The MIT Press To the Nuclear Brink:Eisenhower,Dulles,and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis Author(s):Gordon H.Chang Source:International Security,Vol.12.No.4(Spring.1988),pp.96-123 Published by:The MIT Press Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538996 Accessed:15/05/201301:03 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms&Conditions of Use,available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive.We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to International Security. 29 STOR http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis Author(s): Gordon H. Chang Source: International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring, 1988), pp. 96-123 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538996 . Accessed: 15/05/2013 01:03 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
To the Nuclear Brink Gordon H.Chang Eisenhower,Dulles,and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis Shortly after the first anniversary of the end of the Korean War,the United States confronted the possibility of renewed hostilities with the People's Republic of China.On September 3,1954,while Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was in Manila finalizing the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),Chinese Communist coastal batteries began heavy shelling of Jin- men(Quemoy)',one of the small Nationalist-held islands off the coast of the China mainland.Acting Secretary of Defense Robert Anderson alerted Pres- ident Dwight D.Eisenhower that the intensity of the attack seemed a prelude to an all-out assault.Over the next nine months the United States,in sup- porting the Nationalists'defense of these islands,lurched toward disaster- in Eisenhower's own recollection,the crisis almost caused a "split between the United States and nearly all its allies"and seemingly carried the country to the“edge of war..w2 The president's critics at the time accused him of bringing the country to the verge of war over real estate of little consequence.Much of the historical evaluation was not much kinder.Early literature on Eisenhower portrayed him as a"weak president,"surrounded by advisers who wanted to use the crisis in the Strait to bring about a war with China.His administration,it was said,pursued an inflexible foreign policy that assumed,despite evidence to the contrary,a monolithic "international communism."The picture drawn by even those sympathetic to Eisenhower was one of an unimaginative president preoccupied with maintaining the status quo.3 The author would like to thank Barton Bernstein,David Kennedy,and John Lewis for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article and the MacArthur Foundation for financial support. Gordon H.Chang is a historian at the International Strategic Institute at Stanford UIniversity and Coordinator of the Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region. 1.The pinyin romanization system will be used for Chinese names in this essay,except in the title.Traditional spellings will appear in parentheses after the first use of the pinyin. 2.Robert Anderson to Eisenhower,September 3,1954,Dwight D.Eisenhower Papers as Pres- ident of the United States,1953-1961(Ann Whitman File),Eisenhower Library,Abilene,Kansas, hereafter Eisenhower Papers (AW),Dulles-Herter Series,Box 3,Dulles,Sept.1954(2);Dwight D.Eisenhower,Mandate for Change,1953-1956(New York:Doubleday,1963),p.459. 3.Marquis William Childs,Eisenhower:Captive Hero,A Critical Study of the General and the President International Security,Spring 1988 (Vol.12,No.4) 1988 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 96 soamoR=2213016AM
To the Nuclear Brinik Gordon H. Chang Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis Shortly after the first anniversary of the end of the Korean War, the United States confronted the possibility of renewed hostilities with the People's Republic of China. On September 3, 1954, while Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was in Manila finalizing the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Chinese Communist coastal batteries began heavy shelling of Jinmen (Quemoy)1, one of the small Nationalist-held islands off the coast of the China mainland. Acting Secretary of Defense Robert Anderson alerted President Dwight D. Eisenhower that the intensity of the attack seemed a prelude to an all-out assault. Over the next nine months the United States, in supporting the Nationalists' defense of these islands, lurched toward disasterin Eisenhower's own recollection, the crisis almost caused a "split between the United States and nearly all its allies" and seemingly carried the country to the "edge of war."2 The president's critics at the time accused him of bringing the country to the verge of war over real estate of little consequence. Much of the historical evaluation was not much kinder. Early literature on Eisenhower portrayed him as a "weak president," surrounded by advisers who wanted to use the crisis in the Strait to bring about a war with China. His administration, it was said, pursued an inflexible foreign policy that assumed, despite evidence to the contrary, a monolithic "international communism." The picture drawn by even those sympathetic to Eisenhower was one of an unimaginative president preoccupied with maintaining the status quo.3 The author would like to thank Barton Bernstein, David Kennedy, and John Lewis for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article and the MacArthur Foundation for financial support. Gordon H. Chang is a historian at the International Strategic Institute at Stanford University and Coordinator of the Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region. International Security, Spring 1988 (Vol. 12, No. 4) C 1988 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 96 1. The pinyin romanization system will be used for Chinese names in this essay, except in the title. Traditional spellings will appear in parentheses after the first use of the pinyin. 2. Robert Anderson to Eisenhower, September 3, 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, hereafter Eisenhower Papers (AW), Dulles-Herter Series, Box 3, Dulles, Sept. 1954 (2); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 459. 3. Marquis William Childs, Eisenhower: Captive Hero, A Critical Study of the Generalnd the President This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Quemoy-Matsu,1954-55 97 In recent years,in contrast,a "revisionist"literature on Eisenhower has tried to draw an entirely different picture.Now,he is seen as a commanding chief executive,and is applauded for deft handling of the 1954-55 confron- tation.One recent account characterizes Eisenhower's policy as one of "re- straint and avoidance of conflict in the Taiwan Strait."4 But newly available documentary evidence contradicts many of the revi- sionist contentions and shows that Eisenhower actually brought the country to the "nuclear brink,"far closer to war than a distraught public feared in 1955,closer than Eisenhower acknowledged in his own memoirs,and closer than most historians have heretofore even suspected.5 Among the revelations of the new evidence,three are most important:(1) the Eisenhower administration made a secret commitment to Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)to help defend Jinmen and Mazu(Matsu)in the event of a major Communist attack;(2)Eisenhower,despite his public ambiguity on (New York:Harcourt,Brace,1958),pp.188-212,204,291;Townsend Hoopes,The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston:Little,Brown,1973),pp.262-273;Foster Rhea Dulles,American Policy Toward Communist China,1949-1969(New York:Thomas Y.Crowell,1972),pp.130-160;Peter Lyon,Eisenhower:Portrait of the Hero (Boston:Little,Brown,1974),pp.632,637,853-54.Other literature on the 1954-55 crisis:O.Edmund Clubb,"Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Foreign Policy,1950-1955,"Political Science Quarterly,Vol.74,No.4 (Dec.1959),pp. 517-31;Morton H.Halperin and Tang Tsou,"United States Policy toward the Offshore Islands," Public Policy,Vol.15 (1966),pp.119-38;Alexander George and Richard Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York:Columbia University Press,1971),pp.266-94;J.H.Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises:Political-Military Interactions in the 1950s(London:Cambridge University Press,1975),pp.120-155;and Thomas E.Stolper,China,Taiwan,and the Offshore Islands (Armonk,N.Y.:M.E.Sharpe,1985). 4.Leonard H.D.Gordon,"United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait,1954- 1962,"Journal of American History,Vol.72,No.3(December 1985),pp.637-660.See also Robert Divine,Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York:Oxford University Press,1981);Stephen E. Ambrose,Eisenhower,Vol.II:The President (New York:Simon and Schuster,1985);and Bennett C.Rushkoff,"Eisenhower,Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis,1954-1955,"Political Science Quarterly,Vol.96,No.3 (Fall 1981),pp.465-480. 5.Declassified material used in this essay includes memoranda of discussions between Eisen- hower and his advisers and of top-level policy-making meetings,diary entries,cables,corre- spondence,and position papers.The federal government has released many of these documents in just the last few years,and they are kept in different locations throughout the country.The Dwight D.Eisenhower Library in Abilene,Kansas holds the Dwight D.Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States,1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File),(hereafter Eisenhower Papers [AW]);John Foster Dulles Papers,1951-1959 (hereafter Dulles Papers);and papers from the White House Office,Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs(hereafter WHO OSANSA).The National Archives in Washington,D.C.,in its Diplomatic Branch,holds papers from the Department of State and,in its Military Branch,papers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many State Department documents for the period covered by this essay are reproduced in Department of State,Foreign Relations of the UInited States (hereafter FRUS).The Seeley G.Mudd Library of Princeton University holds the personal papers of John Foster Dulles (hereafter Princeton Dulles Papers),and the Karl Lott Rankin Papers. hs coe o313AM
Quemoy-Matsu, 1954-55 197 In recent years, in contrast, a"revisionist" literature on Eisenhower has tried to draw an entirely different picture. Now, he is seen as a commanding chief executive, and is applauded for deft handling of the 1954-55 confrontation. One recent account characterizes Eisenhower's policy as one of "restraint and avoidance of conflict in the Taiwan Strait."4 But newly available documentary evidence contradicts many of the revisionist contentions and shows that Eisenhower actually brought the country to the "nuclear brink," far closer to war than a distraught public feared in 1955, closer than Eisenhower acknowledged in his own memoirs, and closer than most historians have heretofore even suspected.5 Among the revelations of the new evidence, three are most important: (1) the Eisenhower administration made a secret commitment to Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) to help defend Jinmen and Mazu (Matsu) in the event of a major Communist attack; (2) Eisenhower, despite his public ambiguity on (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958), pp. 188-212, 204, 291; Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 262-273; Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy Toward Communist China, 1949-1969 (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), pp. 130-160; Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 632, 637, 853-54. Other literature on the 1954-55 crisis: 0. Edmund Clubb, "Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 74, No. 4 (Dec. 1959), pp. 517-31; Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "United States Policy toward the Offshore Islands," Public Policy, Vol. 15 (1966), pp. 119-38; Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 266-94; J.H. Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 1950s (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 120-155; and Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1985). 4. Leonard H. D. Gordon, "United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1954- 1962," Journal of American History, Vol. 72, No. 3 (December 1985), pp. 637-660. See also Robert Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Vol. II: The President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985); and Bennett C. Rushkoff, "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 96, No. 3 (Fall 1981), pp. 465-480. 5. Declassified material used in this essay includes memoranda of discussions between Eisenhower and his advisers and of top-level policy-making meetings, diary entries, cables, correspondence, and position papers. The federal government has released many of these documents in just the last few years, and they are kept in different locations throughout the country. The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas holds the Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), (hereafter Eisenhower Papers [AW]); John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951-1959 (hereafter Dulles Papers); and papers from the White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (hereafter WHO OSANSA). The National Archives in Washington, D.C., in its Diplomatic Branch, holds papers from the Department of State and, in its Military Branch, papers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many State Department documents for the period covered by this essay are reproduced in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS). The Seeley G. Mudd Library of Princeton University holds the personal papers of John Foster Dulles (hereafter Princeton Dulles Papers), and the Karl Lott Rankin Papers. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 12:498 the subject,was privately determined to defend the islands,and to use nuclear weapons if necessary;and(3)in April 1955,as the crisis reached its peak,Eisenhower and Dulles proposed to Jiang,if he would withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu,that the United States would establish a 500-mile blockade of China's coastal waters until the Communists renounced their intention to liberate Taiwan. Taken together,these points make it plain that for a time in the spring of 1955,the Eisenhower administration pursued policies that could have led to war with China by either of two paths.If the Chinese Communists had attacked Jinmen or Mazu in force while Eisenhower's secret pledge to defend them was in effect,or if Jiang had accepted the evacuation/blockade plan, Washington almost certainly would have found itself in direct military conflict with Beijing.In such a conflict,Eisenhower was fully prepared to use nuclear weapons. The fact that war was averted was due to Jiang's refusal to give up the offshore islands,thus releasing Washington from the blockade plan,and to the conciliatory gesture of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai(Chou En-lai)to the United States in late April 1955 which dramatically reduced the tensions in the region.Ironically,it was thus the actions of the two directly belligerent parties,the Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists,that pulled the United States back from the brink. The Eisenhower administration's truculence belies the picture which the revisionist historians have tried to paint of a restrained and supple president. Eisenhower was not a compliant chief executive-the revisionists have dis- pelled that misconception-but he must bear primary responsibility for lead- ing the country to an untenable position in April 1955 and to the verge of military conflict with China.Moreover,the new evidence reveals that Eisen- hower's leadership was not as skillful and steady as revisionists have claimed. At two critical junctures of the crisis-in late January when the administration committed itself to the defense of Jinmen and Mazu,and in April,when it proposed the evacuation/blockade plan-Eisenhower equivocated,seriously confusing his subordinates and infuriating the Nationalist government. September,1954:Background of the Crisis In 1954,the United States believed that the legal status of Jinmen,Mazu, Dachen (Tachen),and several other clusters of small offshore islands under the control of the Nationalists differed from that of Taiwan and the Penghus This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 12:4 | 98 the subject, was privately determined to defend the islands, and to use nuclear weapons if necessary; and (3) in April 1955, as the crisis reached its peak, Eisenhower and Dulles proposed to Jiang, if he would withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu, that the United States would establish a500-mile blockade of China's coastal waters until the Communists renounced their intention to liberate Taiwan. Taken together, these points make it plain that for a time in the spring of 1955, the Eisenhower administration pursued policies that could have led to war with China by either of two paths. If the Chinese Communists had attacked Jinmen or Mazu in force while Eisenhower'secret pledge to defend them was in effect, or if Jiang had accepted the evacuation/blockade plan, Washington almost certainly would have found itself in direct military conflict with Beijing. In such a conflict, Eisenhower was fully prepared to use nuclear weapons. The fact that war was averted was due to Jiang's refusal to give up the offshore islands, thus releasing Washington from the blockade plan, and to the conciliatory gesture of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) to the United States in late April 1955 which dramatically reduced the tensions in the region. Ironically, it was thus the actions of the two directly belligerent parties, the Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists, that pulled the United States back from the brink. The Eisenhower administration's truculence belies the picture which the revisionist historians have tried to paint of a restrained and supple president. Eisenhower was not a compliant chief executive-the revisionists have dispelled that misconception-but he must bear primary responsibility for leading the country to an untenable position in April 1955 and to the verge of military conflict with China. Moreover, the new evidence reveals that Eisenhower's leadership was not as skillful and steady as revisionists have claimed. At two critical junctures of the crisis-in late January when the administration committed itself to the defense of Jinmen and Mazu, and in April, when it proposed the evacuation/blockade plan-Eisenhower equivocated, seriously confusing his subordinates and infuriating the Nationalist government. September, 1954: Background ofthe Crisis In 1954, the United States believed that the legal status of Jinmen, Mazu, Dachen (Tachen), and several other clusters of small offshore islands under the control of the Nationalists differed from that of Taiwan and the Penghus This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Quemoy-Matsu,1954-55 99 (Pescadores).The latter had been colonized by the Japanese after their victory over China in the war of 1895 and,even though the jurisdiction of Taiwan and the Penghus had reverted to China following World War II,the United States considered their ultimate disposition still unsettled.On the other hand, the offshore islands-some thirty in number just off the central coast of the mainland-had remained subject to China,and there was no legal question that they were Chinese territory.As the Nationalists retreated from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949,they retained control of the offshore islands for use as staging areas to harass the Communists.Jinmen,Mazu,and the others actually possessed questionable value for the defense of Taiwan,over one hundred miles away on the opposite side of the Taiwan Strait.The several thousand inhabitants of the small islands were mainly farmers and fisher- men.(See map,p.123.) Eisenhower described many of the offshore islands as practically within "wading distance"of the mainland shore,including two important harbors. The Jinmen group is just two miles from the port of Xiamen(Amoy);the Mazu group is ten miles from the port of Fuzhou(Foochow).Both groups lie opposite Taiwan.The third main group,the Dachens,is located two hundred miles north of Taiwan. The Communists and Nationalists had occasionally skirmished over the islands since 1949.By the start of the 1954 crisis,with American help and encouragement,Jiang had transformed them into formidable forward posi- tions.More than fifty thousand Nationalist soldiers,many of them first-line regulars,were stationed on Jinmen alone.Apparently,Jiang was preparing the island as stepping stones for his future invasion of the mainland.6 The United States opposed any effort by the Chinese Communists to expand the amount of territory under their control and was fully committed to the Nationalist regime,which refused to budge from any territory it held. Since 1949,Washington had provided $1.6 billion in economic and military aid to the Nationalists.7 Would the United States go to war with China over these insignificant specks of land?A few days after the Communists started 6.George and Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,pp.266-74;Stewart Alsop,"The Story Behind Quemoy:How We Drifted Close to War,"Saturday Evening Post,December 13, 1958,pp.26-27,86-88;memorandum of conversation,Yu Ta-wei,Walter Robertson and others, December 6,1955,Office of Chinese Affairs,1948-56,Box 53,Offshore Islands,1955,RG 59, National Archives. 7.John Foster Dulles,"Preliminary draft of possible statement of position for communication to the Republic of China,"April 4,1955,Office of Chinese Affairs,1948-56,Box 53,Offshore Islands,1955,RG 59,National Archives. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Quemoy-Matsu, 1954-55 | 99 (Pescadores). The latter had been colonized by the Japanese after their victory over China in the war of 1895 and, even though the jurisdiction of Taiwan and the Penghus had reverted to China following World War II, the United States considered their ultimate disposition still unsettled. On the other hand, the offshore islands-some thirty in number just off the central coast of the mainland-had remained subject to China, and there was no legal question that they were Chinese territory. As the Nationalists retreated from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, they retained control of the offshore islands for use as staging areas to harass the Communists. Jinmen, Mazu, and the others actually possessed questionable value for the defense of Taiwan, over one hundred miles away on the opposite side of the Taiwan Strait. The several thousand inhabitants of the small islands were mainly farmers and fishermen. (See map, p. 123.) Eisenhower described many of the offshore islands as practically within "wading distance" of the mainland shore, including two important harbors. The Jinmen group is just two miles from the port of Xiamen (Amoy); the Mazu group is ten miles from the port of Fuzhou (Foochow). Both groups lie opposite Taiwan. The third main group, the Dachens, is located two hundred miles north of Taiwan. The Communists and Nationalists had occasionally skirmished over the islands since 1949. By the start of the 1954 crisis, with American help and encouragement, Jiang had transformed them into formidable forward positions. More than fifty thousand Nationalist soldiers, many of them first-line regulars, were stationed on Jinmen alone. Apparently, Jiang was preparing the island as stepping stones for his future invasion of the mainland.6 The United States opposed any effort by the Chinese Communists to expand the amount of territory under their control and was fully committed to the Nationalist regime, which refused to budge from any territory it held. Since 1949, Washington had provided $1.6 billion in economic and military aid to the Nationalists.7 Would the United States go to war with China over these insignificant specks of land? A few days after the Communiststarted 6. George and Smoke, Deterrence inAmerican Foreign Policy, pp. 266-74; Stewart Alsop, "The Story Behind Quemoy: How We Drifted Close to War," Saturday Evening Post, December 13, 1958, pp. 26-27, 86-88; memorandum of conversation, Yu Ta-wei, Walter Robertson and others, December 6, 1955, Office of Chinese Affairs, 1948-56, Box 53, Offshore Islands, 1955, RG 59, National Archives. 7. John Foster Dulles, "Preliminary draft of possible statement of position for communication to the Republic of China," April 4, 1955, Office of Chinese Affairs, 1948-56, Box 53, Offshore Islands, 1955, RG 59, National Archives. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 12:4100 shelling Jinmen in September 1954,Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told the National Security Council(NSC)that the crisis was a "horrible dilemma."8 From the start,the administration was divided.Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS)Admiral Arthur W.Radford,speaking for the majority of the JCS,advocated an all-out defense of the offshore islands as critical to the protection of Taiwan and the use of atomic weapons if the Communists launched a major assault.Radford believed that the United States had to take a stand in the interests of the global battle against communism."If we fail to resist this aggression,"Radford told a September 12 meeting of the NSC,"we commit the United States further to a negative policy which could result in a progressive loss of free world strength to local aggression until or unless all-out conflict is forced upon us."9 But the majority of the NSC,reluctant to face the prospect of another war with China,backed away from Radford's militarist line.Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson feared that involvement would inject the United States into the middle of the on-going Chinese civil war.Eisenhower was skeptical about the military importance of the islands for the defense of Taiwan.Though he believed their loss would be a serious blow to the morale of the Nationalists, he suspected that war would not be necessary to hold the islands.Dulles, likewise,wanted neither all-out war with China nor surrender of the islands under duress.He and the president opted to try for a way to defuse the immediate situation,while backing the Nationalists.10 In the following weeks,the administration publicly condemned the Com- munist threat and re-emphasized its support for the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus.But to keep Beijing guessing as to U.S.intentions,Eisenhower and Dulles left vague whether the commitment to the Nationalists extended to the offshore islands under their control.The two also wanted to avoid alienating European and Asian allies,who strongly opposed American in- volvement in the offshore area.To try to strengthen the American diplomatic position and limit the crisis,Dulles went to work with Western nations on a United Nations plan for a ceasefire,from which might develop possible 8.Memorandum of discussion at the 213th meeting of the NSC,September 9,1954,FRUS: 1952-54,Vol.XIV,pp.583-595;memorandum of discussion at the 214th meeting of the NSC, September 12,1954,ibid.,pp.613-24. 9.214th NSC meeting,ibid.;Radford to Wilson,September 11,1954,FRUS:1952-54,Vol.XIV, PP.598-610. 10.Memorandum of 214th meeting of the NSC,Sept.12,1954,FRUS,1952-54,Vol.XIV,pp. 619-624. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 12:4 | 100 shelling Jinmen in September 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told the National Security Council (NSC) that the crisis was a "horrible dilemma."8 From the start, the administration was divided. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Admiral Arthur W. Radford, speaking for the majority of the JCS, advocated an all-out defense of the offshore islands as critical to the protection of Taiwan and the use of atomic weapons if the Communists launched a major assault. Radford believed that the United States had to take a stand in the interests of the global battle against communism. "If we fail to resist this aggression," Radford told a September 12 meeting of the NSC, "we commit the United States further to a negative policy which could result in a progressive loss of free world strength to local aggression until or unless all-out conflict is forced upon us."9 But the majority of the NSC, reluctant to face the prospect of another war with China, backed away from Radford's militarist line. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson feared that involvement would inject the United States into the middle of the on-going Chinese civil war. Eisenhower was skeptical about the military importance of the islands for the defense of Taiwan. Though he believed their loss would be a serious blow to the morale of the Nationalists, he suspected that war would not be necessary to hold the islands. Dulles, likewise, wanted neither all-out war with China nor surrender of the islands under duress. He and the president opted to try for a way to defuse the immediate situation, while backing the Nationalists.10 In the following weeks, the administration publicly condemned the Communist threat and re-emphasized its support for the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus. But to keep Beijing guessing as to U.S. intentions, Eisenhower and Dulles left vague whether the commitment to the Nationalists extended to the offshore islands under their control. The two also wanted to avoid alienating European and Asian allies, who strongly opposed American involvement in the offshore area. To try to strengthen the American diplomatic position and limit the crisis, Dulles went to work with Western nations on a United Nations plan for a ceasefire, from which might develop possible 8. Memorandum of discussion at the 213th meeting of the NSC, September 9, 1954, FRUS: 1952-54, Vol. XIV, pp. 583-595; memorandum of discussion at the 214th meeting of the NSC, September 12, 1954, ibid., pp. 613-24. 9. 214th NSC meeting, ibid.; Radford to Wilson, September 11, 1954, FRUS: 1952-54, Vol. XIV, pp. 598-610. 10. Memorandum of 214th meeting of the NSC, Sept. 12, 1954, FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. XIV, pp. 619-624. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Quemoy-Matsu,1954-55 101 neutralization of the offshore islands.Simultaneously,to remove any doubt about Washington's support for the Nationalists,he concluded and signed in early December a"mutual defense"treaty with Jiang's regime.The treaty explicitly covered Taiwan and the Penghus and provided for extension to other Nationalist-held territories upon the mutual agreement of the two signatories.In return for this protection and to ensure that it would not be drawn into a precipitous war with China,Washington,however,required Jiang to pledge secretly that he would take no more offensive actions against the mainland without explicit U.S.approval.Admiral Radford was so un- happy with these public and private agreements that he charged they were leading the way to the fall of all of Asia to communism.12 January 1955:A "Turn for the Worse" In spite of the administration's efforts,the situation in the Taiwan Strait continued to deteriorate in late 1954,and,in Eisenhower's description,took a "turn for the worse"at the start of 1955.Both the Communists and Na- tionalists predicted imminent widespread hostilities.On January 10,one hundred planes from the mainland raided the Dachens,and on January 18 Communist forces overwhelmed one thousand Nationalist guerrillas (and eight American military personnel)on Yijiang (Ichiang)Island,just north of the Dachens.The Nationalists counter-attacked with air strikes on mainland ports and shipping.From Washington's vantage point,all-out war for the offshore islands and perhaps Taiwan itself seemed to loom.Eisenhower concluded that since the Dachens were too far from Taiwan's airfields,they were not as defensible militarily as Jinmen and Mazu.Nevertheless,he decided that the United States had to clarify its position.On January 19, Eisenhower agreed with Dulles and Radford that the remaining offshore islands could not be held without"U.S.interposition."As Eisenhower wrote 11.Dulles memorandum,September 12,1954,FRUS:1952-54,Vol.XIV,Pp.611-613;memo- randum of discussion at the 215th meeting of the NSC,September 24,1954,ibid.,pp.658-660; Dulles to Robertson,October 7,1954,ibid.,p.708;Dulles memorandum,meeting with Eisen- hower,October 18,1954,ibid.,p.770;Dulles,report to the NSC,October 28,1954,ibid.,Pp. 809-812;Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China,December 2,1954,Department of State Bulletin,December 13,1954,p.899. 12.Goodpaster,memorandum,meeting of Dulles,Radford and others,October 29,1954,FRUS: 1952-54,Vol.XIV,pp.814-16;Radford memorandum,October 29,1954,ibid.,pp.817-19; memorandum of discussion at the 221st meeting of the NSC,November 2,1954,ibid.,pp.827- 839. Thas oe o115 AM
Quemoy-Matsu, 1954-55 1 101 neutralization of the offshore islands. Simultaneously, to remove any doubt about Washington'support for the Nationalists, he concluded and signed in early December a "mutual defense" treaty with Jiang's regime. The treaty explicitly covered Taiwan and the Penghus and provided for extension to other Nationalist-held territories upon the mutual agreement of the two signatories. In return for this protection and to ensure that it would not be drawn into a precipitous war with China, Washington, however, required Jiang to pledge secretly that he would take no more offensive actions against the mainland without explicit U.S. approval.11 Admiral Radford was so unhappy with these public and private agreements that he charged they were leading the way to the fall of all of Asia to communism.12 January 1955: A "Turn for the Worse" In spite of the administration's efforts, the situation in the Taiwan Strait continued to deteriorate in late 1954, and, in Eisenhower's description, took a "turn for the worse" at the start of 1955. Both the Communists and Nationalists predicted imminent widespread hostilities. On January 10, one hundred planes from the mainland raided the Dachens, and on January 18 Communist forces overwhelmed one thousand Nationalist guerrillas (and eight American military personnel) on Yijiang (Ichiang) Island, just north of the Dachens. The Nationalists counter-attacked with air strikes on mainland ports and shipping. From Washington's vantage point, all-out war for the offshore islands and perhaps Taiwan itself seemed to loom. Eisenhower concluded that since the Dachens were too far from Taiwan's airfields, they were not as defensible militarily as Jinmen and Mazu. Nevertheless, he decided that the United States had to clarify its position. On January 19, Eisenhower agreed with Dulles and Radford that the remaining offshore islands could not be held without "U.S. interposition." As Eisenhower wrote 11. Dulles memorandum, September 12, 1954, FRUS: 1952-54, Vol. XIV, pp. 611-613; memorandum of discussion at the 215th meeting of the NSC, September 24, 1954, ibid., pp. 658-660; Dulles to Robertson, October 7, 1954, ibid., p. 708; Dulles memorandum, meeting with Eisenhower, October 18, 1954, ibid., p. 770; Dulles, report to the NSC, October 28, 1954, ibid., pp. 809-812; Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China, December 2, 1954, Department of State Bulletin, December 13, 1954, p. 899. 12. Goodpaster, memorandum, meeting of Dulles, Radford and others, October 29, 1954, FRUS: 1952-54, Vol. XIV, pp. 814-16; Radford memorandum, October 29, 1954, ibid., pp. 817-19; memorandum of discussion at the 221st meeting of the NSC, November 2, 1954, ibid., pp. 827- 839. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 12:4 102 in his memoirs,"the time had come to draw the line"over what territories the United States would fight for.13 Dulles,on Eisenhower's instructions, confidentially informed Nationalist Foreign Minister George K.C.Yeh,who was visiting Washington,that the United States would publicly announce its intention to join in the defense of Jinmen,if the Nationalists withdrew from the Dachens.14 On the next day,January 20,1955,the NSC argued heatedly about the path Eisenhower and Dulles had chosen.On behalf of the president,Dulles reviewed U.S.policy:the United States had obscured its public stand to confuse the enemy.This policy,though,had begun to "backfire."The Com- munists now seemed convinced the United States would not fight for any of the offshore islands.Dulles recommended that,while continuing to seek a ceasefire through the UN,the administration should ask Congress to grant to the president the explicit power to commit U.S.forces to the defense of Taiwan and related areas not specifically mentioned in the mutual defense treaty.These "related areas"would include Jinmen,and probably Mazu,so long as the Communists professed an intention to attack Taiwan.The United States had to remove any ambiguity about what territories it would defend. Leaving the U.S.position unclear,according to Dulles,would now create "greater risk."15 Robert Cutler,the president's national security adviser,Treasury Secretary George Humphrey,and Defense Secretary Charles Wilson all vehemently objected to Dulles's view.They argued that the United States would be drawn directly into war with China over territory of minimal value.Wilson said the United States should hold just Taiwan and the Penghus,and "let the others go."The president,however,vigorously endorsed everything Dulles advo- 13.Dulles memorandum,meeting with Eisenhower and Radford,January 19,1955,FRUS:1955- 57,Vol.II,pp.41-44;Eisenhower,Mandate,p.466.Seven of the eight U.S.personnel were evacuated before Yijiang's capture.According to a historian in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who cites previously closed Chinese sources,Beijing employed limited military means as a political instrument to draw attention to the Taiwan question.Beijing wanted only to take Yijiang but not Jinmen or Mazu and did not want to confront the United States.After the Communists took Yijiang,in fact,Defense Minister Peng Dehuai and the Central Military Commission ordered Chinese forces to postpone their attack on the Dachens to avoid a clash with the United States.He Di,"The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy Toward the Offshore Islands,"unpublished paper,1987. 14.McConaughy memorandum,meeting of Dulles,Yeh and others,January 19,1955;Cutler memorandum,meeting of Dulles,Hoover and others,January 19,1955;both,FRUS:1955-57 Vol.L,Pp.46-48. 15.Memorandum of discussion at the 232nd meeting of the NSC,January 20,1955,Eisenhower Papers (AW)NSC Series,Box 6,NSC Summaries of Discussion. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 12:4 1 102 in his memoirs, "the time had come to draw the line" over what territories the United States would fight for.13 Dulles, on Eisenhower's instructions, confidentially informed Nationalist Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh, who was visiting Washington, that the United States would publicly announce its intention to join in the defense of Jinmen, if the Nationalists withdrew from the Dachens.14 On the next day, January 20, 1955, the NSC argued heatedly about the path Eisenhower and Dulles had chosen. On behalf of the president, Dulles reviewed U.S. policy: the United States had obscured its public stand to confuse the enemy. This policy, though, had begun to "backfire." The Communists now seemed convinced the United States would not fight for any of the offshore islands. Dulles recommended that, while continuing to seek a ceasefire through the UN, the administration should ask Congress to grant to the president the explicit power to commit U.S. forces to the defense of Taiwan and related areas not specifically mentioned in the mutual defense treaty. These "related areas" would include Jinmen, and probably Mazu, so long as the Communists professed an intention to attack Taiwan. The United States had to remove any ambiguity about what territories it would defend. Leaving the U.S. position unclear, according to Dulles, would now create "greater risk."'15 Robert Cutler, the president's national security adviser, Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, and Defense Secretary Charles Wilson all vehemently objected to Dulles's view. They argued that the United States would be drawn directly into war with China over territory of minimal value. Wilson said the United States should hold just Taiwan and the Penghus, and "let the others go." The president, however, vigorously endorsed everything Dulles advo- 13. Dulles memorandum, meeting with Eisenhower and Radford, January 19, 1955, FRUS: 1955- 57, Vol. II, pp. 41-44; Eisenhower, Mandate, p. 466. Seven of the eight U.S. personnel were evacuated before Yijiang's capture. According to a historian in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who cites previously closed Chinese sources, Beijing employed limited military means as a political instrument to draw attention to the Taiwan question. Beijing wanted only to take Yijiang but not Jinmen or Mazu and did not want to confront the United States. After the Communists took Yijiang, in fact, Defense Minister Peng Dehuai and the Central Military Commission ordered Chinese forces to postpone their attack on the Dachens to avoid a clash with the United States. He Di, "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy Toward the Offshore Islands," unpublished paper, 1987. 14. McConaughy memorandum, meeting of Dulles, Yeh and others, January 19, 1955; Cutler memorandum, meeting of Dulles, Hoover and others, January 19, 1955; both, FRUS: 1955-57, Vol. II, pp. 46-48. 15. Memorandum of discussion at the 232nd meeting of the NSC, January 20, 1955, Eisenhower Papers (AW) NSC Series, Box 6, NSC Summaries of Discussion. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Quemoy-Matsu,1954-55 103 cated.The Dachens could be given up,he conceded,but unless the United States was prepared "completely to discount Formosa,"the NSC had to make up its mind about Jinmen and Mazu,the most important remaining offshore islands.If Jiang lost these,the damage to Nationalist morale might be irre- parable.Ever since many of Jiang's forces surrendered without a fight in 1949,Washington had doubted the loyalty and determination of Jiang's forces.Even a symbolic setback might undermine the entire Nationalist cause.According to Eisenhower,a statement of U.S.resolve would reduce the danger of war with China and correct the current "dangerous drift"in policy.In any case,the president said,it was clear to him that Jinmen and Mazu "were the outposts for the defense of Formosa."16 The NSC continued its discussion the following day.Eisenhower remained adamant in his demand that Congress give him broad general authority to defend the islands under Nationalist control.He told the NSC he was "ab- solutely determined"to avoid at all costs "another Yalu River sanctuary situation in any struggle over Quemoy."Eisenhower wanted no restraints if the United States became involved,and while he wished to avoid being pinned down to a permanent defense of Jinmen and Mazu,he would not abandon them as long as the Communists menaced the islands.Eisenhower said the United States might change its policy in the future after tensions eased,but at present the United States had to help hold the islands to protect Taiwan.According to the record of the discussion,Eisenhower made his point abundantly clear:everyone present,he said,should be sure of one thing-no matter how a Congressional resolution was worded,if there was an emergency during this crisis,he would do whatever had to be done to protect the vital interests of the United States,"even if his actions should be interpreted as acts of war."Eisenhower said he "would rather be impeached than fail to do his duty."7 Three days later Eisenhower sent his special request to Congress.On January 28,1955,the Senate,following the House of Representatives,passed what became known as the Formosa Resolution,giving the president a virtual blank check.The resolution authorized the president to employ the armed 16.Ibid.A draft message for Congress,which Dulles wrote for Eisenhower following the NSC meeting,specifically mentioned Jinmen and Mazu as territories that the United States would help defend.The draft was not used.Dulles,"Draft message from the President to the Con- gress,"January 20,1955,ibid.,pp.83-85. 17.Memorandum of discussion at the 233rd meeting of the NSC,Jan.21,1955,Eisenhower Papers(AW),NSC Series,Box 6,NSC Summaries of Discussion. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Quemoy-Matsu, 1954-55 1 103 cated. The Dachens could be given up, he conceded, but unless the United States was prepared "completely to discount Formosa," the NSC had to make up its mind about Jinmen and Mazu, the most important remaining offshore islands. If Jiang lost these, the damage to Nationalist morale might be irreparable. Ever since many of Jiang's forces surrendered without a fight in 1949, Washington had doubted the loyalty and determination of Jiang's forces. Even a symbolic setback might undermine the entire Nationalist cause. According to Eisenhower, astatement of U.S. resolve would reduce the danger of war with China and correcthe current "dangerous drift" in policy. In any case, the president said, it was clear to him that Jinmen and Mazu "were the outposts for the defense of Formosa."'16 The NSC continued its discussion the following day. Eisenhower remained adamant in his demand that Congress give him broad general authority to defend the islands under Nationalist control. He told the NSC he was "absolutely determined" to avoid at all costs "another Yalu River sanctuary situation in any struggle over Quemoy." Eisenhower wanted no restraints if the United States became involved, and while he wished to avoid being pinned down to a permanent defense of Jinmen and Mazu, he would not abandon them as long as the Communists menaced the islands. Eisenhower said the United States might change its policy in the future after tensions eased, but at present the United States had to help hold the islands to protect Taiwan. According to the record of the discussion, Eisenhower made his point abundantly clear: everyone present, he said, should be sure of one thing-no matter how a Congressional resolution was worded, if there was an emergency during this crisis, he would do whatever had to be done to protecthe vital interests of the United States, "even if his actions should be interpreted asacts of war." Eisenhower said he "would rather be impeached than fail to do his duty. "17 Three days later Eisenhower sent his special request to Congress. On January 28, 1955, the Senate, following the House of Representatives, passed what became known as the Formosa Resolution, giving the president avirtual blank check. The resolution authorized the president to employ the armed 16. Ibid. A draft message for Congress, which Dulles wrote for Eisenhower following the NSC meeting, specifically mentioned Jinmen and Mazu as territories that the United States would help defend. The draft was not used. Dulles, "Draft message from the President to the Congress," January 20, 1955, ibid., pp. 83-85. 17. Memorandum of discussion at the 233rd meeting of the NSC, Jan. 21, 1955, Eisenhower Papers (AW), NSC Series, Box 6, NSC Summaries of Discussion. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 12:4 104 forces of the United States for the protection of Taiwan,the Penghus,and "related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands."Eisen- hower,though,had changed his mind about publicly naming which offshore islands he would defend.None were specified.Eisenhower said that the United States would intervene only if a Communist attack appeared to be preliminary to an assault on Taiwan itself.James Reston of the New York Times called the United States line"calculated imprecision."18 This ambiguity was selective,however:on January 31,Washington directed its ambassador on Taiwan,Karl Rankin,to inform Jiang privately of the U.S.intention to defend Jinmen and Mazu during the present crisis.In exchange for its com- mitment to Jinmen and Mazu,the United States received Jiang's agreement to withdraw his forces from the Dachens.19 The islands'twenty-four thou- sand civilians and soldiers were,with the assistance of the U.S.Seventh Fleet,evacuated a few days later.20 Despite his compliance,Jiang was livid with Washington.His understand- ing,based on Dulles's talk with Foreign Minister Yeh on January 19,had been that the United States would make public its explicit commitment to Jinmen and Mazu.Even though Dulles and Robertson had informed the Nationalists of the administration's decision not to make its commitment public,Jiang had insisted that Washington live up to its original proposal or he would not withdraw from the Dachens.Although he felt double-crossed, he finally relented under American pressures.Just before the evacuation of the Dachens,Radford and Dulles's subordinates in the State Department 18.Public Law 4,January 29,1955,FRUS:1955-57,Vol.II,pp.162-63;New York Times,April 7,1955,p.13.A top-secret unsigned memorandum from someone in the State Department to Eisenhower explicitly warned of the danger of a vague U.S.position.If the Communists "are left in ignorance of our intentions as to Quemoy and Matsu,read the memo,"they might stumble into a war with us,not believing that we would react.They could then allege with some plausibility that we had failed to state our position in advance and that if we had done so hostilities could have been averted."Unsigned memorandum,"Draft memorandum for the president,"Feb.1955,RG 59,Office of Chinese Affairs 1948-56,Box 53,Offshore Islands 1955, National Archives. 19.Goodpaster memorandum,meeting with Eisenhower,Hoover,Radford and others,January 30,1955,WHO OSANSA,NSC Series,Briefing Notes Subseries,Box 17,Taiwan and Offshore Islands,Eisenhower Library;Karl Rankin,Offshore Islands Chronology of Events,June 3,1955, Rankin Papers,Box 28,Re:Off-shore Islands,Princeton University;Hoover cable to Rankin, January 31,1955,FRUS:1955-57,Vol.II,pp.182-184.Wellington Koo,the Nationalists'ambas- sador to the United States,also received the United States promise.See Koo,diary entries, January 27,29,31 and February 3,1955,Wellington Koo Papers,Diaries,No.34,January 1, 1955-August 31,1955,Box 220,Columbia University. 20.Briscoe to Eisenhower,February 12,1955,RG 218,Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Box 6,091 China(Feb.-Mar.1955),National Archives. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 12:4 1 104 forces of the United States for the protection of Taiwan, the Penghus, and "related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands." Eisenhower, though, had changed his mind about publicly naming which offshore islands he would defend. None were specified. Eisenhower said that the United States would intervene only if a Communist attack appeared to be preliminary to an assault on Taiwan itself. James Reston of the New York Times called the United States line "calculated imprecision."1'8 This ambiguity was selective, however: on January 31, Washington directed its ambassador on Taiwan, Karl Rankin, to inform Jiang privately of the U.S. intention to defend Jinmen and Mazu during the present crisis. In exchange for its commitment to Jinmen and Mazu, the United States received Jiang's agreement to withdraw his forces from the Dachens.19 The islands' twenty-four thousand civilians and soldiers were, with the assistance of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, evacuated a few days later.20 Despite his compliance, Jiang was livid with Washington. His understanding, based on Dulles's talk with Foreign Minister Yeh on January 19, had been that the United States would make public its explicit commitment to Jinmen and Mazu. Even though Dulles and Robertson had informed the Nationalists of the administration's decision not to make its commitment public, Jiang had insisted that Washington live up to its original proposal or he would not withdraw from the Dachens. Although he felt double-crossed, he finally relented under American pressures. Just before the evacuation of the Dachens, Radford and Dulles's subordinates in the State Department 18. Public Law 4, January 29, 1955, FRUS: 1955-57, Vol. II, pp. 162-63; New York Times, April 7, 1955, p. 13. A top-secret unsigned memorandum from someone in the State Department to Eisenhower explicitly warned of the danger of a vague U.S. position. If the Communists "are left in ignorance of our intentions as to Quemoy and Matsu," read the memo, "they might stumble into a war with us, not believing that we would react. They could then allege with some plausibility that we had failed to state our position in advance and that if we had done so hostilities could have been averted." Unsigned memorandum, "Draft memorandum for the president," Feb. 1955, RG 59, Office of Chinese Affairs 1948-56, Box 53, Offshore Islands 1955, National Archives. 19. Goodpaster memorandum, meeting with Eisenhower, Hoover, Radford and others, January 30, 1955, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 17, Taiwan and Offshore Islands, Eisenhower Library; Karl Rankin, Offshore Islands Chronology of Events, June 3, 1955, Rankin Papers, Box 28, Re: Off-shore Islands, Princeton University; Hoover cable to Rankin, January 31, 1955, FRUS: 1955-57, Vol. II, pp. 182-184. Wellington Koo, the Nationalists' ambassador to the United States, also received the United States promise. See Koo, diary entries, January 27, 29, 31 and February 3, 1955, Wellington Koo Papers, Diaries, No. 34, January 1, 1955-August 31, 1955, Box 220, Columbia University. 20. Briscoe to Eisenhower, February 12, 1955, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Box 6, 091 China (Feb.-Mar. 1955), National Archives. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
