上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源（相关阅读）Taiwan Strait Crisis_Sino-Soviet relations in the bombardment of Jjinmen 1958

The Impact of the Bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 upon Sino-Soviet Relations Dai Chaowu* 198年炮击金门是中苏关系走向破裂进程中的重要事件。炮击金门体现了这一时期中共领导人 对国际问题的新看法和外交战略的显著变化，是毛泽东推行“革命外交”的具体实践。这种思想和 实践同赫鲁晓夫的社会主义国家外交政策总路线存在着根本的分歧。炮击事件严重损害了中苏同 盟，进一步加深了双方的矛盾和分歧，并促使苏联领导人决定停止向中国提供核武器，从而成为中 苏矛盾和分歧公开化以及国家关系迅速走向恶化的重要标志之一。 The bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 termediate zones,the issue of war and peace, put the Soviet Union in a very difficult situ- the argument that "The East wind prevails ation to make decisions.The crisis in Sino- over the West wind,"a dialectical understand- Soviet relations not only affected the two ing of tense international situations and so countries'alliance,but deepened the two on.There can be no doubt that in bombard- sides'differences and conflicts on the issue ing Jinmen he was putting his views into con- of Taiwan and the offshore islands.At the crete practice. same time,the crisis resulted in the Soviet The issue of intermediate zones was an Union's decision to stop providing nuclear important one to which Mao gave consider- technical support to China.Therefore the able thought in the late 1950s and on which crisis was a very important event in the Sino- his views changed fundamentally.This is- Soviet split and had a profound influence. sue became the basic starting point for Mao's observation of international problems in that The Significant Change in Chinese Dip- period and his decisions on China's foreign lomatic Ideas,the Strategic Differences policy.First of all,Mao Zedong thought that between China and Soviet Union and the the US tried to control the intermediate zones Decision to Bombard Jinmen not only to oppose communism but also to weaken the intermediate countries.Secondly, Mao Zedong once said that over twenty he made new judgments and analysis on the years of turning over international issues in nature of nation-states and thus changed his his mind he had gradually formed some opin- previous opinions.Mao Zedong regarded ions and achieved a certain clarity.These those states'neutral policy in the Cold War important views included the theory of in- as an"independent and autonomous stand" C 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

The Impact of the Bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 upon Sino-Soviet Relations Dai Chaowu* 1958年炮击金门是中苏关系走向破裂进程中的重要事件。炮击金门体现了这一时期中共领导人 对国际问题的新看法和外交战略的显著变化，是毛泽东推行“革命外交”的具体实践。这种思想和 实践同赫鲁晓夫的社会主义国家外交政策总路线存在着根本的分歧。炮击事件严重损害了中苏同 盟，进一步加深了双方的矛盾和分歧，并促使苏联领导人决定停止向中国提供核武器，从而成为中 苏矛盾和分歧公开化以及国家关系迅速走向恶化的重要标志之一。 The bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 put the Soviet Union in a very difficult situ￾ation to make decisions. The crisis in Sino￾Soviet relations not only affected the two countries’alliance, but deepened the two sides’differences and conflicts on the issue of Taiwan and the offshore islands. At the same time, the crisis resulted in the Soviet Union’s decision to stop providing nuclear technical support to China. Therefore the crisis was a very important event in the Sino￾Soviet split and had a profound influence. The Significant Change in Chinese Dip￾lomatic Ideas, the Strategic Differences between China and Soviet Union and the Decision to Bombard Jinmen Mao Zedong once said that over twenty years of turning over international issues in his mind he had gradually formed some opin￾ions and achieved a certain clarity. These important views included the theory of in￾termediate zones, the issue of war and peace, the argument that “The East wind prevails over the Westwind,”a dialectical understand￾ing of tense international situations and so on. There can be no doubt that in bombard￾ing Jinmen he was putting his views into con￾crete practice. The issue of intermediate zones was an important one to which Mao gave consider￾able thought in the late 1950s and on which his views changed fundamentally. This is￾sue became the basic starting point for Mao’s observation of international problems in that period and his decisions on China’s foreign policy. First of all, Mao Zedong thought that the US tried to control the intermediate zones not only to oppose communism but also to weaken the intermediate countries. Secondly, he made new judgments and analysis on the nature of nation-states and thus changed his previous opinions. Mao Zedong regarded those states’neutral policy in the Cold War as an “independent and autonomous stand

SPECIALISSUE THE COLD WARAND SINO-SOVIET RELATION 135 that China welcomed.Furthermore,Mao but also pointed out that in the treatment of Zedong pointed out that the main areas im- some specific problems there existed the ten- perialist countries tried to control were in Asia dencies of rightist conservatism.These and Africa.He said:"Among communism, included,in relations with other socialist nationalism and imperialism,communism and countries,neglecting necessary criticism and nationalism are closer."At the same time failing to refute revisionist opinions;in rela- Mao Zedong clearly pointed out that the in- tions with nationalist countries,overlooking termediate zones were strategic areas that necessary struggles and thus obscuring the could pin down and even wipe out imperial- boundaries between socialist and nationalist ist strength.He stressed mutual support countries;in relations with imperialist among nationalist and socialist countries.He countries,harboring unrealistic expectations. also pointed out that it was very important Mao Zedong especially stressed that his in- to make relative strengths more favorable to structions to contact the US at the Geneva the socialist camp to win over the countries Conference in 1954 were inconsistent with in intermediate zones.2 To achieve that goal, his thought,and that it was better to go on Mao Zedong emphasized that "we must sup- fighting against the US and not to develop port"the struggles against imperialism in relations with it.It was concluded at the meet- Asia,Africa,Latin America,and people's ing that Chinese foreign policy was to"de- revolutionary struggles in all countries.He nounce Yugoslavia,consolidate socialism; also stressed that the national liberation move- strike the US,rout imperialism;isolate Japan, ments in Asia,Africa and Latin America con- and win over nationalism."In light of this,in stituted“the major support'”to socialist the future foreign affairs,"struggle would countries.3 be absolute;the Cold War could not be In addition to international factors, avoided;and compromise would be relative China's diplomatic strategy underwent fun- and temporary."4 damental changes due to some important That the intermediate zone theory was domestic factors,namely,the "Great Leap re-proposed and given new meanings pointed Forward"in national economic construction. to the new characteristics of"revolutionary The theoretical base of the "Great Leap For- diplomacy"in China's foreign affairs guide- ward"was consistent with the guidelines of lines in the late 1950s.It required that China China's"revolutionary diplomacy"in late should support world revolution and oppose 1950s and each complemented the other.The imperialism,especially the US But it was fever of the"Great Leap Forward"had pro- basically different from the Soviet Union's foundly influenced China's diplomacy and socialist foreignpolicy,especially that latter's Mao Zedong asked diplomatic workers to policy of"peaceful coexistence,peaceful conquer conservative ideas and break down competition and peaceful transition"and its blind faith in the West.In June 1958,the intended detente with the US In the middle Foreign Ministry convened a conference to and late 1950s,Sino-Soviet relations began discuss the international situation.The con- to undergo an obvious change.In the realm ference affirmed foreign policy since 1949,of ideology China opposed the Soviet Union's 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

SPECIAL ISSUE: THE COLD WAR AND SINO-SOVIET RELATION 135 that China welcomed. Furthermore, Mao Zedong pointed out that the main areas im￾perialist countries tried to control were inAsia and Africa. He said: “Among communism, nationalism and imperialism, communism and nationalism are closer.”1 At the same time Mao Zedong clearly pointed out that the in￾termediate zones were strategic areas that could pin down and even wipe out imperial￾ist strength. He stressed mutual support among nationalist and socialist countries. He also pointed out that it was very important to make relative strengths more favorable to the socialist camp to win over the countries in intermediate zones. 2 To achieve that goal, Mao Zedong emphasized that “we must sup￾port”the struggles against imperialism in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and people’s revolutionary struggles in all countries. He also stressed that the national liberation move￾ments in Asia, Africa and Latin America con￾stituted “the major support”to socialist countries. 3 In addition to international factors, China’s diplomatic strategy underwent fun￾damental changes due to some important domestic factors, namely, the “Great Leap Forward”in national economic construction. The theoretical base of the “Great Leap For￾ward”was consistent with the guidelines of China’s “revolutionary diplomacy”in late 1950s and each complemented the other. The fever of the “Great Leap Forward”had pro￾foundly influenced China’s diplomacy and Mao Zedong asked diplomatic workers to conquer conservative ideas and break down blind faith in the West. In June 1958, the Foreign Ministry convened a conference to discuss the international situation. The con￾ference affirmed foreign policy since 1949, but also pointed out that in the treatment of some specific problems there existed the ten￾dencies of rightist conservatism. These included, in relations with other socialist countries, neglecting necessary criticism and failing to refute revisionist opinions; in rela￾tions with nationalist countries, overlooking necessary struggles and thus obscuring the boundaries between socialist and nationalist countries; in relations with imperialist countries, harboring unrealistic expectations. Mao Zedong especially stressed that his in￾structions to contact the US at the Geneva Conference in 1954 were inconsistent with his thought, and that it was better to go on fighting against the US and not to develop relations with it. It was concluded at the meet￾ing that Chinese foreign policy was to “de￾nounce Yugoslavia, consolidate socialism; strike the US, rout imperialism; isolate Japan, and win over nationalism.”In light of this, in the future foreign affairs, “struggle would be absolute; the Cold War could not be avoided; and compromise would be relative and temporary.”4 That the intermediate zone theory was re-proposed and given new meanings pointed to the new characteristics of “revolutionary diplomacy”in China’s foreign affairs guide￾lines in the late 1950s. It required that China should support world revolution and oppose imperialism, especially the US But it was basically different from the Soviet Union’s socialist foreign policy, especially that latter’s policy of “peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition and peaceful transition”and its intended detente with the US In the middle and late 1950s, Sino-Soviet relations began to undergo an obvious change. In the realm of ideology China opposed the Soviet Union’s

136 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA Summer 2005 blanket negation of Stalin.Besides,the two would become and the fewer its friends in countries basically had divided opinions on China would be."6 Therefore onrelations with some important strategic problems. the US,China's policy was to "isolate and The systematization of the intermediate strike the US imperialists,eliminate fear of zones theory and the imagined rapid increase the US,give people more confidence and in Chinese economic strength directly re- make them dare to fight firmly against the sulted in Mao Zedong's famous statement US imperialists"7 Chinese leaders later even that "the East wind prevails over the West thought,"The fight between socialism and wind."In 1957,Mao pointed out at the Con- imperialism is a fight to the death.It's very ference of the Communist and the Workers' dangerous to neglect this fight and sing the Parties in Moscow that"the Western coun- praises of peaceful coexistence,and not tries have been surpassed and we have gained speak of the confrontation between the two the advantage over them."5 With that worlds."8 So when Chinese leaders publicly judgment,China and the Soviet Union be- stated "only the Chinese government dares came fundamentally divided in opinions upon to confront the US,"the bombardment on the guiding principle in foreign policy of so- Jinmen was the best answer to the Soviet cialist countries.The disparities demon- Union's policy of detente. strated themselves first in their different Another significant difference in the for- views on“peaceful coexistence”and "de- eign policies of China and the Soviet Union tente with US"Peaceful coexistence was 'the was the issue of how to treat the national general guideline of socialist countries'for- liberation movement.Along with the putting eign policies"put forward in the 20th Con- forward of the intermediate zone theory and gress of the Soviet Communist Party.The new judgments on the international situation, Communist Party of China had also spoken Chinese leaders began to take the "mutual highly of the principle of peaceful coexist- desire for peace of Asian and African coun- ence since 1954.Related to this was the tries and their struggles against colonialism question of whether to seek detente with the and imperialism”as“a basis for socialist US in the international situation of that time. countries to establish a united front with On the basis of the general line on peaceful them."In the view of the Chinese leaders, coexistence,Khrushchev made improvingre- this united front was to fight imperialism and lations with the US a top priority of Soviet colonialism rather than to "peacefully coex- foreign policy.This was precisely what ist"with them.However,in the view of the China opposed firmly.At the beginning of Soviet leaders,peaceful coexistence,coop- 1957 Mao Zedong clearly pointed out,"Ithink eration among socialist countries and sup- it is more advantageous to us to establish port to national liberation movement were diplomatic relations with the US a few years three separate principles,and"it is for the later";and to do so could "isolate the US, cooperation,unity and mutual support of the deprive it completely of political resources socialist camp that the USSR regards peace- and put it in an unjustifiable position.The ful coexistence as the general line of social- longer this went on the more passive US ist countries'foreign policies.It is not only 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

136 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA Summer 2005 blanket negation of Stalin. Besides, the two countries basically had divided opinions on some important strategic problems. The systematization of the intermediate zones theory and the imagined rapid increase in Chinese economic strength directly re￾sulted in Mao Zedong’s famous statement that “the East wind prevails over the West wind.”In 1957, Mao pointed out at the Con￾ference of the Communist and the Workers’ Parties in Moscow that “the Western coun￾tries have been surpassed and we have gained the advantage over them.”5 With that judgment, China and the Soviet Union be￾came fundamentally divided in opinions upon the guiding principle in foreign policy of so￾cialist countries. The disparities demon￾strated themselves first in their different views on “peaceful coexistence”and “de￾tente with US”Peaceful coexistence was “the general guideline of socialist countries’for￾eign policies”put forward in the 20 th Con￾gress of the Soviet Communist Party. The Communist Party of China had also spoken highly of the principle of peaceful coexist￾ence since 1954. Related to this was the question of whether to seek detente with the US in the international situation of that time. On the basis of the general line on peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev made improving re￾lations with the US a top priority of Soviet foreign policy. This was precisely what China opposed firmly. At the beginning of 1957 Mao Zedong clearly pointed out, “I think it is more advantageous to us to establish diplomatic relations with the US a few years later”; and to do so could “isolate the US, deprive it completely of political resources and put it in an unjustifiable position. The longer this went on the more passive US would become and the fewer its friends in China would be.”6 Therefore on relations with the US, China’s policy was to “isolate and strike the US imperialists, eliminate fear of the US, give people more confidence and make them dare to fight firmly against the US imperialists”7 Chinese leaders later even thought, “The fight between socialism and imperialism is a fight to the death. It’s very dangerous to neglect this fight and sing the praises of peaceful coexistence, and not speak of the confrontation between the two worlds.”8 So when Chinese leaders publicly stated “only the Chinese government dares to confront the US,”the bombardment on Jinmen was the best answer to the Soviet Union’s policy of detente. Another significant difference in the for￾eign policies of China and the Soviet Union was the issue of how to treat the national liberation movement. Along with the putting forward of the intermediate zone theory and new judgments on the international situation, Chinese leaders began to take the “mutual desire for peace of Asian and African coun￾tries and their struggles against colonialism and imperialism”as “a basis for socialist countries to establish a united front with them.”In the view of the Chinese leaders, this united front was to fight imperialism and colonialism rather than to “peacefully coex￾ist”with them. However, in the view of the Soviet leaders, peaceful coexistence, coop￾eration among socialist countries and sup￾port to national liberation movement were three separate principles, and “it is for the cooperation, unity and mutual support of the socialist camp that the USSR regards peace￾ful coexistence as the general line of social￾ist countries’foreign policies. It is not only

SPECIALISSUE THE COLD WARAND SINO-SOVIET RELATION 137 a matter of supporting national liberation our international relations and our foreign movements."9 As Mao Zedong repeatedly policy.”o explained,the objective of the bombardment The Soviet Union believed that oppos- was in the first place to support the Arab ing peaceful coexistence and insisting on the anti-imperialism struggle.Peng Dehuai also anti-imperialist struggle would certainly make stressed that"the Chinese people must give the international situations tense and would their support through actual actions,of which fundamentally harm the common interests one is the deployment of the air force in of socialist camp.But China's view was just Fujian,and another is the bombardment on the opposite.Mao Zedong believed that ten- Jinmen....It is also to tell people all over the sion "could arouse the masses,backward world that if the U.S.imperial ists want war strata and people in the middle to struggle," Chinese people are not be afraid."The bom- and at the same time "a tense situation could bardment showed the idea of supporting na- make people all over the world stop and think, tional liberation movement in China's"revo- and could mobilize people all over the world, lutionary diplomacy." workers,and other laboring masses to make Besides,the judgment that "the East more a few more communists.Mao wind prevails over the West wind"directly Zedong also believed that struggle against the brought about another question,"Who is U.S.could eliminate people's superstitious afraid of whom?"The question was in fact belief and fear of the US.In the view of the concerned with how to estimate the strength Chinese leaders,bombardment on Jinmenand of the US.The Soviet leaders held that,when creating a tense situation was also a means analyzing US strength and economic to achieve this goal. potential,consideration should be given to the fact that the US had already renewed its The Soviet Response to the Bombard- industrial facilities and had greater economic ment on Jinmen and Its Policy Choice and military strength at the time;they also had a large army and many advanced Soviet leaders were not surprised at the weapons,and therefore couldn't be simply bombardment on 23 August 1958.Khru- regarded as“a paper tiger.”About this,Mao shchev wrote in his memoirs that Chinese Zedong questioned Soviet foreign minister leaders had said they had prepared to take Andrei A.Gromyko:"Is US really so eco- new military operation against Jiang Jieshi. nomically powerful that it is hard for us to They asked for air cover,long-range and sea- take it on?"Mao Zedong's answer to this shore artillery.12 However the outbreak of the was "it is imperialism that is more afraid of second Taiwan Straits crisis still outran us."So the objective of Chinese foreign Khrushchev's expectations.First,that was policy was to"explain clearly and bring into because China did not inform the USSR of play”Mao Zedong's idea that“it is imperial- the time and plan of the bombardment ac- ism that is more afraid of us,"without hav- cording to regular practice.Secondly, ing to“consider Soviet views.”In addition, Khrushchev himself did not expect so strong it was to "publicly announce standpoint in a response from the US.So the crisis put 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

SPECIAL ISSUE: THE COLD WAR AND SINO-SOVIET RELATION 137 a matter of supporting national liberation movements.”9 As Mao Zedong repeatedly explained, the objective of the bombardment was in the first place to support the Arab anti-imperialism struggle. Peng Dehuai also stressed that “the Chinese people must give their support through actual actions, of which one is the deployment of the air force in Fujian, and another is the bombardment on Jinmen. … It is also to tell people all over the world that if the U.S. imperialists want war Chinese people are not be afraid.”The bom￾bardment showed the idea of supporting na￾tional liberation movement in China’s “revo￾lutionary diplomacy.” Besides, the judgment that “the East wind prevails over the West wind”directly brought about another question, “Who is afraid of whom?”The question was in fact concerned with how to estimate the strength of the US. The Soviet leaders held that, when analyzing US strength and economic potential, consideration should be given to the fact that the US had already renewed its industrial facilities and had greater economic and military strength at the time; they also had a large army and many advanced weapons, and therefore couldn’t be simply regarded as “a paper tiger.”About this, Mao Zedong questioned Soviet foreign minister Andrei A. Gromyko: “Is US really so eco￾nomically powerful that it is hard for us to take it on?”Mao Zedong’s answer to this was “it is imperialism that is more afraid of us.”So the objective of Chinese foreign policy was to “explain clearly and bring into play”Mao Zedong’s idea that “it is imperial￾ism that is more afraid of us,”without hav￾ing to “consider Soviet views.”In addition, it was to “publicly announce standpoint in our international relations and our foreign policy.”10 The Soviet Union believed that oppos￾ing peaceful coexistence and insisting on the anti-imperialist strugglewould certainly make the international situations tense and would fundamentally harm the common interests of socialist camp. But China’s view was just the opposite. Mao Zedong believed that ten￾sion “could arouse the masses, backward strata and people in the middle to struggle,” and at the same time “a tense situation could make people all overthe world stop and think, and could mobilize people all over the world, workers, and other laboring masses to make more a few more communists.”11 Mao Zedong also believed that struggle against the U.S. could eliminate people’s superstitious belief and fear of the US. In the view of the Chinese leaders, bombardment on Jinmen and creating a tense situation was also a means to achieve this goal. The Soviet Response to the Bombard￾ment on Jinmen and Its Policy Choice Soviet leaders were not surprised at the bombardment on 23 August 1958. Khru￾shchev wrote in his memoirs that Chinese leaders had said they had prepared to take new military operation against Jiang Jieshi. They asked for air cover, long-range and sea￾shore artillery. 12 However the outbreak of the second Taiwan Straits crisis still outran Khrushchev’s expectations. First, that was because China did not inform the USSR of the time and plan of the bombardment ac￾cording to regular practice. Secondly, Khrushchev himself did not expect so strong a response from the US. So the crisis put

138 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA Summer 2005 the USSR into a difficult dilemma.Soviet Soviet embassy sent in all 52 reports on the policy choices at the time were based on their matter.According to these reports,the Rus- understanding and knowledge of China's sians believed that"It would not be entirely policy decisions and their judgments about correct to regard the solution of the Taiwan the US response to the crisis.Their policy issue...as purely a domestic affair ofChina. choices can be roughly divided into two In the first stage of the development of the phases.Throughout the course of the crisis Taiwan conflict our Chinese friends have the Soviet response and policy decisions were demonstrated a rather simplistic approach to passive and cautious. evaluating the degree of urgency of the Tai- In the first phase of the crisis (from the wan problem and have let the possibility of beginning of the bombardment to the end of aggravating the international situation emerge September 1958),because the USSR did not to keep the United States 'on the verge of know what China's strategic objectives war'from their side too."The reports also were,it announced its support for China's pointed out that"Our Chinese friends started actions and tried to take some concrete steps to show excessive sensitivity toward the on the one hand,while on the other hand it problems of sovereignty and independence sought through a variety of channel to as- of their country,and reservations about the certain China's intentions so as to influence measures that used to be taken by both coun- and restrict China's actions.Realizing that tries jointly."The Soviets obviously believed war might break out in the Taiwan Straits that the Chinese showed a tendency towards area,the Soviet military showed great cau- solving Asian problems themselves.They did tion and restraint at this stage.Although the not think it necessary to consult the USSR USSR might have known in advance what about their planned actions,though they action China would take,the Soviet leaders would expect its support when the situation were nonetheless astonished that China had got out of control.14 absolutely not informed them of the time, On receiving the reports from the So- objective and plan of the bombardment.13 viet Embassy,Khrushchev immediately de- Hence the knowledge of China's intentions manded that the embassy inform Beijing that became the essential prerequisite for the China had just begun socialist construction USSR's policy decisions and the Soviet em- and was quite backward both economically bassy in China became the important source and militarily,she did not at present have the of relevant information.After the bombard- capacity to launch a modern war and carry ment the Soviet embassy immediately tele- out a landing operation on Taiwan.There was graphed the Central Committee of the Soviet no need for the whole socialist camp includ- Communist Party to say that China had sent ing the USSR to get involved in this war.To a message only after the bombardment on this Mao Zedong replied,via Foreign Ministry, 23 August and had not in any way given ad- that these islands were Chinese territory and vance notice of its intentions in this impor- their liberation was China's internal affair.5 tant military and political action.From the Because the USSR could not exactly learn beginning of the crisis till the end of 1958, what China had in mind,it decided to send 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

138 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA Summer 2005 the USSR into a difficult dilemma. Soviet policy choices at the time were based on their understanding and knowledge of China’s policy decisions and their judgments about the US response to the crisis. Their policy choices can be roughly divided into two phases. Throughout the course of the crisis the Soviet response and policy decisions were passive and cautious. In the first phase of the crisis (from the beginning of the bombardment to the end of September 1958), because the USSR did not know what China’s strategic objectives were, it announced its support for China’s actions and tried to take some concrete steps on the one hand, while on the other hand it sought through a variety of channel to as￾certain China’s intentions so as to influence and restrict China’s actions. Realizing that war might break out in the Taiwan Straits area, the Soviet military showed great cau￾tion and restraint at this stage. Although the USSR might have known in advance what action China would take, the Soviet leaders were nonetheless astonished that China had absolutely not informed them of the time, objective and plan of the bombardment. 13 Hence the knowledge of China’s intentions became the essential prerequisite for the USSR’s policy decisions and the Soviet em￾bassy in China became the important source of relevant information. After the bombard￾ment the Soviet embassy immediately tele￾graphed the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to say that China had sent a message only after the bombardment on 23 August and had not in any way given ad￾vance notice of its intentions in this impor￾tant military and political action. From the beginning of the crisis till the end of 1958, Soviet embassy sent in all 52 reports on the matter. According to these reports, the Rus￾sians believed that “It would not be entirely correct to regard the solution of the Taiwan issue … as purely a domestic affair of China. In the first stage of the development of the Taiwan conflict our Chinese friends have demonstrated a rather simplistic approach to evaluating the degree of urgency of the Tai￾wan problem and have let the possibility of aggravating the international situation emerge to keep the United States ‘on the verge of war’from their side too.”The reports also pointed out that “Our Chinese friends started to show excessive sensitivity toward the problems of sovereignty and independence of their country, and reservations about the measures that used to be taken by both coun￾tries jointly.”The Soviets obviously believed that the Chinese showed a tendency towards solvingAsian problems themselves. They did not think it necessary to consult the USSR about their planned actions, though they would expect its support when the situation got out of control. 14 On receiving the reports from the So￾viet Embassy, Khrushchev immediately de￾manded that the embassy inform Beijing that China had just begun socialist construction and was quite backward both economically and militarily, she did not at present have the capacity to launch a modern war and carry out a landing operation on Taiwan. There was no need for the whole socialist camp includ￾ing the USSR to get involved in this war. To this Mao Zedong replied, via Foreign Ministry, that these islands were Chinese territory and their liberation was China’s internal affair. 15 Because the USSR could not exactly learn what China had in mind, it decided to send

SPECIALISSUE THE COLD WARAND SINO-SOVIET RELATION 139 Gromyko to China.Before this,the Soviet U.S.used nuclear weapons,the Chinese gov- Embassy Counsellor,Sudarikov,called on ernment would move to Yanan and go on Zhou Enlai on 5 September under Khru- fighting.i8 shchev's instructions.Zhou Enlai used the After exchanging views with China, meeting to discuss China's analysis of the Khrushchev published an open letter to situations in Taiwan Straits from both the Eisenhower on 7 September in response to domestic and international perspectives,the J.F.Dulles's nuclear threat and the Newport problems between Taiwan and the US,and Declaration,appealing to US government to China's stand,tactics and the actions China exercise caution in their actions in Taiwan had taken.Zhou Enlai especially stressed that and the Taiwan Straits area and not to lightly the bombardment of the islands of Jinmen adopt measures that could result in irretriev- and Mazu did not mean that China would able consequences.In the letter he especially attempt to liberate Taiwan by force.It was stressed that any attack on the Soviet Union's just to punish Guomindang troops and pre-great friend,ally and neighbor,the People's vent the US from supporting"Two Chinas." Republic of China,would be seen as an at- China would bear the consequences and tack on Soviet Union.In Gromyko's speech would not drag the USSR in if trouble broke at the UN Assembly on 18 September and 0ut16 Khrushchev's second open letter to Eisen- On 6 September,Zhou Enlai met with hower on 19 September,the same stand was Gromyko and explained to him the Chinese again expressed. government's stand on the Taiwan Straits. At the peak of the crisis after mid- Gromyko indicated that the Central Commit- September,Zhou Enlai continuously met with tee of the Soviet Communist Party fully en- the Charge d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy dorsed China's stand and measures.Zhou in Beijing,S.F.Antonov,and informed him stated that with the strike on the offshore of the CCCPC's policy assumptions.At the islands China had considered the possibility meeting on 18 September Zhou Enlai said of the outbreak of a local war between the that China would still focus on punitive at- US and China in the area,and was prepared tacks on Jiang's troops on Jinmen and Mazu to come under heavy attack including atomic islands.The US did not want to get involved bombs and the destructions of cities.Zhou nor did China want to fight the US.But China Enlai pointed out that the USSR would not was not afraid of the expansion of the mili- need to take part in this stage even if the US tary actions on Jinmen and other islands.At used tactical nuclear weapons.Only when their talk on 28 September Zhou Enlai fur- the US used more powerful nuclear weap-ther pointed out,"Our strikes may be heavy, ons and risked expanding the war should moderate,or light.But we do not want to Russian nuclear retaliation take place.17 Ac-beat them to death in one go.Our intention cording to Gromyko's memoirs,Mao is to make things difficult for them but not Zedong expressed the same idea in talking to to make them desperate.The longer it takes, him.Mao Zedong told Gromyko that China the greater the difficulties for the US."Zhou was not afraid of the nuclear threat.If the also informed him of CCCPC's three esti- 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

SPECIAL ISSUE: THE COLD WAR AND SINO-SOVIET RELATION 139 Gromyko to China. Before this, the Soviet Embassy Counsellor, Sudarikov, called on Zhou Enlai on 5 September under Khru￾shchev’s instructions. Zhou Enlai used the meeting to discuss China’s analysis of the situations in Taiwan Straits from both the domestic and international perspectives, the problems between Taiwan and the US, and China’s stand, tactics and the actions China had taken. Zhou Enlai especially stressed that the bombardment of the islands of Jinmen and Mazu did not mean that China would attempt to liberate Taiwan by force. It was just to punish Guomindang troops and pre￾vent the US from supporting “Two Chinas.” China would bear the consequences and would not drag the USSR in if trouble broke out. 16 On 6 September, Zhou Enlai met with Gromyko and explained to him the Chinese government’s stand on the Taiwan Straits. Gromyko indicated that the Central Commit￾tee of the Soviet Communist Party fully en￾dorsed China’s stand and measures. Zhou stated that with the strike on the offshore islands China had considered the possibility of the outbreak of a local war between the US and China in the area, and was prepared to come under heavy attack including atomic bombs and the destructions of cities. Zhou Enlai pointed out that the USSR would not need to take part in this stage even if the US used tactical nuclear weapons. Only when the US used more powerful nuclear weap￾ons and risked expanding the war should Russian nuclear retaliation take place. 17 Ac￾cording to Gromyko’s memoirs, Mao Zedong expressed the same idea in talking to him. Mao Zedong told Gromyko that China was not afraid of the nuclear threat. If the U.S. used nuclear weapons, the Chinese gov￾ernment would move to Yanan and go on fighting. 18 After exchanging views with China, Khrushchev published an open letter to Eisenhower on 7 September in response to J.F.Dulles’s nuclear threat and the Newport Declaration, appealing to US government to exercise caution in their actions in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits area and not to lightly adopt measures that could result in irretriev￾able consequences. In the letter he especially stressed that any attack on the Soviet Union’s great friend, ally and neighbor, the People’s Republic of China, would be seen as an at￾tack on Soviet Union. In Gromyko’s speech at the UN Assembly on 18 September and Khrushchev’s second open letter to Eisen￾hower on 19 September, the same stand was again expressed. At the peak of the crisis after mid￾September, Zhou Enlai continuously met with the Chargéd’Affaires of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, S.F.Antonov, and informed him of the CCCPC’s policy assumptions. At the meeting on 18 September Zhou Enlai said that China would still focus on punitive at￾tacks on Jiang’s troops on Jinmen and Mazu islands. The US did not want to get involved nor did China want to fight the US. But China was not afraid of the expansion of the mili￾tary actions on Jinmen and other islands. At their talk on 28 September Zhou Enlai fur￾ther pointed out, “Our strikes may be heavy, moderate, or light. But we do not want to beat them to death in one go. Our intention is to make things difficult for them but not to make them desperate. The longer it takes, the greater the difficulties for the US.”Zhou also informed him of CCCPC’s three esti-

140 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA Summer 2005 mates on the developing situation in the Tai- extremely dissatisfied.On 27 September the wan Straits:the US might make concessions Central Committee of the Communist Party and reach a compromise with China,al- of the Soviet Union wrote to the CCCPC and though conditions for this were not mature; again emphasized the position of the Soviet or the status quo might be maintained,which government on the crisis,clearly indicating was highly probable;or the US might stick the Soviet leadership's unhappiness with the its head into the noose,though this possibil- Chinese decision.The wording of the letter ity was unlikely. sounds even rather agitated in some places: At the same time,Khrushchev had es- "Thank you for your nobility that you are pecially called in Chinese Ambassador to the ready to absorb a strike,not involving the USSR Liu Xiao and had“an important talk.” Soviet Union."But,"It would be a great ca- Khrushchev said that after discussion the lamity for the entire Socialist camp,for the Central Committee of the Communist Party Communist working class movement,if and of Soviet Union thought that the air force in when atomic bombs have begun to fall on the area should be strengthened and made the Chinese People's Republic and China has strong enough to threaten the naval forces begun to pay with the life of its sons and of the US and Jiang Jieshi.20 On receiving daughters,the Soviet Union,possessing ter- Liu Xiao's telegram,Zhou Enlai met with rible weapons which could not only stop but Peng Zhen,Peng Dehuai,Chen Yi,Huang also devastate our common enemy,would Kecheng,Zhang Wentian and air force of- allow itself not to come to your assistance. ficer Wang Binzhang and carefully discussed This would be a crime before the working the Soviet proposal.They reported the re- class,it would be a retreat from the holy of sult of the discussion to Mao Zedong in a holies of the Communism-from the teach- letter dated 23 September,stating,"We should ing of Marxism-Leninism."2 Besides, welcome Soviet support and the Soviet and Khrushchev himself wrote to Mao Zedong Chinese air forces should undertake techni- twice on 27 September and 4 October,say- cal preparations.The question of when the ing that the USSR could send the C-75 bomb- time is ripe for the T-16 fighters to enter ers carrying ground-to-air missiles to Fujian China and come under Chinese command to increase the strength of the Chinese air should be separately decided through joint defense and change the relative strategic consultations."Mao approved their proposal strength across the Straits so as to avoid war in his telegraphed reply the next day,but at To this Mao Zedong instructed,"No rushed the same time stressed that great caution reply until further discussions are held."23 should be taken in deciding the way in which Mao Zedong did not reply until 14 October, Sino-Soviet cooperation was to be realized: when he wrote to Khrushchev:We were would it be a volunteer army,a mercenary deeply moved by your unselfish contribu- army or a Soviet regular army?21 After the tion to Marxist-Leninist principles and discussion,the CCCPC refused the Soviet internationalism.On behalf of the CCCPC,I proposal. gave you our sincere thanks.But Mao Zedong The decision left the Soviet leadership stressed that,"For the ultimate victory,we 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

140 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA Summer 2005 mates on the developing situation in the Tai￾wan Straits: the US might make concessions and reach a compromise with China, al￾though conditions for this were not mature; or the status quo might be maintained, which was highly probable; or the US might stick its head into the noose, though this possibil￾ity was unlikely. 19 At the same time, Khrushchev had es￾pecially called in Chinese Ambassador to the USSR Liu Xiao and had “an important talk.” Khrushchev said that after discussion the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union thought that the air force in the area should be strengthened and made strong enough to threaten the naval forces of the US and Jiang Jieshi. 20 On receiving Liu Xiao’s telegram, Zhou Enlai met with Peng Zhen, Peng Dehuai, Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, Zhang Wentian and air force of￾ficer Wang Binzhang, and carefully discussed the Soviet proposal. They reported the re￾sult of the discussion to Mao Zedong in a letter dated 23 September, stating,“We should welcome Soviet support and the Soviet and Chinese air forces should undertake techni￾cal preparations. The question of when the time is ripe for the T-16 fighters to enter China and come under Chinese command should be separately decided through joint consultations.”Mao approved their proposal in his telegraphed reply the next day, but at the same time stressed that great caution should be taken in deciding the way in which Sino-Soviet cooperation was to be realized: would it be a volunteer army, a mercenary army or a Soviet regular army? 21 After the discussion, the CCCPC refused the Soviet proposal. The decision left the Soviet leadership extremely dissatisfied. On 27 September the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union wrote to the CCCPC and again emphasized the position of the Soviet government on the crisis, clearly indicating the Soviet leadership’s unhappiness with the Chinese decision. The wording of the letter sounds even rather agitated in some places: “Thank you for your nobility that you are ready to absorb a strike, not involving the Soviet Union.”But, “It would be a great ca￾lamity for the entire Socialist camp, for the Communist working class movement, if and when atomic bombs have begun to fall on the Chinese People’s Republic and China has begun to pay with the life of its sons and daughters, the Soviet Union, possessing ter￾rible weapons which could not only stop but also devastate our common enemy, would allow itself not to come to your assistance. This would be a crime before the working class, it would be a retreat from the holy of holies of the Communism — from the teach￾ing of Marxism-Leninism.”22 Besides, Khrushchev himself wrote to Mao Zedong twice on 27 September and 4 October, say￾ing that the USSR could send the C-75 bomb￾ers carrying ground-to-air missiles to Fujian to increase the strength of the Chinese air defense and change the relative strategic strength across the Straits so as to avoid war. To this Mao Zedong instructed, “No rushed reply until further discussions are held.”23 Mao Zedong did not reply until 14 October, when he wrote to Khrushchev: We were deeply moved by your unselfish contribu￾tion to Marxist-Leninist principles and internationalism. On behalf of the CCCPC, I gave you our sincere thanks. But Mao Zedong stressed that,“For the ultimate victory, we

SPECIALISSUE THE COLD WARAND SINO-SOVIET RELATION 141 are willing to bear the first strike and to de- Although we still need more documen- stroy imperialism,even at the expense of many tation to make clear the development of Sino- lives."At the same time Mao suggested that it Soviet relations inthe crisis,there is no doubt was best for Soviet government to supply that the crisis seriously affected the Sino- China with some field-to-air and shore-to-ship Soviet alliance.First,the crisis produced un- missiles.He also asked Soviet government to precedented difficulties in the development send technical staff to help China train the of the two countries'relations.The USSR troops equipped with these weapons.24 proposed a series of criticisms of the bom- At the later stage of the crisis,CCCPC bardment of Jinmen,blaming the CPC for changed its policy on the offshore islands. "having misjudged the intemational situation," On the basis of his analysis of the Warsaw and believing that the bombardment was"ben- talks and his judgments on U.S policies,Mao eficial only for the enemy"and dragged the Zedong came to the conclusion at the end of USSR into a serious risk of war.More September that "unfortunately it is not ap- importantly,the bombardment was"in fact propriate to adopt"the proposal to occupy in accord with the US war party's intention Jinmen After careful discussion CCCPC re- to disrupt the Soviet policy of relaxing inter- solved to leave Jinmen and Mazu in the hands national tensions.Beijing planned to use this of the Nationalist Party and solve the Tai- kind of actions to harm USSR-US relations wan problem altogether in the future.Zhou and made use of the Sino-Soviet treaty to Enlai informed the Soviet charge d'affaires expand the conflict to a military confronta- Antonov of the readjustment of and change tion in the Far East."That is why Khru- in China's policies on 5 and 14 October.25 shchev always felt dissatisfied with China's As the CCCPC understood it,Khrushchev not informing him in advance of so impor- agreed with the CPC's policies at that time. tant an action.To China,the bombardment Although to date there are no Soviet docu- of Jinmen was decided against the political ments which disclose the details of Soviet background of "opposing Khrushchev decisionmaking in the later stages of the group's ambition to control China"and crisis,two points are clear:first,Khrushchev "against the Soviet policy of indulging the continued on several occasions to express West after Khrushchev took office."26 To his support for China's actions;second, Mao Zedong,Khrushchev had sought detente Khrushchev was very dissatisfied with the with the U.S.and given up the fight against CCCPC's new policies in this period,a fact imperialism,especially the US,and hence that was clearly revealed at the Sino-Soviet could no longer be regarded as a communist meeting in October 1959 when he criticized and Marxist.The great differences between CCCPC's handling of the offshore islands China and the USSR in ideology,disclosed as "Trotskyite"at the talks. through the bombardment on Jinmen,im- plied that it was only a question of time be- The Impact upon Sino-Soviet Relations fore the two countries split.At the end of of the Bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 1959,Chinese leaders began to stress:"To criticize revisionism is our main and most C 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

SPECIAL ISSUE: THE COLD WAR AND SINO-SOVIET RELATION 141 are willing to bear the first strike and to de￾stroy imperialism, even at the expense of many lives.”At the same time Mao suggested that it was best for Soviet government to supply China with some field-to-air and shore-to-ship missiles. He also asked Soviet government to send technical staff to help China train the troops equipped with these weapons. 24 At the later stage of the crisis, CCCPC changed its policy on the offshore islands. On the basis of his analysis of the Warsaw talks and his judgments on U.S policies, Mao Zedong came to the conclusion at the end of September that “unfortunately it is not ap￾propriate to adopt”the proposal to occupy Jinmen. After careful discussion CCCPC re￾solved to leave Jinmen and Mazu in the hands of the Nationalist Party and solve the Tai￾wan problem altogether in the future. Zhou Enlai informed the Soviet chargéd’affaires Antonov of the readjustment of and change in China’s policies on 5 and 14 October. 25 As the CCCPC understood it, Khrushchev agreed with the CPC’s policies at that time. Although to date there are no Soviet docu￾ments which disclose the details of Soviet decisionmaking in the later stages of the crisis, two points are clear: first, Khrushchev continued on several occasions to express his support for China’s actions; second, Khrushchev was very dissatisfied with the CCCPC’s new policies in this period, a fact that was clearly revealed at the Sino-Soviet meeting in October 1959 when he criticized CCCPC’s handling of the offshore islands as “Trotskyite”at the talks. The Impact upon Sino-Soviet Relations of the Bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 Although we still need more documen￾tation to make clear the development of Sino￾Soviet relations in the crisis, there is no doubt that the crisis seriously affected the Sino￾Soviet alliance. First, the crisis produced un￾precedented difficulties in the development of the two countries’relations. The USSR proposed a series of criticisms of the bom￾bardment of Jinmen, blaming the CPC for “having misjudged the international situation,” and believing that the bombardment was “ben￾eficial only for the enemy”and dragged the USSR into a serious risk of war. More importantly, the bombardment was “in fact in accord with the US war party’s intention to disrupt the Soviet policy of relaxing inter￾national tensions. Beijing planned to use this kind of actions to harm USSR-US relations and made use of the Sino-Soviet treaty to expand the conflict to a military confronta￾tion in the Far East.”That is why Khru￾shchev always felt dissatisfied with China’s not informing him in advance of so impor￾tant an action. To China, the bombardment of Jinmen was decided against the political background of “opposing Khrushchev group’s ambition to control China”and “against the Soviet policy of indulging the West after Khrushchev took office.”26 To Mao Zedong, Khrushchev had sought detente with the U.S. and given up the fight against imperialism, especially the US, and hence could no longer be regarded as a communist and Marxist. The great differences between China and the USSR in ideology, disclosed through the bombardment on Jinmen, im￾plied that it was only a question of time be￾fore the two countries split. At the end of 1959, Chinese leaders began to stress: “To criticize revisionism is our main and most

142 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA Summer 2005 important task at present."27 US,Khrushchev regarded it as very danger- Secondly,the crisis deepened the dif- ous to provide China with the atomic bomb. ferences and conflicts of the two countries On 20 June 1959,the USSR officially in- with regard to the problems of Taiwan and formed China that it would stop providing the offshore islands.Although the USSR sup- China with a sample atomic bomb and tech- ported China in the crisis,it actually opposed nical documents on the production of atomic China's stand on Taiwan and the offshore bomb.The CCCPC thought this was a sig- islands.This attitude was fully evident in nificant event in Sino-Soviet relations that Khrushchev's talks with Chinese leaders showed Khrushchev might adopt new poli- during his visit to Beijing in October 1959. cies on Sino-Soviet relations involving op- He complained that the bombardment in 1958 posing China together with the West,espe- “created difficulties for the USSR,”and ex- cially the US.The Soviet action later was pressed dissatisfaction with China's policy assailed as"opposing China together with the on the Taiwan problem.He told Chinese lead- US."Therefore Khrushchev's decision to ers clearly that once the war broke out over halt nuclear technical support to China in the the Taiwan Straits the USSR would not get second Taiwan Straits crisis was actually an involved.He also suggested that in future important dimension in the Sino-Soviet split: China and the USSR exchange views on the a starting point of the struggle ofcontrol and Taiwan problem through particular channels counter-control in nuclear policy,which had so that each was aware of the other's profound influences and results stands,principles and policies.His propos- The bombardment of Jinmen was an als and views were rejected and rebutted in important event in the lead-up to the Sino- severe terms by the Chinese leadership.Mao Soviet split.Harmonious and cooperative on told him directly:How to liberate Taiwancan the surface,the two countries'significant only be decided by ourselves...You can't do differences in ideology and national interests anything so shouldn't comment.28 Because were deeply buried.The crisis further deep- of this,the Chinese leadership thought that ened the two sides'differences in ideology. the Soviet leadership's response to China's At the same time,and evenmore importantly, action on Jinmen was an obvious sign that the second Taiwan Straits crisis showed the USSR would not hesitate to sacrifice clearly that the contradictions and differ- China's sovereignty and territorial integrity ences had begun to develop from ideology for its own diplomatic interests. to national interests.It is one of the impor- Thirdly,another important result pro- tant markers of the emergence into the pub- duced by the bombardment of Jinmen was lic arena of Sino-Soviet contradictions and the Soviet leadership's decision to stop of the rapid deterioration of Sino-Soviet nuclear technical support to China.In the relations. crisis Khrushchev decided that the USSR would not supply China with a sample atomic Dai Chaowu is Professor of School of Inter- bomb and would reconsider its relations with national Studies,Nanjing University.He studies the China.Determined to seek detente with the history of Cold War and that of Sino-US relations. 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

142 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA Summer 2005 important task at present.”27 Secondly, the crisis deepened the dif￾ferences and conflicts of the two countries with regard to the problems of Taiwan and the offshore islands. Although the USSR sup￾ported China in the crisis, it actually opposed China’s stand on Taiwan and the offshore islands. This attitude was fully evident in Khrushchev’s talks with Chinese leaders during his visit to Beijing in October 1959. He complained that the bombardment in 1958 “created difficulties for the USSR,”and ex￾pressed dissatisfaction with China’s policy on the Taiwan problem. He told Chinese lead￾ers clearly that once the war broke out over the Taiwan Straits the USSR would not get involved. He also suggested that in future China and the USSR exchange views on the Taiwan problem through particular channels so that each was aware of the other’s stands, principles and policies. His propos￾als and views were rejected and rebutted in severe terms by the Chinese leadership. Mao told him directly: How to liberate Taiwan can only be decided by ourselves… You can’t do anything so shouldn’t comment. 28 Because of this, the Chinese leadership thought that the Soviet leadership’s response to China’s action on Jinmen was an obvious sign that the USSR would not hesitate to sacrifice China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity for its own diplomatic interests. Thirdly, another important result pro￾duced by the bombardment of Jinmen was the Soviet leadership’s decision to stop nuclear technical support to China. In the crisis Khrushchev decided that the USSR would not supply China with a sample atomic bomb and would reconsider its relations with China. Determined to seek détente with the US, Khrushchev regarded it as very danger￾ous to provide China with the atomic bomb. On 20 June 1959, the USSR officially in￾formed China that it would stop providing China with a sample atomic bomb and tech￾nical documents on the production of atomic bomb. The CCCPC thought this was a sig￾nificant event in Sino-Soviet relations that showed Khrushchev might adopt new poli￾cies on Sino-Soviet relations involving op￾posing China together with the West, espe￾cially the US. The Soviet action later was assailed as “opposing China together with the US.”Therefore Khrushchev’s decision to halt nuclear technical support to China in the second Taiwan Straits crisis was actually an important dimension in the Sino-Soviet split: a starting point of the struggle of control and counter-control in nuclear policy, which had profound influences and results. The bombardment of Jinmen was an important event in the lead-up to the Sino￾Soviet split. Harmonious and cooperative on the surface, the two countries’significant differences in ideology and national interests were deeply buried. The crisis further deep￾ened the two sides’differences in ideology. At the same time, and even more importantly, the second Taiwan Straits crisis showed clearly that the contradictions and differ￾ences had begun to develop from ideology to national interests. It is one of the impor￾tant markers of the emergence into the pub￾lic arena of Sino-Soviet contradictions and of the rapid deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. * DaiChaowu is Professor of School of Inter￾national Studies, Nanjing University. He studies the history of Cold War and that of Sino-US relations

SPECIALISSUE THE COLD WARAND SINO-SOVIET RELATION 143 He recently published The Age of Confrontation and no.3),and "The Development of Chinese Nuclear Crisis(Beijing:SocialSciences Academic Press,2003), Weapons and the Split of Sino-Soviet Relations" "The Conflicts at Sino-India Borders and the Re- (Dangdai Zhongguo Lishi Yanjiu,2003,nos.3,5). sponse and Policy of the USSR"(Lishi Yanjiu,2003, E-mail:dchw@public 1.ptt.js.cn. Notes 1. Party Literature Research Centre,CCCPC, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War:From Stalin to Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Found- Khrushchev,Cambridge,Mass,Harvard Uni- ing of People's Republic,vol 7,Central Party versity Press,1996,p.220. Literature Publishing House,1992 edition,pp. 13. According to recently declassified Chinese 370-371. documents.the CCCPC did not inform Russia 2.Minutes of talks between Mao Zedong and before the bombardment.Cf.A Biography of Yudin,Russian documents collected and num- Mao Zedong,vol 1,pp.855-856;for the latest bered by Shen Zhihua (henceforth referred to research on this question please see Shen as Russian documents),SD08102. Zhihua,"Did China Inform the USSR before 3.Collected Works of Mao Zedong,vol.8, the Bombardment on Jinmen in 1958?" People's Publishing House,1999,p.8. Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu,2004,no.4. 4. Collected Works ofZhang Wentian,vol.4,His- 14.TsKhSD(Storage Center for Contemporary tory of CPC Publishing House,1995,p.298. Documents of Russia),f.5,op.49,d.134, 5.Feng Xianzhi and Jin Chongji,eds.,A Biogra- Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, phy of Mao Zedong,vol.1,Central Party Lit- Inside the Kremlin's Cold War,p.223. erature Publishing House,2003,p.745. 15.TsKhSD.,f5,op.49,d.239,f5,op.49,d.131 6. Mao Zedong's speech at a meeting of the Party f.5,op.49,d.134,Vladislav Zubok and secretaries of provinces,municipalities directly Constantine Pleshakov.Inside the Kremlin 's under the central governments and autonomous Cold War,pp.221-224. regions.Cf.Yang Shangkun's Diary,vol.1, 16.TsKhSD,f.5,op.49,d.134,Vladislav Zubok Central Party Literature Publishing House, and Constantine Pleshakov,Inside the 2000,Pp.277-278 Kremlin's Cold War,pp.224-225;Party Lit- 7. Zhang Peisen,ed,Chronicles ofZhang Wentian, erature Research Centre,CCCPC,ed., voL 2,History of CPC Publishing House Press, Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1949-1976),vol.2, 2000,pp.1097-1098. Central Party Literature Publishing House, 8. See The Records of Zhou Enlai's Military 1997,p.166. Activities,vol.2,Central Party Literature Pub- 17.TsKhSD,f.5,op.49,d.133,Vladislav Zubok lishing House,2000,pp.510-511. and Constantine Pleshakov,Inside the 9. Minutes of talks between Liu Shaoqi,Deng Kremlin's Cold War,p.225 Xiaoping,Peng Zheng,Mikoyan and Kozlov, 18.Cf.Nan Shan and Nan Zhe,eds.,The Life of Russian documents,SD09880. Zhou Enlai,vol.2,Changchun:Jilin People's 10.Zhang Peisen,ed.,Chronicles ofZhang Wentian, Publishing House,1998,pp.1175-1176. vol.2,pp.1098-1099. 19.The Records ofZhou Enlai's Military Activities, 11.Collected Works of Mao Zedong,vol.8,p.20. vol2,pp.464,468-469. 12.Vkaduskav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, 20.See Liu Xiao,Eight Years in Soviet Union.His- C 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

SPECIAL ISSUE: THE COLD WAR AND SINO-SOVIET RELATION 143 1. Party Literature Research Centre, CCCPC, Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Found￾ing of People’s Republic, vol. 7, Central Party Literature Publishing House, 1992 edition, pp. 370-371. 2. Minutes of talks between Mao Zedong and Yudin, Russian documents collected and num￾bered by Shen Zhihua (henceforth referred to as Russian documents), SD08102. 3. Collected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 8, People’s Publishing House, 1999, p. 8. 4. Collected Works of Zhang Wentian, vol. 4, His￾tory of CPC Publishing House, 1995, p. 298. 5. Feng Xianzhi and Jin Chongji, eds., A Biogra￾phy of Mao Zedong, vol. 1, Central Party Lit￾erature Publishing House, 2003, p. 745. 6. Mao Zedong’s speech at a meeting of the Party secretaries of provinces, municipalities directly under the centralgovernments and autonomous regions. Cf. Yang Shangkun’s Diary, vol. 1, Central Party Literature Publishing House, 2000, pp. 277-278. 7. Zhang Peisen, ed., ChroniclesofZhang Wentian, vol. 2, History of CPC Publishing House Press, 2000, pp. 1097-1098. 8. See The Records of Zhou Enlai’s Military Activities, vol. 2, Central Party Literature Pub￾lishing House, 2000, pp. 510-511. 9. Minutes of talks between Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zheng, Mikoyan and Kozlov, Russian documents, SD09880. 10. Zhang Peisen, ed., ChroniclesofZhangWentian, vol. 2, pp. 1098-1099. 11. Collected Worksof Mao Zedong, vol. 8, p. 20. 12. Vkaduskav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’sCold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Uni￾versity Press, 1996, p. 220. 13. According to recently declassified Chinese documents, the CCCPCdid not inform Russia before the bombardment. Cf. A Biography of Mao Zedong, vol. 1, pp. 855-856; for the latest research on this question please see Shen Zhihua, “Did China Inform the USSR before th e Bombardmen t on Jinmen in 1958?” Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu, 2004, no. 4. 14. TsKhSD ( Storage Center for Contemporary Documents of Russia), f.5, op.49,d.134, Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 223. 15. TsKhSD, f.5, op.49, d.239, f.5, op.49, d.131, f.5, op.49, d.134, Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 221-224. 16. TsKhSD, f.5, op.49, d.134, Vladislav Zubok and Cons tan tin e P les hakov, In sid e the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 224-225; Party Lit￾erature Research Cen tre, CCCPC, ed ., Chroniclesof Zhou Enlai (1949-1976), vol. 2, Central Party Literature Publishing House, 1997, p. 166. 17. TsKhSD, f.5, op.49, d.133, Vladislav Zubok and Cons tan tin e P les hakov, In sid e the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 225 18. Cf. Nan Shan and Nan Zhe, eds., The Life of Zhou Enlai, vol. 2, Changchun: Jilin People’s Publishing House, 1998, pp. 1175-1176. 19. The Records ofZhou Enlai’s Military Activities, vol. 2, pp. 464, 468-469. 20. SeeLiu Xiao, Eight Years in Soviet Union, His￾Notes He recently published TheAge ofConfrontation and Crisis (Beijing:SocialSciencesAcademicPress, 2003), “The Conflicts at Sino-India Borders and the Re￾sponse and Policy of the USSR”(Lishi Yanjiu, 2003, no. 3), and “The Development of Chinese Nuclear Weapons and the Split of Sino-Soviet Relations” (Dangdai Zhongguo Lishi Yanjiu, 2003, nos. 3, 5). E-mail: dchw@public1.ptt.js.cn