Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION PROJECT WORKING PAPER #4 China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea,1953-1961 NKI囡P By Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia May 2012
NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION PROJECT China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953-1961 By Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia May 2012 WORKING PAPER #4
THE NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION PROJECT WORKING PAPER SERIES Christian F.Ostermann and James F.Person,Series Editors This paper is one of a series of Working Papers published by the North Korea International Documentation Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington,D.C.Established in 2006 by a grant from the Korea Foundation, and in cooperation with the University of North Korean Studies(Seoul),the North Korea International Documentation Project(NKIDP)addresses the scholarly and policymaking communities'critical need for reliable information on the North Korean political system and foreign relations by widely disseminating newly declassified documents on the DPRK from the previously inaccessible archives of Pyongyang's former communist allies.With no history of diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and severely limited access to the country's elite,it is difficult to for Western policymakers,journalists,and academics to understand the forces and intentions behind North Korea's actions.The diplomatic record of North Korea's allies provides valuable context for understanding DPRK policy.Among the activities undertaken by the project to promote this aim are a section in the periodic Cold War International History Project BULLETIN to disseminate new findings,views,and activities pertaining to North Korea in the Cold War;a fellowship program for Korean scholars working on North Korea;international scholarly meetings,conferences,and seminars;and publications. The NKIDP Working Paper Series is designed to provide a speedy publications outlet for historians associated with the project who have gained access to newly- available archives and sources and would like to share their results.We especially welcome submissions by junior scholars from Korea and from the former Communist bloc who have done research in their countries'archives and are looking to introduce their findings to a Western audience.As a non-partisan institute of scholarly study,the Woodrow Wilson Center takes no position on the historical interpretations and opinions offered by the authors.This NKIDP Working Paper has been made possible by generous support from the Korea Foundation. Those interested in receiving copies of NKIDP Working Papers should contact: North Korea International Documentation Project Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Ave,NW Washington,DC 20523 Telephone:(202)691-4110 Fax:(202)691-4001 Email:nkidp@wilsoncenter.org NKIDP Web Page:http://www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp
THE NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION PROJECT WORKING PAPER SERIES Christian F. Ostermann and James F. Person, Series Editors This paper is one of a series of Working Papers published by the North Korea International Documentation Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Established in 2006 by a grant from the Korea Foundation, and in cooperation with the University of North Korean Studies (Seoul), the North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP) addresses the scholarly and policymaking communities’ critical need for reliable information on the North Korean political system and foreign relations by widely disseminating newly declassified documents on the DPRK from the previously inaccessible archives of Pyongyang’s former communist allies. With no history of diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and severely limited access to the country’s elite, it is difficult to for Western policymakers, journalists, and academics to understand the forces and intentions behind North Korea’s actions. The diplomatic record of North Korea’s allies provides valuable context for understanding DPRK policy. Among the activities undertaken by the project to promote this aim are a section in the periodic Cold War International History Project BULLETIN to disseminate new findings, views, and activities pertaining to North Korea in the Cold War; a fellowship program for Korean scholars working on North Korea; international scholarly meetings, conferences, and seminars; and publications. The NKIDP Working Paper Series is designed to provide a speedy publications outlet for historians associated with the project who have gained access to newlyavailable archives and sources and would like to share their results. We especially welcome submissions by junior scholars from Korea and from the former Communist bloc who have done research in their countries’ archives and are looking to introduce their findings to a Western audience. As a non-partisan institute of scholarly study, the Woodrow Wilson Center takes no position on the historical interpretations and opinions offered by the authors. This NKIDP Working Paper has been made possible by generous support from the Korea Foundation. Those interested in receiving copies of NKIDP Working Papers should contact: North Korea International Documentation Project Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW Washington, DC 20523 Telephone: (202) 691-4110 Fax: (202) 691-4001 Email: nkidp@wilsoncenter.org NKIDP Web Page: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp
NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION PROJECT WORKING PAPERS SERIES Christian F.Ostermann and James F.Person,Series Editors #1 Charles K.Armstrong,"Juche and North Korea's Global Aspirations" #2 Bernd Schaefer,"Overconfidence Shattered:North Korean Unification Policy,1971-1975," #3 Mitchell Lerner,""Mostly Propaganda in Nature:'Kim lI Sung,the Juche Ideology,and the Second Korean War" #4 Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia,"China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea,1953- 1961
NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION PROJECT WORKING PAPERS SERIES Christian F. Ostermann and James F. Person, Series Editors #1 Charles K. Armstrong, “Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations” #2 Bernd Schaefer, “Overconfidence Shattered: North Korean Unification Policy, 1971-1975,” #3 Mitchell Lerner, "‘Mostly Propaganda in Nature:’ Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War” #4 Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, “China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953- 1961
China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea,1953-1961 Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia* Since the end of the Cold War,and especially since the emergence of the North Korean nuclear crisis,scholars have paid closer attention to the history of North Korea and its relations with its former Communist allies after the Korean War.The declassification of Cold War era documents from the archives of North Korea's erstwhile allies contributes to this new scholarship.'These newly available archival materials shed fresh light,if still dim,on previously misunderstood episodes and themes in North Korean history,including the "August 1956 Incident"of the Korean Workers'Party(KWP)Central Committee;Soviet and Eastern European economic and technical aid to Korea after the Korean War;'the evolution of Soviet- North Korean relations,the evolution of Kim Il Sung'sJuche ideology,and North Korea's Yafeng Xia completed this article during his time as a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars from September 2011 through May 2012.He would like to thank Christian Ostermann,James F.Person, Charles Kraus,Yuree Kim,and Miriam Wishnick for their advice,support,and patience throughout the process. 1 Many of these documents have also been translated into English.See Sergey Radchenko,"The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo:Evidence from the Russian Archives,"CWIHP Working Paper 47 (April 2005);James F.Person,ed.,"New Evidence on North Korea in 1956,"CWIHP Bulletin 16(Fall 2007/Winter 2008);James F.Person,ed.,"Limits of the"Lips and Teeth Alliance"-New Evidence on Sino-DPRK Relations, 1955-1984,"NKIDP Document Reader 2 (March 2009). Andrei Lankov,Crisis in North Korea:The Failure of De-Stalinization,1956(Honolulu:University of Hawaii Press,2004),Sin Se Ra,"Politicheskaia bor'ba v rukovodstve KNDR v 1953-1956 gg.:prichiny i dinamika," Problemy dal'nego vostoka [Far East Affairs],no.3(2009). 3 Balazs Szalontai,"You Have No Political Line of Your Own':Kim Il Sung and the Soviets,1963-1964,"CWIHP Bulletin 14/15(Winter 2003-Spring 2004);Charles Armstrong,"Fraternal Socialism':The International Reconstruction of Korea,1953-62,"Cold War History 5,no.2(May 2005);James F.Person,"We Need Help from Outside:The North Korean Opposition Movement of 1956,"CWIHP Working Paper 52(August 2006);Balazs Szalontai and Sergey Radchenko,"North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence from Russian and Hungarian,"CWIHP Working Paper 53(August 2006);Avram Agov,"North Korea in the Socialist World:Integration and Divergence,1945-1970"(PhD diss.,The University of British Columbia,2010). Andrei Lankov,From Stalin to Kim Il Sung:The Formation of North Korea 1945-1960 (London:Hurst Company,2002);Szalontai,"You Have No Political Line of Your Own',"93-103;Balasz Szalontai,Kim II Sung in the Khrushchey Era:Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism,1953-1964 (Washington, D.C.:Woodrow Wilson Center Press;Stanford,CA:Stanford University Press,2006);Nobuo Shimotomai,"Kim Il- Sung's Balancing Act between Moscow and Beijing,1956-1972,"in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa,ed.,The Cold War in East Asia,1945-199/(Washington,D.C.:Woodrow Wilson Center Press;Stanford,CA:Stanford University Press, www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp
1 www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953-1961 Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia* Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the emergence of the North Korean nuclear crisis, scholars have paid closer attention to the history of North Korea and its relations with its former Communist allies after the Korean War. The declassification of Cold War era documents from the archives of North Korea’s erstwhile allies contributes to this new scholarship.1 These newly available archival materials shed fresh light, if still dim, on previously misunderstood episodes and themes in North Korean history, including the “August 1956 Incident” of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Central Committee; 2 Soviet and Eastern European economic and technical aid to Korea after the Korean War; 3 the evolution of SovietNorth Korean relations; 4 the evolution of Kim Il Sung’s Juche ideology; 5 and North Korea’s * Yafeng Xia completed this article during his time as a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars from September 2011 through May 2012. He would like to thank Christian Ostermann, James F. Person, Charles Kraus, Yuree Kim, and Miriam Wishnick for their advice, support, and patience throughout the process. 1 Many of these documents have also been translated into English. See Sergey Radchenko, “The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from the Russian Archives,” CWIHP Working Paper 47 (April 2005); James F. Person, ed., “New Evidence on North Korea in 1956,” CWIHP Bulletin 16 (Fall 2007/Winter 2008); James F. Person, ed., “Limits of the “Lips and Teeth Alliance”—New Evidence on Sino-DPRK Relations, 1955-1984,” NKIDP Document Reader 2 (March 2009). 2 Andrei Lankov, Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004); Sin Se Ra, “Politicheskaia bor’ba v rukovodstve KNDR v 1953-1956 gg.: prichiny i dinamika,” Problemy dal’nego vostoka [Far East Affairs], no. 3 (2009). 3 Balazs Szalontai, “‘You Have No Political Line of Your Own’: Kim Il Sung and the Soviets, 1963-1964,” CWIHP Bulletin 14/15 (Winter 2003-Spring 2004); Charles Armstrong, “‘Fraternal Socialism’: The International Reconstruction of Korea, 1953-62,” Cold War History 5, no. 2 (May 2005); James F. Person, “We Need Help from Outside: The North Korean Opposition Movement of 1956,” CWIHP Working Paper 52 (August 2006); Balazs Szalontai and Sergey Radchenko, “North Korea’s Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence from Russian and Hungarian,” CWIHP Working Paper 53 (August 2006); Avram Agov, “North Korea in the Socialist World: Integration and Divergence, 1945-1970” (PhD diss., The University of British Columbia, 2010). 4 Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945-1960 (London: Hurst & Company, 2002); Szalontai, “‘You Have No Political Line of Your Own’,” 93-103; Balasz Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); Nobuo Shimotomai, “Kim IlSung’s Balancing Act between Moscow and Beijing, 1956-1972,” in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ed., The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea,1953-1961 NKIDP Working Paper #4 unification policies,among other subjects.These studies,based on the newly available archival evidence,also reveal previously unknown details about the inner-workings and foreign relations of the highly secretive Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK). When the fighting stopped in July 1953,the northern half of the Korean peninsula lay in utter ruin.North Korea,which endured three years of sustained bombing campaigns,claimed a reduction in industrial output at the end of the war of nearly 40 percent compared to that of 1949.The production of consumer goods similarly declined,and the production of agriculture had dropped by some 24 percent.Hundreds of thousands of acres of farmland had been destroyed,along with nearly three-quarters of homes.Electricity production was down to 26 percent of its pre-war levels,chemical production 22 percent,and fuel and metallurgical production 11 percent and 10 percent respectively.The transportation infrastructure had been seriously harmed,with 70 percent of trains and 85 percent of ships destroyed and much of the railway system not operational.The DPRK estimated that war-related damage amounted to 420 billion won,or nearly 170 million US dollars(USD)by then-current exchange rates.As 2011),122-51;Nobuo Shimtomai,Mosukinwa to Kin Nisei [Moscow and Kim Il-Sung](Tokyo:Iwanami shoten, 2006). 5 James F.Person,"From Anti-Foreignism to Self-Reliance:The Evolution of North Korea's Juche Ideology"(paper presented at"Northeast Asia in the Cold War:New Evidence and Perspectives,"Hokkaido University,Summer 2008);Charles K.Armstrong,"Juche and North Korea's Global Aspirations,"NKIDP Working Paper 1(December 2010);Mitchell Lerner,"Mostly Propaganda in Nature':Kim Il Sung,the Juche Ideology,and the Second Korean War,"NKIDP Working Paper 3(December 2010). 6 Bernd Schaefer,"Overconfidence Shattered:North Korean Unification Policy,1971-1975,"NKIDP Working Paper 2(December 2010). Postwar Reconstruction and Development of the National Economy of the DPRK(Pyongyang:Foreign Languages Publishing House,1957),8. s Natalia Bazhanova,Kiroe son Puk Han kyongje [North Korean Economy at the Crossroads],trans.Yang Chu-yong (Seoul:Hanguk kyongjie sinmunsa,1992),8. Soviet Embassy to the DPRK,Diary Report,7 July 1954,Archives of Foreign Policy of Russian Federation (AVPRF),f.0102,op.10,p.53,d,8. 10 Postwar Reconstruction,8.According to an April 1955 Soviet document,the damage inflicted on North Korea by the war was calculated at 430 billion won(14 billion rubles or USD 3.5 billion).See N.Fedorenko and B. Ponomarev to the CPSU CC,"Information about the Situation in the DPRK,"April 1955,NKIDP Archives. 2 www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp
China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953-1961 NKIDP Working Paper #4 2 www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp unification policies, among other subjects. 6 These studies, based on the newly available archival evidence, also reveal previously unknown details about the inner-workings and foreign relations of the highly secretive Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). When the fighting stopped in July 1953, the northern half of the Korean peninsula lay in utter ruin. North Korea, which endured three years of sustained bombing campaigns, claimed a reduction in industrial output at the end of the war of nearly 40 percent compared to that of 1949.7 The production of consumer goods similarly declined, and the production of agriculture had dropped by some 24 percent. 8 Hundreds of thousands of acres of farmland had been destroyed, along with nearly three-quarters of homes. Electricity production was down to 26 percent of its pre-war levels, chemical production 22 percent, and fuel and metallurgical production 11 percent and 10 percent respectively. The transportation infrastructure had been seriously harmed, with 70 percent of trains and 85 percent of ships destroyed and much of the railway system not operational. 9 The DPRK estimated that war-related damage amounted to 420 billion won, or nearly 170 million US dollars (USD) by then-current exchange rates.10 As 2011), 122-51; Nobuo Shimtomai, Mosukuwa to Kin Nisei [Moscow and Kim Il-Sung] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2006). 5 James F. Person, “From Anti-Foreignism to Self-Reliance: The Evolution of North Korea’s Juche Ideology” (paper presented at “Northeast Asia in the Cold War: New Evidence and Perspectives,” Hokkaido University, Summer 2008); Charles K. Armstrong, “Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations,” NKIDP Working Paper 1 (December 2010); Mitchell Lerner, “‘Mostly Propaganda in Nature’: Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War,” NKIDP Working Paper 3 (December 2010). 6 Bernd Schaefer, “Overconfidence Shattered: North Korean Unification Policy, 1971-1975,” NKIDP Working Paper 2 (December 2010). 7 Postwar Reconstruction and Development of the National Economy of the DPRK (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), 8. 8 Natalia Bazhanova, Kiroe son Puk Han kyongje [North Korean Economy at the Crossroads], trans. Yang Chu-yong (Seoul: Hanguk kyongjie sinmunsa, 1992), 8. 9 Soviet Embassy to the DPRK, Diary Report, 7 July 1954, Archives of Foreign Policy of Russian Federation (AVPRF), f. 0102, op. 10, p. 53, d., 8. 10 Postwar Reconstruction, 8. According to an April 1955 Soviet document, the damage inflicted on North Korea by the war was calculated at 430 billion won (14 billion rubles or USD 3.5 billion). See N. Fedorenko and B. Ponomarev to the CPSU CC, “Information about the Situation in the DPRK,” April 1955, NKIDP Archives
Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia NKIDP Working Paper #4 historian Charles Armstrong puts it,"[i]n short,North Korea had been virtually destroyed as an industrial society"by the end of the Korean War. North Korea was highly successful in securing foreign aid for its post-war reconstruction. In the immediate post-war period,the Soviet Union,China and other socialist countries provided large-scale aid to North Korea,totaling to one-third of North Korea's financial budget for 1954. The aid came in the form of labor,materials and goods,reconstruction and building plants,civil construction work,technology transfers,and the education of specialists and students.It played a vital role in North Korea's economic recovery.In his article "Fraternal Socialism,"Charles Armstrong writes,"[t]he period of post-war reconstruction in North Korea was the first and only time the Soviet Union,China and the Soviet-aligned countries of Eastern Europe and Mongolia cooperated in a multilateral development project of such scale.Armstrong's article is strong in documenting Soviet and Eastern European countries'contributions to the process,but it is very brief on the tremendous role that China played in North Korea's reconstruction.Although China was itself in a dire economic situation after the Korean War,the assistance Beijing provided to North Korea was comparable to and even surpassing that of Moscow.In particular,at its peak, thirty-four divisions of Chinese People's Volunteers were stationed in North Korea,providing free labor-which was an irreplaceable contribution-until they were withdrawn in 1958.13 Making use of recently declassified Chinese archival materials,particularly those from the Chinese Foreign Ministry and provincial and municipal government level archives,and supplementing these materials with Soviet and Eastern European documents,this article examines the period of post-war reconstruction,paying particular attention to China's economic 1Armstrong."Fraternal Socialism,"162. 12 Ibid. After the war,thirty-four Chinese divisions were stationed in North Korea.Nineteen divisions left in 1954-1955 and the rest stayed until 1958. 3 www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp
Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia NKIDP Working Paper #4 3 www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp historian Charles Armstrong puts it, “[i]n short, North Korea had been virtually destroyed as an industrial society” by the end of the Korean War.11 North Korea was highly successful in securing foreign aid for its post-war reconstruction. In the immediate post-war period, the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries provided large-scale aid to North Korea, totaling to one-third of North Korea’s financial budget for 1954. The aid came in the form of labor, materials and goods, reconstruction and building plants, civil construction work, technology transfers, and the education of specialists and students. It played a vital role in North Korea’s economic recovery. In his article “Fraternal Socialism,” Charles Armstrong writes, “[t]he period of post-war reconstruction in North Korea was the first and only time the Soviet Union, China and the Soviet-aligned countries of Eastern Europe and Mongolia cooperated in a multilateral development project of such scale.” 12 Armstrong’s article is strong in documenting Soviet and Eastern European countries’ contributions to the process, but it is very brief on the tremendous role that China played in North Korea’s reconstruction. Although China was itself in a dire economic situation after the Korean War, the assistance Beijing provided to North Korea was comparable to and even surpassing that of Moscow. In particular, at its peak, thirty-four divisions of Chinese People’s Volunteers were stationed in North Korea, providing free labor—which was an irreplaceable contribution—until they were withdrawn in 1958.13 Making use of recently declassified Chinese archival materials, particularly those from the Chinese Foreign Ministry and provincial and municipal government level archives, and supplementing these materials with Soviet and Eastern European documents, this article examines the period of post-war reconstruction, paying particular attention to China’s economic 11 Armstrong, “Fraternal Socialism,” 162. 12 Ibid. 13 After the war, thirty-four Chinese divisions were stationed in North Korea. Nineteen divisions left in 1954-1955 and the rest stayed until 1958
China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea,1953-1961 NKIDP Working Paper #4 aid to North Korea.It analyzes the connections between Chinese aid and the Sino-North Korean political and diplomatic relationship,as well as how China's assistance affected the triangular relations between China,North Korea,and the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1961;i.e.from the honeymoon period of Sino-Soviet cooperation to the verge of the split that divided the communist camp,placing North Korea-which maintained a common border with both countries-in a precarious position. During the war,North Korean leader Kim Il Sung was already very much concerned with post-war reconstruction.Within days of signing the armistice,Kim approached the Soviet Union, a backstage player during the war,for economic aid.On 31 July 1953,Kim Il Sung sent a report to the Soviet ambassador in Pyeongyang [Pyongyang],describing the extent of war damage and the need for Soviet assistance to rehabilitate North Korea's economy.4 At the Sixth Plenum of the Korean Workers'Party(KWP)Central Committee(CC)on 5 August,Kim outlined North Korea's plan for post-war reconstruction.The new economic program would consist of three stages:a preparatory period of about six months to a year to assess the needs and make plans for reconstruction;a Three-Year Plan(1954-1956)to bring the economy up to pre-1950 levels;and a Five-Year Plan for the general industrialization of the entire country.5 In the end,the Soviet Union,China,East Germany,Poland,Czechoslovakia,Hungary,and other"fraternal countries" all contributed to North Korea's reconstruction.6 The post-war reconstruction of North Korea was a real division of labor for the Socialist camp,wholly consistent with the renewed interest in coordinating intra-bloc investments and trade policies.According to documents from the USSR 14Kim Il Sung to Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev,"General Report on Basic Reconstruction of Important Enterprises Relating to Heavy Industry,"31 July 1953,AVPRF,f.0102,Op.9,p.44,d.8,cited from Armstrong,"Fraternal Socialism,”163. 1s Kim I Sung,All for the Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy(Pyongyang:Foreign Languages Publishing House,1961);Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee,Communism in Korea:The Movement (Berkeley:University of California Press,1972),528;Zhonggong zhongyang duiwai lianluobu bian,Jin Richeng wenji.1945-1967 [Selected Papers of Kim Il Sung](1982,unpublished),51-52. 16 Armstrong,"Fraternal Socialism,"163-64. 4 www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp
China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953-1961 NKIDP Working Paper #4 4 www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp aid to North Korea. It analyzes the connections between Chinese aid and the Sino-North Korean political and diplomatic relationship, as well as how China’s assistance affected the triangular relations between China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1961; i.e. from the honeymoon period of Sino-Soviet cooperation to the verge of the split that divided the communist camp, placing North Korea—which maintained a common border with both countries—in a precarious position. During the war, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung was already very much concerned with post-war reconstruction. Within days of signing the armistice, Kim approached the Soviet Union, a backstage player during the war, for economic aid. On 31 July 1953, Kim Il Sung sent a report to the Soviet ambassador in Pyeongyang [Pyongyang], describing the extent of war damage and the need for Soviet assistance to rehabilitate North Korea’s economy.14 At the Sixth Plenum of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Central Committee (CC) on 5 August, Kim outlined North Korea’s plan for post-war reconstruction. The new economic program would consist of three stages: a preparatory period of about six months to a year to assess the needs and make plans for reconstruction; a Three-Year Plan (1954-1956) to bring the economy up to pre-1950 levels; and a Five-Year Plan for the general industrialization of the entire country.15 In the end, the Soviet Union, China, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other “fraternal countries” all contributed to North Korea’s reconstruction. 16 The post-war reconstruction of North Korea was a real division of labor for the Socialist camp, wholly consistent with the renewed interest in coordinating intra-bloc investments and trade policies. According to documents from the USSR 14 Kim Il Sung to Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev, “General Report on Basic Reconstruction of Important Enterprises Relating to Heavy Industry,” 31 July 1953, AVPRF, f. 0102, Op.9, p. 44, d. 8, cited from Armstrong, “Fraternal Socialism,” 163. 15 Kim Il Sung, All for the Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961); Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea: The Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 528; Zhonggong zhongyang duiwai lianluobu bian, Jin Richeng wenji, 1945-1967 [Selected Papers of Kim Il Sung] (1982, unpublished), 51-52. 16 Armstrong, “Fraternal Socialism,” 163-64
Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia NKIDP Working Paper #4 Trade Ministry documents,exactly one-third(33.3 percent)of reconstruction aid came from the USSR,29.4 percent from China,37.8 percent from Eastern European Communist countries,and 0.5 percent from Mongolia and North Vietnam.17 To paraphrase Karl Marx,"From each according to its ability,to North Korea according to its need." The Preparatory Period China's influence and role in North Korea increased dramatically during the Korean War. Kim Il Sung had relied on Soviet aid and support from 1945 to 1950,i.e.prior to the war.Once the Chinese People's Volunteers were dispatched to Korea following the collapse of the North Korean offensive in the fall of 1950,Soviet leader Joseph Stalin stood firmly by Mao Zedong- for the duration of the war-whenever Kim clashed with the Chinese over how to fight the war and achieve peace.Kim suffered the humiliation of becoming completely dependent on China, and to a lesser extent,on the Soviet Union,for the survival of both his regime and of North Korea itself.This experience undoubtedly left a deep psychological impact on him.This probably explained why the North Korean leaders were hesitant to ask China for economic aid immediately after the war.Kim first sought aid from the Soviet Union,not China.He led a delegation to Moscow in September 1953 to settle the terms of Soviet aid,which amounted to one billion rubles(USD 250 million).It was decided that these funds would be used primarily for reconstructing major factories and institutions.In November,Kim then dispatched Minister of Commerce Ri Ju-yeon [Ri Ju Yon]to Poland,Czechoslovakia,Hungary,Romania,Bulgaria, Albania,and East Germany to seek economic aid.Each of the Eastern European Communist countries agreed to undertake some rehabilitation projects as part of their contribution to North Korea's reconstruction.The total economic commitment from Eastern European countries for a 7Foreign assistance to the DPRK,1953-60,"cited from Armstrong,"Fraternal Socialism,"165. 18 AVPRF f.3,op.65,p.779,d.2,pp.11-12. 5 www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp
Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia NKIDP Working Paper #4 5 www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp Trade Ministry documents, exactly one-third (33.3 percent) of reconstruction aid came from the USSR, 29.4 percent from China, 37.8 percent from Eastern European Communist countries, and 0.5 percent from Mongolia and North Vietnam.17 To paraphrase Karl Marx, “From each according to its ability, to North Korea according to its need.” The Preparatory Period China’s influence and role in North Korea increased dramatically during the Korean War. Kim Il Sung had relied on Soviet aid and support from 1945 to 1950, i.e. prior to the war. Once the Chinese People’s Volunteers were dispatched to Korea following the collapse of the North Korean offensive in the fall of 1950, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin stood firmly by Mao Zedong— for the duration of the war—whenever Kim clashed with the Chinese over how to fight the war and achieve peace. Kim suffered the humiliation of becoming completely dependent on China, and to a lesser extent, on the Soviet Union, for the survival of both his regime and of North Korea itself. This experience undoubtedly left a deep psychological impact on him. This probably explained why the North Korean leaders were hesitant to ask China for economic aid immediately after the war. Kim first sought aid from the Soviet Union, not China. He led a delegation to Moscow in September 1953 to settle the terms of Soviet aid, which amounted to one billion rubles (USD 250 million). It was decided that these funds would be used primarily for reconstructing major factories and institutions. 18 In November, Kim then dispatched Minister of Commerce Ri Ju-yeon [Ri Ju Yon] to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and East Germany to seek economic aid. Each of the Eastern European Communist countries agreed to undertake some rehabilitation projects as part of their contribution to North Korea’s reconstruction. The total economic commitment from Eastern European countries for a 17 “Foreign assistance to the DPRK, 1953-60,” cited from Armstrong, “Fraternal Socialism,” 165. 18 AVPRF f. 3, op. 65, p. 779, d. 2, pp. 11-12
China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea,1953-1961 NKIDP Working Paper #4 period of ten years was 1.147 billion rubles(USD 286.75 million),of which nearly half from East Germany.By the end of 1954,the total amount of aid from Eastern European countries was 202 million rubles(USD 50.5 million).19 A full two months after his trip to the Soviet Union,Kim Il Sung visited China for two weeks in November.Despite wartime clashes over the use of railroads,the pace of reconstruction efforts,and peace talks,Beijing proved ready to help and made an initial commitment,which was much more generous than Moscow's.In their first meeting on 16 November,Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai proposed signing a secret Sino-Korean technological cooperation agreement.On the 23 November,China and North Korea signed the "Sino-Korean Economic and Cultural Cooperation Agreement."2 China's aid included the cancellation of North Korea's war-time debt,which amounted to 729 million Chinese yuan(USD 362.5 million), and a gift of 800 million Chinese yuan (USD 400 million)in aid for the period between 1954 and 1957,of which 300 million Chinese yuan(USD 125 million)was made available during the first year.2 These funds would be used for purchasing industrial materials,construction materials. machines and equipment,grains,and repairing railways and bridges.From 1954 to 1956,China also looked after 22,735 Korean child refugees.In other areas,China also offered very favorable terms.According to the Sino-North Korean agreement,the North Korean government only had to pay Chinese experts dispatched to Korea the same salary as they earned in China(plus travelling allowances,health costs,lodging and transportation).By contrast,the DPRK government had to offer much higher living allowances to Soviet experts dispatched to Korea to help in reconstruction.Korean trainees(mechanics and technicians)sent to China enjoyed the 19Russian State Archive of Contemporary History(RGAND),f.5,op.28,d.412,170-72;Bernd Schafer,"Weathering the Sino-Soviet Conflict:The GDR and North Korea,1949-1989,"CWIHP Bulletin 14/15 (Winter 2003-Spring 2004):25-71;Armstrong,"Fraternal Socialism,"168-69,174-75. 20 Li Ping et al.,Zhou Enlai nianpu,1949-1976 [The Chronicles of Zhou Enlai,1949-1976],vol.1(Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian and Renmin Chubanshe,1997),334-35. 21 The exchange rate in the 1950s was that 4 rubles equaled to USD 1. 6 www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp
China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953-1961 NKIDP Working Paper #4 6 www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp period of ten years was 1.147 billion rubles (USD 286.75 million), of which nearly half from East Germany. By the end of 1954, the total amount of aid from Eastern European countries was 202 million rubles (USD 50.5 million). 19 A full two months after his trip to the Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung visited China for two weeks in November. Despite wartime clashes over the use of railroads, the pace of reconstruction efforts, and peace talks, Beijing proved ready to help and made an initial commitment, which was much more generous than Moscow’s. In their first meeting on 16 November, Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai proposed signing a secret Sino-Korean technological cooperation agreement. On the 23 November, China and North Korea signed the “Sino-Korean Economic and Cultural Cooperation Agreement.” 20 China’s aid included the cancellation of North Korea’s war-time debt, which amounted to 729 million Chinese yuan (USD 362.5 million), and a gift of 800 million Chinese yuan (USD 400 million) in aid for the period between 1954 and 1957, of which 300 million Chinese yuan (USD 125 million) was made available during the first year.21 These funds would be used for purchasing industrial materials, construction materials, machines and equipment, grains, and repairing railways and bridges. From 1954 to 1956, China also looked after 22,735 Korean child refugees. In other areas, China also offered very favorable terms. According to the Sino-North Korean agreement, the North Korean government only had to pay Chinese experts dispatched to Korea the same salary as they earned in China (plus travelling allowances, health costs, lodging and transportation). By contrast, the DPRK government had to offer much higher living allowances to Soviet experts dispatched to Korea to help in reconstruction. Korean trainees (mechanics and technicians) sent to China enjoyed the 19 Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), f. 5, op. 28, d. 412, 170-72; Bernd Schafer,”Weathering the Sino- Soviet Conflict: The GDR and North Korea, 1949-1989,” CWIHP Bulletin 14/15 (Winter 2003-Spring 2004): 25-71; Armstrong, “Fraternal Socialism,” 168-69, 174-75. 20 Li Ping et al., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949-1976 [The Chronicles of Zhou Enlai, 1949-1976], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian and Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), 334-35. 21 The exchange rate in the 1950s was that 4 rubles equaled to USD 1
