上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源（相关阅读）Geneva, Bandung & Rapprochement_Sino-US Rapprochement_Yafeng Xia

China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement,January 1969-February 1972 中 Yafeng Xia estern scholars have long assumed that opposition existed in the upper levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)to the efforts by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in the late 1960s and early 1970s to reach out to the United States.'Documents and first-hand accounts published in China over the last two decades cast doubt on this argument.The new Chinese- language sources contravene the rumors that Chinese leaders were divided over the rapprochement with the United States-rumors that stem mainly from Henry Kissinger's account of the way Mao depicted Lin Biao during a meeting with Richard Nixon in February 1972. This article examines China's policymaking process vis-a-vis the United 1.During the Sino-American summit in February 1972,Mao intentionally gave this impression,tell- ing Nixon,"In our country also there is a reactionary group which is opposed to our contact with you. The result was that they got on an airplane and fled abroad."See"Memorandum of Conversation [Mao and Nixon],21 February 1972,"Box 91,National Security Council Files (NSCF),Nixon Presi- dential Materials Project(NPMP),National Archives II(NARA).Henry Kissinger wrote in his mem- oirs that Lin Biao,then Chinese defense minister and Mao's designated successor,opposed China's rapprochement with the United States.See Henry Kissinger,White House Years (Boston:Little, Brown,1979).pp.696-697.This allegation has been continually disseminated in Western writings. See,for example,Kenneth Lieberthal,"Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy,"in Harry Harding.ed. China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s(New Haven:Yale University Press,1984),p.52:John Garver, Chinas Decision for Rapprochement with the United States,1969-1971(Boulder,CO:Westview Press, 1982),pp.134-137;Robert S.Ross,"From Lin Biao to Deng Xiaoping:Elite Instability and China's U.S.Policy,"China Quarterly,No.118 (June 1989),pp.267-268;Rosemary Foot,The Practice of Power:U.S.Relations with China since 1949(Oxford,UK:Clarendon Press,1995),p.105;Robert Ross,Negotiating Cooperation:The United States and China,1969-1989(Stanford,CA:Stanford Uni- versity Press,1995),p.27;and William Bundy,A Tangled Web:The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nicon Presideney (New York:Hill and Wang,1998),pp.109,165.Most recently,James Mann,About Face:A History of America's Curious Relationship with China(New York:Alfred A.Knopf,1999),p.26; and Jeffrey Kimball,Nixons Vietnam War(Lawrence:University of Kansas Press,1998),p.261.Rob- ert Garson claimed that Mao's wife,Jiang Qing,the leader of the radicals,was against rapprochement with the United States.See Robert Garson,The United States and China since 1949(Teaneck,N]: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press,1994),p.123.In a recent,controversial biography of Mao Zedong.Jung Chang and Jon Halliday say nothing about Lin Biao's alleged role in Sino-American rapprochement.See Jung Chang and Jon Halliday,Mao:The Unknown Story (New York:Alfred A. Knopf.2005). lournal of Cold War Studies Vol.8,No.4,Fall 2006,pp.3-28 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

3 Xia China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement, January 1969–February 1972 ✣ Yafeng Xia Western scholars have long assumed that opposition existed in the upper levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to the efforts by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in the late 1960s and early 1970s to reach out to the United States.1 Documents and ªrst-hand accounts published in China over the last two decades cast doubt on this argument. The new Chinese￾language sources contravene the rumors that Chinese leaders were divided over the rapprochement with the United States—rumors that stem mainly from Henry Kissinger’s account of the way Mao depicted Lin Biao during a meeting with Richard Nixon in February 1972. This article examines China’s policymaking process vis-à-vis the United 1. During the Sino-American summit in February 1972, Mao intentionally gave this impression, tell￾ing Nixon, “In our country also there is a reactionary group which is opposed to our contact with you. The result was that they got on an airplane and ºed abroad.” See “Memorandum of Conversation [Mao and Nixon], 21 February 1972,” Box 91, National Security Council Files (NSCF), Nixon Presi￾dential Materials Project (NPMP), National Archives II (NARA). Henry Kissinger wrote in his mem￾oirs that Lin Biao, then Chinese defense minister and Mao’s designated successor, opposed China’s rapprochement with the United States. See Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 696–697. This allegation has been continually disseminated in Western writings. See, for example, Kenneth Lieberthal, “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy,” in Harry Harding, ed., China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 52; John Garver, China’s Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1969–1971 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 134–137; Robert S. Ross, “From Lin Biao to Deng Xiaoping: Elite Instability and China’s U.S. Policy,” China Quarterly, No. 118 (June 1989), pp. 267–268; Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 105; Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989 (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni￾versity Press, 1995), p. 27; and William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), pp. 109, 165. Most recently, James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p. 26; and Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), p. 261. Rob￾ert Garson claimed that Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, the leader of the radicals, was against rapprochement with the United States. See Robert Garson, The United States and China since 1949 (Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1994), p. 123. In a recent, controversial biography of Mao Zedong, Jung Chang and Jon Halliday say nothing about Lin Biao’s alleged role in Sino-American rapprochement. See Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005). Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 8, No. 4, Fall 2006, pp. 3–28 © 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Xia States during the crucial period from January 1969 to February 1972.It traces the positions of senior Chinese leaders(especially Mao,Lin,and Zhou)re- garding major events in U.S.-China relations,including the "Four Marshals Study Group";the instructions given to Lei Yang regarding the final two Sino- American ambassadorial talks;the advent of "ping-pong diplomacy;"the CCP Politburo meeting in May 1971 regarding Kissinger's secret visit in July; the rough treatment of Alexander Haig's advance team in China in January 1972;and the controversy over drafts of a joint communique during Nixon's China trip. China's Foreign Policymaking Structure under Mao: 1949-1976 Domestic politics is the"internal setting"of foreign policy.In a democratic society,domestic constraints on foreign policy include public opinion,the legislature,the media,and powerful interest groups.Under Mao's autocratic control,however,foreign policy decision-making in China was left to a small coterie of political elites.Some Western scholars have assumed that"opinion groups"in China were able to exert influence on the CCP Politburo and that factions existed within the Chinese leadership.This article challenges the "factionalism model"by focusing on China's foreign policymaking in the late 1960s and early 1970s. From the time the People's Republic of China(PRC)was founded in 1949,Mao,as the chairman of the CCP had sufficient power to set the for- eign policy agenda and guidelines on his own.He consigned Premier Zhou Enlai,who was also foreign minister,to the role of a manager overseeing day- to-day aspects of foreign affairs.The role of the five-man CCP Secretariat, and later the Standing Committee of the Politburo,was to accord legitimacy to major policy decisions made by Mao.The Politburo meetings helped him weigh the pros and cons of major foreign policy decisions and to overcome opposition and build consensus once he had made up his mind.Until the 2.Richard C.Snyder,H.W.Bruck,and Burton Sapin,"The Decision-Making Approach to the Study of International Politics,"in James N.Rosenau,ed.,International Politics and Foreign Policy:A Reader in Research and Theory (New York:Free Press,1969),p.203. 3.Andrew Nathan,"A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,"China Quarterly,No.53 (January- March 1973),p.34.Responding to Nathan's"factionalism model,"Tang Tsou argues that"Nathan's model explains only a small part of Chinese elite politics"and has a narrow focus.See Tsou,"Chinese Politics at the Top:Factionalism or Informal Politics?Balance-of-Power Politics or a Game to Win All?"China Journal,No.34 (July 1995),p.122. 4.Lu Ning.The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-Making in China.2nd ed.(Boulder,CO: Westview Press,2000),pp.161-162

States during the crucial period from January 1969 to February 1972. It traces the positions of senior Chinese leaders (especially Mao, Lin, and Zhou) re￾garding major events in U.S.-China relations, including the “Four Marshals’ Study Group”; the instructions given to Lei Yang regarding the ªnal two Sino￾American ambassadorial talks; the advent of “ping-pong diplomacy;” the CCP Politburo meeting in May 1971 regarding Kissinger’s secret visit in July; the rough treatment of Alexander Haig’s advance team in China in January 1972; and the controversy over drafts of a joint communiqué during Nixon’s China trip. China’s Foreign Policymaking Structure under Mao: 1949–1976 Domestic politics is the “internal setting” of foreign policy.2 In a democratic society, domestic constraints on foreign policy include public opinion, the legislature, the media, and powerful interest groups. Under Mao’s autocratic control, however, foreign policy decision-making in China was left to a small coterie of political elites. Some Western scholars have assumed that “opinion groups” in China were able to exert inºuence on the CCP Politburo and that factions existed within the Chinese leadership.3 This article challenges the “factionalism model” by focusing on China’s foreign policymaking in the late 1960s and early 1970s. From the time the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, Mao, as the chairman of the CCP, had sufªcient power to set the for￾eign policy agenda and guidelines on his own. He consigned Premier Zhou Enlai, who was also foreign minister, to the role of a manager overseeing day￾to-day aspects of foreign affairs. The role of the ªve-man CCP Secretariat, and later the Standing Committee of the Politburo, was to accord legitimacy to major policy decisions made by Mao. The Politburo meetings helped him weigh the pros and cons of major foreign policy decisions and to overcome opposition and build consensus once he had made up his mind.4 Until the 4 Xia 2. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, “The Decision-Making Approach to the Study of International Politics,” in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 203. 3. Andrew Nathan, “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” China Quarterly, No. 53 (January– March 1973), p. 34. Responding to Nathan’s “factionalism model,” Tang Tsou argues that “Nathan’s model explains only a small part of Chinese elite politics” and has a narrow focus. See Tsou, “Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-of-Power Politics or a Game to Win All?” China Journal, No. 34 (July 1995), p. 122. 4. Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-Making in China, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 161–162

China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement Cultural Revolution in 1966,"Mao alone received Foreign Ministry options papers from Zhou Enlai for decision,with information copies to Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping,and Peng Zhen."5 This procedure was temporarily inter- rupted during the early period of the Cultural Revolution,especially from May to August 1967.5 Mao and Zhou,however,were able to resume full con- trol of foreign policy decision-making after August 1967. Because interest groups,the media,and public opinion in China had no independent influence on foreign policy during the Maoist era(1949-1976), analysis of China's elite politics is crucial in understanding how policy was made during that time.The elite is a collectivity"having a separate identity, internal structure,and elevated status based upon its special role in the deci- sion-making and enforcing process.During the Maoist decades,China's po- litical elite consisted of the key CCB state,and military leaders,and China's foreign policy political elite included Mao,Lin,Zhou,and other Politburo members.This article analyses the positions and interactions of these key figures in the making of China's policy toward the United States from 1969 to 1972. Four Marshals'Study Group Since 1965,China and the Soviet Union had continually expanded their mili- tary forces along their shared border.Tensions between the two countries in- creased further during the Cultural Revolution,and by 1968-1969 each side had amassed several hundred thousand troops along the border.In early 1968,Sino-Soviet conflict erupted around Qilixin Island,on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri River,a prelude to large-scale armed 5.Carol Lee Hamrin,"Elite Politics and Foreign Relations,"in Thomas W.Robinson and David Shambaugh,eds.,Chinese Foreign Policy:Theory and Practice(Oxford,UK:Clarendon Press,1994), P.83. 6.From May to August 1967,the Foreign Ministry did not function normally because of the assault from the"rebel faction."All leading cadres,including Foreign Minister Chen Yi,were under fire and not allowed to work.China's relations with many countries deteriorated.The office of the British charge d'affaires in Beijing was set on fire by the "rebel faction"on 22 August 1967.After this inci- dent,Zhou Enlai,with Mao's support,regained control over foreign affairs.For a Chinese version of this period,see Jin Ge,"Zai waijiaobu 'duoquan'qianhou"[The Beginning and End of"Seizing Power"in the Foreign Ministry],in An Jianshe,ed.,Zhou Enlai de zuihou suiyue,1966-1976 [Zhou Enlai's Final Years,1966-1976](Beijing:Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe,1995),pp.207-243. 7.Robert A.Scalapino,"Introduction,"in Robert A.Scalapino,ed.,Elites in the Peoples Republic of China(Seattle:University of Washington Press,1972),p.vi. 8.Avery Goldstein,"Trends in the Study of Political Elites and Institutions in the PRC,"China Quar- terly.No.139 (September 1994),p.714

Cultural Revolution in 1966, “Mao alone received Foreign Ministry options papers from Zhou Enlai for decision, with information copies to Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Zhen.”5 This procedure was temporarily inter￾rupted during the early period of the Cultural Revolution, especially from May to August 1967.6 Mao and Zhou, however, were able to resume full con￾trol of foreign policy decision-making after August 1967. Because interest groups, the media, and public opinion in China had no independent inºuence on foreign policy during the Maoist era (1949–1976), analysis of China’s elite politics is crucial in understanding how policy was made during that time. The elite is a collectivity “having a separate identity, internal structure, and elevated status based upon its special role in the deci￾sion-making and enforcing process.”7 During the Maoist decades, China’s po￾litical elite consisted of the key CCP, state, and military leaders,8 and China’s foreign policy political elite included Mao, Lin, Zhou, and other Politburo members. This article analyses the positions and interactions of these key ªgures in the making of China’s policy toward the United States from 1969 to 1972. Four Marshals’ Study Group Since 1965, China and the Soviet Union had continually expanded their mili￾tary forces along their shared border. Tensions between the two countries in￾creased further during the Cultural Revolution, and by 1968–1969 each side had amassed several hundred thousand troops along the border. In early 1968, Sino-Soviet conºict erupted around Qilixin Island, on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri River, a prelude to large-scale armed 5 China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement 5. Carol Lee Hamrin, “Elite Politics and Foreign Relations,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 83. 6. From May to August 1967, the Foreign Ministry did not function normally because of the assault from the “rebel faction.” All leading cadres, including Foreign Minister Chen Yi, were under ªre and not allowed to work. China’s relations with many countries deteriorated. The ofªce of the British chargé d’affaires in Beijing was set on ªre by the “rebel faction” on 22 August 1967. After this inci￾dent, Zhou Enlai, with Mao’s support, regained control over foreign affairs. For a Chinese version of this period, see Jin Ge, “Zai waijiaobu ‘duoquan’ qianhou” [The Beginning and End of “Seizing Power” in the Foreign Ministry], in An Jianshe, ed., Zhou Enlai de zuihou suiyue, 1966–1976 [Zhou Enlai’s Final Years, 1966–1976] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1995), pp. 207–243. 7. Robert A. Scalapino, “Introduction,” in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People’s Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. vi. 8. Avery Goldstein, “Trends in the Study of Political Elites and Institutions in the PRC,” China Quar￾terly, No. 139 (September 1994), p. 714

Xia conflicts the following year.The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 heightened Chinese leaders'concern about Soviet intentions. When intense armed conflicts between Chinese and Soviet border forces broke out in March 1969 on Zhenbao Island (called Damansky Island in Russian)near the bank of the Ussuri River,China's security situation dramati- cally worsened.Soon border conflicts spread to other areas as tension in- creased along the entire length of the border.These incidents brought China and the Soviet Union to the brink of a major military confrontation. Kissinger claims that Soviet leaders even considered conducting a preemptive nuclear strike against their former Communist ally.It is not surprising that Mao and his colleagues felt compelled to respond to the Soviet Union by em- barking on major changes in China's foreign and security strategy. After the Ninth CCP Congress in April 1969,the most radical phase of the Cultural Revolution was over.Chinese ambassadors,who were recalled at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution,returned to their posts one by one, and Chinese diplomacy gradually returned to normality.The stabilization of Chinese politics was favorable to the improvement of Sino-American rela- tions.Even before the Ninth Party Congress,Zhou Enlai had been giving Mao articles about notable developments in international affairs,important commentaries,and possible Chinese responses.This was an oft-employed technique by Zhou when important policies were under consideration,inso- far it allowed him to exert discreet influence on Mao's decision-making. In mid-May,Zhou Enlai at Mao's behest asked four veteran marshals- Chen Yi,Ye Jianying,Xu Xiangqian,and Nie Rongzhen-to "pay attention to"international affairs.He urged them to meet "two to three times a month" to discuss "important issues"of international security and to provide the CCP Central Committee(CC)with their suggestions.3 Zhou told the marshals 9.Yang Kuisong,"Cong Zhenbaodao Zhizhan dao Huanhe Zhong Mei Guanxi"[From the Battle at the Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement],Dangshiyanjin ziliao [Materials on Party His- tory Research],No.12 (1997),pp.7-8;and Xu Yan,"1969 Nian Zhong Su bianjie chongtu"[The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict of 1969],Dangshi yanjiu ziliao,No.5(1994),pp.6-10. 10.Kissinger claimed in his memoirs that in August 1969 a Soviet diplomat in Washington inquired "what the U.S.reaction would be to a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities."See Kissinger,White House Years,p.183;and discussions in Yang,"Cong Zhenbaodao Zhizhan dao Huanhe Zhong Mei Guanxi,"p.12.Later that year the Western press also reported rumors of Soviet plans to strike at Chi- nese nuclear bases.Whether these overtures reflected actual planning or were merely part of a disinfor- mation campaign to exert psychological pressure on Chinese leaders is uncertain. 11.All Chinese ambassadors except Huang Hua in Egypt were called back to take part in the Cultural Revolution. 12.Gao Wenqian,Wannian Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai's Later Years](Hong Kong:Mirror Books,2003), p.407. 13.Xiong Xianghui,Wo de gingbao yu waijiao shengya [My Carcer in Intelligence and Diplomacyl (Beijing:Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe,1999),p.166.Because Xiong was assistant to the Four 6

conºicts the following year.9 The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 heightened Chinese leaders’ concern about Soviet intentions. When intense armed conºicts between Chinese and Soviet border forces broke out in March 1969 on Zhenbao Island (called Damansky Island in Russian) near the bank of the Ussuri River, China’s security situation dramati￾cally worsened. Soon border conºicts spread to other areas as tension in￾creased along the entire length of the border. These incidents brought China and the Soviet Union to the brink of a major military confrontation. Kissinger claims that Soviet leaders even considered conducting a preemptive nuclear strike against their former Communist ally.10 It is not surprising that Mao and his colleagues felt compelled to respond to the Soviet Union by em￾barking on major changes in China’s foreign and security strategy. After the Ninth CCP Congress in April 1969, the most radical phase of the Cultural Revolution was over. Chinese ambassadors, who were recalled at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, returned to their posts one by one, and Chinese diplomacy gradually returned to normality.11 The stabilization of Chinese politics was favorable to the improvement of Sino-American rela￾tions. Even before the Ninth Party Congress, Zhou Enlai had been giving Mao articles about notable developments in international affairs, important commentaries, and possible Chinese responses. This was an oft-employed technique by Zhou when important policies were under consideration, inso￾far it allowed him to exert discreet inºuence on Mao’s decision-making.12 In mid-May, Zhou Enlai at Mao’s behest asked four veteran marshals— Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen—to “pay attention to” international affairs. He urged them to meet “two to three times a month” to discuss “important issues” of international security and to provide the CCP Central Committee (CC) with their suggestions.13 Zhou told the marshals 6 Xia 9. Yang Kuisong, “Cong Zhenbaodao Zhizhan dao Huanhe Zhong Mei Guanxi” [From the Battle at the Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement], Dangshi yanjiu ziliao [Materials on Party His￾tory Research], No. 12 (1997), pp. 7–8; and Xu Yan, “1969 Nian Zhong Su bianjie chongtu” [The Sino-Soviet Border Conºict of 1969], Dangshi yanjiu ziliao, No. 5 (1994), pp. 6–10. 10. Kissinger claimed in his memoirs that in August 1969 a Soviet diplomat in Washington inquired “what the U.S. reaction would be to a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities.” See Kissinger, White House Years, p. 183; and discussions in Yang, “Cong Zhenbaodao Zhizhan dao Huanhe Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 12. Later that year the Western press also reported rumors of Soviet plans to strike at Chi￾nese nuclear bases. Whether these overtures reºected actual planning or were merely part of a disinfor￾mation campaign to exert psychological pressure on Chinese leaders is uncertain. 11. All Chinese ambassadors except Huang Hua in Egypt were called back to take part in the Cultural Revolution. 12. Gao Wenqian, Wannian Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai’s Later Years] (Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 2003), p. 407. 13. Xiong Xianghui, Wo de qingbao yu waijiao shengya [My Career in Intelligence and Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1999), p. 166. Because Xiong was assistant to the Four

China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement not to be"restricted by any established frame of reference."They should help Mao"gain an understanding of new strategic developments"in the world. Zhou stressed that Mao had assigned them the task because they were mar- shals with a good deal of military experience and clear strategic vision.Pre- sumably,they would have a much better grasp of China's position in the changing world situation.Only Mao,Zhou,the four marshals,and their two assistants-Xiong Xianghui,a high-ranking intelligence and foreign service officer;and Yao Guang,the director-general of the Foreign Ministry's Depart- ment of European and American Affairs-knew about the study group. Another major border clash,much larger than the two at Zhenbao Island in March,broke out between Chinese and Soviet garrisons in Xinjiang on 13 August.Chinese leaders warned that Moscow was preparing to launch a ma- jor war.The situation deteriorated rapidly in subsequent weeks.On 27 Au- gust,the CCP Central Committee and Central Military Commission issued an urgent order to set up a new "National Leading Group for the People's Air Defense,"with Zhou Enlai as the head,assigning to it the task of immediately organizing the large-scale evacuation of people and major industries from the big cities.6 On 28 August,the CCP Central Committee ordered a military mobilization in the provinces and regions bordering the Soviet Union and Mongolia.17 Although the Four Marshals'Study Group believed that the Soviet Union would probably not wage an all-out war against China,they emphasized the need for Beijing to be prepared for a worst-case scenario.Chen Yi and Ye Jianying contended that in order for China to be ready for a major confronta- tion with the Soviet Union,"the card of the United States"should be played. In a written report,"Our Views about the Current Situation,"completed on 17 September,they pointed out that although Moscow was intending to Marshals'Study Group,his account is more reliable than other Chinese sources.The marshals'first meeting was on 7 June 1969.According to Chinese scholar Wang Yongqin,Mao first instructed the four marshals on 19 February to study the international situation.He again asked them on 22 March and 19 April to survey the international scene.See Wang Yongqin,"1966-1976 Nian Zhong Mei Su guanxi jishi,lianzai 1"[Chronicle of Sino-American-Soviet Relations,1966-1976,Part I],Dangdai Zhongguashiyanjiu [Contemporary China History Studies],No.4(1997),pp.118-119,121. 14.Xiong,Wo de qingbao yu waijiao shengya,pp.166-167. 15.Xu,"1969 Nian Zhong Su bianjie chongtu,"p.10;and Yang,"Cong Zhenbaodao Zhizhan dao Huanhe Zhong Mei Guanxi,"pp.11-19. 16.CCP Central Committee and Administrative Group of the Central Military Commission,"Re- port on Measures Needed to Be Taken to Enhance Air Defense,"27 August 1969,Chinese Central Archives:quoted in Yang Kuisong."The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969:From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,"Cold War Histor.Vol.1.No.1 (August 2000),pp.36-37. 17.See"The CCP Central Committee's Order for General Mobilization in Border Provinces and Re- gions,"28 August 1969,Cold War International History Project Bulletin.Issue No.11 (Winter 1998), Pp.168-169

not to be “restricted by any established frame of reference.” They should help Mao “gain an understanding of new strategic developments” in the world. Zhou stressed that Mao had assigned them the task because they were mar￾shals with a good deal of military experience and clear strategic vision. Pre￾sumably, they would have a much better grasp of China’s position in the changing world situation. Only Mao, Zhou, the four marshals, and their two assistants—Xiong Xianghui, a high-ranking intelligence and foreign service ofªcer; and Yao Guang, the director-general of the Foreign Ministry’s Depart￾ment of European and American Affairs—knew about the study group.14 Another major border clash, much larger than the two at Zhenbao Island in March, broke out between Chinese and Soviet garrisons in Xinjiang on 13 August.15 Chinese leaders warned that Moscow was preparing to launch a ma￾jor war. The situation deteriorated rapidly in subsequent weeks. On 27 Au￾gust, the CCP Central Committee and Central Military Commission issued an urgent order to set up a new “National Leading Group for the People’s Air Defense,” with Zhou Enlai as the head, assigning to it the task of immediately organizing the large-scale evacuation of people and major industries from the big cities.16 On 28 August, the CCP Central Committee ordered a military mobilization in the provinces and regions bordering the Soviet Union and Mongolia.17 Although the Four Marshals’ Study Group believed that the Soviet Union would probably not wage an all-out war against China, they emphasized the need for Beijing to be prepared for a worst-case scenario. Chen Yi and Ye Jianying contended that in order for China to be ready for a major confronta￾tion with the Soviet Union, “the card of the United States” should be played. In a written report, “Our Views about the Current Situation,” completed on 17 September, they pointed out that although Moscow was intending to 7 China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement Marshals’ Study Group, his account is more reliable than other Chinese sources. The marshals’ ªrst meeting was on 7 June 1969. According to Chinese scholar Wang Yongqin, Mao ªrst instructed the four marshals on 19 February to study the international situation. He again asked them on 22 March and 19 April to survey the international scene. See Wang Yongqin, “1966–1976 Nian Zhong Mei Su guanxi jishi, lianzai 1” [Chronicle of Sino-American-Soviet Relations, 1966–1976, Part I], Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjiu [Contemporary China History Studies], No. 4 (1997), pp. 118–119, 121. 14. Xiong, Wo de qingbao yu waijiao shengya, pp. 166–167. 15. Xu, “1969 Nian Zhong Su bianjie chongtu,” p. 10; and Yang, “Cong Zhenbaodao Zhizhan dao Huanhe Zhong Mei Guanxi,” pp. 11–19. 16. CCP Central Committee and Administrative Group of the Central Military Commission, “Re￾port on Measures Needed to Be Taken to Enhance Air Defense,” 27 August 1969, Chinese Central Archives: quoted in Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History, Vol. 1, No. 1 (August 2000), pp. 36–37. 17. See “The CCP Central Committee’s Order for General Mobilization in Border Provinces and Re￾gions,” 28 August 1969, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue No. 11 (Winter 1998), pp. 168–169

Xia "wage war against China"and had actually deployed forces for this purpose, the Soviet Politburo was unable to reach a final decision"because of political considerations.The marshals proposed that,in addition to waging"a tit-for- tat struggle against both the United States and the Soviet Union,"China should use "negotiation as a means of struggle against them."Perhaps the Sino-American ambassadorial talks should be resumed "when the timing is proper."1s The report by the Four Marshals'Study Group provided Chinese leaders with a strategic assessment that emphasized the benefits of improving Sino- American relations.As subsequent developments revealed,the marshals're- ports to Mao and Zhou was the catalyst for important decisions regarding the United States,paving the way for the Sino-American rapprochement.During the heyday of the Cultural Revolution,Mao's power was unchallengeable,but he had to take into consideration potential opposition from the "ultra- leftists,"many of whom would have had difficulty understanding an abrupt change in policy toward the United States.There is no evidence,however, that Lin Biao,Mao's second in command,was informed or aware of the mar- shals'assignment.The marshals themselves,in their memoirs or biographies, gave no indication that they had ever consulted in any fashion with Lin Biao about Sino-American relations.20 The war scare gave Chinese leaders sufficient incentive,both strategically and psychologically,to reconsider their long-standing confrontation with the United States.The perception of an extremely grave threat from the Soviet Union pushed Mao Zedong to break with the existing conceptual frame- work of Chinese policy."The catch was how to establish a communication channel. 18.Xiong,Wo de qingbao yu waijiao shengya,pp.184-186. 19.Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,p.408. 20.Xu Xiangqian,Lishi de buigu [Reflections on Historyl.3 vols.(Beijing:Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1987),3:p.848;and"Dangdai Zhongguo Renwu Zhuanji"Congshu Bianjibu [Editorial Board of Biographical Series of Contemporary Chinese Figures],Chen yihn [Biography of Chen Yi] (Beijing:Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe,1991),pp.614-615. 21.The historian Chen Jian contends that the geopolitics-centered interpretation alone does not fully reveal the complicated reasons for Mao's decision to improve relations with the United States.To achieve a better understanding of the issue,he places the Sino-American rapprochement in the context of the fading status of Mao's continuous revolution.Chen points out that the Sino-American rap- prochement came at a time when the Cultural Revolution and the more general enterprise of Mao's continuous revolution had been declining.See Chen Jian,Maos China and the Cold War(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,2001),p.239.My own view is that multiple factors,includ- ing the decade-long Sino-American ambassadorial talks,China's nuclear arsenal,the U.S.quagmire in Vietnam,and Nixon's personality contributed to the U.S.-China rapprochement. 8

“wage war against China” and had actually deployed forces for this purpose, the Soviet Politburo was unable “to reach a ªnal decision” because of political considerations. The marshals proposed that, in addition to waging “a tit-for￾tat struggle against both the United States and the Soviet Union,” China should use “negotiation as a means of struggle against them.” Perhaps the Sino-American ambassadorial talks should be resumed “when the timing is proper.”18 The report by the Four Marshals’ Study Group provided Chinese leaders with a strategic assessment that emphasized the beneªts of improving Sino￾American relations. As subsequent developments revealed, the marshals’ re￾ports to Mao and Zhou was the catalyst for important decisions regarding the United States, paving the way for the Sino-American rapprochement. During the heyday of the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s power was unchallengeable, but he had to take into consideration potential opposition from the “ultra￾leftists,” many of whom would have had difªculty understanding an abrupt change in policy toward the United States.19 There is no evidence, however, that Lin Biao, Mao’s second in command, was informed or aware of the mar￾shals’ assignment. The marshals themselves, in their memoirs or biographies, gave no indication that they had ever consulted in any fashion with Lin Biao about Sino-American relations.20 The war scare gave Chinese leaders sufªcient incentive, both strategically and psychologically, to reconsider their long-standing confrontation with the United States. The perception of an extremely grave threat from the Soviet Union pushed Mao Zedong to break with the existing conceptual frame￾work of Chinese policy.21 The catch was how to establish a communication channel. 8 Xia 18. Xiong, Wo de qingbao yu waijiao shengya, pp. 184–186. 19. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, p. 408. 20. Xu Xiangqian, Lishi de huigu [Reºections on History], 3 vols. (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1987), 3: p. 848; and “Dangdai Zhongguo Renwu Zhuanji” Congshu Bianjibu [Editorial Board of Biographical Series of Contemporary Chinese Figures], Chen Yi zhuan [Biography of Chen Yi] (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1991), pp. 614–615. 21. The historian Chen Jian contends that the geopolitics-centered interpretation alone does not fully reveal the complicated reasons for Mao’s decision to improve relations with the United States. To achieve a better understanding of the issue, he places the Sino-American rapprochement in the context of the fading status of Mao’s continuous revolution. Chen points out that the Sino-American rap￾prochement came at a time when the Cultural Revolution and the more general enterprise of Mao’s continuous revolution had been declining. See Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 239. My own view is that multiple factors, includ￾ing the decade-long Sino-American ambassadorial talks, China’s nuclear arsenal, the U.S. quagmire in Vietnam, and Nixon’s personality contributed to the U.S.-China rapprochement

China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement The Resumption of the Warsaw channel In September 1969,Soviet leaders attempted to hold a summit meeting with their Chinese counterparts in order to relax the tension that had been build- ing since March.After some complications,Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin was able to meet with his Chinese counterpart,Zhou Enlai,at Beijing airport on 11 September.22 Mao had several reasons for agreeing to these talks.He was interested in mitigating the tension with the USSR after the two costly border clashes and was seeking to avoid a two-front war (against both the Soviet Union and the United States).He also wanted to re- duce any chance of Soviet-American collusion.Zhou sought to use the occa- sion to provoke U.S.interest in a possible Sino-American rapprochement.To this end,Zhou tried hard to avoid“closeness”and“friendliness”with Kosygin,lest he send the wrong signals to Washington.The subsequent Sino- Soviet border negotiations at the level of deputy foreign ministers gave the United States another impetus to improve relations with the PRC.23 The Chinese strategy seemed to work well.U.S.officials began to rethink their policy toward China.In late 1969 and early 1970,the Nixon adminis- tration made several attempts to establish direct talks with China.During the summer senior U.S.officials had been in secret contact with the Chinese through the Pakistanis and Romanians.2 To supplement these indirect chan- 22.Western journalists suspected that Kosygin planned to meet with Zhou Enlai at Ho Chi Minh's fu- neral in early September 1969.Zhou led a Chinese delegation to the funeral,arriving on 4 September and leaving the same day.Chinese spokesmen denied that Zhou had deliberately avoided a meeting with Kosygin,though the snub was obvious.After arriving in Hanoi on 6 September,Kosygin with help from the Chinese embassy proposed to meet with Zhou in Beijing en route to Moscow.However, Kosygin did not hear back until 11 September,by which time he was already in Dushanbe,the capital of Soviet Tajikistan.See Jin Chongji,ed.,Zhou Enlai zhuan,1949-1976 [A Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1949-1976],2 vols.(Beijing:Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe,1998),pp.1083-1084;and Wang Taiping,ed.,Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi,1957-1969 [A Diplomatic History of the Peo- ple's Republic of China,1957-1969](Beijing:Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe,1998),pp.274-276. 23.Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,p.411.The Sino-Soviet border negotiations,which started on 20 Oc- tober 1969,continued with a few interruptions until the late 1980s.Chinese leaders tried to give the impression that if the United States remained uncompromising in negotiation with the PRC,a break- through might occur in Sino-Soviet relations.See Alexei Elizavetin,"Kosygin-Zhou Talks at Beijing Airport,"Far Eastern Affairs,Nos.1-3 (1993),pp.52-54. 24.During an around-the-world trip in August 1969,Nixon informed Romanian and Pakistani lead- ers that he was interested in improving relations with the PRC.In the late summer and fall of that year,Pakistani president Yahya Khan offered to play an active role in the quest.The Pakistani channel gave Nixon and Kissinger a secret avenue for communication that bypassed the State Department.In December,the Pakistani ambassador to the United States,Agha Hilaly,transmitted the first direct message from the PRC.Hilaly reported that Chinese leaders had released two detained Americans and were willing to resume the Warsaw talks without preconditions.Kissinger replied that the United States was interested in improving relations.See Steven Phillips,"Nixon's China Initiative,1969- 1972,"in U.S.Department of State,Documenting Diplomacy in the 2Ist Century (Washington D.C.: U.S.Government Printing Office,2001),p.135

The Resumption of the Warsaw Channel In September 1969, Soviet leaders attempted to hold a summit meeting with their Chinese counterparts in order to relax the tension that had been build￾ing since March. After some complications, Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin was able to meet with his Chinese counterpart, Zhou Enlai, at Beijing airport on 11 September.22 Mao had several reasons for agreeing to these talks. He was interested in mitigating the tension with the USSR after the two costly border clashes and was seeking to avoid a two-front war (against both the Soviet Union and the United States). He also wanted to re￾duce any chance of Soviet-American collusion. Zhou sought to use the occa￾sion to provoke U.S. interest in a possible Sino-American rapprochement. To this end, Zhou tried hard to avoid “closeness” and “friendliness” with Kosygin, lest he send the wrong signals to Washington. The subsequent Sino￾Soviet border negotiations at the level of deputy foreign ministers gave the United States another impetus to improve relations with the PRC.23 The Chinese strategy seemed to work well. U.S. ofªcials began to rethink their policy toward China. In late 1969 and early 1970, the Nixon adminis￾tration made several attempts to establish direct talks with China. During the summer senior U.S. ofªcials had been in secret contact with the Chinese through the Pakistanis and Romanians.24 To supplement these indirect chan- 9 China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement 22. Western journalists suspected that Kosygin planned to meet with Zhou Enlai at Ho Chi Minh’s fu￾neral in early September 1969. Zhou led a Chinese delegation to the funeral, arriving on 4 September and leaving the same day. Chinese spokesmen denied that Zhou had deliberately avoided a meeting with Kosygin, though the snub was obvious. After arriving in Hanoi on 6 September, Kosygin with help from the Chinese embassy proposed to meet with Zhou in Beijing en route to Moscow. However, Kosygin did not hear back until 11 September, by which time he was already in Dushanbe, the capital of Soviet Tajikistan. See Jin Chongji, ed., Zhou Enlai zhuan, 1949–1976 [A Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976], 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1998), pp. 1083–1084; and Wang Taiping, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1957–1969 [A Diplomatic History of the Peo￾ple’s Republic of China, 1957–1969] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1998), pp. 274–276. 23. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, p. 411.The Sino-Soviet border negotiations, which started on 20 Oc￾tober 1969, continued with a few interruptions until the late 1980s. Chinese leaders tried to give the impression that if the United States remained uncompromising in negotiation with the PRC, a break￾through might occur in Sino-Soviet relations. See Alexei Elizavetin, “Kosygin-Zhou Talks at Beijing Airport,” Far Eastern Affairs, Nos. 1–3 (1993), pp. 52–54. 24. During an around-the-world trip in August 1969, Nixon informed Romanian and Pakistani lead￾ers that he was interested in improving relations with the PRC. In the late summer and fall of that year, Pakistani president Yahya Khan offered to play an active role in the quest. The Pakistani channel gave Nixon and Kissinger a secret avenue for communication that bypassed the State Department. In December, the Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Agha Hilaly, transmitted the ªrst direct message from the PRC. Hilaly reported that Chinese leaders had released two detained Americans and were willing to resume the Warsaw talks without preconditions. Kissinger replied that the United States was interested in improving relations. See Steven Phillips, “Nixon’s China Initiative, 1969– 1972,” in U.S. Department of State, Documenting Diplomacy in the 21st Century (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofªce, 2001), p. 135

Xia nels,Nixon and Kissinger decided to reopen the long-suspended U.S.-China ambassadorial talks in Warsaw.25 In September 1969 they ordered Walter Stoessel,the U.S.ambassador to Poland,to contact his Chinese counterpart for a new meeting.To Kissinger's irritation,it took almost three months be- fore Stoessel could approach Chinese diplomats in Warsaw.Kissinger was ex- ploring possible paths for an earlier meeting when U.S.intelligence learned of a secret directive issued by Zhou Enlai to Chinese embassies in November calling for greater diplomatic flexibility to protect China from the Soviet Union.Zhou declared that the PRC's "flexible tactics"would include a re- sumption of talks with Washington to keep Moscow off balance and exacer- bate U.S.-Soviet tensions.Meanwhile,for domestic political consumption, Zhou stated that Beijing would not abandon its"revolutionary principles," the first of many times over the next few years that Chinese leaders made this pledge. Stoessel acted in an unusual fashion when,on 3 December,he spotted Chinese diplomats at a Yugoslav fashion show at Warsaw's Palace of Culture and followed them outside the building afterward.The Chinese diplomats, caught off guard,quickly fled.Stoessel ran after them and was able to catch the Chinese interpreter,telling him in"broken Polish"that he had an impor- tant message for the Chinese embassy.27 The Chinese embassy sent a report to Beijing about the U.S.ambassa- dor's "unusual behavior,"and it was conveyed to Zhou Enlai.Up to this point,Mao and Zhou had regarded Nixon's probing as only exploratory.But 25.China and the United States had originally agreed to hold the 135th session of the ambassadorial talks on 20 February 1969. 26.U.S.Central Intelligence Agency,Intelligence Memorandum,"Signs of Life in Chinese Foreign Policy,"11 April 1970,copy at National Security Archive:quoted in William Burr,"Sino-American Relations,1969:Sino-Soviet Border Conflict and Steps toward Rapprochement,"Cold War History Vol.1,No.3(April 2001),p.97. 27.Xue Mouhong,ed.,Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy](Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe,1990),p.219.See also Stoessel to Secretary of State,3 Decem- ber 1969,pp.23-28,POL-US,Subject-Numeric Files,1967-1969.Record Group(RG)59,NARA. In the telegram Stoessel mistakenly said that the Chinese diplomat he tried to approach was Lei Yang. the Chinese charge d'affaires to Poland.Actually,it was Li Juqing,the Chinese embassy's second secre- tary,and the interpreter was Jing Zhicheng.See Luo Yisu,"Zai Bolan de suiyue"[My Years in Poland], in Wang Taiping,ed.,Dangdai Zhongguo shijie waijiao shengya [Diplomatic Careers of Contemporary Chinese Envoys](Beijing:Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe,1996),pp.179-180;and Zong Daoyi,"Xin Zhongguo waijiaoshi ruogan shishi kaoding"[Textual Research into Some Facts of Chinese Diplo- matic Historyl,Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjin,No.6,(1997),pp.103-109.Kissinger was dissatisfied with Stoessel's delay in establishing contact and sent three cables warning him that "either you do it or we will get someone who will."Stoessel claimed that he was unable to approach Chinese officials pri- vately at any party or diplomatic reception that fall and winter.See Seymour M.Hersh,The Price of Power:Kisinger in the White House (New York:Summit Books,1983),p.359.It is not clear why the United States did not contact Beijing through the extant channel between the Chinese and U.S.em- bassy second secretaries in Warsaw.One possibility is that the second-secretary-level contact was only for routine issues,and the Chinese did not regard the channel as important. 10

nels, Nixon and Kissinger decided to reopen the long-suspended U.S.-China ambassadorial talks in Warsaw.25 In September 1969 they ordered Walter Stoessel, the U.S. ambassador to Poland, to contact his Chinese counterpart for a new meeting. To Kissinger’s irritation, it took almost three months be￾fore Stoessel could approach Chinese diplomats in Warsaw. Kissinger was ex￾ploring possible paths for an earlier meeting when U.S. intelligence learned of a secret directive issued by Zhou Enlai to Chinese embassies in November calling for greater diplomatic ºexibility to protect China from the Soviet Union. Zhou declared that the PRC’s “ºexible tactics” would include a re￾sumption of talks with Washington to keep Moscow off balance and exacer￾bate U.S.-Soviet tensions. Meanwhile, for domestic political consumption, Zhou stated that Beijing would not abandon its “revolutionary principles,” the ªrst of many times over the next few years that Chinese leaders made this pledge.26 Stoessel acted in an unusual fashion when, on 3 December, he spotted Chinese diplomats at a Yugoslav fashion show at Warsaw’s Palace of Culture and followed them outside the building afterward. The Chinese diplomats, caught off guard, quickly ºed. Stoessel ran after them and was able to catch the Chinese interpreter, telling him in “broken Polish” that he had an impor￾tant message for the Chinese embassy.27 The Chinese embassy sent a report to Beijing about the U.S. ambassa￾dor’s “unusual behavior,” and it was conveyed to Zhou Enlai. Up to this point, Mao and Zhou had regarded Nixon’s probing as only exploratory. But 10 Xia 25. China and the United States had originally agreed to hold the 135th session of the ambassadorial talks on 20 February 1969. 26. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum, “Signs of Life in Chinese Foreign Policy,” 11 April 1970, copy at National Security Archive: quoted in William Burr, “Sino-American Relations, 1969: Sino-Soviet Border Conºict and Steps toward Rapprochement,” Cold War History, Vol. 1, No. 3 (April 2001), p. 97. 27. Xue Mouhong, ed., Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1990), p. 219. See also Stoessel to Secretary of State, 3 Decem￾ber 1969, pp. 23–28, POL-US, Subject-Numeric Files, 1967–1969, Record Group (RG) 59, NARA. In the telegram Stoessel mistakenly said that the Chinese diplomat he tried to approach was Lei Yang, the Chinese chargé d’affaires to Poland. Actually, it was Li Juqing, the Chinese embassy’s second secre￾tary, and the interpreter was Jing Zhicheng. See Luo Yisu, “Zai Bolan de suiyue” [My Years in Poland], in Wang Taiping, ed., Dangdai Zhongguo shijie waijiao shengya [Diplomatic Careers of Contemporary Chinese Envoys] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1996), pp. 179–180; and Zong Daoyi, “Xin Zhongguo waijiaoshi ruogan shishi kaoding” [Textual Research into Some Facts of Chinese Diplo￾matic History], Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjiu, No. 6, (1997), pp. 103–109. Kissinger was dissatisªed with Stoessel’s delay in establishing contact and sent three cables warning him that “either you do it or we will get someone who will.” Stoessel claimed that he was unable to approach Chinese ofªcials pri￾vately at any party or diplomatic reception that fall and winter. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), p. 359. It is not clear why the United States did not contact Beijing through the extant channel between the Chinese and U.S. em￾bassy second secretaries in Warsaw. One possibility is that the second-secretary-level contact was only for routine issues, and the Chinese did not regard the channel as important

China's Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement upon hearing about the incident,the Chinese leaders seemed convinced that the Americans were serious,and they responded swiftly.Zhou told Mao that "the opportunity is coming;we now have a brick in our hands to knock at the door."28 At Mao's instruction,Zhou acted at once to let the Americans know of Beijing's interest in reopening communication with Washington.On 4 De- cember,Zhou,with Mao's approval,made a goodwill gesture by ordering the release of two Americans who had been held in China since mid-February 1969,when their yacht had strayed into China's territorial water off Guangdong.” Stoessel's encounter with the Chinese diplomats at the Yugoslav fashion show was a turning point in U.S.-China relations.It convinced Mao and Zhou that the United States was genuinely interested in improving relations with the PRC,and it happened at a time when the Chinese leaders were fear- ful of war with the Soviet Union.They were looking for opportunities to ameliorate relations with the United States in order to offset the Soviet Union.Moreover,the circumstances of the Stoessel incident were useful for Mao and Zhou,who could cite it in telling their Chinese colleagues that"it is the Americans who need something from us,not the other way around."The two leaders would retell the story and repeat the theme time and again.3 In reality,the PRC's quest to resume the ambassadorial talks had been under way for some time.When the first group of Chinese ambassadors re- turned to their posts after the Ninth Party Congress,Lei Yang was appointed charge d'affaires in Poland in June 1969.Although Lei was not an ambassador in rank,he was a senior diplomat,having served as director of the Foreign Ministry's education department for many years.Before Lei left for Poland, Zhou Enlai urged him to study the record of Sino-American ambassadorial contacts and to keep an eye out for signs of change in U.S.policy so that he could report back on anything significant.Zhou emphasized the importance of retaining the"Warsaw channel."As instructed,Lei carefully went through the records of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks and other written mate- rials on U.S.-China relations before departing for Warsaw. On 20 January 1970,China and the United States agreed to resume the ambassadorial talks,with sessions alternating between the Chinese and U.S. 28.Jin,ed.,Zhou Enlai zhuan,Vol.2,p.1087. 29.Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [Division of CCP Central Archives and Manuscripts].comp.,Zhou Enlai nianpu:1949-1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai],Vol.3 (Beijing:Zhongyang Wenxian and Renmin Chubanshe,1997),p.336;Jin,ed.,Zhou Enlai zhuan,Vol.2,p.1088;and Kissinger,White House Years,p.188. 30.Interview with CCP historians who requested anonymity,in Beijing.January 2002 31.Qian Jiang,"Huifu Zhong Mei Huasha Huitan de Qibu"[The Beginning of the Renewal of Sino- American Warsaw Talks],Bainianchao [Hundred-Year Tide],No.3(2000),pp,20-21

upon hearing about the incident, the Chinese leaders seemed convinced that the Americans were serious, and they responded swiftly. Zhou told Mao that “the opportunity is coming; we now have a brick in our hands to knock at the door.”28 At Mao’s instruction, Zhou acted at once to let the Americans know of Beijing’s interest in reopening communication with Washington. On 4 De￾cember, Zhou, with Mao’s approval, made a goodwill gesture by ordering the release of two Americans who had been held in China since mid-February 1969, when their yacht had strayed into China’s territorial water off Guangdong.29 Stoessel’s encounter with the Chinese diplomats at the Yugoslav fashion show was a turning point in U.S.-China relations. It convinced Mao and Zhou that the United States was genuinely interested in improving relations with the PRC, and it happened at a time when the Chinese leaders were fear￾ful of war with the Soviet Union. They were looking for opportunities to ameliorate relations with the United States in order to offset the Soviet Union. Moreover, the circumstances of the Stoessel incident were useful for Mao and Zhou, who could cite it in telling their Chinese colleagues that “it is the Americans who need something from us, not the other way around.” The two leaders would retell the story and repeat the theme time and again.30 In reality, the PRC’s quest to resume the ambassadorial talks had been under way for some time. When the ªrst group of Chinese ambassadors re￾turned to their posts after the Ninth Party Congress, Lei Yang was appointed chargé d’affaires in Poland in June 1969. Although Lei was not an ambassador in rank, he was a senior diplomat, having served as director of the Foreign Ministry’s education department for many years. Before Lei left for Poland, Zhou Enlai urged him to study the record of Sino-American ambassadorial contacts and to keep an eye out for signs of change in U.S. policy so that he could report back on anything signiªcant. Zhou emphasized the importance of retaining the “Warsaw channel.” As instructed, Lei carefully went through the records of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks and other written mate￾rials on U.S.-China relations before departing for Warsaw.31 On 20 January 1970, China and the United States agreed to resume the ambassadorial talks, with sessions alternating between the Chinese and U.S. 11 China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement 28. Jin, ed., Zhou Enlai zhuan, Vol. 2, p. 1087. 29. Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [Division of CCP Central Archives and Manuscripts], comp., Zhou Enlai nianpu: 1949–1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], Vol. 3 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian and Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), p. 336; Jin, ed., Zhou Enlai zhuan, Vol. 2, p. 1088; and Kissinger, White House Years, p. 188. 30. Interview with CCP historians who requested anonymity, in Beijing, January 2002. 31. Qian Jiang, “Huifu Zhong Mei Huasha Huitan de Qibu” [The Beginning of the Renewal of Sino￾American Warsaw Talks], Bainianchao [Hundred-Year Tide], No. 3 (2000), pp, 20–21

Xia embassies.3 To prepare for the talks,the Foreign Ministry drafted instructions and an opening statement for Lei Yang,and submitted the drafts to Zhou Enlai for amendment.Zhou added the following instructions: After your speech,if the U.S.reiterates that the U.S.and Taiwan have a relation- ship based on a treaty,you should reply in such terms as "The U.S.-ROC (the Republic of China)Treaty is not recognized by the Chinese people";if the U.S. side inquires about what the higher-level talks or other channels refer to,you should respond by saying that if the U.S.government is interested,it can make a proposal or work out a solution upon mutual agreement at the ambassadorial- level talks.33 The Chinese leaders believed that because"Nixon at present appears to be a bit more sober-minded than Brezhnev...the policy of engagement is neces- sary.”3 Meanwhile,Zhou had to spend much time and energy to surmount ob- stacles posed by the ultra-leftists on the home front.Because China was still in the midst of the Cultural Revolution,it was inconceivable even to talk about improving relations with the United States-the number one imperialist country.Even the PRC Foreign Ministry,which was under Zhou's direct su- pervision,was not immune to leftist influence.Besides,the Chinese govern- ment had proclaimed in 1960 that no progress was expected in U.S.-PRC re- lations until the Taiwan issue was solved.The rank and file at the Foreign Ministry were understandably slow in responding to any change.Zhou was worried and reported the problem to Mao,who offered his support.Zhou then relayed Mao's instruction to his subordinates,assuring them it was ideo- 32.Luo,"Zai Bolan de suiyue,"p.181;Stoessel to the Secretary of State,8 January 1970,POL Chicom,Subject-Numeric Files,1970-1973,RG 59,NARA.Two points should be noted here.First, in the past the U.S.-Chinese ambassadorial talks in Warsaw had been held in a venue arranged by the Polish government.This time,by contrast,the Americans sought to preserve secrecy by shifting the meetings to the two embassies,a proposal immediately accepted by the Chinese.Informal meetings were held in the respective embassies in Warsaw on 11 December 1969 and 8 January 1970.Stoessel was invited to the Chinese embassy for tea on 11 December and was instructed to arrive at the front door in order to send a signal to Moscow.Second,because China did not have an ambassador in Po- land at the time,the final two sets of talks were held between Chinese charge d'affaires Lei Yang and U.S.ambassador Stoessel.The Chinese ambassador to Poland,Wang Guoquan,had been recalled to China in July 1967 to take part in the Cultural Revolution.The 134th session of the ambassadorial talks was held between Chinese charge d'affaires Chen Dong and U.S.ambassador John Gronouski as "a temporary solution"in Warsaw on 8 January 1968.On the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in the 1960s,see Yafeng Xia,"Negotiating at Cross-Purposes:Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, 1961-1968,"Diplomacy and Statecrafi,Vol.16,No.2 (June 2005),pp.297-329. 33.Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi,Zhou Enlai nianpu.p.344. 34."Zhou Enlai's Talk with Khwaja Mohammad Kaiser,Pakistan's Ambassador to China,22 January 1970,"cited in Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin,eds.,Re-examining the Cold War:U.S.-China Diplo- macy.1954-1973 (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Asia Center,2001),p.337. 12

embassies.32 To prepare for the talks, the Foreign Ministry drafted instructions and an opening statement for Lei Yang, and submitted the drafts to Zhou Enlai for amendment. Zhou added the following instructions: After your speech, if the U.S. reiterates that the U.S. and Taiwan have a relation￾ship based on a treaty, you should reply in such terms as “The U.S.-ROC (the Republic of China) Treaty is not recognized by the Chinese people”; if the U.S. side inquires about what the higher-level talks or other channels refer to, you should respond by saying that if the U.S. government is interested, it can make a proposal or work out a solution upon mutual agreement at the ambassadorial￾level talks.33 The Chinese leaders believed that because “Nixon at present appears to be a bit more sober-minded than Brezhnev . . . the policy of engagement is neces￾sary.”34 Meanwhile, Zhou had to spend much time and energy to surmount ob￾stacles posed by the ultra-leftists on the home front. Because China was still in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, it was inconceivable even to talk about improving relations with the United States—the number one imperialist country. Even the PRC Foreign Ministry, which was under Zhou’s direct su￾pervision, was not immune to leftist inºuence. Besides, the Chinese govern￾ment had proclaimed in 1960 that no progress was expected in U.S.-PRC re￾lations until the Taiwan issue was solved. The rank and ªle at the Foreign Ministry were understandably slow in responding to any change. Zhou was worried and reported the problem to Mao, who offered his support. Zhou then relayed Mao’s instruction to his subordinates, assuring them it was ideo- 12 Xia 32. Luo, “Zai Bolan de suiyue,” p. 181; Stoessel to the Secretary of State, 8 January 1970, POL Chicom, Subject-Numeric Files, 1970–1973, RG 59, NARA. Two points should be noted here. First, in the past the U.S.-Chinese ambassadorial talks in Warsaw had been held in a venue arranged by the Polish government. This time, by contrast, the Americans sought to preserve secrecy by shifting the meetings to the two embassies, a proposal immediately accepted by the Chinese. Informal meetings were held in the respective embassies in Warsaw on 11 December 1969 and 8 January 1970. Stoessel was invited to the Chinese embassy for tea on 11 December and was instructed to arrive at the front door in order to send a signal to Moscow. Second, because China did not have an ambassador in Po￾land at the time, the ªnal two sets of talks were held between Chinese chargé d’affaires Lei Yang and U.S. ambassador Stoessel. The Chinese ambassador to Poland, Wang Guoquan, had been recalled to China in July 1967 to take part in the Cultural Revolution. The 134th session of the ambassadorial talks was held between Chinese chargé d’affaires Chen Dong and U.S. ambassador John Gronouski as “a temporary solution” in Warsaw on 8 January 1968. On the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in the 1960s, see Yafeng Xia, “Negotiating at Cross-Purposes: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, 1961–1968,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2005), pp. 297–329. 33. Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Zhou Enlai nianpu , p. 344. 34. “Zhou Enlai’s Talk with Khwaja Mohammad Kaiser, Pakistan’s Ambassador to China, 22 January 1970,” cited in Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplo￾macy, 1954–1973 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), p. 337