nancy Tucker,ed.,China Confidential:Amer- ican Diplomats and Sino-American Relations,1945-1996 (New York,2001),278. 17.Memcon,7/9/71,Box 851,NSE,NPM,p.6. 18.Memcon,7/1o/71,12.10-6pm,pp.7,28;Memcon,7/11/71,10.35-11.55am,p.8; Io/22/71,Pp.32-33 1g.Memcon,7/1o/71,12.Io-6pm,P.35-
problems.15 The subtext was aimed at maintaining the new strategic triangle: “We are making some progress with the Soviets, and you Chinese should be sure that you keep up with us and improve relations with us, so that we don’t get ahead of you in relations with the Russians.”16 While it was true that Washington sought good relations with both Moscow and Beijing, it did not necessarily wish for better Sino-Soviet relations. According to Kissinger’s model of triangular politics, while the United States did not seek a Sino-Soviet war, it did require some frigidity in Sino-Soviet relations because the pivotal American position would be beneficial only so long as the Chinese and Soviets regarded each other as a greater threat than the Americans. Thus, in their dialogues, Nixon and Kissinger sought to persuade the Chinese leaders that while Moscow harbored ill intent toward them, Washington was China’s firm friend. During the early talks, the Americans quickly realized that Beijing’s key security concern revolved around superpower collusion to encircle China. At their opening meeting, Kissinger made sure to assure Zhou at the outset that the United States would never collude with other countries against the PRC.17 He added the remarkable statements that, because—apart from the Taiwan issue which he fully expected to be resolved in the near future—the United States and China had “no conflicting interests at all” in great power relations, the United States would be “your supporter and not your opponent.” As evidence, Nixon sent his assurance that Washington would not take any “major steps” affecting Chinese interests without prior discussion with Beijing, and that he was prepared to provide information regarding Soviet-American negotiations to alleviate Chinese concerns. Moreover, the Nixon administration was prepared to make with Beijing any arms control agreement it concluded with Moscow. The Chinese politely declined these offers.18 Despite their perceived fear of the Soviets, the Chinese leaders were relatively taciturn on the subject in the early meetings: in July 1971, Zhou referred only obliquely to “our northern neighbour” and “the other superpower,” but did not initiate any further discussion on the issue.19 Kissinger put Zhou’s reticence down to a sense of “face.” During the October trip, although Zhou had placed the Soviet Union last on a list of six key issues on the substantive agenda for the talks and declared that Beijing was not opposed to U.S.-USSR relations, Kissinger was convinced that the Chinese were displaying bravado in the face 480 : diplomatic history 15. Memcon, 10/22/71, p. 30; Kissinger to Nixon, “My October China Visit: Discussions of the Issues,” Box 851, NSF, NPM, p. 29. Zhou’s phlegmatic response was that “it does not matter.” 16. Winston Lord oral history interview, in Nancy Tucker, ed., China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945–1996 (New York, 2001), 278. 17. Memcon, 7/9/71, Box 851, NSF, NPM, p. 6. 18. Memcon, 7/10/71, 12.10-6pm, pp. 7, 28; Memcon, 7/11/71, 10.35-11.55am, p. 8; 10/22/71, pp. 32–33. 19. Memcon, 7/10/71, 12.10-6pm, p. 35
Nixon,Kissinger,and the "Soviet Card"in the U.S.Opening to China,1971-1974:481 of the Soviet threat.Thus,he reminded them that the Soviet menace was directed mainly toward China.As his staff noted,even at the public banquet, Kissinger used "anti-Soviet play"and deliberately "always [used]Soviet exam- ples as bad guys."In private,he warned Zhou that in the wake of the Sino- American rapprochement,Moscow had reached agreement with Washington on Berlin and SALT,and was pushing for a European Security Community, because of its "desire to free itself in Europe so it can concentrate on other areas,"namely China.Furthermore,he fanned Beijing's ire about superpower nuclear hegemony in August by informing the Chinese leaders that,in bilateral negotiations about an agreement to prevent accidental nuclear war,the Soviets had tried unsuccessfully to make provisions in the agreement which would have obliged Washington to report about nuclear events in China.*3 The first opportunity for the White House to demonstrate to Beijing that Washington recognized and would act to support Chinese national interests occurred during the South Asia crisis at the end of 1971.While the U.S."tilt" toward Pakistan was motivated by various reasons,the desire to boost the new opening to China played an important role.Kissinger encouraged Beijing to support actively its Pakistani ally in several ways.He provided the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations,Huang Hua,with detailed intelligence information about Indian deployments,including unconfirmed reports that the Indians were moving their divisions away from the Chinese border toward East Pakistan.'When war broke out between India and Pakistan on 3 December, Kissinger argued that strong U.S.action was necessary to counter the growing Soviet influence on the subcontinent,telling Nixon,"We really don't have any choice.We can't allow a friend of ours and China's to get screwed in a conflict with a friend of Russia's."5 Against this backdrop,he informed Huang Hua about U.S.moves in the subcontinent and indicated "our approval of Chinese support for Pakistan, including diversionary troop movements."6 To demonstrate U.S.support for China and its ally,Kissinger made his first offer to Beijing of U.S.satellite intel- 20.Kissinger to Nixon,"My October China Visit:Discussions of the Issues,"pp.5,7,29. 21.Dwight Chapin,"Zhou-Dinner 1o/24,"10/25/71,Box 27,Chapin Files,NPM. 22.Memcon,Io/22/71,pp.29-30. 23.Memcon,8/16/71,Box 330,Lord Files,LOT 77DI12,Record Group [RG]59,NA, pp.4-5.But Garthoff argues that Kissinger misread the Soviet position,which was not intended to be anti-Chinese-see Detente and Confrontation,202,272. 24.Memcon,11/23/71,Box 330,Lord Files,pp.I2-13. 25.White House Years,897-98;Richard Nixon,RN:The Memoirs of Richard Nicon (London, 1978),527.The State Department,Joint Chiefs of Staff,and CIA disagreed with the White House,and there was"open rebellion"by the interagency Special Action Group for the crisis- see H.R.Haldeman,Tbe Haldeman Diaries:Inside the Nixon Wbite House (New York,1994), 381. 26.Kissinger to Nixon,"My December to Meeting with the Chinese in New York," National Security Archives NSA],China and the United States:From Hostility to Engagement, Special Collections Series,Microfiche Document no.233,p.I.Emphasis mine
of the Soviet threat.20 Thus, he reminded them that the Soviet menace was directed mainly toward China. As his staff noted, even at the public banquet, Kissinger used “anti-Soviet play” and deliberately “always [used] Soviet examples as bad guys.”21 In private, he warned Zhou that in the wake of the SinoAmerican rapprochement, Moscow had reached agreement with Washington on Berlin and SALT, and was pushing for a European Security Community, because of its “desire to free itself in Europe so it can concentrate on other areas,” namely China.22 Furthermore, he fanned Beijing’s ire about superpower nuclear hegemony in August by informing the Chinese leaders that, in bilateral negotiations about an agreement to prevent accidental nuclear war, the Soviets had tried unsuccessfully to make provisions in the agreement which would have obliged Washington to report about nuclear events in China.23 The first opportunity for the White House to demonstrate to Beijing that Washington recognized and would act to support Chinese national interests occurred during the South Asia crisis at the end of 1971. While the U.S. “tilt” toward Pakistan was motivated by various reasons, the desire to boost the new opening to China played an important role. Kissinger encouraged Beijing to support actively its Pakistani ally in several ways. He provided the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, Huang Hua, with detailed intelligence information about Indian deployments, including unconfirmed reports that the Indians were moving their divisions away from the Chinese border toward East Pakistan.24 When war broke out between India and Pakistan on 3 December, Kissinger argued that strong U.S. action was necessary to counter the growing Soviet influence on the subcontinent, telling Nixon, “We really don’t have any choice. We can’t allow a friend of ours and China’s to get screwed in a conflict with a friend of Russia’s.”25 Against this backdrop, he informed Huang Hua about U.S. moves in the subcontinent and indicated “our approval of Chinese support for Pakistan, including diversionary troop movements.”26 To demonstrate U.S. support for China and its ally, Kissinger made his first offer to Beijing of U.S. satellite intelNixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974 : 481 20. Kissinger to Nixon, “My October China Visit: Discussions of the Issues,” pp. 5, 7, 29. 21. Dwight Chapin, “Zhou—Dinner 10/24,” 10/25/71, Box 27, Chapin Files, NPM. 22. Memcon, 10/22/71, pp. 29–30. 23. Memcon, 8/16/71, Box 330, Lord Files, LOT 77D112, Record Group [RG] 59, NA, pp. 4–5. But Garthoff argues that Kissinger misread the Soviet position, which was not intended to be anti-Chinese—see Détente and Confrontation, 202, 272. 24. Memcon, 11/23/71, Box 330, Lord Files, pp. 12–13. 25. White House Years, 897–98; Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London, 1978), 527. The State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CIA disagreed with the White House, and there was “open rebellion” by the interagency Special Action Group for the crisis— see H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York, 1994), 381. 26. Kissinger to Nixon, “My December 10 Meeting with the Chinese in New York,” National Security Archives [NSA], China and the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, Special Collections Series, Microfiche Document no. 233, p. 1. Emphasis mine
482:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY ligence information about the disposition of Soviet forces."7 Further,Nixon sent the message that if Beijing"took measures to protect its security"as a result of the situation in South Asia,the United States would "oppose any effort of others to interfere with the PRC."Clearly,the intention was to encourage the PRC to move its troops to the Indian border as a way to help divert Indian mil- itary attention away from Pakistan,by helping to ensure that Beijing was able to monitor its northern flank at the same time.Kissinger stated in his memoirs that "an active if tacit collaboration"developed.*Yet,the White House's belief that Beijing would take military action contributed significantly to a series of escalatory and potentially dangerous actions in December,including Nixon's order for the U.S.naval force to sail toward the Bay of Bengal.*9 In any event, Beijing did not accept U.S.offers and instead supported a ceasefire in both East and West Pakistan followed by mutual troop withdrawals.3 In January 1972,Kissinger's deputy Alexander Haig headed an advance team to China for a "rehearsal"for the president's visit,and the White House tried to use Haig's brusque,military style to convey more forcefully the Soviet threat.For instance,Haig told Zhou that in the wake of the South Asian crisis, Soviet policy on the subcontinent had moved toward greater involvement in order to "encircle the PRC with unfriendly states."Evidence of this included its recent announcement of support for Bangladesh,offer of assistance to Pakistan,increased material support for Hanoi,and Gromyko's planned visit to Japan.The United States objected to these Soviet moves because "the future viability of the PRC was of the greatest interest to us and a matter of our own national interest."Because Washington was convinced that the Soviet strategy was first to neutralize the PRC and then turn on the United States itself,the United States and PRC "must concert at this critical juncture."In Washing- ton's first substantial offer of cooperation with the PRC against the Soviet Union,Haig told Zhou that the United States would,as it had done during the crisis between India and Pakistan,attempt to "neutralize"Soviet threats in the PRC's periphery,and to "deter threats against the PRC]."Specifically,the White House would-"unilaterally and without any reciprocity"-provide Beijing with U.S.strategic and tactical intelligence pertaining to the Soviet threat against China.3 27.Kissinger's talking points for this meeting,however,suggest that there would have been considerable limits to what intelligence information the United States could provide,as the next relevant satellite information would not be available until the end of December or begin- ning of January,when,as it turned out,the crisis had already passed.See NSC,"Talking Points South Asia,"n.d.,NSA Doc.229,p.7. 28.Kissinger,Wbite House Years,9o6. 29.Ibid.,91o. 30.Haig-Huang memcon,12/12/71,Box 330,Lord Files. 31.Zhou-Haig memcon,1/3/72,Box 1037,NSF,NPM,pp.2-4,6;NSC,"Talking Points for Haig Trip,"n.d.,Box 1037,NSF,NPM,pp.6-7.Haig's presentation did not go down well. Mao reportedly commented,"To worry about us,[the Americans]are the cat who is crying over the death of a mouse!When [the Soviets]are in Vietnam,they want to surround China
ligence information about the disposition of Soviet forces.”27 Further, Nixon sent the message that if Beijing “took measures to protect its security” as a result of the situation in South Asia, the United States would “oppose any effort of others to interfere with the PRC.” Clearly, the intention was to encourage the PRC to move its troops to the Indian border as a way to help divert Indian military attention away from Pakistan, by helping to ensure that Beijing was able to monitor its northern flank at the same time. Kissinger stated in his memoirs that “an active if tacit collaboration” developed.28 Yet, the White House’s belief that Beijing would take military action contributed significantly to a series of escalatory and potentially dangerous actions in December, including Nixon’s order for the U.S. naval force to sail toward the Bay of Bengal.29 In any event, Beijing did not accept U.S. offers and instead supported a ceasefire in both East and West Pakistan followed by mutual troop withdrawals.30 In January 1972, Kissinger’s deputy Alexander Haig headed an advance team to China for a “rehearsal” for the president’s visit, and the White House tried to use Haig’s brusque, military style to convey more forcefully the Soviet threat. For instance, Haig told Zhou that in the wake of the South Asian crisis, Soviet policy on the subcontinent had moved toward greater involvement in order to “encircle the PRC with unfriendly states.” Evidence of this included its recent announcement of support for Bangladesh, offer of assistance to Pakistan, increased material support for Hanoi, and Gromyko’s planned visit to Japan. The United States objected to these Soviet moves because “the future viability of the PRC was of the greatest interest to us and a matter of our own national interest.” Because Washington was convinced that the Soviet strategy was first to neutralize the PRC and then turn on the United States itself, the United States and PRC “must concert at this critical juncture.” In Washington’s first substantial offer of cooperation with the PRC against the Soviet Union, Haig told Zhou that the United States would, as it had done during the crisis between India and Pakistan, attempt to “neutralize” Soviet threats in the PRC’s periphery, and to “deter threats against the [PRC].” Specifically, the White House would—“unilaterally and without any reciprocity”—provide Beijing with U.S. strategic and tactical intelligence pertaining to the Soviet threat against China.31 482 : diplomatic history 27. Kissinger’s talking points for this meeting, however, suggest that there would have been considerable limits to what intelligence information the United States could provide, as the next relevant satellite information would not be available until the end of December or beginning of January, when, as it turned out, the crisis had already passed. See NSC, “Talking Points South Asia,” n.d., NSA Doc. 229, p. 7. 28. Kissinger, White House Years, 906. 29. Ibid., 910. 30. Haig-Huang memcon, 12/12/71, Box 330, Lord Files. 31. Zhou-Haig memcon, 1/3/72, Box 1037, NSF, NPM, pp. 2–4, 6; NSC, “Talking Points for Haig Trip,” n.d., Box 1037, NSF, NPM, pp. 6–7. Haig’s presentation did not go down well. Mao reportedly commented, “To worry about us, [the Americans] are the cat who is crying over the death of a mouse! When [the Soviets] are in Vietnam, they want to surround China
Nixon,Kissinger,and the "Soviet Card"in the U.S.Opening to China,1971-1974 483 During the February 1972 summit,Nixon repeated this offer and assured Zhou that the United States would "oppose"any attempt by the Soviets to engage in "aggressive action"against China.*The declassified transcript of a meeting on 23 February 1972 shows that Kissinger-along with his aides Winston Lord,Jonathan Howe,and John Holdrige-briefed Marshal Yeh Jianying,the vice chairman of the military commission and Qiao Guanhua,the vice minister of foreign affairs,about the deployment of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border.The briefing included details about ground forces,tactical aircraft and missiles,strategic air defense systems,and strategic attack forces, especially nuclear forces.3 Kissinger's assistant Robert MacFarlane has revealed that he and other aides provided intelligence briefings to the Chinese on each of Kissinger's subsequent trips to Beijing.Winston Lord,Kissinger's key aide on China,confirms that these briefings occurred,but added that they were more a gesture to back up the verbal exchanges than of significant substance;the main purpose was "to build trust,confidence,a sense of shared danger."There was also a degree of "political symbolism":according to Lord,the White House assumed that the Soviets might well "get to hear of it,"and by implication,had regarded this action as a means to further load the China card.35 The signifi- cance of the intelligence information provided over this period is debatable,as the full documentary record is not available.However,the secret provision of regular intelligence information to Beijing regarding Soviet disposition of forces from Indochina,and again,when they are in the subcontinent,the Russians want to encircle China from the subcontinent....What about Taiwan,the Philippines,and South Korea?Do all these countries need [U.S.]protection?Isn't it dangerous that China's independence and living should be protected by you?"Accordingly,Zhou took umbrage with Haig,stating that he was"surprised"that the United States seemed to be"all of a sudden express[ing]doubts over China's viability,asserting that it wants to maintain China's independence and viability." Zhou retorted that China would never rely on "external forces"to maintain its independence and viability,because this would make it"a protectorate or a colony."Gong Li,"Chinese Deci- sion Making and the Thawing of Sino-US Relations,"in Re-examining the Cold War:US-Cbina Diplomacy,1954-1973,eds.Robert S.Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cambridge,MA,2001), 352-53;Hong Zhaohui,"The Role of Individuals in US-China Relations,1949-1972,"in Image,Perception,and the Making of US-Cbina Relations,eds.Li Hongshan and Hong Zhaohui (Lanham,MD,1998),358;Memcon,1//72,Box 1o37,NSE,NPM,pp.2,4. 32.Nixon-Zhou memcon,2/23/72,Box 87,POF,NPM,p.21.Nixon did not elaborate on just how Washington would oppose Soviet aggression. 33.See Nixon-Zhou memcon,2/22/72,Box 87,POF,NPM,p.Io;Kissinger-Yeh memcon,2/23/72,Box 92,NSE,NPM.These documents are also available at http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBBIo6/index.htm. 34.See Robert MacFarlane,Special Trust (New York,1994),149-69.MacFarlane writes that apart from detailed briefings about Soviet military dispositions and readiness at the Chinese border,they also provided information on Soviet military aid to North Vietnam and other Third World countries and guerilla movements. 35.Author interview with Winston Lord,3/7/o1.Moscow apparently did learn about the provision of intelligence information:Anatoly Dobrynin,the Soviet ambassador in Washing- ton,told Kissinger in March that Moscow had it on Chinese sources that Kissinger had given the Chinese "a complete rundown of the 'dislocation'of Soviet forces on the Chinese border, as well as of the location of Soviet missile installations."Kissinger denied it.See Memcon, 3/9/72,Box 493,NSF,NPM,p.3
During the February 1972 summit, Nixon repeated this offer and assured Zhou that the United States would “oppose” any attempt by the Soviets to engage in “aggressive action” against China.32 The declassified transcript of a meeting on 23 February 1972 shows that Kissinger—along with his aides Winston Lord, Jonathan Howe, and John Holdrige—briefed Marshal Yeh Jianying, the vice chairman of the military commission and Qiao Guanhua, the vice minister of foreign affairs, about the deployment of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border. The briefing included details about ground forces, tactical aircraft and missiles, strategic air defense systems, and strategic attack forces, especially nuclear forces.33 Kissinger’s assistant Robert MacFarlane has revealed that he and other aides provided intelligence briefings to the Chinese on each of Kissinger’s subsequent trips to Beijing.34 Winston Lord, Kissinger’s key aide on China, confirms that these briefings occurred, but added that they were more a gesture to back up the verbal exchanges than of significant substance; the main purpose was “to build trust, confidence, a sense of shared danger.” There was also a degree of “political symbolism”: according to Lord, the White House assumed that the Soviets might well “get to hear of it,” and by implication, had regarded this action as a means to further load the China card.35 The signifi- cance of the intelligence information provided over this period is debatable, as the full documentary record is not available. However, the secret provision of regular intelligence information to Beijing regarding Soviet disposition of forces Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974 : 483 from Indochina, and again, when they are in the subcontinent, the Russians want to encircle China from the subcontinent. ... What about Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea? Do all these countries need [U.S.] protection? Isn’t it dangerous that China’s independence and living should be protected by you?” Accordingly, Zhou took umbrage with Haig, stating that he was “surprised” that the United States seemed to be “all of a sudden express[ing] doubts over China’s viability, asserting that it wants to maintain China’s independence and viability.” Zhou retorted that China would never rely on “external forces” to maintain its independence and viability, because this would make it “a protectorate or a colony.” Gong Li, “Chinese Decision Making and the Thawing of Sino-US Relations,” in Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973, eds. Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cambridge, MA, 2001), 352–53; Hong Zhaohui, “The Role of Individuals in US-China Relations, 1949–1972,” in Image, Perception, and the Making of US-China Relations, eds. Li Hongshan and Hong Zhaohui (Lanham, MD, 1998), 358; Memcon, 1/7/72, Box 1037, NSF, NPM, pp. 2, 4. 32. Nixon-Zhou memcon, 2/23/72, Box 87, POF, NPM, p. 21. Nixon did not elaborate on just how Washington would oppose Soviet aggression. 33. See Nixon-Zhou memcon, 2/22/72, Box 87, POF, NPM, p. 10; Kissinger-Yeh memcon, 2/23/72, Box 92, NSF, NPM. These documents are also available at http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/index.htm. 34. See Robert MacFarlane, Special Trust (New York, 1994), 149–69. MacFarlane writes that apart from detailed briefings about Soviet military dispositions and readiness at the Chinese border, they also provided information on Soviet military aid to North Vietnam and other Third World countries and guerilla movements. 35. Author interview with Winston Lord, 3/7/01. Moscow apparently did learn about the provision of intelligence information: Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, told Kissinger in March that Moscow had it on Chinese sources that Kissinger had given the Chinese “a complete rundown of the ‘dislocation’ of Soviet forces on the Chinese border, as well as of the location of Soviet missile installations.” Kissinger denied it. See Memcon, 3/9/72, Box 493, NSF, NPM, p. 3
484:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY indicates that in spite of their rhetoric about even-handedness,Nixon and Kissinger were prepared to lean covertly toward Beijing in order to strengthen the image of the Soviet Union as a shared adversary. The Chinese were more cautious.Marshal Yeh responded positively to the February 1972 intelligence briefing,but his remark that the information was "an indication of your wish to improve our relationship"suggested that the Chinese appreciated it mainly as a demonstration of mutual trust and confi- dence.s6 Zhou himself was circumspect in response to Nixon's indirect refer- ences to the Soviet threat,37 agreeing that the Soviets pursued a "policy of expansion"but insisting that China was willing to improve relations with Moscow.s Zhou's presentation appears to accord with official Chinese accounts which report that Mao's understanding of the basic issue in the Sino-American rapprochement was that "no matter whether it is the United States or China, neither of us could fight simultaneously on two fronts."That is,the Chinese leaders were primarily seeking detente with the United States,but not a de facto alliance-they had decided to rely upon themselves in defending against the Soviets-in order to concentrate on their main Soviet adversary.39 Be that as it may,the Shanghai Communique signed at the end of the summit carried clear anti-Soviet overtones.The short list of five issues on which the two sides agreed included the following: Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region,and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony;and neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states. As Kissinger's memoirs noted,these boiled down to an agreement not to coop- erate with the Soviet bloc,and to oppose any attempt by any country to dom- inate Asia.Because the Soviet Union was the only other country capable of such domination,the text suggested that "a tacit alliance to block Soviet expansion- ism in Asia was coming into being."4 This reflected the centrality of the Soviet threat to the developing U.S.-PRC relationship,and foreshadowed the way in which Kissinger's progressive construction of this threat would bring the Nixon administration closer to a U.S.-China coalition against the Soviet Union. 36.Kissinger-Yeh memcon,p.20. 37.For instance,Nixon told Mao that the United States and PRC did not want to dom- inate each other,or "reach out and control the world,"but "this cannot be said of some other nations,"and observed to Zhou that China was "so significant a power that the Soviet Union has more units on its border with China than it does on the border with Western Europe." Nixon-Mao memcon,2/21/72,in William Burr,ed.,The Kissinger Transcripts:The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York,1999),64;Nixon-Zhou memcon,2/21/72,p.Io. 38.Memcon,2/23/72,Pp.22-36;Memcon,2/25/72,pp.45 39.Li,"Chinese Decision Making,"353;Garver,Cbinese Decision for Rapprocbement,chaps. I-3. 40.Kissinger,Diplomacy,728
indicates that in spite of their rhetoric about even-handedness, Nixon and Kissinger were prepared to lean covertly toward Beijing in order to strengthen the image of the Soviet Union as a shared adversary. The Chinese were more cautious. Marshal Yeh responded positively to the February 1972 intelligence briefing, but his remark that the information was “an indication of your wish to improve our relationship” suggested that the Chinese appreciated it mainly as a demonstration of mutual trust and confi- dence.36 Zhou himself was circumspect in response to Nixon’s indirect references to the Soviet threat,37 agreeing that the Soviets pursued a “policy of expansion” but insisting that China was willing to improve relations with Moscow.38 Zhou’s presentation appears to accord with official Chinese accounts which report that Mao’s understanding of the basic issue in the Sino-American rapprochement was that “no matter whether it is the United States or China, neither of us could fight simultaneously on two fronts.” That is, the Chinese leaders were primarily seeking détente with the United States, but not a de facto alliance—they had decided to rely upon themselves in defending against the Soviets—in order to concentrate on their main Soviet adversary.39 Be that as it may, the Shanghai Communiqué signed at the end of the summit carried clear anti-Soviet overtones. The short list of five issues on which the two sides agreed included the following: Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states. As Kissinger’s memoirs noted, these boiled down to an agreement not to cooperate with the Soviet bloc, and to oppose any attempt by any country to dominate Asia. Because the Soviet Union was the only other country capable of such domination, the text suggested that “a tacit alliance to block Soviet expansionism in Asia was coming into being.”40 This reflected the centrality of the Soviet threat to the developing U.S.-PRC relationship, and foreshadowed the way in which Kissinger’s progressive construction of this threat would bring the Nixon administration closer to a U.S.-China coalition against the Soviet Union. 484 : diplomatic history 36. Kissinger-Yeh memcon, p. 20. 37. For instance, Nixon told Mao that the United States and PRC did not want to dominate each other, or “reach out and control the world,” but “this cannot be said of some other nations,” and observed to Zhou that China was “so significant a power that the Soviet Union has more units on its border with China than it does on the border with Western Europe.” Nixon-Mao memcon, 2/21/72, in William Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York, 1999), 64; Nixon-Zhou memcon, 2/21/72, p. 10. 38. Memcon, 2/23/72, pp. 22–36; Memcon, 2/25/72, pp. 4–5. 39. Li, “Chinese Decision Making,” 353; Garver, Chinese Decision for Rapprochement, chaps. 1–3. 40. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 728