上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源（相关阅读）Mao Zedong and China_Mao in his sunset years.PDF

Myth or Reality?:Factional Politics,U.S.-China Relations, and Mao Zedong's Psychology in His Sunset Years, 1972-1976 Yafeng Xia Long Island University Official Chinese Communist historiography claims that the "Gang of Four"interfered in China's foreign policymaking,especially China's relations with the United States from the time of President Richard Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 to October 1976 when the Gang of Four was ousted.Seizing on the difference in thinking between Chi- nese paramount leader Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai on the criticism of the "Ultra-left Trend of Thought and Anarchism"in Chinese politics in December 1972,the radicals influenced Mao to put a stop to Zhou's effort to eliminate the interference of the ultra-leftism in diplomatic affairs.Taking advantage of Mao's criticism of a report en- titled "A Preliminary View on the Talks between Nixon and Brezhnev" published in New Information,an internal journal of the Foreign Minis- try,the radicals forced Zhou into a very difficult political crisis in July- August 1973.Zhou suffered a severe political blow when Mao,based on erroneous reports,concluded that Zhou had made mistakes during his talks with U.S.Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in November 1973. The Chinese historiography claims that the Gang of Four used all these so-called"mistakes"as pretexts in order to purge Zhou and to impede the improvement in U.S.-China relations.Mao was dissatisfied with Zhou,but had no plan to get rid of him.It was Mao who eventually rescued Zhou from these troubled political moments. Several Western scholars have adopted the factional model in inter- preting China's elite politics during those years.2 For example,Harry The Journal of American-East Asian Relations,Vol.15 (2008) Copyright 2008 by Imprint Publications.All rights reserved. 1."The Gang of Four"was the radical supporters and beneficiaries of the Cul- tural Revolution,including Mao Zedong's wife Jiang Qing,and her cohort Zhang Chunqiao,Yao Wenyuan,and Wang Hongwen after June 1973.The official forma- tion of the clique was in November 1973.They were ousted after Mao's death in October 1976. 2.There are numerous publications on elite politics in the People's Republic of China,but very little on elite politics regarding foreign policy issues,especially during the Maoist period.See Hong Yung Lee,From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China(Berkeley,Calif.,1991);Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel 1

1 Myth or Reality?: Factional Politics, U.S.-China Relations, and Mao Zedong’s Psychology in His Sunset Years, 1972–1976 Yafeng Xia Long Island University Official Chinese Communist historiography claims that the “Gang of Four”1 interfered in China’s foreign policymaking, especially China’s relations with the United States from the time of President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972 to October 1976 when the Gang of Four was ousted. Seizing on the difference in thinking between Chi￾nese paramount leader Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai on the criticism of the “Ultra-left Trend of Thought and Anarchism” in Chinese politics in December 1972, the radicals influenced Mao to put a stop to Zhou’s effort to eliminate the interference of the ultra-leftism in diplomatic affairs. Taking advantage of Mao’s criticism of a report en￾titled “A Preliminary View on the Talks between Nixon and Brezhnev” published in New Information, an internal journal of the Foreign Minis￾try, the radicals forced Zhou into a very difficult political crisis in July– August 1973. Zhou suffered a severe political blow when Mao, based on erroneous reports, concluded that Zhou had made mistakes during his talks with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in November 1973. The Chinese historiography claims that the Gang of Four used all these so-called “mistakes” as pretexts in order to purge Zhou and to impede the improvement in U.S.-China relations. Mao was dissatisfied with Zhou, but had no plan to get rid of him. It was Mao who eventually rescued Zhou from these troubled political moments. Several Western scholars have adopted the factional model in inter￾preting China’s elite politics during those years.2 For example, Harry The Journal of American–East Asian Relations, Vol. 15 (2008) © Copyright 2008 by Imprint Publications. All rights reserved. 1. “The Gang of Four” was the radical supporters and beneficiaries of the Cul￾tural Revolution, including Mao Zedong’s wife Jiang Qing, and her cohort Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen after June 1973. The official forma￾tion of the clique was in November 1973. They were ousted after Mao’s death in October 1976. 2. There are numerous publications on elite politics in the People’s Republic of China, but very little on elite politics regarding foreign policy issues, especially during the Maoist period. See Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley, Calif., 1991); Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel

2 The Journal of American-East Asian Relations Harding suggests,"It was at the Tenth Party Congress that radical ele- ments in the Chinese leadership,later known as the 'Gang of Four, began actively to criticize the course of Chinese foreign policy since the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969."3 Robert Ross notes,"Beneath the Chairman,factions jockeyed for position in preparation for the post- Mao era.As the struggle intensified,the factions polarized into two com- peting groups-the radicals,clustered around the so-called Gang of Four, and more moderate leaders,led first by Zhou Enlai and later by Deng Xiaoping."4 Jing Huang argues,"By October 1972,the Maoists,who had been in disarray since Lin's fall,regrouped and reversed Zhou's anti- leftist offensive with Mao's support.Contrary to Zhou's claim that 'the Lin Biao anti-Party clique was ultra-left,'Mao decreed on December 17 that Lin 'was an ultra-rightist,'which the Maoists had advocated."5 Oksenberg,Policy Making in China:Leaders,Structures,and Processes (Princeton,N.J. 1992);David M.Lampton,"Chinese Politics:The Bargaining Treadmill,"Issues and Studies 23 (March 1987);idem,ed.,Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berke- ley,Calif.,1992);Kenneth Lieberthal and David M.Lampton,eds.,Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley,Calif.,1992);Lucien Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge,Mass.,1992);Lowell Dittmer,"Chinese Informal Politics,"China Journal,July 1995;Tang Tsou,"Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics,"in Tsou,The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms:A Historical Perspective(Chicago,1986);idem,"Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics?Balance of Power Politics or a Game to Win All?" China Journal,July 1995;and Cheng Li,China's Leaders:The New Generation (Lenham, Md.,2001).Recent publications on U.S.-China relations during the period have little to contribute to this topic;see,for example,Patrick Tyler,A Great Wall,Six Presidents and China:An Investigative History (New York,1999),105-225;and James Mann, About Face:A History of America's Curious Relationship with China (New York,1999), 53-77.Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun offer important insights on major foreign policy-related events,notably Zhou Enlai's political setbacks at the Politburo meet- ings in 1973,and the Politburo debate regarding dispatching Deng Xiaoping to the United Nations in April 1974,but has not offered a coherent explanation of the drastic shift in Chinese foreign policy stances and Mao's changing psyche in the 1970s.See Frederick C.Teiwes and Warren Sun,The End of Maoist Era,Chinese Politics during the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution,1972-1976(Armonk,N.Y.,2007),85- 93,132-46,178-85. 3.Harry Harding,"The Domestic Politics of China's Global Posture,1973-1978," in Thomas Fingar,China's Quest for Independence:Policy Evolution in the 1970s (Boul- der,Colo.,1980),94.Harding has also noted,"Although the radicals concentrated most of their fire on Zhou's personnel appointments and his educational policy, criticism of the premier's foreign policy and economic strategy was also a significant theme,and any concessions to the United States on Taiwan would have immedi- ately given the radicals powerful ammunition with which to continue their assault." See Harry Harding,A Fragile Relationship:The United States and China since 1972 (Washington,D.C.,1992),51. 4.Robert S.Ross,Negotiating Cooperation:The United States and China,1969-1989 (Stanford,Calif.,1995),60. 5.Jing Huang,Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (New York,2000),326

2 The Journal of American–East Asian Relations Harding suggests, “It was at the Tenth Party Congress that radical ele￾ments in the Chinese leadership, later known as the ‘Gang of Four,’ began actively to criticize the course of Chinese foreign policy since the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969.”3 Robert Ross notes, “Beneath the Chairman, factions jockeyed for position in preparation for the post￾Mao era. As the struggle intensified, the factions polarized into two com￾peting groups—the radicals, clustered around the so-called Gang of Four, and more moderate leaders, led first by Zhou Enlai and later by Deng Xiaoping.”4 Jing Huang argues, “By October 1972, the Maoists, who had been in disarray since Lin’s fall, regrouped and reversed Zhou’s anti￾leftist offensive with Mao’s support. Contrary to Zhou’s claim that ‘the Lin Biao anti-Party clique was ultra-left,’ Mao decreed on December 17 that Lin ‘was an ultra-rightist,’ which the Maoists had advocated.”5 Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton, N.J., 1992); David M. Lampton, “Chinese Politics: The Bargaining Treadmill,” Issues and Studies 23 (March 1987); idem, ed., Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berke￾ley, Calif., 1992); Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley, Calif., 1992); Lucien Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass., 1992); Lowell Dittmer, “Chinese Informal Politics,” China Journal, July 1995; Tang Tsou, “Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics,” in Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective (Chicago, 1986); idem, “Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance of Power Politics or a Game to Win All?” China Journal, July 1995; and Cheng Li, China’s Leaders: The New Generation (Lenham, Md., 2001). Recent publications on U.S.-China relations during the period have little to contribute to this topic; see, for example, Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall, Six Presidents and China: An Investigative History (New York, 1999), 105–225; and James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China (New York, 1999), 53–77. Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun offer important insights on major foreign policy–related events, notably Zhou Enlai’s political setbacks at the Politburo meet￾ings in 1973, and the Politburo debate regarding dispatching Deng Xiaoping to the United Nations in April 1974, but has not offered a coherent explanation of the drastic shift in Chinese foreign policy stances and Mao’s changing psyche in the 1970s. See Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, The End of Maoist Era, Chinese Politics during the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972–1976 (Armonk, N.Y., 2007), 85– 93, 132–46, 178–85. 3. Harry Harding, “The Domestic Politics of China’s Global Posture, 1973–1978,” in Thomas Fingar, China’s Quest for Independence: Policy Evolution in the 1970s (Boul￾der, Colo., 1980), 94. Harding has also noted, “Although the radicals concentrated most of their fire on Zhou’s personnel appointments and his educational policy, criticism of the premier’s foreign policy and economic strategy was also a significant theme, and any concessions to the United States on Taiwan would have immedi￾ately given the radicals powerful ammunition with which to continue their assault.” See Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington, D.C., 1992), 51. 4. Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989 (Stanford, Calif., 1995), 60. 5. Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (New York, 2000), 326

Myth or Reality？.3 What we don't know is the actual role Mao played in these political struggles Even some Chinese scholars accepted the factional model.In analyz- ing Chinese politics from the Lin Biao incident in September 1971 to Mao's death in September 1976,Chinese scholar Shan Shaojie argues that Mao first relied on senior cadres headed by Zhou Enlai to restore productivity and to rehabilitate many officials who were purged during the Cultural Revolution in order to rescue his political fortune after the Lin Biao incident.However,Mao soon turned to the Cultural Revolution faction to criticize Zhou's so-called "rightist relapse."Then,in 1974-75, Mao depended on Deng Xiaoping and other senior cadres to improve the national economy in order to achieve security and stability.But by early 1976,Mao turned to the Cultural Revolution faction to beat back Deng's so-called "rightist effort to reverse the verdict."6 Newly available Chinese sources reveal that Mao was the real plotter and director of these events.Jealous of Western media's praise of Zhou and the wording of "The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai"after Nixon's China trip,and Zhou's effort to eliminate the ultra-leftist interference in Chi- nese foreign policy in 1973,Mao intended to punish Zhou and possibly purge his political influence.The restoration of Deng Xiaoping in 1973 was Mao's tactical strategy to diminish Zhou's power and eventually replace Zhou with Deng.?Only after learning Zhou's fatal illness and repeated self-criticisms did Mao decide to wait for his chance.The new sources indicate that Mao had no clear conception for improving U.S.- China relations.The instability of the elite in Chinese politics had a very negative effect on this relationship from 1972 to 1976.In light of newly available Chinese sources,this article attempts to reconstruct what re- ally happened in those years by looking at several cases of foreign policy- related events and high-level political struggles in the People's Republic of China(PRC).It reveals the political maneuvers and policy orientation of Chinese leaders such as Mao,Zhou,Deng,and the Gang of Four in the twilight of the Cultural Revolution,and concludes with a comparison of official Chinese interpretation of these events and interpretation by Chi- nese expatriates.This article rebuts official Chinese interpretation and offers a new interpretation of China's elite politics in those years.It thus sheds new light on the study of PRC politics in general,and how China's elite politics affected U.S.-China relations in the 1970s in particular. 6.Shan Shaojie,Mao Zedong zhizheng chungiu (The spring and autumn while Mao Zedong was in power)(Taibei,2001),585-86. 7.Jing Huang argues that Mao's effort to restore Deng was because Deng "had certain control over the factional networks."Mao's second reason "was to contain Zhou's power-that was why the Maoists actually helped Deng's comeback rather than opposing it."See Huang,Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics,328,332

Myth or Reality? 3 What we don’t know is the actual role Mao played in these political struggles. Even some Chinese scholars accepted the factional model. In analyz￾ing Chinese politics from the Lin Biao incident in September 1971 to Mao’s death in September 1976, Chinese scholar Shan Shaojie argues that Mao first relied on senior cadres headed by Zhou Enlai to restore productivity and to rehabilitate many officials who were purged during the Cultural Revolution in order to rescue his political fortune after the Lin Biao incident. However, Mao soon turned to the Cultural Revolution faction to criticize Zhou’s so-called “rightist relapse.” Then, in 1974–75, Mao depended on Deng Xiaoping and other senior cadres to improve the national economy in order to achieve security and stability. But by early 1976, Mao turned to the Cultural Revolution faction to beat back Deng’s so-called “rightist effort to reverse the verdict.”6 Newly available Chinese sources reveal that Mao was the real plotter and director of these events. Jealous of Western media’s praise of Zhou and the wording of “The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai” after Nixon’s China trip, and Zhou’s effort to eliminate the ultra-leftist interference in Chi￾nese foreign policy in 1973, Mao intended to punish Zhou and possibly purge his political influence. The restoration of Deng Xiaoping in 1973 was Mao’s tactical strategy to diminish Zhou’s power and eventually replace Zhou with Deng.7 Only after learning Zhou’s fatal illness and repeated self-criticisms did Mao decide to wait for his chance. The new sources indicate that Mao had no clear conception for improving U.S.- China relations. The instability of the elite in Chinese politics had a very negative effect on this relationship from 1972 to 1976. In light of newly available Chinese sources, this article attempts to reconstruct what re￾ally happened in those years by looking at several cases of foreign policy– related events and high-level political struggles in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It reveals the political maneuvers and policy orientation of Chinese leaders such as Mao, Zhou, Deng, and the Gang of Four in the twilight of the Cultural Revolution, and concludes with a comparison of official Chinese interpretation of these events and interpretation by Chi￾nese expatriates. This article rebuts official Chinese interpretation and offers a new interpretation of China’s elite politics in those years. It thus sheds new light on the study of PRC politics in general, and how China’s elite politics affected U.S.-China relations in the 1970s in particular. 6. Shan Shaojie, Mao Zedong zhizheng chunqiu (The spring and autumn while Mao Zedong was in power) (Taibei, 2001), 585–86. 7. Jing Huang argues that Mao’s effort to restore Deng was because Deng “had certain control over the factional networks.” Mao’s second reason “was to contain Zhou’s power—that was why the Maoists actually helped Deng’s comeback rather than opposing it.” See Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics, 328, 332

4 The Journal of American-East Asian Relations Criticism of the "Ultra-left Trend of Thought and Anarchism"(Novem- ber-December 1972) After Nixon's trip to Beijing in February 1972,U.S.-China relations gradu- ally improved.On 19-23 June 1972,Henry Kissinger,President Richard Nixon's National Security Adviser,visited China for the fourth time.He updated Zhou Enlai on the status of U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks.Soon after Kissinger left China,in the company of Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong met with Sri Lanka Prime Minister Mrs.Sirimavo Bandaranaike on 28 June.During the meeting,Mao said,"Who are the leftists'?They are those who burned the British legation in Beijing.They want to overthrow the Premier today;tomorrow they want to overthrow Chen Yi;and the day after tomorrow,they want to overthrow Ye Jianying. These so-called leftists now end up in prison.Mao also talked about the destruction caused by those so-called "ultra-leftists"and said,"The backstage boss of these people is now dead.His name is Lin Biao."9 Zhou Enlai,who was eager to purge the leftist influence in foreign affairs,got Mao's message and was obviously encouraged.At a foreign affairs conference on 1-2 August,Zhou delivered a lengthy report.He pointed out that there was"leftist"tendency in foreign affairs work,and blamed Lin Biao for this.0 To further eliminate interference of the"ultra- left"ideological trends and to consolidate the achievements of China's new diplomacy,the International Liaison Department(ILD)of the Chi- nese Communist Party(CCP)and the Foreign Ministry proposed that Zhou Enlai hold a national foreign affairs conference.In a report to Zhou on 28 November,the ILD and the Foreign Ministry clearly proposed to criticize the ultra-leftism of the Lin Biao clique.When Zhou declared himself "incline to agree"to a "thorough denunciation of the ultra-left- ist trend of thought and anarchism stirred up by the Lin Biao anti-Party clique"on 30 November,Zhang Chungiao and Jiang Qing openly chal- lenged Zhou's position.Jiang Qing announced,"Personally,I am of the opinion that we should denounce the traitor Lin Biao's ultra-rightism while we simultaneously denounce him for being 'left in form but right in essence'in certain matters.While criticizing Lin Biao the 8.Li Ping et al.,Zhou Enlai nianpu,1949-1976 (The chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949-1976)(Beijing,1997),3:531 (Hereafter cited as Zhou nianpu). 9."Minutes of Mao Zedong's Talk with Sri Lanka Prime Minister Mrs. Bandananeika,28 June 1972,"cited in Gong Li,William C.Kirby,and Robert S.Ross, Cong jiedong zouxiang jianjiao:Zhong Mei guanxi zhengchanghua jincheng zai tantao, 1969-1979(From rapprochement to the establishment of formal diplomatic rela- tions:Re-exploring U.S.-China normalization process,1969-1979)(Beijing,2004), 270. 10.Zhou nianpu,3:541-42

4 The Journal of American–East Asian Relations Criticism of the “Ultra-left Trend of Thought and Anarchism” (Novem￾ber–December 1972) After Nixon’s trip to Beijing in February 1972, U.S.-China relations gradu￾ally improved. On 19–23 June 1972, Henry Kissinger, President Richard Nixon’s National Security Adviser, visited China for the fourth time. He updated Zhou Enlai on the status of U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks. Soon after Kissinger left China, in the company of Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong met with Sri Lanka Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike on 28 June. During the meeting, Mao said, “‘Who are the leftists’? They are those who burned the British legation in Beijing. They want to overthrow the Premier today; tomorrow they want to overthrow Chen Yi; and the day after tomorrow, they want to overthrow Ye Jianying. These so-called leftists now end up in prison.”8 Mao also talked about the destruction caused by those so-called “ultra-leftists” and said, “The backstage boss of these people is now dead. His name is Lin Biao.”9 Zhou Enlai, who was eager to purge the leftist influence in foreign affairs, got Mao’s message and was obviously encouraged. At a foreign affairs conference on 1–2 August, Zhou delivered a lengthy report. He pointed out that there was “leftist” tendency in foreign affairs work, and blamed Lin Biao for this.10 To further eliminate interference of the “ultra￾left” ideological trends and to consolidate the achievements of China’s new diplomacy, the International Liaison Department (ILD) of the Chi￾nese Communist Party (CCP) and the Foreign Ministry proposed that Zhou Enlai hold a national foreign affairs conference. In a report to Zhou on 28 November, the ILD and the Foreign Ministry clearly proposed to criticize the ultra-leftism of the Lin Biao clique. When Zhou declared himself “incline to agree” to a “thorough denunciation of the ultra-left￾ist trend of thought and anarchism stirred up by the Lin Biao anti-Party clique” on 30 November, Zhang Chunqiao and Jiang Qing openly chal￾lenged Zhou’s position. Jiang Qing announced, “Personally, I am of the opinion that we should denounce the traitor Lin Biao’s ultra-rightism while we simultaneously denounce him for being ‘left in form but right in essence’ in certain matters. While criticizing Lin Biao the 8. Li Ping et al., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949–1976 (The chronology of Zhou Enlai, 1949–1976) (Beijing, 1997), 3:531 (Hereafter cited as Zhou nianpu). 9. “Minutes of Mao Zedong’s Talk with Sri Lanka Prime Minister Mrs. Bandananeika, 28 June 1972,” cited in Gong Li, William C. Kirby, and Robert S. Ross, Cong jiedong zouxiang jianjiao: Zhong Mei guanxi zhengchanghua jincheng zai tantao, 1969–1979 (From rapprochement to the establishment of formal diplomatic rela￾tions: Re-exploring U.S.-China normalization process, 1969–1979) (Beijing, 2004), 270. 10. Zhou nianpu, 3:541–42

Myth or Reality？.5 traitor,we should simultaneously stress the success of the Great Cul- tural Revolution." Zhou Enlai came to realize the inevitable conflict with Jiang Qing's clique over the issue of criticizing the left.He tried to avoid such a show- down in order not to bother Mao Zedong.In a subsequent Politburo meeting,Zhou agreed to delete the words"denunciation of the ultra- leftist trend of thought and anarchism,"but also insisted upon includ- ing Mao's instructions on anti-great-nation chauvinism,which contained criticism of leftism and memoranda of Zhou's speech at the conference of diplomatic envoys as study materials.Zhou attempted to maintain a keynote of criticizing the leftist trend.The Jiang Qing clique cooled down.12 The 5 December letter from the Renmin Ribao(People's Daily)editor Wang Ruoshui to Mao Zedong prompted Mao's direct intervention.In his letter,Wang indicated his support for Zhou's formulation that"the right is bound to return,unless we thoroughly denounce the 'left.""He also lodged a complaint against Zhang Chungiao and Yao Wenyuan. The rank and file of the CCP welcomed the proposition of criticizing the left,but Mao could not tolerate this any longer and decided to put a stop to the campaign.Criticizing the left was closely related to evaluating the Cultural Revolution,which Mao treasured so much and regarded as one of the two great achievements of his life time,the other being the over- throw of the Nationalist regime and establishment of the People's Re- public of China.13 Making use of Wang Ruoshui's letter,Mao resolved to counter-attack those who criticized the left and intended to negate the Cultural Revolu- tion.He asked Jiang Qing to communicate his words to Zhou Enlai, Zhang Chungiao,and Yao Wenyuan to "resolve"the issues Wang raised in his letter.When he saw Mao's real attitude,Zhou backed down.In a meeting with Zhou,Zhang,and Yao,Mao declared that Lin Biao's line was"ultra-right,not ultra-left.It is revisionism,splittism,schemes and intrigues,betrayal of the party and of the country."Mao's real target was Zhou Enlai.During the conversation,Mao viciously threw out words to 11.Gao Wengian,Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai's later years)(Hong Kong, 2003),389.For an English version of the book,see Gao Wengian (trans.Peter Rand and Lawrence R.Sullivan)Zhou Enlai:The Last Perfect Revolutionary,A Biography (New York,2007),310.The English version has been adapted for Western readers by adding the story of Zhou Enlai's earlier years prior to the Cultural Revolution and by elaborating the political context of the Cultural Revolution and the behavior of other actors.Also see Zhou nianpu,3:565. 12.Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,390. 13.Wang Ruoshui,Xin faxian de Mao Zedong:Puren yanzhong de weiren(A newly- discovered Mao Zedong:A great man in the eyes of his servants),6th ed.(Hong Kong,2005),571-75;Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,390

Myth or Reality? 5 traitor, we should simultaneously stress the success of the Great Cul￾tural Revolution.”11 Zhou Enlai came to realize the inevitable conflict with Jiang Qing’s clique over the issue of criticizing the left. He tried to avoid such a show￾down in order not to bother Mao Zedong. In a subsequent Politburo meeting, Zhou agreed to delete the words “denunciation of the ultra￾leftist trend of thought and anarchism,” but also insisted upon includ￾ing Mao’s instructions on anti-great-nation chauvinism, which contained criticism of leftism and memoranda of Zhou’s speech at the conference of diplomatic envoys as study materials. Zhou attempted to maintain a keynote of criticizing the leftist trend. The Jiang Qing clique cooled down.12 The 5 December letter from the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) editor Wang Ruoshui to Mao Zedong prompted Mao’s direct intervention. In his letter, Wang indicated his support for Zhou’s formulation that “the right is bound to return, unless we thoroughly denounce the ‘left.’” He also lodged a complaint against Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan. The rank and file of the CCP welcomed the proposition of criticizing the left, but Mao could not tolerate this any longer and decided to put a stop to the campaign. Criticizing the left was closely related to evaluating the Cultural Revolution, which Mao treasured so much and regarded as one of the two great achievements of his life time, the other being the over￾throw of the Nationalist regime and establishment of the People’s Re￾public of China.13 Making use of Wang Ruoshui’s letter, Mao resolved to counter-attack those who criticized the left and intended to negate the Cultural Revolu￾tion. He asked Jiang Qing to communicate his words to Zhou Enlai, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan to “resolve” the issues Wang raised in his letter. When he saw Mao’s real attitude, Zhou backed down. In a meeting with Zhou, Zhang, and Yao, Mao declared that Lin Biao’s line was “ultra-right, not ultra-left. It is revisionism, splittism, schemes and intrigues, betrayal of the party and of the country.” Mao’s real target was Zhou Enlai. During the conversation, Mao viciously threw out words to 11. Gao Wenqian, Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai’s later years) (Hong Kong, 2003), 389. For an English version of the book, see Gao Wenqian (trans. Peter Rand and Lawrence R. Sullivan) Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary, A Biography (New York, 2007), 310. The English version has been adapted for Western readers by adding the story of Zhou Enlai’s earlier years prior to the Cultural Revolution and by elaborating the political context of the Cultural Revolution and the behavior of other actors. Also see Zhou nianpu, 3:565. 12. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 390. 13. Wang Ruoshui, Xin faxian de Mao Zedong: Puren yanzhong de weiren (A newly￾discovered Mao Zedong: A great man in the eyes of his servants), 6th ed. (Hong Kong, 2005), 571–75; Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 390

6 The Journal of American-East Asian Relations Zhang Chungiao and Yao Wenyuan:"To study some foreign language to avoid being cheated."Zhou's effort to "check the leftism"and to re- verse the political trend in the wake of Lin Biao incident failed.Then,the political situation took a turn for the worse.The 1973 New Year's edito- rial in the Central Committee's"two newspapers and one magazine" (Renmin Ribao [People's Daily],Jiefang Ribao [Liberation Daily],and Hongqi [Red Flag])emphasized the need to grasp the"ultra-right es- sence"of Lin Biao's"reactionary revisionist line."To criticize"the left" thus became a political taboo.4 Mao's Strategy of a Global "Horizontal Line"to Deal with the Soviet Union(February 1973) Early 1973 witnessed some progress in U.S.-China relations.In January, the Paris accord was signed,negotiating American withdrawal from Vietnam.This eliminated the foremost obstacle to a better U.S.-China relationship (Taiwan being the second issue).As Nixon promised to solve the Taiwan issue during his second term,he sent Kissinger to China in February 1973 to work out a concrete solution. At a meeting on 16 February,Zhou Enlai and Kissinger agreed that normalization of U.S.-China relations would be attained by a two-step process during Nixon's second term.First,each agreed to establish a liaison office at each other's capital.The second phase was to achieve normalization of U.S.-China relations at the opportune moment.By 1 May,the United States and China opened liaison offices in Beijing and Washington respectively,operating as de facto embassies.15 During his meeting with Kissinger on 17 February,Mao suggested that the United States and China should"work together to commonly deal with a bastard [the Soviet Union]."Mao also proposed his strategy of establishing"a horizontal line [yi tiao xian]-the U.S.-Japan-Paki- stan-Iran-Turkey and Europe"in order to jointly counter Soviet hege- mony.16 As Gong Li observes,"In fact,this is Mao's international strategic thinking on a united front(against the Soviet expansion and hegemony) from China,Japan to Pakistan,Iran,Turkey,Europe to the United States."7 14.Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,391-92,394. 15.Gong Li,Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo (Deng Xiaoping and the United States) (Beijing,2004),105-9. 16.William Burr,The Kissinger Transcripts:The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York,1998),88,94;Gong,Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo,104-9. 17.Gong Li,"Tongxiang jianjiao zhilu de jiannanbashe:1972-1978 nian Zhongguo due Mei zhengce de yanbian"(Tortuous road to the establishment of diplomatic rela- tions:The evolution of China's U.S.policy,1972-1978),"in Gong,Kirby,and Ross, Cong jiedong zouxiang jianjiao,125

6 The Journal of American–East Asian Relations Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan: “To study some foreign language to avoid being cheated.” Zhou’s effort to “check the leftism” and to re￾verse the political trend in the wake of Lin Biao incident failed. Then, the political situation took a turn for the worse. The 1973 New Year’s edito￾rial in the Central Committee’s “two newspapers and one magazine” (Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], Jiefang Ribao [Liberation Daily], and Hongqi [Red Flag]) emphasized the need to grasp the “ultra-right es￾sence” of Lin Biao’s “reactionary revisionist line.” To criticize “the left” thus became a political taboo.14 Mao’s Strategy of a Global “Horizontal Line” to Deal with the Soviet Union (February 1973) Early 1973 witnessed some progress in U.S.-China relations. In January, the Paris accord was signed, negotiating American withdrawal from Vietnam. This eliminated the foremost obstacle to a better U.S.-China relationship (Taiwan being the second issue). As Nixon promised to solve the Taiwan issue during his second term, he sent Kissinger to China in February 1973 to work out a concrete solution. At a meeting on 16 February, Zhou Enlai and Kissinger agreed that normalization of U.S.-China relations would be attained by a two-step process during Nixon’s second term. First, each agreed to establish a liaison office at each other’s capital. The second phase was to achieve normalization of U.S.-China relations at the opportune moment. By 1 May, the United States and China opened liaison offices in Beijing and Washington respectively, operating as de facto embassies.15 During his meeting with Kissinger on 17 February, Mao suggested that the United States and China should “work together to commonly deal with a bastard [the Soviet Union].” Mao also proposed his strategy of establishing “a horizontal line [yi tiao xian]—the U.S.—Japan—Paki￾stan—Iran—Turkey and Europe” in order to jointly counter Soviet hege￾mony. 16As Gong Li observes, “In fact, this is Mao’s international strategic thinking on a united front (against the Soviet expansion and hegemony) from China, Japan to Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Europe to the United States.”17 14. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 391–92, 394. 15. Gong Li, Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo (Deng Xiaoping and the United States) (Beijing, 2004), 105–9. 16. William Burr, The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York, 1998), 88, 94; Gong, Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo, 104–9. 17. Gong Li, “Tongxiang jianjiao zhilu de jiannanbashe: 1972–1978 nian Zhongguo due Mei zhengce de yanbian” (Tortuous road to the establishment of diplomatic rela￾tions: The evolution of China’s U.S. policy, 1972–1978),” in Gong, Kirby, and Ross, Cong jiedong zouxiang jianjiao, 125

Myth or Reality？.7 The shift from rapprochement to "alliance with the U.S.to deter the Soviets"(lian Mei kang Su)is to some extent simply classical Maoist tactics.In 1940,during the War of Resistance against Japan,Mao explic- itly pointed out:"On the whole,we are anti-imperialism.But we also need to formulate different diplomatic tactics based on the extent of harm- fulness and whether it is presently harmful."That is,Mao drew a dis- tinction between "Japanese imperialism which is now committing aggression against China and the imperialist powers which are not do- ing so now.""The basic principles are 'to win over the many,to oppose the few,to utilize contradictions and crush our enemies one by one.'"1s On the one hand,in a New Year's Message of 1 January 1973,the Chi- nese government continued to loudly chant the tune of "opposing the hegemony of the two superpowers [the Soviet Union and the United States]and great power politics,"and"resolutely supporting the revolu- tionary struggle of the revolutionary people of all countries."On the other hand,it turned to adopt a policy of allying with the United States.9 The Chinese government felt obliged to offer a reasonable interpretation and explain the internal logic. On 25 February,the Central Committee transmitted a document pre- pared by the Foreign Ministry stating that the improvement in Sino- American relations would not change China's principled position but that China's foreign policy would continue to oppose the two super- powers.It would not be a paralleled opposition but one distinguish between primary and secondary targets.Currently,the target of the struggle was the Soviet revisionist.Thus,improvement in Sino-Ameri- can relations would be beneficial to the struggle against the Soviet revisionists.20 No.153 Issue of the New Information Incident(July-August 1973) The interpretation of the Foreign Ministry was in accordance with Mao thesis of "utilizing contradiction and defeating enemies one by one." However,not everyone appreciated Mao's decision.Alarge number of revolutionary parties and leftist groups,including Albania,which had been following China's position of countering imperialism and revi- sionism raised strongly worded doubts and harsh questions regarding the transformation of China's foreign policy.What irked Mao most was the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations.An important precondition for a better U.S.-China relationship and "alliance with the U.S.to deter the 18.Mao Zedong,"On Policy"(25 Dec.1940),Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing, 1964),2:444. 19.Renmin Ribao (People's Daily),1 Jan.1973. 20.Gong,"Tongxiang jianjiao zhilu de jiannanbashe,"126

Myth or Reality? 7 The shift from rapprochement to “alliance with the U.S. to deter the Soviets” (lian Mei kang Su) is to some extent simply classical Maoist tactics. In 1940, during the War of Resistance against Japan, Mao explic￾itly pointed out: “On the whole, we are anti-imperialism. But we also need to formulate different diplomatic tactics based on the extent of harm￾fulness and whether it is presently harmful.” That is, Mao drew a dis￾tinction between “Japanese imperialism which is now committing aggression against China and the imperialist powers which are not do￾ing so now.” “The basic principles are ‘to win over the many, to oppose the few, to utilize contradictions and crush our enemies one by one.’”18 On the one hand, in a New Year’s Message of 1 January 1973, the Chi￾nese government continued to loudly chant the tune of “opposing the hegemony of the two superpowers [the Soviet Union and the United States] and great power politics,” and “resolutely supporting the revolu￾tionary struggle of the revolutionary people of all countries.” On the other hand, it turned to adopt a policy of allying with the United States.19 The Chinese government felt obliged to offer a reasonable interpretation and explain the internal logic. On 25 February, the Central Committee transmitted a document pre￾pared by the Foreign Ministry stating that the improvement in Sino￾American relations would not change China’s principled position but that China’s foreign policy would continue to oppose the two super￾powers. It would not be a paralleled opposition but one distinguish between primary and secondary targets. Currently, the target of the struggle was the Soviet revisionist. Thus, improvement in Sino-Ameri￾can relations would be beneficial to the struggle against the Soviet revisionists.20 No. 153 Issue of the New Information Incident (July–August 1973) The interpretation of the Foreign Ministry was in accordance with Mao thesis of “utilizing contradiction and defeating enemies one by one.” However, not everyone appreciated Mao’s decision. A large number of revolutionary parties and leftist groups, including Albania, which had been following China’s position of countering imperialism and revi￾sionism raised strongly worded doubts and harsh questions regarding the transformation of China’s foreign policy. What irked Mao most was the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. An important precondition for a better U.S.-China relationship and “alliance with the U.S. to deter the 18. Mao Zedong, “On Policy” (25 Dec. 1940), Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing, 1964), 2:444. 19. Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 1 Jan. 1973. 20. Gong, “Tongxiang jianjiao zhilu de jiannanbashe,” 126

8 The Journal of American-East Asian Relations Soviets"was Mao's belief that contradictions in the U.S.-Soviet relation- ship were much greater than their ability to compromise or talent for collusion.However,Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union in May 1972 and Brezhenev's return visit to the United States in June 1973 elevated U.S.- Soviet relations to a good standing.21 This put Mao in an awkward posi- tion and implied that his new policy toward the U.S.was indeed a blunder. After the signing of the U.S.-Soviet agreements on preventing nuclear war and strategic arms limitation in June 1973,David Bruce,the director of American liaison office in China,requested an audience with Zhou Enlai to brief him on the event and deliver Nixon's letter to him.Mao was unsatisfied with the talking-points prepared by the Foreign Minis- try for Zhou and carped that the Foreign Ministry "constantly forgets struggle while allying with the capitalists."In his subsequent meeting with Bruce on 25 June,Zhou,following Mao's instruction,"adopted a scornful and critical attitude.He lashed out at U.S.-Soviet notion of pursuing hegemony and dominance around the world.2 New developments in U.S.-Soviet relations attracted the attention of Zhou Enlai and the Foreign Ministry.The Department of American and Oceanic Affairs of the Foreign Ministry put together a research article, entitled"A Preliminary Analysis on Nixon and Brezhenev Talk,"which was published on 28 June in No.153 issue of New Information.The article argued that the U.S.-Soviet summit talk was"more deceitful"and cre- ated "a stronger atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet domination around the world."2 This article stressed U.S.-Soviet collusion,which touched on Mao Zedong's tender spot.Mao was outraged and severely criticized the Foreign Ministry,implicating Zhou Enlai.Mao even used vulgar language:"What crap!"On 3 July,when Zhou learned about Mao's criticism from Wang Hairong,Mao's grandniece and assistant foreign minister,he immediately wrote to the related personnel in the Foreign Ministry,asking them to withdraw No.153 issue of New Information. "I'm mainly responsible for such a mistake,"stated Zhou."I hope that you also learn from this mistake,carrying on the positive attitude of studying and discussing intensively.Sometime,you should also ask me to chair brief meetings to exchange views.Don't worry that I may be too busy.[We should]discard small errands and give more attention to big issues.We should learn from the Chairman's work method."24 21.Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,286 22.Ibid.,452. 23.Cited from Zong Daoyi,"1973 nian waijiaobu 153 xinqingkuang shijian'shimo" (The beginning and end of"No.153 issue of New Information Incident"in the Foreign Ministry in 1973),Dangshi yanjiu ziliao(Materials on party history research),no.5 (2001).Also see Gong,Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo,116-17 24.Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong's manuscripts since the found- ing of the PRC)(Beijing,1998),13:356-57n1.Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,454

8 The Journal of American–East Asian Relations Soviets” was Mao’s belief that contradictions in the U.S.-Soviet relation￾ship were much greater than their ability to compromise or talent for collusion. However, Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union in May 1972 and Brezhenev’s return visit to the United States in June 1973 elevated U.S.- Soviet relations to a good standing.21 This put Mao in an awkward posi￾tion and implied that his new policy toward the U.S. was indeed a blunder. After the signing of the U.S.-Soviet agreements on preventing nuclear war and strategic arms limitation in June 1973, David Bruce, the director of American liaison office in China, requested an audience with Zhou Enlai to brief him on the event and deliver Nixon’s letter to him. Mao was unsatisfied with the talking-points prepared by the Foreign Minis￾try for Zhou and carped that the Foreign Ministry “constantly forgets struggle while allying with the capitalists.” In his subsequent meeting with Bruce on 25 June, Zhou, following Mao’s instruction, “adopted a scornful and critical attitude.” He lashed out at U.S.-Soviet notion of pursuing hegemony and dominance around the world.22 New developments in U.S.-Soviet relations attracted the attention of Zhou Enlai and the Foreign Ministry. The Department of American and Oceanic Affairs of the Foreign Ministry put together a research article, entitled “A Preliminary Analysis on Nixon and Brezhenev Talk,” which was published on 28 June in No. 153 issue of New Information. The article argued that the U.S.–Soviet summit talk was “more deceitful” and cre￾ated “a stronger atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet domination around the world.”23 This article stressed U.S.-Soviet collusion, which touched on Mao Zedong’s tender spot. Mao was outraged and severely criticized the Foreign Ministry, implicating Zhou Enlai. Mao even used vulgar language: “What crap!” On 3 July, when Zhou learned about Mao’s criticism from Wang Hairong, Mao’s grandniece and assistant foreign minister, he immediately wrote to the related personnel in the Foreign Ministry, asking them to withdraw No. 153 issue of New Information. “I’m mainly responsible for such a mistake,” stated Zhou. “I hope that you also learn from this mistake, carrying on the positive attitude of studying and discussing intensively. Sometime, you should also ask me to chair brief meetings to exchange views. Don’t worry that I may be too busy. [We should] discard small errands and give more attention to big issues. We should learn from the Chairman’s work method.”24 21. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 286. 22. Ibid., 452. 23. Cited from Zong Daoyi, “1973 nian waijiaobu ‘153 xinqingkuang shijian' shimo” (The beginning and end of “No. 153 issue of New Information Incident” in the Foreign Ministry in 1973), Dangshi yanjiu ziliao (Materials on party history research), no. 5 (2001). Also see Gong, Deng Xiaoping yu Meiguo, 116–17. 24. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s manuscripts since the found￾ing of the PRC) (Beijing, 1998), 13:356–57n1. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 454

Myth or Reality？.9 On 4 July,Mao summoned Zhang Chungiao(who was then in charge of drafting the political report of the 10th Party Congress)and Wang Hongwen (who was then being groomed to be Mao's successor).Mao severely criticized the diplomatic work,and directed his barbs at Zhou Enlai although he did not mention Zhou by name.Mao said,"Recently, there has been something very unsatisfactory in the Foreign Ministry's work.I often say 'great chaos and great reshuffle.'But suddenly,the Foreign Ministry declared 'great deception and domination.'This is to focus on the superficial and neglect the essence."Mao continued,"I thus come to four conclusions:They don't report to me what is impor- tant,only submit to me what is insignificant.If they don't alter their work method,they are heading for revisionism.When that does happen, don't say that I have not warned them in advance."Mao told Zhang and Wang,"As you are not old,you'd better study foreign languages so that you can avoid being deceived by those 'lords and masters'[in the For- eign Ministry].Once being deceived,you might end up in the reaction- ary faction."25 Mao's criticism was vicious and ominous.It was more than a criti- cism of mistakes committed at work.Zhou Enlai,who had been hospi- talized for his bladder cancer,and the leading members of the Foreign Ministry soon were forced to admit their mistakes,and they thought it prudent to submit their written self-criticism to Mao.After reading Zhou's self-criticism on 5 July,Mao commented,"This chronic and stubborn disease is widespread,not just the affliction of a specific person.You'd better study how to correct it."Mao's order that it be shown to the Polit- buro members was intended to humiliate Zhou.26 Meanwhile,Zhou tried his best to pacify Mao's anger.He laid aside all other works,called a meeting of Foreign Ministry officials in order to correct the views of the article in New Information.He personally decided on the title of a rectifying article,"What is wrong with No.153 issue of New Information?"The article incorporated Mao's view,stressing "the U.S.-Soviet collusion is superficial while the rivalry is the essence,and the collusion is only for even more fierce contention."Once the article was finished,Zhou immediately sent for Mao's approval on 15 July. Zhou added,"I'll write another report to examine my mistakes."At that point,Mao seemed to be mollified.He instructed Zhou,"Written self- criticism is not necessary.27 Why was Mao so irritated and making such a big fuss over an expres- sion of views?It is worth noting that while criticizing the Foreign Minis- try,Mao frankly stated the reason and justification of why he approved rapprochement with the United States.He declared that the Albanians 25."Minutes of Mao Zedong's Talk with Zhang Chungiao and Wang Hongwen," cited in Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,454;Zhou nianpu,3:604. 26.Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,457;Zhou nianpu,3:604. 27.Gao,Wannian Zhou Enlai,457;Zhou nianpu,3:604-5

Myth or Reality? 9 On 4 July, Mao summoned Zhang Chunqiao (who was then in charge of drafting the political report of the 10th Party Congress) and Wang Hongwen (who was then being groomed to be Mao’s successor). Mao severely criticized the diplomatic work, and directed his barbs at Zhou Enlai although he did not mention Zhou by name. Mao said, “Recently, there has been something very unsatisfactory in the Foreign Ministry’s work. I often say ‘great chaos and great reshuffle.’ But suddenly, the Foreign Ministry declared ‘great deception and domination.’ This is to focus on the superficial and neglect the essence.” Mao continued, “I thus come to four conclusions: They don’t report to me what is impor￾tant, only submit to me what is insignificant. If they don’t alter their work method, they are heading for revisionism. When that does happen, don’t say that I have not warned them in advance.” Mao told Zhang and Wang, “As you are not old, you’d better study foreign languages so that you can avoid being deceived by those ‘lords and masters’ [in the For￾eign Ministry]. Once being deceived, you might end up in the reaction￾ary faction.”25 Mao’s criticism was vicious and ominous. It was more than a criti￾cism of mistakes committed at work. Zhou Enlai, who had been hospi￾talized for his bladder cancer, and the leading members of the Foreign Ministry soon were forced to admit their mistakes, and they thought it prudent to submit their written self-criticism to Mao. After reading Zhou’s self-criticism on 5 July, Mao commented, “This chronic and stubborn disease is widespread, not just the affliction of a specific person. You’d better study how to correct it.” Mao’s order that it be shown to the Polit￾buro members was intended to humiliate Zhou.26 Meanwhile, Zhou tried his best to pacify Mao’s anger. He laid aside all other works, called a meeting of Foreign Ministry officials in order to correct the views of the article in New Information. He personally decided on the title of a rectifying article, “What is wrong with No. 153 issue of New Information?” The article incorporated Mao’s view, stressing “the U.S.-Soviet collusion is superficial while the rivalry is the essence, and the collusion is only for even more fierce contention.” Once the article was finished, Zhou immediately sent for Mao’s approval on 15 July. Zhou added, “I’ll write another report to examine my mistakes.” At that point, Mao seemed to be mollified. He instructed Zhou, “Written self￾criticism is not necessary.”27 Why was Mao so irritated and making such a big fuss over an expres￾sion of views? It is worth noting that while criticizing the Foreign Minis￾try, Mao frankly stated the reason and justification of why he approved rapprochement with the United States. He declared that the Albanians 25. “Minutes of Mao Zedong’s Talk with Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen,” cited in Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 454; Zhou nianpu, 3:604. 26. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 457; Zhou nianpu, 3:604. 27. Gao, Wannian Zhou Enlai, 457; Zhou nianpu, 3:604–5

10 The Journal of American-East Asian Relations were determined not to allow the American withdrawal from Vietnam. The Albanians,he continued,believed that"the tempest of world revo- lution is in Asia.The storm of Asian revolution is in Vietnam.If war ends,it is terrible."The former Sovietleader Vladimir I.Lenin,Mao added, told us that when bandits deliver an ultimatum to"either be killed or surrender your pistol and car,you must surrender your pistol and car. Later,you may eradicate the bandits and retrieve your pistol and car." Similarly,after the Bolshevik Revolution the Soviet government encoun- tered both internal and external threats.In order to avoid a two-front war,Lenin advocated that Russia cede territory,pay indemnities,and sign a humiliating peace treaty.It turned out that Russia did not have to cede territory or pay indemnities:"The peace treaty was just a piece of waster paper."Mao added"although we compromised with Jiang Jieshi twice,in the end,weren't we the winners?"28 With this in mind,it is not difficult to understand why Mao advo- cated reconciliation with the United States,but he continued to mouth high-sounding revolutionary words.Obviously,this is unlike what Mao had told Nixon-firing"empty cannons."It was a true reflection of Mao's psyche.At Mao's insistence,Zhou Enlai,in his political report to the 10th Party Congress in August 1973,stated clearly from the very begin- ning Lenin's theory of imperialism and proletarian revolution,insisting that the"[Revolutionary]epoch has not changed.The basic principles of Leninism are not out-dated.They are still the guiding principles of our epoch."Meanwhile,Zhou's report emphasized Mao's views on the international situation,declaring the"main feature of the current inter- national situation is great chaos under Heaven.The rising wind fore- tells the coming storm."It continued,"U.S.-Soviet scramble for supremacy is the key.Every day they talk about disarmament,but every day they move their armies.The aim is to contend for supremacy.They collude while struggling.Collusion is for even fiercer contention.Contention is absolute and long-term.Collusion is relative and temporary."29 The Struggle against Zhou Enlai at the Politburo Meetings(November- December 1973) Whether Mao Zedong's view on U.S.-Soviet relations fitted to reality or not,his strategic design of"alliance with the U.S.to deter the Soviets" "a horizontal line,"and "a big terrain"(yi da pian)was impossible to come to fruition.Mao was disheartened to see the frequent U.S.-Soviet summits and the subsequent signing of treaties.During Kissinger's sixth 28.Li Danhui,ed.,Zhongguo yu Yinduzhina zhanzheng (China and the Indochina War)(Hong Kong,2000),50. 29."Report at the 10th Congress of the CCP,"Renmin Ribao,1 Sept.1973

10 The Journal of American–East Asian Relations were determined not to allow the American withdrawal from Vietnam. The Albanians, he continued, believed that “the tempest of world revo￾lution is in Asia. The storm of Asian revolution is in Vietnam. If war ends, it is terrible.” The former Soviet leader Vladimir I. Lenin, Mao added, told us that when bandits deliver an ultimatum to “either be killed or surrender your pistol and car, you must surrender your pistol and car. Later, you may eradicate the bandits and retrieve your pistol and car.” Similarly, after the Bolshevik Revolution the Soviet government encoun￾tered both internal and external threats. In order to avoid a two-front war, Lenin advocated that Russia cede territory, pay indemnities, and sign a humiliating peace treaty. It turned out that Russia did not have to cede territory or pay indemnities: “The peace treaty was just a piece of waster paper.” Mao added “although we compromised with Jiang Jieshi twice, in the end, weren’t we the winners?”28 With this in mind, it is not difficult to understand why Mao advo￾cated reconciliation with the United States, but he continued to mouth high-sounding revolutionary words. Obviously, this is unlike what Mao had told Nixon—firing “empty cannons.” It was a true reflection of Mao’s psyche. At Mao’s insistence, Zhou Enlai, in his political report to the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, stated clearly from the very begin￾ning Lenin’s theory of imperialism and proletarian revolution, insisting that the “[Revolutionary] epoch has not changed. The basic principles of Leninism are not out-dated. They are still the guiding principles of our epoch.” Meanwhile, Zhou’s report emphasized Mao’s views on the international situation, declaring the “main feature of the current inter￾national situation is great chaos under Heaven. The rising wind fore￾tells the coming storm.” It continued, “U.S.-Soviet scramble for supremacy is the key. Every day they talk about disarmament, but every day they move their armies. The aim is to contend for supremacy. They collude while struggling. Collusion is for even fiercer contention. Contention is absolute and long-term. Collusion is relative and temporary.”29 The Struggle against Zhou Enlai at the Politburo Meetings (November– December 1973) Whether Mao Zedong’s view on U.S.-Soviet relations fitted to reality or not, his strategic design of “alliance with the U.S. to deter the Soviets,” “a horizontal line,” and “a big terrain” (yi da pian) was impossible to come to fruition. Mao was disheartened to see the frequent U.S.-Soviet summits and the subsequent signing of treaties. During Kissinger’s sixth 28. Li Danhui, ed., Zhongguo yu Yinduzhina zhanzheng (China and the Indochina War) (Hong Kong, 2000), 50. 29. “Report at the 10th Congress of the CCP,” Renmin Ribao, 1 Sept. 1973