APS Beijing and the Korean Crisis,June 1950-June 1951 Author(s):Michael H.Hunt Reviewed work(s): Source:Political Science Quarterly,Vol.107,No.3(Autumn,1992),pp.453-478 Published by:The Academy of Political Science Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152440 Accessed:27/02/201208:57 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use,available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive.We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. The Academy of Political Science is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to Political Science Quarterly. 291 STOR http://www.jstor.org
Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951 Author(s): Michael H. Hunt Reviewed work(s): Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 3 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 453-478 Published by: The Academy of Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152440 . Accessed: 27/02/2012 08:57 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The Academy of Political Science is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Science Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org
Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951 MICHAEL H.HUNT Our understanding of the Korean War and especially the crisis- filled first year of that war has undergone some dramatic changes.Through the 1980s,approaching the fortieth anniversary of the outbreak of the war,some twenty books appeared dealing with the war's politics,diplomacy,and strategy. The late Gregory Henderson,writing in an elegiac vein,acknowledged this new era in scholarship."The men who lived the Korean War now pass.A new genera- tion,eyes deep in mountains of documents declassified up to 1954,claims the old fields.The headiness of those years for us who lived them ebbs.We come,cooly [sic]enmeshed in footnotes,to the scribes'time."2 The scribes have been busiest rewriting American policy and Anglo-American relations during the war.Perhaps as much as anything,the appearance between 1976 and 1984 of the relevant volumes in the U.S.foreign relations series and the clock-like opening of pertinent materials in the British Public Records Office stimulated this fresh research.New accounts have also brought the role of Ko- A count that included military and campaign histories would go substantially higher.The findings of Bruce Cumings,Rosemary Foot,Burton I.Kaufman,Callum A.MacDonald,and others have served cumulatively to displace David Rees,Korea:The Limited War (New York:St.Martin's Press, 1964),the standard treatment for at least twenty years.For recent reviews of the new literature,see Rosemary Foot,"Making Known the Unknown War:Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade,"Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991):411-31;:Philip West,"Interpreting the Korean War,"American Historical Review 94 (February 1989):80-96. Gregory Henderson,book review,Journal of Asian Studies 47 (May 1988):389. MICHAEL H.HUNT,professor of history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,is the author of Ideology and U.S.Foreign Policy and The Making of a Special Relationship,which is a study of early U.S.-China ties.He is now completing a book on the origins of Chinese Communist foreign policy. Political Science Quarterly Volume 107 Number 3 1992 453
Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951 MICHAEL H. HUNT Our understanding of the Korean War and especially the crisisfilled first year of that war has undergone some dramatic changes. Through the 1980s, approaching the fortieth anniversary of the outbreak of the war, some twenty books appeared dealing with the war's politics, diplomacy, and strategy.' The late Gregory Henderson, writing in an elegiac vein, acknowledged this new era in scholarship. "The men who lived the Korean War now pass. A new generation, eyes deep in mountains of documents declassified up to 1954, claims the old fields. The headiness of those years for us who lived them ebbs. We come, cooly [sic] enmeshed in footnotes, to the scribes' time."2 The scribes have been busiest rewriting American policy and Anglo-American relations during the war. Perhaps as much as anything, the appearance between 1976 and 1984 of the relevant volumes in the U.S. foreign relations series and the clock-like opening of pertinent materials in the British Public Records Office stimulated this fresh research. New accounts have also brought the role of KoI A count that included military and campaign histories would go substantially higher. The findings of Bruce Cumings, Rosemary Foot, Burton I. Kaufman, Callum A. MacDonald, and others have served cumulatively to displace David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), the standard treatment for at least twenty years. For recent reviews of the new literature, see Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991): 411-31; and Philip West, "Interpreting the Korean War," American Historical Review 94 (February 1989): 80-96. 2 Gregory Henderson, book review, Journal of Asian Studies 47 (May 1988): 389. MICHAEL H. HUNT, professor of history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, is the author of Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy and The Making of a Special Relationship, which is a study of early U.S.-China ties. He is now completing a book on the origins of Chinese Communist foreign policy. Political Science Quarterly Volume 107 Number 3 1992 453
454 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY reans into clearer focus.Integrating Korean sources with the English-language literature,those accounts have focused attention on the peninsular origins of the war and the interaction between the great powers and the local actors,between international politics and local politics.On a third front,Soviet involvement,the first volume of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs opened up some intriguing insights in 1970,and the 1990 volume has offered some supplementary details.But in general,our view on the Kremlin remained limited in the age of glasnost,and little has yet changed now in the age of Boris Yeltsin.3 The Chinese role has,at least until recently,been only marginally better under- stood.Whether and when the Chinese might release illuminating material on the war has been a subject of occasional,generally pessimistic comment.But the Chinese are making their own contribution to our understanding of the war,helping us to move beyond the point researchers relying heavily on the contemporary public record had carried us.5 Thanks to new material China's intrusion into the narrative need no longer be accompanied by a relentless rain of speculation and misinformation.We can now correct misconceptions by nonspecialists intent on a more global view of the war,s subject undocu- mented claims to critical scrutiny,?and begin to nail down such vital but elu- 3 See John Merrill,review article,Journal of Korean Studies 3(1981):181-91,for a helpful appraisal of Nikita S.Khrushchev,Khrushchev Remembers,Strobe Talbott,trans.and ed.,2 vols. (Boston:Little,Brown,1970 and 1974).See also Khrushchev Remembers:The Glasnost Tapes, Jerrold L.Schecter with Vyacheslav V.Luchkov,trans.and eds.(Boston:Little,Brown,1990),143- 47.For recent revelations,perhaps a harbinger,see the Reuters report from Moscow,"Ex-North Korea Envoy Says Kim Started War,"New York Times,6 July 1990;and N.Anin (pseud.),"How the War in Korea Started,"Newsreview,13 July 1991,31,and 20 July 1991,29,and 27 July 1991, 30.Milton Leitenberg was kind enough to supply me with a copy of the latter item. 4 For example,Max Hastings writing in 1987 suggested that the Chinese records are either lost or forever sealed."It may never be possible to piece together the precise decision-making process in Peking that led to the order to enter Korea.Almost all the key participants are dead,and among the living there is no reliable body of records to enable even those who wish to establish the objective truth about recent Chinese political history to do so."Hastings,The Korean War(New York:Simon Schuster,1987),132.Edwin P.Hoyt,The Day the Chinese Attacked:Korea,1950(New York: McGraw-Hill,1990),144,is similarly pessimistic. 5 Allen S.Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu:The Decision to Enter the Korean War (originally published 1960,Stanford,CA:Stanford University Press,1968),a meticulous reconstruction of Chinese signalling from June to November 1950,is the best known and most influential of these works based primarily on the public record. 6 Take for example the basic error of making Lin Biao the commander of the Chinese "volunteers" in Korea in Joseph C.Goulden,Korea:The Untold Story of the War (New York:Times Books, 1982),309;and Clay Blair,The Forgotten War:America in Korea,1950-53 (New York:Times Books, 1987),390,396. 7 See for example the imaginative treatment of Chinese decision making in October and November 1950 in Russell Spurr,Enter the Dragon:China's Undeclared War against the U.S.in Korea,1950- 5/(New York:Newmarket Press,1988).Spurr fails to indicate precisely how the interviews in China on which he relies so heavily support his narrative.Hoyt,The Day the Chinese Attacked,a somewhat better grounded account,also dispenses with precise documentation
454 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY reans into clearer focus. Integrating Korean sources with the English-language literature, those accounts have focused attention on the peninsular origins of the war and the interaction between the great powers and the local actors, between international politics and local politics. On a third front, Soviet involvement, the first volume of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs opened up some intriguing insights in 1970, and the 1990 volume has offered some supplementary details. But in general, our view on the Kremlin remained limited in the age of glasnost, and little has yet changed now in the age of Boris Yeltsin.3 The Chinese role has, at least until recently, been only marginally better understood. Whether and when the Chinese might release illuminating material on the war has been a subject of occasional, generally pessimistic comment.4 But the Chinese are making their own contribution to our understanding of the war, helping us to move beyond the point researchers relying heavily on the contemporary public record had carried US.5 Thanks to new material China's intrusion into the narrative need no longer be accompanied by a relentless rain of speculation and misinformation. We can now correct misconceptions by nonspecialists intent on a more global view of the war,6 subject undocumented claims to critical scrutiny,7 and begin to nail down such vital but elu- 3 See John Merrill, review article, Journal of Korean Studies 3 (1981): 181-91, for a helpful appraisal of Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed., 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970 and 1974). See also Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov, trans. and eds. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 143- 47. For recent revelations, perhaps a harbinger, see the Reuters report from Moscow, "Ex-North Korea Envoy Says Kim Started War," New York Times, 6 July 1990; and N. Anin (pseud.), "How the War in Korea Started," Newsreview, 13 July 1991, 31, and 20 July 1991, 29, and 27 July 1991, 30. Milton Leitenberg was kind enough to supply me with a copy of the latter item. 4For example, Max Hastings writing in 1987 suggested that the Chinese records are either lost or forever sealed. "It may never be possible to piece together the precise decision-making process in Peking that led to the order to enter Korea. Almost all the key participants are dead, and among the living there is no reliable body of records to enable even those who wish to establish the objective truth about recent Chinese political history to do so." Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 132. Edwin P. Hoyt, The Day the Chinese Attacked: Korea, 1950 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 144, is similarly pessimistic. 5 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (originally published 1960, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), a meticulous reconstruction of Chinese signalling from June to November 1950, is the best known and most influential of these works based primarily on the public record. 6 Take for example the basic error of making Lin Biao the commander of the Chinese "volunteers" in Korea in Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: Times Books, 1982), 309; and Clay Blair, TheForgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-53 (New York: Times Books, 1987), 390, 396. 7See for example the imaginative treatment of Chinese decision making in October and November 1950 in Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War against the U.S. in Korea, 1950- 51 (New York: Newmarket Press, 1988). Spurr fails to indicate precisely how the interviews in China on which he relies so heavily support his narrative. Hoyt, The Day the Chinese Attacked, a somewhat better grounded account, also dispenses with precise documentation
BEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS 455 sive topics as the domestic impact of the wars and its effects on Sino-Soviet re- lations. The credit for this advance on the Chinese front of the Korean War,but one aspect of a broad movement to develop and open up party history,goes to the Communist party central committee itself.Much of the headway made through the 1980s was due to the efforts of three historical units in Beijing operating under the direct supervision of a central committee"small group."The party center's own research offices have put out a wide variety of material relevant to Mao Zedong's central role in the crisis as well as the context in which he operated. Adding significantly to the literature,the Chinese military itself has promoted research and publication on a topic in which it takes considerable pride.Officers who played a prominent role in the conflict together with military researchers have produced an impressive body of work,much of it published by one or another of the military-run presses.2 These various secondary treatments and 8 The most ambitious study to date is Larry S.Weiss,"Storm Around the Cradle:The Korean War and the Early Years of the People's Republic of China"(Ph.D.dissertation in Political Science, Columbia University,1981),which contends that the war radicalized China's domestic policy,thus bringing to a premature end the New Democracy stage of China's development. See Robert R.Simmons,The Strained Alliance:Peking,Pyongyang,Moscow and the Politics of the Korean War (New York:Free Press,1975);Wilbur A.Chaffee,"Two Hypotheses of Sino- Soviet Relations as Concerns the Instigation of the Korean War,Journal ofKorean Affairs 6(1976- 77):1-13;and Nakajima Mineo,"The Sino-Soviet Confrontation:Its Roots in the International Background of the Korean War,"Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs I (January 1979):19-47. 10 For a fuller treatment of developments over the last decade,Michael H.Hunt and Odd Arne Westad,"The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs:A Field Report on New Historical Sources and Old Research Problems,"China Quarterly 122(Summer 1990):258-72.For an updated listing of sources,see Steven M.Goldstein and He Di,"New Chinese Sources on the History of the Cold War,"Cold War International History Project Bulletin 1 (Spring 1992):4-6. i Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi,comp.,Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong manuscripts for the period following the establishment of the country],5 vols.to date, internal circulation (Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1987),vols.1-4 covering the Korean War;and Peng Dehuai zhuanji bianxiezu,comp.,Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan [A selection of Peng Dehuai works on military affairs](Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1988).For a selection of translated materials from Jianguo yilai,vol.1,see Li Xiaobing et al.,"Mao's Despatch of Chinese Troops into Korea: Forty-Six Telegrams,July-October 1950,"Chinese Historians 5(Spring 1992):63-86. 12 The military compiled and published the first major collection of inner party documents and military dispatches in Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi kexueyuan,comp.,Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan [A selection of Mao Zedong works on military affairs],internal circulation(Beijing:Zhong- guo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi,1981;Tokyo reprint,Sososha,1985).For recent overviews by re- searchers in the military,Yao Xu,Cong Yalujiang dao Banmendian:Weida de kangMei yuanChao zhanzheng [From the Yalu River to Panmunjom:The great war to resist America and aid Korea], internal circulation (Beijing:Renmin,1985);Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian,KangMei yuan- Chao jishi [A record of resisting America and aiding Korea],internal circulation(Beijing:Zhonggong dangshi ziliao,1987);and Chai and Zhao,Banmendian tanpan:Chaoxian zhanzheng juan [The Panmunjom talks:A volume on the Korean War](Beijing:Jiefangjun,1989);Junshi jiaoxueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu,comp.,Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangMei yuanChao zhanshi [A battle history of resistance to America and aid to Korea by the Chinese people's volunteer army],internal circulation (Beijing:Junshi jiaoxue,1988);and Xu Yan,Diyici jiaoliang:KangMei yuanChao zhan-
BEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS | 455 sive topics as the domestic impact of the war8 and its effects on Sino-Soviet relations.9 The credit for this advance on the Chinese front of the Korean War, but one aspect of a broad movement to develop and open up party history, goes to the Communist party central committee itself. Much of the headway made through the 1980s was due to the efforts of three historical units in Beijing operating under the direct supervision of a central committee "small group."'0 The party center's own research offices have put out a wide variety of material relevant to Mao Zedong's central role in the crisis as well as the context in which he operated."I Adding significantly to the literature, the Chinese military itself has promoted research and publication on a topic in which it takes considerable pride. Officers who played a prominent role in the conflict together with military researchers have produced an impressive body of work, much of it published by one or another of the military-run presses.-2 These various secondary treatments and 8 The most ambitious study to date is Larry S. Weiss, "Storm Around the Cradle: The Korean War and the Early Years of the People's Republic of China" (Ph.D. dissertation in Political Science, Columbia University, 1981), which contends that the war radicalized China's domestic policy, thus bringing to a premature end the New Democracy stage of China's development. I See Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean War (New York: Free Press, 1975); Wilbur A. Chaffee, "Two Hypotheses of SinoSoviet Relations as Concerns the Instigation of the Korean War," Journal of Korean Affairs 6 (1976- 77): 1-13; and Nakajima Mineo, "The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Its Roots in the International Background of the Korean War," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 1 (January 1979): 19-47. 10 For a fuller treatment of developments over the last decade, see Michael H. Hunt and Odd Arne Westad, "The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs: A Field Report on New Historical Sources and Old Research Problems," China Quarterly 122 (Summer 1990): 258-72. For an updated listing of sources, see Steven M. Goldstein and He Di, "New Chinese Sources on the History of the Cold War," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 1 (Spring 1992): 4-6. " Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, comp., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong manuscripts for the period following the establishment of the country], 5 vols. to date, internal circulation (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1987), vols. 1-4 covering the Korean War; and Peng Dehuai zhuanji bianxiezu, comp., Peng Dehuaijunshi wenxuan [A selection of Peng Dehuai works on military affairs] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1988). For a selection of translated materials from Jianguo yilai, vol. 1, see Li Xiaobing et al., "Mao's Despatch of Chinese Troops into Korea: Forty-Six Telegrams, July-October 1950," Chinese Historians 5 (Spring 1992): 63-86. 12 The military compiled and published the first major collection of inner party documents and military dispatches in Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi kexueyuan, comp., Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan [A selection of Mao Zedong works on military affairs], internal circulation (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi, 1981; Tokyo reprint, Sososha, 1985). For recent overviews by researchers in the military, Yao Xu, Cong Yalujiang dao Banmendian: Weida de kangMei yuanChao zhanzheng [From the Yalu River to Panmunjom: The great war to resist America and aid Korea], internal circulation (Beijing: Renmin, 1985); Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian, KangMei yuanChaojishi [A record of resisting America and aiding Korea], internal circulation (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, 1987); and Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan: Chaoxian zhanzheng juan [The Panmunjom talks: A volume on the Korean War] (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 1989); Junshi jiaoxueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, comp., Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangMei yuanChao zhanshi [A battle history of resistance to America and aid to Korea by the Chinese people's volunteer army], internal circulation (Beijing: Junshi jiaoxue, 1988); and Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang: KangMeiyuanChao zhan-
456 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY documentary collections provide a window-indirect to be sure-into military, party,and foreign ministry archives.Taken together,they offer a view that contrasts sharply with what was available earlier in China.13 Foreign scholars soon recognized this historical opening.The first hints came at a conference in Beijing in 1986.14 Since then,as more and more material has been published and reached specialists outside China,additional accounts in English have begun to appear,pulling aside the curtain long obscuring Chinese decision making.i5 While the record of China's role in the Korean War is by no means complete, the materials now in hand are voluminous and reliable enough to invite a sweeping reappraisal of Beijing's response to the crisis and an overall reassessment of the crisis itself.These new Chinese materials on the Korean War are especially rich for the first year of the conflict when Beijing moved toward a decision to intervene, struggled to formulate war aims and an appropriate strategy,and finally accepted negotiations and a military stalemate.This article begins by sketching out some of the central findings that have emerged to date.It then seeks to relate those findings to themes drawn from the more fully documented Anglo-American side zheng de lishi huigu yu fansi [The first test of strength:A historical review and evaluation of the war to resist America and aid Korea](Beijing:Zhongguo guangbo dianshi,1990).The chief memoirists from the military side are Nie Rongzhen,Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [The memoirs of Nie Rongzhen]3 vols.(Beijing:Janshi,1983,and Jiefangjun,1984);Du Ping,Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu [With the headquarters of the volunteer army](Beijing:Jiefangjun,1989);Yang Chengwu,Yang Chengwu huiyilu [Memoirs of Yang Chengwu]2 vols.(Beijing:Jiefangjun,1987 and 1990);Yang Dezhi,Weile heping [For the sake of peace](Beijing:Changzheng,1987);and Hong Xuezhi,KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng huiyi ["Recollections of the war to resist U.S.aggression and aid Korea"](Beijing:Jiefang- jun wenyi,1990). 13 For an impression of how thin and domestically oriented the treatment of the war was before the recent explosion of publications,see Hu Zhongchi,KangMei yuanChao yundong shihua [An informal history of the resist-America aid-Korea campaign](Beijing:ZhongHua qingnian,1956);and Zhongguo renmin kangMei yuanChao zonghui xuanchuanbu,comp.,Weida de kangMei yuanChao yundong [The great resist-America,aid-Korea campaign](Beijing:Renmin,1954),a collection of documents. 14 The two conference papers that deal with the Korean War are Jonathan D.Pollack's "The Korean War and Sino-American Relations,"a treatment that is strongest on the first months of the war,and Chen Xiaolu's "China's Policy Toward the United States,1949-1955,"both in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming,eds.,Sino-American Relations 1945-1955:A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington,DE:Scholarly Resources,1989),213-37 and 184-97. Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai,"China's Decision to Enter the Korean War:History Revisited," China Quarterly 121 (March 1990):94-115,is a revealing treatment rendered problematic by its heavy reliance on unattributed interviews.That account has been improved upon and extended by Chen Jian,"The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War"(Occasional paper,Cold War International History Project,Woodrow Wilson Center,Washington,DC,n.d.[1992?]);Chen Jian,"China's Changing Aims during the Korean War,1950-1951,"The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1992):8-41;:Thomas J.Christensen,"Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace:The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams,"International Security 17 (Summer 1992):122-54.Chen,drawing on a book manuscript he is preparing on Chinese policy and the origins of the Korean War,offers the most detailed treatment
456 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY documentary collections provide a window - indirect to be sure - into military, party, and foreign ministry archives. Taken together, they offer a view that contrasts sharply with what was available earlier in China.'3 Foreign scholars soon recognized this historical opening. The first hints came at a conference in Beijing in 1986.14 Since then, as more and more material has been published and reached specialists outside China, additional accounts in English have begun to appear, pulling aside the curtain long obscuring Chinese decision making.'5 While the record of China's role in the Korean War is by no means complete, the materials now in hand are voluminous and reliable enough to invite a sweeping reappraisal of Beijing's response to the crisis and an overall reassessment of the crisis itself. These new Chinese materials on the Korean War are especially rich for the first year of the conflict when Beijing moved toward a decision to intervene, struggled to formulate war aims and an appropriate strategy, and finally accepted negotiations and a military stalemate. This article begins by sketching out some of the central findings that have emerged to date. It then seeks to relate those findings to themes drawn from the more fully documented Anglo-American side zheng de lishi huigu yufansi [The first test of strength: A historical review and evaluation of the war to resist America and aid Korea] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi, 1990). The chief memoirists from the military side are Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [The memoirs of Nie Rongzhen] 3 vols. (Beijing: Janshi, 1983, and Jiefangjun, 1984); Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu [With the headquarters of the volunteer army] (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 1989); Yang Chengwu, Yang Chengwu huiyilu [Memoirs of Yang Chengwu] 2 vols. (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 1987 and 1990); Yang Dezhi, Weile heping [For the sake of peace] (Beijing: Changzheng, 1987); and Hong Xuezhi, KangMeiyuanChao zhanzheng huiyi ["Recollections of the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea"] (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi, 1990). 13 For an impression of how thin and domestically oriented the treatment of the war was before the recent explosion of publications, see Hu Zhongchi, KangMei yuanChao yundong shihua [An informal history of the resist-America aid-Korea campaign] (Beijing: ZhongHua qingnian, 1956); and Zhongguo renmin kangMei yuanChao zonghui xuanchuanbu, comp., Weida de kangMeiyuanChao yundong [The great resist-America, aid- Korea campaign] (Beijing: Renmin, 1954), a collection of documents. 14 The two conference papers that deal with the Korean War are Jonathan D. Pollack's "The Korean War and Sino-American Relations," a treatment that is strongest on the first months of the war, and Chen Xiaolu's "China's Policy Toward the United States, 1949-1955," both in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1989), 213-37 and 184-97. 15 Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," China Quarterly 121 (March 1990): 94-115, is a revealing treatment rendered problematic by its heavy reliance on unattributed interviews. That account has been improved upon and extended by Chen Jian, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War" (Occasional paper, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, n.d. [1992?]); Chen Jian, "China's Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950-195 1," The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1992): 8-41; and Thomas J. Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams," International Security 17 (Summer 1992): 122-54. Chen, drawing on a book manuscript he is preparing on Chinese policy and the origins of the Korean War, offers the most detailed treatment
BEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS 457 of the story.It finally offers some reflections on the implications of the Korean case for our general understanding of international crises. BEIJING AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR New materials coming out of China complicate and marginally clarify our picture of Beijing's role in the origins of the Korean War and its response to the first months of the fighting.They do not set directly in doubt the older impression that the actual outbreak of the war found the Chinese leadership preoccupied with reconstructing the economy,carrying out land reform in newly liberated areas,and in general consolidating the revolution at home.16 There are now,however,some hints that Beijing knew that the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung had some military initiative afoot.Several accounts claim that Mao and Stalin discussed the Korean question during their summit meeting in Moscow (December 1949-February 1950)and that Mao exchanged views with Kim during a later meeting in Beijing.7 Whatever may have been said on these occasions,it is clear that Beijing and Pyongyang worked together in the year before the war to repatriate Korean troops who had fought in the Chinese civil war.Those troops had marched into the Northeast with the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army at the end of the Pacific War carrying orders to organize Korean residents of the Northeast and to help the Soviet army in the liberation of Korea.18 In fall 1949 China and North Korea reached an agreement on the return of two divisions of those troops in the Fourth Field Army.While in Moscow in January 1950 Mao received Kim Il Sung's request for the return of additional Korean nationals in the Fourth Field Army;and during the spring, after some additional discussions with the North Koreans,Nie Rongzhen,then acting chief of staff,effected the return of 14,000 with their weapons and equip- ment.Estimates of the total number of troops sent back to Korea by the eve of the war run around 50-70,000 and by the fall exceed 100,000.19 16 The"liberation"of Taiwan was somewhere on the agenda,but (to judge from the evidence now available)an invasion attempt was not imminent because the Communists lacked the requisite naval and air forces.Nie,Nie Rongzhen huiyilu 3:7 Jon W.Huebner,"The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan,"China Quarterly 110 (June 1987):256-75,which surveys U.S.and Nationalist intelligence estimates;and Xu Yan,Jinmen zhi zhan (1949-1959 nian)[The battle for Jinmen (1949-1959)] (Beijing:Zhongguo guangbo dianshi,1992),116-25,142-44,which describes the long-term planning for an invasion and reports that by 11 August 1950 the Military Affairs Committee had decided to put off any decision to 1952 in order to focus on Korea. 17Hao and Zhai,"China's Decision,"100,claim on the basis of"interviews"that Kim Il Sung visited China in April on his way back from Moscow and revealed his intention to unify Korea by force but not the details of his plans. isZhongyang dang'anguan,comp.,Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (hereafter ZYWJ)[A selection of CCP central committee documents],inner-party circulation,14 vols.(Beijing:Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao,1982-87),13:121. Nie,Nie Rongzhen huiyilu,3:744 (which does not reveal if the North Korean requests carried any hints of the uses to which the troops would be put);Bruce Cumings,The Origins of the Korean
BEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS | 457 of the story. It finally offers some reflections on the implications of the Korean case for our general understanding of international crises. BEIJING AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR New materials coming out of China complicate and marginally clarify our picture of Beijing's role in the origins of the Korean War and its response to the first months of the fighting. They do not set directly in doubt the older impression that the actual outbreak of the war found the Chinese leadership preoccupied with reconstructing the economy, carrying out land reform in newly liberated areas, and in general consolidating the revolution at home.'6 There are now, however, some hints that Beijing knew that the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung had some military initiative afoot. Several accounts claim that Mao and Stalin discussed the Korean question during their summit meeting in Moscow (December 1949-February 1950) and that Mao exchanged views with Kim during a later meeting in Beijing.'7 Whatever may have been said on these occasions, it is clear that Beijing and Pyongyang worked together in the year before the war to repatriate Korean troops who had fought in the Chinese civil war. Those troops had marched into the Northeast with the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army at the end of the Pacific War carrying orders to organize Korean residents of the Northeast and to help the Soviet army in the liberation of Korea.'8 In fall 1949 China and North Korea reached an agreement on the return of two divisions of those troops in the Fourth Field Army. While in Moscow in January 1950 Mao received Kim Il Sung's request for the return of additional Korean nationals in the Fourth Field Army; and during the spring, after some additional discussions with the North Koreans, Nie Rongzhen, then acting chief of staff, effected the return of 14,000 with their weapons and equipment. Estimates of the total number of troops sent back to Korea by the eve of the war run around 50-70,000 and by the fall exceed 1I0,000.'9 16 The "liberation" of Taiwan was somewhere on the agenda, but (to judge from the evidence now available) an invasion attempt was not imminent because the Communists lacked the requisite naval and air forces. Nie, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu 3: 719; Jon W. Huebner, "The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan," China Quarterly 110 (June 1987): 256-75, which surveys U.S. and Nationalist intelligence estimates; and Xu Yan, Jinmen zhi zhan (1949-1959 nian) [The battle for Jinmen (1949-1959)] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi, 1992), 116-25, 142-44, which describes the long-term planning for an invasion and reports that by 11 August 1950 the Military Affairs Committee had decided to put off any decision to 1952 in order to focus on Korea. 17 Hao and Zhai, "China's Decision," 100, claim on the basis of "interviews" that Kim I1 Sung visited China in April on his way back from Moscow and revealed his intention to unify Korea by force but not the details of his plans. 18 Zhongyang dang'anguan, comp., Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (hereafter ZYWJ) [A selection of CCP central committee documents], inner-party circulation, 14 vols. (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1982-87), 13: 121. '9 Nie, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, 3:744 (which does not reveal if the North Korean requests carried any hints of the uses to which the troops would be put); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean
458 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY On 25 June 1950,North Korean forces launched an invasion of South Korea, setting off a string of unpleasant surprises for Beijing.The first of these came on 27 June when President Harry S.Truman announced that the United States would not only defend South Korea under the auspices of the United Nations but also "neutralize"the Taiwan Strait by sending the Seventh Fleet to block any communist invasion attempt.Beijing's earliest public response to the American intervention,published on 28 and 29 June,was notably cautious and vague. While deploring American intervention around the world and especially in Asia, Mao,Premier Zhou Enlai,and a Renmin ribao editorial all nonetheless focused their public fire on the American attempt to deny China control of its province of Taiwan.20 But the Chinese Communist Party(CCP)began almost at once to prepare against untoward developments in Korea.On 30 June Zhou ordered Chinese military observers to North Korea.On 7 and 10 July the Military Affairs Com- mittee met,and in sessions chaired by Zhou and attended by the army command- er-in-chief,Zhu De,and Nie Rongzhen recommended creating a force to defend the border and if necessary cross the Yalu River to help North Korea.Mao at once endorsed the proposal.By early August more than a quarter of a million troops were assembled along the Yalu with Gao Gang,in charge of party and military affairs in the Northeast,bearing responsibility for logistical support. Even so,Beijing's alarm,reflected in public warnings directed against the advance of the United Nations forces,continued to mount.On 5 August Mao personally instructed Gao Gang to have the border forces ready for combat by early Sep- tember.Told by Gao of the difficulties in completing the preparations,Mao agreed on 18 August to extend the deadline to the end of the month.On 17 September,in the immediate aftermath of the successful American landing at Inchon,the Military Affairs Committee dispatched Chinese officers to Korea to lay the groundwork for possible intervention.21 China's growing alarm,reenforced by Soviet and Korean calls for assistance, gave rise to efforts to coordinate policy among the three countries,so at least the War,vol.2:The Roaring of the Cataract,1947-1950(Princeton,NJ:Princeton University Press, 1990),362-63;Chen,"The Sino-Soviet Alliance,"13n,22-23. 20 Michael M.Kau and John K.Leung,The Writings of Mao Zedong 1949-1976(Armonk,NY: M.E.Sharpe,1986-),1:118;ZhongHua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi,comps.,Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic writings of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1990),18-19;and Renmin ribao,29 June 1950. 21 Chai and Zhao Banmendian tanpan,34-36;Zhang Xi,"Peng Dehuai shouming shuaishuai kangMei yuanChao de qianqian houhou"[The full story of Peng Dehuai's appointment to head the resistance to the United States and the assistance to Korea],Zhonggong dangshi ziliao 31(1989):118- 20;Jianguo yilai,1:429,454,469;Chai and Zhao,KangMei yuanChao jishi,46-47,51.Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Reflections on some major incidents and decisions] (Beijing:Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao,1991),43,recalls a Political Bureau meeting on 4 August at which Mao contended that China had to help Korea by sending troops,that preparations for their dispatch had to begin at once,and that only the timing of the intervention was a matter for discussion. Bo's account needs confirmation
458 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces launched an invasion of South Korea, setting off a string of unpleasant surprises for Beijing. The first of these came on 27 June when President Harry S. Truman announced that the United States would not only defend South Korea under the auspices of the United Nations but also "neutralize" the Taiwan Strait by sending the Seventh Fleet to block any communist invasion attempt. Beijing's earliest public response to the American intervention, published on 28 and 29 June, was notably cautious and vague. While deploring American intervention around the world and especially in Asia, Mao, Premier Zhou Enlai, and a Renmin ribao editorial all nonetheless focused their public fire on the American attempt to deny China control of its province of Taiwan.20 But the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began almost at once to prepare against untoward developments in Korea. On 30 June Zhou ordered Chinese military observers to North Korea. On 7 and 10 July the Military Affairs Committee met, and in sessions chaired by Zhou and attended by the army commander-in-chief, Zhu De, and Nie Rongzhen recommended creating a force to defend the border and if necessary cross the Yalu River to help North Korea. Mao at once endorsed the proposal. By early August more than a quarter of a million troops were assembled along the Yalu with Gao Gang, in charge of party and military affairs in the Northeast, bearing responsibility for logistical support. Even so, Beijing's alarm, reflected in public warnings directed against the advance of the United Nations forces, continued to mount. On 5 August Mao personally instructed Gao Gang to have the border forces ready for combat by early September. Told by Gao of the difficulties in completing the preparations, Mao agreed on 18 August to extend the deadline to the end of the month. On 17 September, in the immediate aftermath of the successful American landing at Inchon, the Military Affairs Committee dispatched Chinese officers to Korea to lay the groundwork for possible intervention.2' China's growing alarm, reenforced by Soviet and Korean calls for assistance, gave rise to efforts to coordinate policy among the three countries, so at least the War, vol. 2: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 362-63; Chen, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance," 13n, 22-23. 20 Michael M. Kau and John K. Leung, The Writings of Mao Zedong 1949-1976 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986- ), 1: 118; ZhongHua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, comps., Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic writings of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990), 18-19; and Renmin ribao, 29 June 1950. 21 Chai and Zhao Banmendian tanpan, 34-36; Zhang Xi, "Peng Dehuai shouming shuaishuai kangMei yuanChao de qianqian houhou" [The full story of Peng Dehuai's appointment to head the resistance to the United States and the assistance to Korea], Zhonggong dangshi ziliao 31 (1989): 118- 20; Jianguo yilai, 1: 429, 454, 469; Chai and Zhao, KangMei yuanChao jishi, 46-47, 51. Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Reflections on some major incidents and decisions] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1991), 43, recalls a Political Bureau meeting on 4 August at which Mao contended that China had to help Korea by sending troops, that preparations for their dispatch had to begin at once, and that only the timing of the intervention was a matter for discussion. Bo's account needs confirmation
BEUJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS 459 new secondary accounts suggest.While some older accounts contend that regular, high-level consultations among the three began in early July,22 the new evidence points to a later date-after the Inchon landing and General Douglas MacAr- thur's rapid push north created panic in Pyongyang and alarm in Beijing and Moscow.These contacts quickly moved to the highest level,bringing the Chinese fully into inner councils of the war.In late September Stalin raised with Beijing the possibility of Kim Il Sung setting up a government in exile in China,and on 1 October with South Korean forces crossing the thirty-eighth parallel Kim personally followed up with a desperate request for China's help in the war.23 The Peoples Republic of China (PRC)had to scramble to create working relations with Kim's regime.A Chinese embassy was hastily set up in early July, nearly a year after diplomatic recognition.The post-Inchon alarm brought the Koreans and Chinese into increasingly frequent military contact.On 8 October Kim sent a liaison to the headquarters of the Chinese forces gathering in the Northeast,and on 4 December,as a result of a Kim-Mao meeting in Beijing,a joint Chinese-Korean command was set up under Peng Dehuai,the commander of the Chinese forces in Korea.At several critical points in the tumultuous first year of the war,Kim Il Sung travelled to Beijing.These visits in early December 1950,late January 1951,and early June 1951 served to coordinate war strategy and to iron out practical difficulties such as friction between the Chinese "volun- teers"and Koreans,differences over policy on the release of prisoners,and inadequate North Korean logistical support.24 THE DECISION TO INTERVENE The new materials offer some new insights on the decisions that led China to intervene militarily in the conflict.These materials,which include a substantial body of documents,reveal Mao's dominant role.Not surprisingly,however, given the complexity of the man,the rapidly developing crisis confronting him, and the size of the stakes for the CCP,those materials raise fresh,knotty ques- tions about precisely when and exactly why Mao resolved to act. To clarify the issue of timing it is useful to think of Mao moving along two sometimes intersecting tracks toward a definitive commitment of his forces. 22 Drawing on a 1968 study by Huang Chenxia,Jurgen Domes,P'eng Te-huai(Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press,1985),60,points to Sino-Soviet military meeting in Beijing in August and the creation of a joint Sino-Soviet general staff in Shenyang in September. 2 Chai and Zhao,KangMei yuanChao jishi,55;Zhang,"Peng Dehuai shouming,"123;Xu,Diyici jiaoliang,22;for what purports to be the text of Kim's I October appeal for help,see Ye Yumeng, Chubing Chaoxian:KangMei yuanChao lishi jishi [Sending troops to Korea:A historical record of the resistance to America and assistance to Korea](Beijing:Beijing shiyue wenyi,1990),39-40. 24 Chai and Zhao,KangMei yuanChao jishi,47,50,55,58,61-62,64,65,68,74,76,78,86; Zhang,"Peng Dehuai shouming,"143;Jianguo yilai,1:545,2:43-44;Mao junshi wenxuan,685; Qi Dexue,Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu [Inside story of the Korean war decisions](Shenyang: Liaoning daxue,1991),184-85;Du,Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu,127,165,176-77,185
BEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS | 459 new secondary accounts suggest. While some older accounts contend that regular, high-level consultations among the three began in early July,22 the new evidence points to a later date - after the Inchon landing and General Douglas MacArthur's rapid push north created panic in Pyongyang and alarm in Beijing and Moscow. These contacts quickly moved to the highest level, bringing the Chinese fully into inner councils of the war. In late September Stalin raised with Beijing the possibility of Kim Il Sung setting up a government in exile in China, and on 1 October with South Korean forces crossing the thirty-eighth parallel Kim personally followed up with a desperate request for China's help in the war.23 The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) had to scramble to create working relations with Kim's regime. A Chinese embassy was hastily set up in early July, nearly a year after diplomatic recognition. The post-Inchon alarm brought the Koreans and Chinese into increasingly frequent military contact. On 8 October Kim sent a liaison to the headquarters of the Chinese forces gathering in the Northeast, and on 4 December, as a result of a Kim-Mao meeting in Beijing, a joint Chinese-Korean command was set up under Peng Dehuai, the commander of the Chinese forces in Korea. At several critical points in the tumultuous first year of the war, Kim Il Sung travelled to Beijing. These visits in early December 1950, late January 1951, and early June 1951 served to coordinate war strategy and to iron out practical difficulties such as friction between the Chinese "volunteers" and Koreans, differences over policy on the release of prisoners, and inadequate North Korean logistical support.24 THE DECISION TO INTERVENE The new materials offer some new insights on the decisions that led China to intervene militarily in the conflict. These materials, which include a substantial body of documents, reveal Mao's dominant role. Not surprisingly, however, given the complexity of the man, the rapidly developing crisis confronting him, and the size of the stakes for the CCP, those materials raise fresh, knotty questions about precisely when and exactly why Mao resolved to act. To clarify the issue of timing it is useful to think of Mao moving along two sometimes intersecting tracks toward a definitive commitment of his forces. 22 Drawing on a 1968 study by Huang Chenxia, Jurgen Domes, P'eng Te-huai (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985), 60, points to Sino-Soviet military meeting in Beijing in August and the creation of a joint Sino-Soviet general staff in Shenyang in September. 23 Chai and Zhao, KangMeiyuanChao jishi, 55; Zhang, "Peng Dehuai shouming," 123; Xu, Diyici jiaoliang, 22; for what purports to be the text of Kim's 1 October appeal for help, see Ye Yumeng, Chubing Chaoxian: KangMei yuanChao lishijishi [Sending troops to Korea: A historical record of the resistance to America and assistance to Korea] (Beijing: Beijing shiyue wenyi, 1990), 39-40. 24 Chai and Zhao, KangMei yuanChao jishi, 47, 50, 55, 58, 61-62, 64, 65, 68, 74, 76, 78, 86; Zhang, "Peng Dehuai shouming," 143; Jianguo yilai, 1: 545, 2: 43-44; Mao junshi wenxuan, 685; Qi Dexue, Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu [Inside story of the Korean war decisions] (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue, 1991), 184-85; Du, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, 127, 165, 176-77, 185
460 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY Suspiciously,little of either track is evident before Kim's appeal for help on 1 October,even though we know that Mao began to take a hold of strategic plan- ning two months earlier. One of those tracks led to Moscow.Having announced to his colleagues his own view that China should intervene,Mao on 2 October cabled his decision to Stalin.Chinese troops would enter Korea on 15 October,Mao announced,and there they would assume a defensive posture,letting the enemy forces know that they faced a new situation.Once better prepared and equipped with Soviet arms, those troops could if need be take the offensive.Aside from equipment,Mao wanted from Stalin help in fending off possible American naval and air attacks on Chinese cities and industry.Thus,while indicating that China was ready to shoulder the main burden of saving North Korea,Mao also sought to ensure practical military cooperation from a Soviet leader known for his caution and now perhaps growing reluctant to be drawn directly into a protracted or escalating conflict.25 In any case,on 8 October Mao followed up by sending Zhou Enlai to meet with Stalin on Chinese intervention.Zhou,accompanied by Lin Biao (seeking Soviet medical treatment)and perhaps by Ambassador Wang Jiaxiang,travelled to Sochi on the Black Sea for a meeting with Stalin that lasted through the night of 9-10 October.Stalin revealed that he would not provide the air cover Chinese forces operating in Korea would desperately need.The Soviet air force,he ex- plained,needed more time for preparation before being engaged even in the defense of Chinese airspace.Zhou returned to Moscow to cable Mao this disap- pointing news but also to pass on assurances that the Soviets would immediately begin supplying weaponry for twenty Chinese divisions.26 While dealing with Stalin,Mao moved along the second track defined by a string of high-level meetings devoted to discussing the grave crisis facing the new regime.The existing record suggests that Mao's proposal for decisive action elicited doubts that he was not able to dispel either quickly or easily,and indeed that he himself seems at points to have fallen prey to uncertainties.Indeed,as early as 2 October in his cable to Stalin,Mao had identified one set of risks: attacking Chinese troops might fail to destroy American forces in Korea and become entangled in a Sino-American military stand-off that would bring serious collateral damage to China's economic reconstruction and that would deepen the discontent of the Chinese already unsettled by revolution.Mao's colleagues who 25 Mao cable to Stalin,2 October 1950 in Jianguo yilai,1:539-41. 26 Zhang,"Peng Dehuai shouming,"147-48.Shi Zhe,who accompanied Zhou as translator,has offered a detailed description of the trip that is often not congruent with other sources and thus has to be used with care.See Shi Zhe with Li Haiwen,Zai lishijuren shenbian:She Zhe huiyilu [Alongside the giants of history:Shi Zhe's memoir](Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1991),495-502.For alternative accounts,see Hong,KangMei yuanChao,25-27;and Qi,Chaoxian zhanzheng,62-63(for the recol- lections of Kang Yimin,another member of Zhou's party).For details on the ensuing Soviet aid program that included air support in Korea beginning in January 1951,see Xu,Diyici jigoliang,30- 32;and Hong,KangMei yuanChao,184
460 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY Suspiciously, little of either track is evident before Kim's appeal for help on 1 October, even though we know that Mao began to take a hold of strategic planning two months earlier. One of those tracks led to Moscow. Having announced to his colleagues his own view that China should intervene, Mao on 2 October cabled his decision to Stalin. Chinese troops would enter Korea on 15 October, Mao announced, and there they would assume a defensive posture, letting the enemy forces know that they faced a new situation. Once better prepared and equipped with Soviet arms, those troops could if need be take the offensive. Aside from equipment, Mao wanted from Stalin help in fending off possible American naval and air attacks on Chinese cities and industry. Thus, while indicating that China was ready to shoulder the main burden of saving North Korea, Mao also sought to ensure practical military cooperation from a Soviet leader known for his caution and now perhaps growing reluctanto be drawn directly into a protracted or escalating conflict.25 In any case, on 8 October Mao followed up by sending Zhou Enlai to meet with Stalin on Chinese intervention. Zhou, accompanied by Lin Biao (seeking Soviet medical treatment) and perhaps by Ambassador Wang Jiaxiang, travelled to Sochi on the Black Sea for a meeting with Stalin that lasted through the night of 9-10 October. Stalin revealed that he would not provide the air cover Chinese forces operating in Korea would desperately need. The Soviet air force, he explained, needed more time for preparation before being engaged even in the defense of Chinese airspace. Zhou returned to Moscow to cable Mao this disappointing news but also to pass on assurances that the Soviets would immediately begin supplying weaponry for twenty Chinese divisions.26 While dealing with Stalin, Mao moved along the second track defined by a string of high-level meetings devoted to discussing the grave crisis facing the new regime. The existing record suggests that Mao's proposal for decisive action elicited doubts that he was not able to dispel either quickly or easily, and indeed that he himself seems at points to have fallen prey to uncertainties. Indeed, as early as 2 October in his cable to Stalin, Mao had identified one set of risks: attacking Chinese troops might fail to destroy American forces in Korea and become entangled in a Sino-American military stand-off that would bring serious collateral damage to China's economic reconstruction and that would deepen the discontent of the Chinese already unsettled by revolution. Mao's colleagues who 25 Mao cable to Stalin, 2 October 1950 in Jianguo yilai, 1: 539-41. 26 Zhang, "Peng Dehuai shouming," 147-48. Shi Zhe, who accompanied Zhou as translator, has offered a detailed description of the trip that is often not congruent with other sources and thus has to be used with care. See Shi Zhe with Li Haiwen, Zai lishi juren shenbian: She Zhe huiyilu [Alongside the giants of history: Shi Zhe's memoir] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1991), 495-502. For alternative accounts, see Hong, KangMeiyuanChao, 25-27; and Qi, Chaoxian zhanzheng, 62-63 (for the recollections of Kang Yimin, another member of Zhou's party). For details on the ensuing Soviet aid program that included air support in Korea beginning in January 1951, see Xu, Diyici jiaoliang, 30- 32; and Hong, KangMeiyuanChao, 184
BEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS 461 opposed sending troops or at least wanted to delay intervention also pointed to the military risks and the prospects of a direct,damaging attack on China.They also argued that the new Chinese state needed time to consolidate its political control,wipe out remaining Chinese Nationalist resistance,complete land re- form,stabilize the economy,and upgrade the armed forces.They pointed to the burdens intervention would place on a war-weary population.They may also have stressed the uncertain nature of Soviet assistance.The rapidly deteriorating battlefield situation,the delays in getting Chinese troops ready for combat,Sta- lin's refusal of air support,and in general the gnawing anxieties about the risks China was about to take-all combined to complicate Mao's task and prolong the discussion. The identity of the doubters is still a matter of some conjecture,27 and even a full record may not reveal a clearly drawn debate with a neat line-up of those for and against intervention.In the face of the prestige that Mao brought to the discussion of military affairs,his colleagues would have expressed themselves carefully,even though in principle collegial decision making still prevailed within the party center.Moreover,the discussions at this time were(the existing record suggests)complex,turning more on the aims and level of the Chinese commitment than on the principle of somehow assisting North Korea.The issue thus did not invite yes or no answers but offered opportunity aplenty for the participants to reassess and shift their views. The first of a hurried and tension-filled series of high-level meetings took place on 1 October.The leadership broke away early from the public celebration of the PRC's first anniversary to discuss Kim Il Sung's urgent request for military assistance.This meeting,held like most of the others to follow within the CCP headquarters compound at Zhongnanhai in Beijing,did not end until dawn.28 The middle of the afternoon the next day (2 October)Mao met with Zhu,Liu Shaoqi,Zhou,Nie,and Gao (having just flown into the capital),and he an- nounced that troops had to intervene.The only questions were when and under 27 Contemporary rumor and later Red Guard indictments have pointed variously to Gao Gang, Liu Bocheng,Lin Biao,Peng Dehuai,Dong Biwu,and Chen Yun.See Carsun Chang,The Third Force in China(New York:Bookman Associates,1952),286;Union Research Institute,The Case of Peng Teh-huai,1959-1968(Hongkong:Union Research Institute,1968),154;and John Gittings, The World and China,1922-1972(New York:Harper and Row,1974),183-84.Other Chinese sources concede inner party differences in early October.Peng Dehuai zishu bianjizu,Peng Dehuai zishu [Peng Dehuai's own account](Beijing:Renmin,1981),a memoir prepared before the Cultural Revolu- tion and apparently without access to personal files;Peng Dehuai zhuanji bianxiezu,Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan,320-21;and Zhang,"Peng Dehuai shouming,"132,136,are all circumspect in naming names,presumably on the principle that the Korean War was a triumph not to be diminished by admissions of division and uncertainty among the CCP leadership at the outset.Several accounts, such as Nie Rongzhen huiyilu,3:736,and Xu,Diyici jiaoliang,23-24,are less discrete in pointing to Lin Biao as an opponent.Hao and Zhai,"China's Decision,"105,points to Lin as well as Gao Gang. 2s Zhang,"Peng Dehuai shouming,"124.This account offers the most detailed treatment of the October meetings but without indicating the source on which it draws
BEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS | 461 opposed sending troops or at least wanted to delay intervention also pointed to the military risks and the prospects of a direct, damaging attack on China. They also argued that the new Chinese state needed time to consolidate its political control, wipe out remaining Chinese Nationalist resistance, complete land reform, stabilize the economy, and upgrade the armed forces. They pointed to the burdens intervention would place on a war-weary population. They may also have stressed the uncertain nature of Soviet assistance. The rapidly deteriorating battlefield situation, the delays in getting Chinese troops ready for combat, Stalin's refusal of air support, and in general the gnawing anxieties about the risks China was about to take -all combined to complicate Mao's task and prolong the discussion. The identity of the doubters is still a matter of some conjecture,27 and even a full record may not reveal a clearly drawn debate with a neat line-up of those for and against intervention. In the face of the prestige that Mao brought to the discussion of military affairs, his colleagues would have expressed themselves carefully, even though in principle collegial decision making still prevailed within the party center. Moreover, the discussions at this time were (the existing record suggests) complex, turning more on the aims and level of the Chinese commitment than on the principle of somehow assisting North Korea. The issue thus did not invite yes or no answers but offered opportunity aplenty for the participants to reassess and shift their views. The first of a hurried and tension-filled series of high-level meetings took place on 1 October. The leadership broke away early from the public celebration of the PRC's first anniversary to discuss Kim I1 Sung's urgent request for military assistance. This meeting, held like most of the others to follow within the CCP headquarters compound at Zhongnanhai in Beijing, did not end until dawn.28 The middle of the afternoon the next day (2 October) Mao met with Zhu, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou, Nie, and Gao (having just flown into the capital), and he announced that troops had to intervene. The only questions were when and under 27 Contemporary rumor and later Red Guard indictments have pointed variously to Gao Gang, Liu Bocheng, Lin Biao, Peng Dehuai, Dong Biwu, and Chen Yun. See Carsun Chang, The Third Force in China (New York: Bookman Associates, 1952), 286; Union Research Institute, The Case of Peng Teh-huai, 1959-1968 (Hongkong: Union Research Institute, 1968), 154; and John Gittings, The World and China, 1922-1972 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 183-84. Other Chinese sources concede inner party differences in early October. Peng Dehuai zishu bianjizu, Peng Dehuai zishu [Peng Dehuai's own account] (Beijing: Renmin, 1981), a memoir prepared before the Cultural Revolution and apparently without access to personal files; Peng Dehuai zhuanji bianxiezu, Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan, 320-21; and Zhang, "Peng Dehuai shouming," 132, 136, are all circumspect in naming names, presumably on the principle that the Korean War was a triumph not to be diminished by admissions of division and uncertainty among the CCP leadership at the outset. Several accounts, such as Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, 3: 736, and Xu, Diyici jiaoliang, 23-24, are less discrete in pointing to Lin Biao as an opponent. Hao and Zhai, "China's Decision," 105, points to Lin as well as Gao Gang. 28 Zhang, "Peng Dehuai shouming," 124. This account offers the most detailed treatment of the October meetings but without indicating the source on which it draws
