上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源（相关阅读）China-Korean Relations reading package_Allen Whiting China & the Korean War

The MIT Press Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace:The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams Author(s):Thomas J.Christensen Reviewed work(s): Source:International Security,Vol.17,No.1(Summer,1992),pp.122-154 Published by:The MIT Press Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539160 Accessed:27/01/201321:05 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms&Conditions of Use,available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive.We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to International Security. 29 STOR http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams Author(s): Thomas J. Christensen Reviewed work(s): Source: International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer, 1992), pp. 122-154 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539160 . Accessed: 27/01/2013 21:05 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Threats,Assurances, Thomas J. and the Last Chance Christensen for Peace The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams In Cold War history few topics have received more attention than the 1950 Sino-American crisis over Korea.1 China's massive attack on UN troops in late November 1950 led to the longest retreat in American military history,an epic confrontation between the Truman administration and General Douglas MacArthur,and a polarizing domestic political debate about policy toward China.One major point of controversy was the question of how Mao might have been dis- suaded from escalating China's involvement in Korea.MacArthur supporters argued that Mao attacked out of adventurism because he was certain the Thomas I.Christensen is an Olin Fellow in National Security Studies at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs (CFIA)and a Ph.D.Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University.In July 1993 he will join the faculty of the Department of Government at Cornell University.This article was originally written in September 1991 under the auspices of Harvard's CFIA,and was first presented there in November 1991. For extensive critiques of earlier drafts I am indebted to Robert Jervis,Jonathan Mercer,Lucian Pye,and Stephen Van Evera.For helpful comments I also thank Thomas Bernstein,Hu Weixing, Michael Hunt,Samuel Huntington,Yuen Foong Khong,Timothy Naftali,Andrew Nathan,Ren Yue,Stephen P.Rosen,Robert Ross,David Rowe,Randall Schweller,Jack Snyder,Fareed Zakaria,and the members of the Olin National Security Group at Harvard's CFIA.For editing my translations,I am grateful to Ms.Irene Liu of Columbia University.I also thank the Olin Foundation and Harvard's Center for International Affairs for financial and institutional support. 1.For classic treatments of American policy during the crisis,see David Rees,Korea:The Limited War (London:Macmillan,1964),Parts I and II;John W.Spanier,The Truman-MacArthur Contro versy (Cambridge,Mass.:Belknap/Harvard University Press,1959);Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War:The Challenge to American Strategy(Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1957),ch. 8;Bernard Brodie,War and Politics (New York:Macmillan:1973),ch.3;Alexander L.George and Richard Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy:Theory and Practice (New York:Columbia University Press,1974),ch.7;Richard E.Neustadt,Presidential Power:The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter (New York:Wiley,1980),ch.6.For a comprehensive military account of the first months of the war,see Roy Edgar Appleman,U.S.Army in the Korean War:Vol.1,South to the Naktong and North to the Yalu (Washington:Department of the Army,1961),chs.29-39.For the pioneering works on Chinese policy in the crisis,see Allen S.Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu:The Decision to Enter the Korean War(Stanford,Calif.:Stanford University Press,1960);Tang Tsou,America's Failure in China:1941-50(Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1963),ch.13; and Jan Kalicki,The Pattern of Sino-American Crises (London:Cambridge University Press,1975), ch.3. International Security,Summer 1992 (Vol.17,No.1) 1992 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 122 sta02323201Pw

Threats, Assurances, Thomas J. and the Last Chance Christensen for Peace The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams In Cold War history few topics have received more attention than the 1950 Sino-American crisis over Korea.' China's massive attack on UN troops in late November 1950 led to the longest retreat in American military history, an epic confrontation between the Truman administration and General Douglas MacArthur, and a polarizing domestic political debate about policy toward China. One major point of controversy was the question of how Mao might have been dis￾suaded from escalating China's involvement in Korea. MacArthur supporters argued that Mao attacked out of adventurism because he was certain the Thomas J. Christensen is an Olin Fellow in National Security Studies at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs (CFIA) and a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University. In July 1993 he will join the faculty of the Department ofGovernment at Cornell University. This article was originally written in September 1991 under the auspices of Harvard's CFIA, and was first presented there in November 1991. For extensive critiques of earlier drafts I am indebted to Robert Jervis, Jonathan Mercer, Lucian Pye, and Stephen Van Evera. For helpful comments I also thank Thomas Bernstein, Hu Weixing, Michael Hunt, Samuel Huntington, Yuen Foong Khong, Timothy Naftali, Andrew Nathan, Ren Yue, Stephen P. Rosen, Robert Ross, David Rowe, Randall Schweller, Jack Snyder, Fareed Zakaria, and the members of the Olin National Security Group at Harvard's CFIA. For editing my translations, I am grateful to Ms. Irene Liu of Columbia University. I also thank the Olin Foundation and Harvard's Center for International Affairs for financial and institutional support. 1. For classic treatments of American policy during the crisis, see David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan, 1964), Parts I and II; John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Contro￾versy (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1959); Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), ch. 8; Bemard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan: 1973), ch. 3; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), ch. 7; Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter (New York: Wiley, 1980), ch. 6. For a comprehensive military account of the first months of the war, see Roy Edgar Appleman, U.S. Army in the Korean War: Vol. 1, South to the Naktong and North to the Yalu (Washington: Department of the Army, 1961), chs. 29-39. For the pioneering works on Chinese policy in the crisis, see Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960); Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China: 1941-50 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), ch. 13; and Jan Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), ch. 3. International Security, Summer 1992 (Vol. 17, No. 1) C 1992 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 122 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace 123 United States would not respond with attacks on the mainland.The general accused the Truman administration of appeasement for not threatening China with retaliatory air strikes if Chinese troops attacked in force.2 De- fenders of the Truman administration charged that MacArthur's massive drive north in late November provoked China,by threatening the security of the Yalu River Valley and Manchuria.3 In hindsight,civilian and military officials in Washington suggested that the United States should have left a military buffer zone somewhere between the bulk of U.S.forces near Pyong- yang and Wonsan (the neck of Korea)and the Chinese border.4(See map, p.124) Both sides based their arguments on assumptions about Mao's risk analysis and strategy in Korea.But until now we have had little solid evidence of Mao's intentions and fears in entering the Korean War.This article presents 2.MacArthur wrote of the failure of American deterrence:"I will always believe that if the United States had issued a warning to the effect that any entry of the Chinese Communists in force into Korea would be considered an act of international war against the United States,then the Korean war would have terminated with our advance north.I feel that the reds would have stayed on their side of the Yalu....They knew they could swarm down across the Yalu River without having to worry about bombers hitting their Manchurian supply lines."Douglas MacArthur,Reminiscences (New York:McGraw-Hill,1964),pp.374-375.Also see Spanier,Tru- man-MacArthur Controversy,p.130. 3.For this accusation and MacArthur's response to it,see Spanier,The Truman-MacArthur Controversy,p.149 4.Buffer zones of varying widths were discussed during the early months of the Korean War. The buffers were designed to keep non-Korean troops away from the border areas so as not to provoke China.The largest proposed buffer would have run from the Yalu border to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line;the smallest would have straddled the Yalu with a ten-mile de-mili- tarized zone on both sides.(See map.)For Truman's recollections,see Peter N.Farrar,"A Pause for Negotiations:The British Buffer Plan of November,1950,"in James Cotton and Ian Neary, The Korean War in History (Atlantic Highlands,N.I.:Humanities Press International,1989),p.66. For criticisms of MacArthur's strategy,see Dean Acheson,Present at the Creation (New York: Norton,1969),pp.466-468.Acheson claims that the government's failure to prevent MacArthur from sending American forces toward the Chinese border squandered "the last chance to halt the march to disaster."Despite the reference to Washington's inaction,Acheson ultimately blamed the general for initiating the decision to drive north with American troops.He also claims that a British buffer plan was not attempted because he was sure that MacArthur "would frustrate any such efforts."The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that MacArthur could at least have halted on the high ground above the Yalu River Valley,where he could repel any Chinese offensive in the valley with artillery fire without threatening the Chinese border.See Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy,p.129;and Osgood,Limited War,p.172.It is important to note that while MacArthur may have disobeyed the "spirit"of his orders,neither military nor civilian leaders in Washington had placed clear restraints on the General's activities.Richard Ned Lebow challenges Acheson's claim that he had wanted to stop MacArthur,citing declassified State Department records showing that Acheson voiced no opposition to MacArthur's drive north.See Lebow,Between Peace and War:The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press,1981),p.183. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace | 123 United States would not respond with attacks on the mainland. The general accused the Truman administration of appeasement for not threatening China with retaliatory air strikes if Chinese troops attacked in force.2 De￾fenders of the Truman administration charged that MacArthur's massive drive north in late November provoked China, by threatening the security of the Yalu River Valley and Manchuria.3 In hindsight, civilian and military officials in Washington suggested that the United States should have left a military buffer zone somewhere between the bulk of U.S. forces near Pyong￾yang and Wonsan (the neck of Korea) and the Chinese border.4 (See map, p. 124.) Both sides based their arguments on assumptions about Mao's risk analysis and strategy in Korea. But until now we have had little solid evidence of Mao's intentions and fears in entering the Korean War. This article presents 2. MacArthur wrote of the failure of American deterrence: "I will always believe that if the United States had issued a warning to the effect that any entry of the Chinese Communists in force into Korea would be considered an act of international war against the United States, then the Korean war would have terminated with our advance north. Ifeel that the reds would have stayed on their side of the Yalu.... They knew they could swarm down across the Yalu River without having to worry about bombers hitting their Manchurian supply lines." Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 374-375. Also see Spanier, Tru￾man-MacArthur Controversy, p.130. 3. For this accusation and MacArthur's response to it, see Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy, p.149. 4. Buffer zones of varying widths were discussed during the early months of the Korean War. The buffers were designed to keep non-Korean troops away from the border areas so as not to provoke China. The largest proposed buffer would have run from the Yalu border to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line; the smallest would have straddled the Yalu with a ten-mile de-mili￾tarized zone on both sides. (See map.) For Truman's recollections, see Peter N. Farrar, "A Pause for Negotiations: The British Buffer Plan of November, 1950," in James Cotton and Ian Neary, The Korean War in History (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1989), p. 66. For criticisms of MacArthur's strategy, see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 466-468. Acheson claims that the government's failure to prevent MacArthur from sending American forces toward the Chinese border squandered "the last chance to halt the march to disaster." Despite the reference to Washington's inaction, Acheson ultimately blamed the general for initiating the decision to drive north with American troops. He also claims that a British buffer plan was not attempted because he was sure that MacArthur "would frustrate any such efforts." The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that MacArthur could at least have halted on the high ground above the Yalu River Valley, where he could repel any Chinese offensive in the valley with artillery fire without threatening the Chinese border. See Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy, p. 129; and Osgood, Limited War, p. 172. It is important to note that while MacArthur may have disobeyed the "spirit" of his orders, neither military nor civilian leaders in Washington had placed clear restraints on the General's activities. Richard Ned Lebow challenges Acheson's claim that he had wanted to stop MacArthur, citing declassified State Department records showing that Acheson voiced no opposition to MacArthur's drive north. See Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 183. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 17:1 124 100 Miles CHINA (Manchuria) Yalu River NORTH KOREA Tokchon Yongwon Sea of Japan 39 Pyongyang Wonsan 38th Parallel ®Kaesong Inchon Seoul 37 SOUTH KOREA Yellow Sea 。Taegu Pusan This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace 125 new documents from China-Mao's Korean War telegrams to Stalin,Zhou Enlai,and Chinese military commanders in the field-that force a reassess- ment of both positions in the Truman-MacArthur debate.5 A reconsideration of Mao's Korean War strategy in light of these documents and recent work by Chinese scholars reveals new lessons about American coercive diplomacy in Korea.6 The controversy over the "lessons of Korea"has affected American civil- military relations throughout the postwar era.For example,in Vietnam the military evoked MacArthur's lessons about Korea,arguing against civilian interference in bombing operations,while the Johnson administration drew Truman's lessons,strictly controlling American bombing in the North so as not to threaten the Chinese border.The Korean War case has also given rise to a rich literature on deterrence and limited war.Scholars clarify the Truman- MacArthur debate by restating it in terms of the two central concepts of deterrence theory:reassurance,and credibility of threat.Viewing the Novem- ber disaster as a failure of deterrence,these scholars point to a deficiency of one or both elements in American coercive diplomacy.8 5.The documents are bound in a collection of Mao's manuscripts entitled Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao (The Manuscripts of Mao Zedong Since The Founding of the Nation),Vols.I-III, September 1949-December 1952(Beijing:Central Documents Publishing House,1987 and 1990). The collection,containing classified documents,is highly restricted in the PRC.Copies are currently available in the West at Harvard University's Yenching Library,among other locations. Three of the documents are translated in their entirety in the appendix(pp.151-154). 6.See Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai,"China's Decision to Enter the Korean War:History Revis- ited,China Ouarterly,No.121 (March 1990),pp.94-115;and Chen Jian,"The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War,"Working Paper of the Cold War History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.Hao and Zhai rely heavily on leaders memoirs,open Chinese sources,and not-for-attribution interviews to piece together their his- tory.In this article,I supply supporting documentary evidence for their account,and offer a fuller analysis of Mao's grand strategy after initial entry into Korea and its implications for bilateral coercive diplomacy,which were not major focuses of their study.Chen Jian analyzes primary and secondary sources to explain Sino-Soviet relations during the crisis. 7.For an excellent discussion of the impact of the lessons of Korea on decision-making in the Vietnam War,see Yuen Foong Khong,Analogies At War:Korea,Munich,Dien Bien Phu,and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965(Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,1992),ch.5,esp.pp.141- 145.Khong cites William Bundy,assistant secretary of state for Far-Eastern affairs under Presi- dent Johnson,who argued that,in 1964-1965,airfields in northernmost Vietnam were not attacked because of the lessons of November 1950.Bundy wrote:"If the Chinese came to think the United States was out to destroy North Vietnam,would not the situation be essentially similar to MacArthur's advance to the top of North Korea fourteen years before?"Also see Mark Clodfelter,The Limits of Air Power:The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York:Free Press, 1989),chap.3. 8.For political science and deterrence theory works that treat the Korean crisis,see George and This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace | 125 new documents from China-Mao's Korean War telegrams to Stalin, Zhou Enlai, and Chinese military commanders in the field-that force a reassess￾ment of both positions in the Truman-MacArthur debate.5 A reconsideration of Mao's Korean War strategy in light of these documents and recent work by Chinese scholars reveals new lessons about American coercive diplomacy in Korea.6 The controversy over the "lessons of Korea" has affected American civil￾military relations throughout the postwar era. For example, in Vietnam the military evoked MacArthur's lessons about Korea, arguing against civilian interference in bombing operations, while the Johnson administration drew Truman's lessons, strictly controlling American bombing in the North so as not to threaten the Chinese border.7 The Korean War case has also given rise to a rich literature on deterrence and limited war. Scholars clarify the Truman￾MacArthur debate by restating it in terms of the two central concepts of deterrence theory: reassurance, and credibility of threat. Viewing the Novem￾ber disaster as a failure of deterrence, these scholars point to a deficiency of one or both elements in American coercive diplomacy.8 5. The documents are bound in a collection of Mao's manuscripts entitled Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao (The Manuscripts of Mao Zedong Since The Founding of the Nation), Vols. I-Ill, September 1949-December 1952 (Beijing: Central Documents Publishing House, 1987 and 1990). The collection, containing classified documents, is highly restricted in the PRC. Copies are currently available in the West at Harvard University's Yenching Library, among other locations. Three of the documents are translated in their entirety in the appendix (pp. 151-154). 6. See Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revis￾ited," China Quarterly, No. 121 (March 1990), pp. 94-115; and Chen Jian, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War," Working Paper of the Cold War History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Hao and Zhai rely heavily on leaders' memoirs, open Chinese sources, and not-for-attribution interviews to piece together their his￾tory. In this article, I supply supporting documentary evidence for their account, and offer a fuller analysis of Mao's grand strategy after initial entry into Korea and its implications for bilateral coercive diplomacy, which were not major focuses of their study. Chen Jian analyzes primary and secondary sources to explain Sino-Soviet relations during the crisis. 7. For an excellent discussion of the impact of the lessons of Korea on decision-making in the Vietnam War, see Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies At War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), ch. 5, esp. pp. 141- 145. Khong cites William Bundy, assistant secretary of state for Far-Eastern affairs under Presi￾dent Johnson, who argued that, in 1964-1965, airfields in northernmost Vietnam were not attacked because of the lessons of November 1950. Bundy wrote: "If the Chinese came to think the United States was out to destroy North Vietnam, would not the situation be essentially similar to MacArthur's advance to the top of North Korea fourteen years before?" Also see Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989), chap. 3. 8. For political science and deterrence theory works that treat the Korean crisis, see George and This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 17:1 126 While studies of American strategy in Korea often disagree on whether American policy was too soft or too tough,many agree on what constituted the last chance for peace.Several authors argue that escalation of the Korean conflict could have been avoided even after American troops crossed the 38th parallel on October 7,1950,seized the North Korean cities of Pyongyang and Wonsan in mid-October,and briefly engaged Chinese detachments north of those cities from October 25 through November 7.9 Analysts of the war have therefore paid great attention to American policy in the period between November 7,when the Chinese disengaged from American forces,and No- vember 24,when MacArthur began the massive drive toward the Yalu. During this period,they suggest,some mixture of reassuring buffers and sobering threats might still have dissuaded the Chinese from a major offen- sive against American troops.10 Smoke,Deterrence and American Foreign Policy,ch.7;Walter Zelman,"Chinese Intervention in the Korean War:A Bilateral Failure of Deterrence,"UCLA Security Studies Project,No.11(1967) Morton H.Halperin,Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York:Wiley,1963),ch.3;Osgood, Limited War,ch.8;Thomas C.Schelling,Arms and Influence(New Haven:Yale University Press, 1966),pp.53-55 and passim;Robert Jervis,Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1976),p.46 and passim;Lebow,Between Peace and War, pp.172-184 and passim;John Orme,"Deterrence Failures:A Second Look,"International Security, Vol.11,No.4(Spring 1987),pp.109-112;and Paul K.Huth,Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven:Yale University Press,1988),pp.139-148. 9.See,for example,George and Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,pp.222-231."Even as late as the second or third week in November,Washington had the opportunity to take steps to reduce Peking's incentives to engage in a major war by modifying the U.S.war objectives and restricting military operations.The final 'point of no return'for U.S.policy was not passed until shortly before the Chinese launched their all-out offensive."Allen Whiting argues that "while China crossed the Yalu on October 15th,she did not cross the Rubicon until November 26th."Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,p.118.See also Halperin,Limited War,pp.50-53;Zelman, "Chinese Intervention,"p.27;Orme,"Deterrence Failures,"p.110;Kalicki,Pattern of Sino- American Crises,p.63;Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang,China under Threat:The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy(Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press,1980),pp.53-58.Gurtov and Hwang view China's late October engagements as a "warning shot"designed to deter American escalation.Lebow,Between Peace and War,pp.178-179,also portrays Chinese intervention in late October and early November as part of a deterrence strategy designed to avoid escalation. These positions are undercut by the new documentary evidence from China. 10.For discussions of the potential effectiveness of a buffer in this period,see Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,pp.155,160-162 and passim;William Whitney Stueck,Jr.,The Road to Confron- tation:American Foreign Policy Toward China and Korea,1947-1950(Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press,1981),p.251;George and Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,pp.222- 231;Zelman,"Chinese Intervention,"p.26;Orme,"Deterrence Failures,"pp.109-110;Schelling, Arms and Influence,pp.54-55;Kalicki,Pattern of Sino-American Crises,pp.57-64.Kalicki discusses "the all-important buffer,"but believes that MacArthur's initial late October thrusts north of the neck of Korea "eliminated"this buffer.Still,he argues that the two weeks between Chinese disengagement and MacArthur's final drive north allowed time for the Americans to pull back This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 17:1 | 126 While studies of American strategy in Korea often disagree on whether American policy was too soft or too tough, many agree on what constituted the last chance for peace. Several authors argue that escalation of the Korean conflict could have been avoided even after American troops crossed the 38th parallel on October 7, 1950, seized the North Korean cities of Pyongyang and Wonsan in mid-October, and briefly engaged Chinese detachments north of those cities from October 25 through November 7.9 Analysts of the war have therefore paid great attention to American policy in the period between November 7, when the Chinese disengaged from American forces, and No￾vember 24, when MacArthur began the massive drive toward the Yalu. During this period, they suggest, some mixture of reassuring buffers and sobering threats might still have dissuaded the Chinese from a major offen￾sive against American troops.10 Smoke, Deterrence and American Foreign Policy, ch. 7; Walter Zelman, "Chinese Intervention in the Korean War: A Bilateral Failure of Deterrence," UCLA Security Studies Project, No. 11 (1967); Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: Wiley, 1963), ch. 3; Osgood, Limited War, ch. 8; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 53-55 and passim; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 46 and passim; Lebow, Between Peace and War, pp. 172-184 and passim; John Orme, "Deterrence Failures: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Spring 1987), pp. 109-112; and Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 139-148. 9. See, for example, George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 222-231. "Even as late as the second or third week in November, Washington had the opportunity to take steps to reduce Peking's incentives to engage in a major war by modifying the U.S. war objectives and restricting military operations. The final 'point of no return' for U.S. policy was not passed until shortly before the Chinese launched their all-out offensive." Allen Whiting argues that, "while China crossed the Yalu on October 15th, she did not cross the Rubicon until November 26th." Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 118. See also Halperin, Limited War, pp. 50-53; Zelman, "Chinese Intervention," p. 27; Orme, "Deterrence Failures," p. 110; Kalicki, Pattern of Sino￾American Crises, p. 63; Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 53-58. Gurtov and Hwang view China's late October engagements as a "warning shot" designed to deter American escalation. Lebow, Between Peace and War, pp. 178-179, also portrays Chinese intervention in late October and early November as part of a deterrence strategy designed to avoid escalation. These positions are undercut by the new documentary evidence from China. 10. For discussions of the potential effectiveness of a buffer in this period, see Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 155, 160-162 and passim; William Whitney Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confron￾tation: American Foreign Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), p. 251; George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 222- 231; Zelman, "Chinese Intervention," p. 26; Orme, "Deterrence Failures," pp. 109-110; Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 54-55; Kalicki, Pattern of Sino-American Crises, pp. 57-64. Kalicki discusses "the all-important buffer," but believes that MacArthur's initial late October thrusts north of the neck of Korea "eliminated" this buffer. Still, he argues that the two weeks between Chinese disengagement and MacArthur's final drive north allowed time for the Americans to pull back This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace 127 A central problem for Western analyses of the Korean War has been that arguments about American coercive diplomacy rest on speculation about Chinese leaders'risk analysis and war goals.Scholars have long noted that without solid evidence about Chinese strategy we cannot accurately assess the value of the various prescriptive conclusions drawn by leaders and aca- demics.11 In recent years,the declassification of American documents has spawned excellent new work on the Korean conflict.12 But no matter how voluminous and well-interpreted,American documents cannot tell us what the Chinese side was thinking in 1950.Because of the continuing restrictions on Chinese archival materials,Western analysts have been forced to deduce Chinese strategy from behavior. Mao's Korean War cables offer the first documentary evidence of Chinese strategy in 1950 available to the West.Three of the telegrams are translated in their entirety in the appendix of this article.The cables help answer three crucial questions:Why did China enter the Korean conflict?What were Mao's military and political strategies once he entered?Given Mao's strategies, to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line and to settle for peace.For a skeptical discussion of the buffer proposals in mid-November,see Farrar,"A Pause for Negotiations:The British Buffer Plan of November,1950."Like Kalicki,Farrar suggests that British proposals for a buffer might have been more effective if they had been implemented before the late October and early November clashes north of the neck. For the most assertive argument for the potential utility of additional deterrent threats against the Chinese Mainland,see Halperin,Limited War,pp.50-53.Jacek Kugler also argues that increased bombing threats could have coerced Chinese withdrawal from Korea;Kugler,"As- sessing Stable Deterrence,"in Kugler and Frank C.Zagare,Exploring the Stability of Deterrence (Boulder,Colo.:Lynne Rienner,1987),p.53;see also General Nathan F.Twining,Neither Liberty Nor Safety:A Hard Look at U.S.Military Policy and Strategy (New York:Holt,Rinehart and Winston, 1966),pp.53-54.Discussing deterrent threats without making such extensive claims are Zelman, "Chinese Entrance,"pp.27-28;and George and Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp.220-221.Without making prescriptions for American policy,various other authors have suggested that China might have discounted the possibility of American conventional or atomic strategic bombing.See,for example,Farrar,"A Pause for Negotiations,"p.77;and Richard K. Betts,Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington:Brookings,1987),pp.34-36. 11.See,for example,Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,p.172;Osgood,Limited War,pp.179 and 184;and Farrar,"A Pause for Negotiations,"p.77. 12.Prominent examples include Bruce Cumings,ed.,Child of Conflict:The Korean-American Relationship,1943-53(Seattle:University of Washington Press,1983);Rosemary Foot,The Wrong War:American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict,1950-1953 (Ithaca,N.Y.:Cornell University Press,1985);Stueck,Road To Confrontation;and Burton I.Kaufman,The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis,Credibility and Command (New York:Knopf,1986).For an extensive histo- riography of this literature,see Rosemary Foot,"Making Known the Unknown War:Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade,Diplomatic History,Vol.15,No.3 (Summer 1991),Pp.411-431. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace | 127 A central problem for Western analyses of the Korean War has been that arguments about American coercive diplomacy rest on speculation about Chinese leaders' risk analysis and war goals. Scholars have long noted that without solid evidence about Chinese strategy we cannot accurately assess the value of the various prescriptive conclusions drawn by leaders and aca￾demics.11 In recent years, the declassification of American documents has spawned excellent new work on the Korean conflict.12 But no matter how voluminous and well-interpreted, American documents cannot tell us what the Chinese side was thinking in 1950. Because of the continuing restrictions on Chinese archival materials, Western analysts have been forced to deduce Chinese strategy from behavior. Mao's Korean War cables offer the first documentary evidence of Chinese strategy in 1950 available to the West. Three of the telegrams are translated in their entirety in the appendix of this article. The cables help answer three crucial questions: Why did China enter the Korean conflict? What were Mao's military and political strategies once he entered? Given Mao's strategies, to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line and to settle for peace. For a skeptical discussion of the buffer proposals in mid-November, see Farrar, "A Pause for Negotiations: The British Buffer Plan of November, 1950." Like Kalicki, Farrar suggests that British proposals for a buffer might have been more effective if they had been implemented before the late October and early November clashes north of the neck. For the most assertive argument for the potential utility of additional deterrent threats against the Chinese Mainland, see Halperin, Limited War, pp. 50-53. Jacek Kugler also argues that increased bombing threats could have coerced Chinese withdrawal from Korea; Kugler, "As￾sessing Stable Deterrence," in Kugler and Frank C. Zagare, Exploring the Stability of Deterrence (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1987), p. 53; see also General Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty Nor Safety: AHard Look at U.S. Military Policy and Strategy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 53-54. Discussing deterrent threats without making such extensive claims are Zelman, "Chinese Entrance," pp. 27-28; and George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 220-221. Without making prescriptions for American policy, various other authors have suggested that China might have discounted the possibility of American conventional or atomic strategic bombing. See, for example, Farrar, "A Pause for Negotiations," p. 77; and Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington: Brookings, 1987), pp. 34-36. 11. See, for example, Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 172; Osgood, Limited War, pp. 179 and 184; and Farrar, "A Pause for Negotiations," p. 77. 12. Prominent examples include Bruce Cumings, ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-53 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Stueck, Road To Confrontation; and Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility and Command (New York: Knopf, 1986). For an extensive histo￾riography of this literature, see Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 411-431. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 17:1 128 what options,if any,were open to American policy makers to avert a larger war?The answers to these questions lead to a reevaluation of many standard lessons of Korea. In conjunction with other available Chinese sources,13 the cables provide strong evidence that:Mao's decision to enter Korea in force was triggered by the American decision to send U.S.forces north of the 38th parallel;Mao attacked fully recognizing that the United States might respond by bombing Chinese cities;Mao did not intend to allow American troops to remain permanently behind a buffer in North Korea,regardless of the buffer's width; and once Chinese troops were dispatched to Korea,Mao's primary goal was the destruction or expulsion of all foreign forces on the Korean peninsula. The new documents demonstrate that once American troops actually crossed the 38th parallel on October 7,1950,neither reassurances nor coercive threats could have dissuaded Mao from launching massive attacks on Amer- ican troops.Neither of the policy correctives proposed during the Truman- MacArthur debate would have prevented a wider war:additional bombing threats would not have deterred China and might have made Mao increase the intensity of his preparations for a massive assault on American positions, while the adoption of the buffer zone policy would also have failed to dissuade Mao from escalation. Below,I review the standard theoretical accounts of the case,then offer a reinterpretation based on the new evidence about Mao's strategy.I close by exploring the implications of the new history for theories of coercive diplo- macy. The Dual Failure of Deterrence The 1950 Sino-American crisis has been described as a bilateral failure of deterrence.14 The Chinese failed to deter both the U.S.crossing of the 38th 13.Memoirs available in English include those of Marshals Nie Rongzhen and Peng Dehuai. See Nie,Inside the Red Star:The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Beijing:New World Press, 1988);and Peng,Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal (Beijing:Foreign Languages Press,1984).I am grateful to Robert Ross and Michael Hunt for bringing the following Chinese language sources to my attention:the memoirs of Hong Xuezhi,vice-commander of the Chinese Volunteer Army in Korea,entitled Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Huiyi (Recollections of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea)(Beijing:Liberation Army Literary and Artistic Publishing House, November 1990):Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian,Banmendian Tanpan (Panmunjon Negotia- tions)(Beijing:Liberation Army Publishing House,August 1989);and Ye Yumeng,Chubing Chaoxian(Dispatching Troops to Korea)(Beijing:October Literary and Artistic Publishers,October, 1990).Although Ye's book is written in a literary style,it is based on extensive historical research. 14.See Walter A.Zelman,"Chinese Intervention in the Korean War";and George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,ch.7. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 17:1 1 128 what options, if any, were open to American policy makers to avert a larger war? The answers to these questions lead to a reevaluation of many standard lessons of Korea. In conjunction with other available Chinese sources,13 the cables provide strong evidence that: Mao's decision to enter Korea in force was triggered by the American decision to send U.S. forces north of the 38th parallel; Mao attacked fully recognizing that the United States might respond by bombing Chinese cities; Mao did not intend to allow American troops to remain permanently behind a buffer in North Korea, regardless of the buffer's width; and once Chinese troops were dispatched to Korea, Mao's primary goal was the destruction or expulsion of all foreign forces on the Korean peninsula. The new documents demonstrate that once American troops actually crossed the 38th parallel on October 7, 1950, neither reassurances nor coercive threats could have dissuaded Mao from launching massive attacks on Amer￾ican troops. Neither of the policy correctives proposed during the Truman￾MacArthur debate would have prevented a wider war: additional bombing threats would not have deterred China and might have made Mao increase the intensity of his preparations for a massive assault on American positions, while the adoption of the buffer zone policy would also have failed to dissuade Mao from escalation. Below, I review the standard theoretical accounts of the case, then offer a reinterpretation based on the new evidence about Mao's strategy. I close by exploring the implications of the new history for theories of coercive diplo￾macy. The Dual Failure of Deterrence The 1950 Sino-American crisis has been described as a bilateral failure of deterrence.14 The Chinese failed to deter both the U.S. crossing of the 38th 13. Memoirs available in English include those of Marshals Nie Rongzhen and Peng Dehuai. See Nie, Inside the Red Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Beijing: New World Press, 1988); and Peng, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984). I am grateful to Robert Ross and Michael Hunt for bringing the following Chinese language sources to my attention: the memoirs of Hong Xuezhi, vice-commander of the Chinese Volunteer Army in Korea, entitled Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Huiyi (Recollections of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea) (Beijing: Liberation Army Literary and Artistic Publishing House, November 1990); Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian, Banmendian Tanpan (Panmunjon Negotia￾tions) (Beijing: Liberation Army Publishing House, August 1989); and Ye Yumeng, Chubing Chaoxian (Dispatching Troops to Korea) (Beijing: October Literary and Artistic Publishers, October, 1990). Although Ye's book is written in a literary style, it is based on extensive historical research. 14. See Walter A. Zelman, "Chinese Intervention in the Korean War"; and George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, ch. 7. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace 129 parallel on October 7 and MacArthur's November 24 offensive toward the Yalu.The Americans also failed twice:they were unable to prevent initial Chinese entry into Korea in October,and also failed to dissuade the Chinese from launching a counteroffensive in late November. THE FIRST DETERRENCE FAILURE:OCTOBER 1950 The standard interpretations of the Chinese failure to deter the United States in October are straightforward and stand up well to the historical evidence. The tragedy stemmed from American misperceptions about how Chinese weakness would affect Mao's calculations and from the fact that communi- cations between the two capitals were so poor.In calling for the unconditional surrender of North Korean troops(October 1)and in crossing the 38th parallel (October 7),the Americans felt that China's vulnerability would probably preclude Chinese entrance into the war.However,as Allen Whiting has argued,it was China's vulnerability that,instead,precipitated its October crossing of the Yalu.15 While the Chinese attempted to deter the American crossing,the lack of direct communications meant that their warnings were both too weak and too late to reverse the American decisions.16 In September and October,the United States was emboldened in Korea both by MacArthur's stunning success at Inchon and by China's military, economic and political weakness.17 In late September,Marshal Nie Rongzhen and Premier Zhou Enlai voiced deterrent warnings.These statements were accompanied by movements of Chinese troops in and around Manchuria. On the night of October 2,Zhou called Indian Ambassador Panikkar to a midnight meeting.Zhou gave him a message to pass to Washington:if U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea,China would enter the war.18 Believing these warnings to be bluffs,the Americans nevertheless crossed the parallel on October 7. 15.Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,pp.158-160. 16.On problems of diplomatic signaling,see Zelman,"Chinese Entrance into the Korean War," passim;George and Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,pp.188-190;Lebow,Between Peace and War,pp.148-149,and 178;and Kalicki,Pattern of Sino-American Conflict,pp.56,and 211-217. 17.The Inchon landing of September 15,1950,reversed American fortunes in Korea by suc- cessfully dividing North Korean troops at the waist of Korea.The forces south of the 38th parallel were trapped and the forces north of it were in disarray.For discussion of the invasion, see Appleman,South to the Naktong,North to the Yalu,ch.25.For discussion of American perception of Chinese weakness in the fall of 1950,see Tsou,America's Failure in China,pp.573- 574;and Foot,The Wrong War,pp.80-81. 18.See Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,pp.108-109. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace | 129 parallel on October 7 and MacArthur's November 24 offensive toward the Yalu. The Americans also failed twice: they were unable to prevent initial Chinese entry into Korea in October, and also failed to dissuade the Chinese from launching a counteroffensive in late November. THE FIRST DETERRENCE FAILURE: OCTOBER 1950 The standard interpretations of the Chinese failure to deter the United States in October are straightforward and stand up well to the historical evidence. The tragedy stemmed from American misperceptions about how Chinese weakness would affect Mao's calculations and from the fact that communi￾cations between the two capitals were so poor. In calling for the unconditional surrender of North Korean troops (October 1) and in crossing the 38th parallel (October 7), the Americans felt that China's vulnerability would probably preclude Chinese entrance into the war. However, as Allen Whiting has argued, it was China's vulnerability that, instead, precipitated its October crossing of the Yalu.15 While the Chinese attempted to deter the American crossing, the lack of direct communications meant that their warnings were both too weak and too late to reverse the American decisions.16 In September and October, the United States was emboldened in Korea both by MacArthur's stunning success at Inchon and by China's military, economic and political weakness.17 In late September, Marshal Nie Rongzhen and Premier Zhou Enlai voiced deterrent warnings. These statements were accompanied by movements of Chinese troops in and around Manchuria. On the night of October 2, Zhou called Indian Ambassador Panikkar to a midnight meeting. Zhou gave him a message to pass to Washington: if U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea, China would enter the war.18 Believing these warnings to be bluffs, the Americans nevertheless crossed the parallel on October 7. 15. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 158-160. 16. On problems of diplomatic signaling, see Zelman, "Chinese Entrance into the Korean War," passim; George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 188-190; Lebow, Between Peace and War, pp. 148-149, and 178; and Kalicki, Pattern of Sino-American Conflict, pp. 56, and 211-217. 17. The Inchon landing of September 15, 1950, reversed American fortunes in Korea by suc￾cessfully dividing North Korean troops at the waist of Korea. The forces south of the 38th parallel were trapped and the forces north of it were in disarray. For discussion of the invasion, see Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, ch. 25. For discussion of American perception of Chinese weakness in the fall of 1950, see Tsou, America's Failure in China, pp. 573- 574; and Foot, The Wrong War, pp. 80-81. 18. See Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 108-109. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 17:1 130 The Chinese faced several serious problems in their effort to deter the Americans.First,the United States had solid realpolitik incentives to cross the parallel.Second,without direct diplomatic contacts it was difficult for Beijing to communicate a message strong and authoritative enough to deter implementation of the American strategy.Third,the clearest Chinese warn- ing came only after Truman had decided to cross the 38th parallel. American strategic planners considered Korea a region of little geostrategic significance.American troops were withdrawn from Korea in the spring of 1949 because the manpower was considered better used elsewhere.After the North Korean attack on the South,Truman dispatched American forces in order to punish aggression and save the American reputation for resolve against communist expansion.The decision to intervene was not based on a reevaluation of the strategic significance of Korea. But if the goal of the war was simply to restore the international boundary at the 38th parallel,the United States would find itself back in the position it had been in before 1949,assisting South Korea at the expense of other more important strategic goals world-wide.Dean Acheson put the American dilemma in July of 1950 this way:"In the longer run,if we should succeed in reoccupying the South,the question of garrisoning and supporting it would arise.This would be a hard task for us to take on,and yet it seemed hardly sensible to repel the attack and then abandon the country.I could not see the end of it."19 In the fall of 1950 the American defense budget was still tightly constrained:the outbreak of the Korean War mobilized the American public behind higher military spending levels,but the most significant Ko- rean War increase would not occur until after the Americans crossed the parallel and met the massive Chinese counteroffensive.20 Given this budget- 19.Acheson paraphrased a July 10,1950,letter to Paul Nitze;Present at the Creation,pp.450- 451.The Joint Chiefs and the Defense Department argued that the 38th parallel was a geograph- ically infelicitous position to assume a permanent defense,and that a halt there would permit renewed military instability in Korea and lead to exorbitant American expenditures.See Foot, The Wrong War,pp.71-72;and John Lewis Gaddis,The Long Peace:Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York:Oxford University Press,1987),p.99. 20.The defense budget made two significant jumps after the outbreak of war in Korea.After the initial North Korean attack on the South,the budget jumped from about $14 billion to $25 billion.After the November Chinese counteroffensive in North Korea,it jumped an additional $17 billion.See Paul Y.Hammond,"NSC 68:Prologue to Rearmament,"in Warner R.Schilling, Paul Y.Hammond,and Glenn H.Snyder,Strategy,Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press,1962),pp.351-363.Just before the Chinese counteroffensive,Truman said that the ability of the administration to push the larger package through Congress was This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

International Security 17:1 | 130 The Chinese faced several serious problems in their effort to deter the Americans. First, the United States had solid realpolitik incentives to cross the parallel. Second, without direct diplomatic contacts it was difficult for Beijing to communicate a message strong and authoritative enough to deter implementation of the American strategy. Third, the clearest Chinese warn￾ing came only after Truman had decided to cross the 38th parallel. American strategic planners considered Korea a region of little geostrategic significance. American troops were withdrawn from Korea in the spring of 1949 because the manpower was considered better used elsewhere. After the North Korean attack on the South, Truman dispatched American forces in order to punish aggression and save the American reputation for resolve against communist expansion. The decision to intervene was not based on a reevaluation of the strategic significance of Korea. But if the goal of the war was simply to restore the international boundary at the 38th parallel, the United States would find itself back in the position it had been in before 1949, assisting South Korea at the expense of other more important strategic goals world-wide. Dean Acheson put the American dilemma in July of 1950 this way: "In the longer run, if we should succeed in reoccupying the South, the question of garrisoning and supporting it would arise. This would be a hard task for us to take on, and yet it seemed hardly sensible to repel the attack and then abandon the country. I could not see the end of it."'19 In the fall of 1950 the American defense budget was still tightly constrained: the outbreak of the Korean War mobilized the American public behind higher military spending levels, but the most significant Ko￾rean War increase would not occur until after the Americans crossed the parallel and met the massive Chinese counteroffensive.20 Given this budget- 19. Acheson paraphrased aJuly 10, 1950, letter to Paul Nitze; Present at the Creation, pp. 450- 451. The Joint Chiefs and the Defense Department argued that the 38th parallel was a geograph￾ically infelicitous position to assume a permanent defense, and that a halt there would permit renewed military instability in Korea and lead to exorbitant American expenditures. See Foot, The Wrong War, pp. 71-72; and John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 99. 20. The defense budget made two significant jumps after the outbreak of war in Korea. After the initial North Korean attack on the South, the budget jumped from about $14 billion to $25 billion. After the November Chinese counteroffensiven North Korea, it jumped an additional $17 billion. See Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC 68: Prologue to Rearmament," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 351-363. Just before the Chinese counteroffensive, Truman said that the ability of the administration topush the larger package through Congress was This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions