AL ASSOCIAT N OXFORD JOURNALS OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS NCORPORATED 1885 The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency,Luck,Deterrence Author(s):Gordon H.Chang and He Di Reviewed work(s): Source:The American Historical Review,Vol.98.No.5(Dec.,1993),pp.1500-1524 Published by:Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/2167064 Accessed:27/01/201322:29 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use,available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive.We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. Oxford University Press and American Historical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Historical Review. 29 STOR http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence Author(s): Gordon H. Chang and He Di Reviewed work(s): Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 98, No. 5 (Dec., 1993), pp. 1500-1524 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2167064 . Accessed: 27/01/2013 22:29 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Oxford University Press and American Historical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Historical Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency,Luck,Deterrence? GORDON H.CHANG and HE DI KNOWN IN THE WEST AS THE QUEMOY-MATSU CRISIS OF 1954-1955,the dispute between the United States and the People's Republic of China over several small offshore islands held by the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan is often cited as one of the most intense confrontations of the early Cold War.For almost nine months,the American public feared that widespread military conflict, including the use of nuclear weapons,could break out at any time.After the crisis, American writers devoted considerable attention to its intensity,drama,and duration.They have studied it to understand U.S.-China relations,Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidential leadership,and the practice of deterrence,especially the doctrines of "brinksmanship"and "massive retaliation."Most American accounts have assumed that the Beijing leadership sought territorial expansion and have concluded that the Eisenhower administration's military resolve,deft political maneuvering,and public determination frustrated Beijing's ambitions, thus preventing widespread hostilities and even war.According to most American literature on this topic,Washington's handling of the crisis is a positive example of crisis management and of effective American conduct of the Cold War generally.1 This essay,one of the first collaborative efforts between an American historian and a scholar from the People's Republic of China,began in 1987 and struggled with the obstacles of political upheaval and distance.This essay draws from an expanded documentary base,but the authors also engaged in an interactive effort to seek common standards of argument,understanding about existing literature and interpretations,analytical assumptions,conceptual frameworks,methodologies,and expression. The final product is a genuine synthesis-it is impossible to determine who was responsible for which argument or conclusion.The authors wish to thank the Social Science Research Council(Committee on Foreign Policy Studies),Committee on International Relations Studies with the People's Republic of China,the Brookings Institution,and Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control and Center for East Asian Studies for financial support that made this essay possible. The authors also express their appreciation for encouragement and for comments on earlier versions from A.Doak Barnett,Warren I.Cohen,Katherine de St.Paer,Alexander L.George,Harry Harding,Miles Kahler,John W.Lewis,Scott D.Sagan,Allen S.Whiting,and Xue Litai.We also thank Jing Li for her help with research. Most American accounts of the crisis have generally accepted Dwight D.Eisenhower's entire framework for understanding the crisis and his selection of issues for examination.See his presidential memoir Mandate for Change:1953-1956,The White House Years(New York,1963).Other extended discussions of the crisis in English can be found in the following works,Stephen E. Ambrose,Eisenhower,Vol.II:The President (New York,1985);Robert Accinelli,"Eisenhower, Congress,and the 1954-55 Offshore Island Crisis,"Presidential Studies Quarterly,20(Spring 1990): 329-48;Richard K.Betts,Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance(Washington,D.C.,1987);H.W. Brands,Jr.,"Testing Massive Retaliation:Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait," International Security,12(Spring 1988):124-51;McGeorge Bundy,Danger and Survival:Choices about 1500
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence? GORDON H. CHANG and HE DI KNOWN IN THE WEST AS THE QUEMOY-MATSU CRISIS OF 1954-1955, the dispute between the United States and the People's Republic of China over several small offshore islands held by the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan is often cited as one of the most intense confrontations of the early Cold War. For almost nine months, the American public feared that widespread military conflict, including the use of nuclear weapons, could break out at any time. After the crisis, American writers devoted considerable attention to its intensity, drama, and duration. They have studied it to understand U.S.-China relations, Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidential leadership, and the practice of deterrence, especially the doctrines of "brinksmanship" and "massive retaliation." Most American accounts have assumed that the Beijing leadership sought territorial expansion and have concluded that the Eisenhower administration's military resolve, deft political maneuvering, and public determination frustrated Beijing's ambitions, thus preventing widespread hostilities and even war. According to most American literature on this topic, Washington's handling of the crisis is a positive example of crisis management and of effective American conduct of the Cold War generally.' This essay, one of the first collaborative efforts between an American historian and a scholar from the People's Republic of China, began in 1987 and struggled with the obstacles of political upheaval and distance. This essay draws from an expanded documentary base, but the authors also engaged in an interactive effort to seek common standards of argument, understanding about existing literature and interpretations, analytical assumptions, conceptual frameworks, methodologies, and expression. The final product is a genuine synthesis-it is impossible to determine who was responsible for which argument or conclusion. The authors wish to thank the Social Science Research Council (Committee on Foreign Policy Studies), Committee on International Relations Studies with the People's Republic of China, the Brookings Institution, and Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control and Center for East Asian Studies for financial support that made this essay possible. The authors also express their appreciation for encouragement and for comments on earlier versions from A. Doak Barnett, Warren I. Cohen, Katherine de St. Paer, Alexander L. George, Harry Harding, Miles Kahler, John W. Lewis, Scott D. Sagan, Allen S. Whiting, and Xue Litai. We also thank Jing Li for her help with research. I Most American accounts of the crisis have generally accepted Dwight D. Eisenhower's entire framework for understanding the crisis and his selection of issues for examination. See his presidential memoir Mandate for Change: 1953-1956, The White House Years (New York, 1963). Other extended discussions of the crisis in English can be found in the following works, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Vol. II: The President (New York, 1985); Robert Accinelli, "Eisenhower, Congress, and the 1954-55 Offshore Island Crisis," Presidential Studies Quarterly, 20 (Spring 1990): 329-48; Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C., 1987); H. W. Brands, Jr., "Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait," International Security, 12 (Spring 1988): 124-5 1; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about 1500 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1501 American studies,however,have relied almost exclusively on U.S.documentary material and Western public sources and have only been able to infer the Chinese side of the story from Chinese published materials and observed behavior.On the other side,the standard Chinese public account of the 1950s,reflecting Beijing's official view of events and political purposes,has characterized U.S.China policy in the Taiwan Strait as one of inflexible hostility,aggressiveness,and warmongering.2 The following study contradicts much of these two established interpretations and is the first to use extensive archival material on the crisis from both China and the United States.Access to Chinese documentary material makes possible a fuller understanding of the conflict,as well as a reconceptualization of the entire confrontation.Through examining such documents,we are now able to gain a wider view of Chinese purposes and activity and thus evaluate the wisdom and effectiveness of both U.S.and Chinese policy making based on the consequences of policy and action,that is,on the interaction of U.S.and Chinese decision making.The Chinese evidence also raises new questions and issues and places U.S.documents in a substantially different interpretive light.(The authors of this essay together studied as much of the evidence as was available,but because access to some Chinese material remains restricted,the authors attempted to verify conclusions by using a variety of evidence and did not rely on a single source.) In particular,this essay presents reassessments of seven principal issues related to the encounter:who initiated the crisis;Mao Zedong's purposes in the Taiwan Strait;Eisenhower's ambiguous policy,the Yijiangshan campaign,and the esca- lation of the crisis;China's attitude toward U.S.diplomatic efforts to end the crisis;U.S.interpretation of events in March and April 1955 and the climax of the the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York,1988);O.Edmund Clubb,"Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Foreign Policy,1950-1955,Political Science Quarterly,74 (December 1959): 517-31;Michael Dockdrill,"Britain and the First Chinese Off-Shore Islands Crisis,1954-55,"in Dockdrill and John W.Young,eds.British Foreign Policy,1945-56 (London,1989),173-96;Robert A. Divine,Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York,1981);Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy:Theory and Practice (New York,1974);Leonard H.D.Gordon, "United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait,1954-1962,"Journal of American History,72(December 1985):637-60;Morton H.Halperin and Tang Tsou,"United States Policy toward the Offshore Islands,"Public Policy,15(1966):119-38;Paul K.Huth,Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven,Conn.,1988);J.H.Kalicki,The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 1950s (London,1975);Bennett C.Rushkoff,"Eisenhower,Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis,1954-1955,"Political Science Quarterly,96(August 1981):465-80;and Thomas E.Stolper,China,Taiwan,and the Offshore Islands (Armonk,N.Y.,1985).Also see the essays by Marc S.Gallicchio,Waldo Heinrichs,Rosemary Foot,Nancy Bernkopf Tucker,and others in Warren I.Cohen and Akira Iriye,eds.,The Great Powers in East Asia,1953-1960 (New York,1990); and the essays by Chen Xiaolu,Nancy Bernkopf Tucker,Wang Jisi,and Jia Qingguo in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming,eds.,Sino-American Relations,1945-1955:A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington,Del.,1989). The authors have previously written on the offshore island crisis in Gordon H.Chang,Friends and Enemies:The United States,China,and the Soviet Union,1948-1972(Stanford,Calif.,1990);and He Di, "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy toward the Offshore Islands,"in Cohen and Iriye,Great Powers. 2 For example,see Han Nianlong,et al,eds.,Diplomacy of Contemporary China,Qiu Ke'an,et al, trans.(Hong Kong,1990).This is a translation of the semi-official Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao(Beijing, 1989).A recent article in the official Beijing Review on the offshore island crises reflects the use of much of the Chinese documentary material consulted for this essay and familiarity with current American scholarship;see Li Yuanchao,"The Politics of Artillery Shelling:A Study of the Taiwan Strait Crises," Beijing Review (September 7-13,1992):32-38;also see Xu Yan,Jinmen Zhi Zhan (Beijing,1992). AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1501 American studies, however, have relied almost exclusively on U.S. documentary material and Western public sources and have only been able to infer the Chinese side of the story from Chinese published materials and observed behavior. On the other side, the standard Chinese public account of the 1950s, reflecting Beijing's official view of events and political purposes, has characterized U.S. China policy in the Taiwan Strait as one of inflexible hostility, aggressiveness, and warmongering.2 The following study contradicts much of these two established interpretations and is the first to use extensive archival material on the crisis from both China and the United States. Access to Chinese documentary material makes possible a fuller understanding of the conflict, as well as a reconceptualization of the entire confrontation. Through examining such documents, we are now able to gain a wider view of Chinese purposes and activity and thus evaluate the wisdom and effectiveness of both U.S. and Chinese policy making based on the consequences of policy and action, that is, on the interaction of U.S. and Chinese decision making. The Chinese evidence also raises new questions and issues and places U.S. documents in a substantially different interpretive light. (The authors of this essay together studied as much of the evidence as was available, but because access to some Chinese material remains restricted, the authors attempted to verify conclusions by using a variety of evidence and did not rely on a single source.) In particular, this essay presents reassessments of seven principal issues related to the encounter: who initiated the crisis; Mao Zedong's purposes in the Taiwan Strait; Eisenhower's ambiguous policy, the Yijiangshan campaign, and the escalation of the crisis; China's attitude toward U.S. diplomatic efforts to end the crisis; U.S. interpretation of events in March and April 1955 and the climax of the the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988); 0. Edmund Clubb, "Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Political Science Quarterly, 74 (December 1959): 517-31; Michael Dockdrill, "Britain and the First Chinese Off-Shore Islands Crisis, 1954-55," in Dockdrill and John W. Young, eds. British Foreign Policy, 1945-56 (London, 1989), 173-96; Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981); Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York, 1974); Leonard H. D. Gordon, "United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1954-1962," Journal of American History, 72 (December 1985): 637-60; Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "United States Policy toward the Offshore Islands," Public Policy, 15 (1966): 119-38; Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, Conn., 1988); J. H. Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 1950s (London, 1975); Bennett C. Rushkoff, "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955," Political Science Quarterly, 96 (August 1981): 465-80; and Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (Armonk, N.Y., 1985). Also see the essays by Marc S. Gallicchio, Waldo Heinrichs, Rosemary Foot, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, and others in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960 (New York, 1990); and the essays by Chen Xiaolu, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Wang Jisi, and Jia Qingguo in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington, Del., 1989). The authors have previously written on the offshore island crisis in Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, Calif., 1990); and He Di, "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy toward the Offshore Islands," in Cohen and Iriye, Great Powers. 2 For example, see Han Nianlong, et al., eds., Diplomacy of Contemporary China, Qiu Ke'an, et al., trans. (Hong Kong, 1990). This is a translation of the semi-official Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao (Beijing, 1989). A recent article in the official Beiing Review on the offshore island crises reflects the use of much of the Chinese documentary material consulted for this essay and familiarity with current American scholarship; see Li Yuanchao, "The Politics of Artillery Shelling: A Study of the Taiwan Strait Crises," Beijing Review (September 7-13, 1992): 32-38; also see Xu Yan,Jinmen Zhi Zhan (Beijing, 1992). AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1502 Gordon H.Chang and He Di crisis;the end of the confrontation;and leadership performance during the crisis. Mutual misunderstanding about intentions and objectives in the confrontation was exceedingly high between the two countries(and remained so for forty years), and much of the historical interpretation on both sides has been deeply mislead- ing.This essay,as part of an emerging post-Cold War historiography that draws on Communist sources,suggests that some important assumptions and even lessons drawn from the conduct of the Cold War,especially in the area of security studies,may require rethinking as we begin to learn more about"the other side."s EISENHOWER AND MOST AMERICAN HISTORIANS have given September 3,1954, when Chinese Communist shore batteries opened fire on the Nationalist-held offshore island of Quemoy,as the beginning of a crisis that lasted for almost nine months.4 Most Western accounts have assumed that the Communist leadership ordered the shelling as part of a centrally directed military campaign that was at least a probe of the strength of the U.S.security commitment to Quemoy,if not the beginning of an actual effort to seize the island.Washington reacted to the shelling by dramatically increasing the U.S.military presence in the Taiwan Strait, strengthening Nationalist defenses,and issuing increasingly stern warnings to Beijing over the following months.To bolster its commitment to the Nationalists, the Eisenhower administration completed negotiation of a mutual defense treaty and received a blank check from Congress in early 1955,the so-called Formosa Resolution,for the use of American forces to defend Taiwan island and the nearby Pescadores. The Chinese documentary record of high-level decision making at that time, however,does not indicate that Beijing considered September 3 shelling a precipitant event or even an unintentional initiation of a confrontation with the United States.Furthermore,the Chinese documentary record does not show that China's leaders considered the period from September 1954 to late April 1955 to be especially tense.In contrast to former U.S.officials who vividly recollected the main events,high-level Communist officials and advisers active during the 1950s and interviewed for this essay did not recall the September 3 bombardment or consider the time one of sharp conflict with America.5 3 See,for example,James G.Blight and David A.Welch,On the Brink:Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York,1989);and Sergei N.Goncharov,John W.Lewis,and Xue Li-tai,Uncertain Partners:Stalin,Mao,and the Korean War(Stanford,Calif.,forthcoming,1994). 4The significance of September 3 for the United States is also reflected in the documentary record.See Foreign Relations of the United States(hereafter,FRUS),1952-54 (Washington,D.C.,1985), 14:556-58;Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),"The Chinese Offshore Islands,"September 8,1954, Formosa(1),Box 9,International Series,Eisenhower(AW),Dwight D.Eisenhower Library,Abilene, Kansas;New York Times (September 5,1954):1.We understand a "crisis"as being a distinct period of escalating international tension with a high possibility of the outbreak of large-scale military conflict. 5 See Han,Diplomacy of Contemporary China,94-100,131-37;interviews with Chinese officials;Han Huaizhi,et al.,Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui de Junshi Gongzuo(Beijing,1988),254-71,384-418;Yang Guoyu,et al.,Dangdai Zhongguo Haijun (Beijing,1987),189-223.The issue concerning the term "crisis"is substantive and not semantic:Chinese documentary evidence and current semi-official accounts indicate that China's leadership considered the 1958 confrontation over the offshore islands a"crisis,"with a distinct beginning and conclusion and a high level of tension.This essay refers to the 1954-1955 confrontation as a crisis,since at.least one party,the United States,saw it as one and acted accordingly. AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
1502 Gordon H. Chang and He Di crisis; the end of the confrontation; and leadership performance during the crisis. Mutual misunderstanding about intentions and objectives in the confrontation was exceedingly high between the two countries (and remained so for forty years), and much of the historical interpretation on both sides has been deeply misleading. This essay, as part of an emerging post-Cold War historiography that draws on Communist sources, suggests that some important assumptions and even lessons drawn from the conduct of the Cold War, especially in the area of security studies, may require rethinking as we begin to learn more about "the other side."3 EISENHOWER AND MOST AMERICAN HISTORIANS have given September 3, 1954, when Chinese Communist shore batteries opened fire on the Nationalist-held offshore island of Quemoy, as the beginning of a crisis that lasted for almost nine months.4 Most Western accounts have assumed that the Communist leadership ordered the shelling as part of a centrally directed military campaign that was at least a probe of the strength of the U.S. security commitment to Quemoy, if not the beginning of an actual effort to seize the island. Washington reacted to the shelling by dramatically increasing the U.S. military presence in the Taiwan Strait, strengthening Nationalist defenses, and issuing increasingly stern warnings to Beijing over the following months. To bolster its commitment to the Nationalists, the Eisenhower administration completed negotiation of a mutual defense treaty and received a blank check from Congress in early 1955, the so-called Formosa Resolution, for the use of American forces to defend Taiwan island and the nearby Pescadores. The Chinese documentary record of high-level decision making at that time, however, does not indicate that Beijing considered September 3 shelling a precipitant event or even an unintentional initiation of a confrontation with the United States. Furthermore, the Chinese documentary record does not show that China's leaders considered the period from September 1954 to late April 1955 to be especially tense. In contrast to former U.S. officials who vividly recollected the main events, high-level Communist officials and advisers active during the 1950s and interviewed for this essay did not recall the September 3 bombardment or consider the time one of sharp conflict with America.5 3See, for example, James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, 1989); and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Li-tai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif., forthcoming, 1994). 4The significance of September 3 for the United States is also reflected in the documentary record. See Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter, FRUS), 1952-54 (Washington, D.C., 1985), 14: 556-58; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "The Chinese Offshore Islands," September 8, 1954, Formosa (1), Box 9, International Series, Eisenhower (AW), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; New York Times (September 5, 1954): 1. We understand a "crisis" as being a distinct period of escalating international tension with a high possibility of the outbreak of large-scale military conflict. 5 See Han, Diplomacy of Contemporary China, 94-100, 131-37; interviews with Chinese officials; Han Huaizhi, et al., Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui de junshi Gongzuo (Beijing, 1988), 254-71, 384-418; Yang Guoyu, et al., Dangdai Zhongguo Haijun (Beijing, 1987), 189-223. The issue concerning the term "crisis" is substantive and not semantic: Chinese documentary evidence and current semi-official accounts indicate that China's leadership considered the 1958 confrontation over the offshore islands a "crisis," with a distinct beginning and conclusion and a high level of tension. This essay refers to the 1954-1955 confrontation as a crisis, since at-least one party, the United States, saw it as one and acted accordingly. AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1503 Naniing (Nanking) Hangzhou (Hangchow) Yijiang Dachen Tachen) Wenzhou (Wenchow) Mazu (Matsu] Fuzhou (Foochow) Xiamen Jinmen (Amoyis b一1 Quemoy] TAIWAN Formosa) Penghu (Pescadores) Shantou Guangzhou (Canton) 合iong Kong 1o0 300 miles Macau Offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait.Copyright Stanford University Press. AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1503 ')Nanhinlg ( Nanking) \ Hangzhou Wenzhou (WenchowJ 0 / I Itf Sf {~ ~ ~ Fuzhou M u , I~~~Foochow ( ; Xiamen linmen 1' 9,I (Amoy * aliQuemoy) >/,'. ,,>s)8->(~~~~Pe.adores Guangzhou (Canton) 0 -100 100 ong Kong O ies Macau Offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait. Copyright Stanford University Press. AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1504 Gordon H.Chang and He Di Instead,the Chinese documentary record indicates that China's leaders,and local commanders of the People's Liberation Army(PLA)in particular,consid- ered the events of these nine months as little different in nature from what had transpired in the region since 1949 and not as a separate campaign;that is,they understood the events as an integral part of the continuing tensions of the Chinese civil war in the offshore area.The Nationalists had retained control of some thirty offshore islands,many just a few miles from shore,when they retreated from the mainland in 1949."The civil war against Chiang Kai-shek never ended in the coastal regions,"maintained a high-level,internal report of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)on July 24,1954.6 Because Nationalist and Communist military forces had frequently clashed in the southeastern China coastal area during and after the Korean War in 1953 and 1954,Beijing did not consider the September 3 shelling,though dramatic,to be a radical departure from the pattern or level of hostilities in the area.Other observers at the time,including forces friendly to the United States,also evaluated the September 3 shelling of Quemoy,and the subsequent events in the offshore island area,in a different light than did Washington.The British government saw the activity as part of the latest round of feuding between the Nationalists and the Communists that had broken out during the summer of 1954,and it was not convinced that the Communists intended to attack Quemoy or were even principally interested in the island.7 The Nationalist military high command also expressed in private its belief that the Communists were only probing U.S intentions with the shelling and were not about to launch an all-out assault on Quemoy.On September 10,the Chinese Nationalist Party organ,Central Daily News,dismissed the mainland's "Liberate Taiwan"campaign,which began in late July 1954,as simple propaganda and the Quemoy shelling as part of a political, rather than military,campaign.8 6 Chinese Communist Party (CCP)Central Committee Propaganda Department and the Political Department of the Central Military Commission,"Guanyu Taiwan Wenti de Junshi Baodao de Zhishi,"July 24,1954,Zhongyang Dang'anguan,comp.,Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Huibian:1954 (hereafter,Wenjian Huibian),2722-24.Also see Wang Yan,Mubiao-Yijiangshan (Beijing,1990),54; Han Huaizhi,Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui,256;interviews with Zhang Aiping,Ye Fei,Lei Yingfu; research into restricted archives. 7 Humphrey Trevelyan to Allen,January 22,1955,FO371/115038/FC1041/445,Public Records Office,Kew,England;ALUSNA,Taipei,to Secretary of State,September 3,1954,793.00/9-354, Record Group 59,National Archives,Washington,D.C.;Dockdrill,"Britain and the First Chinese Off-Shore Islands Crisis,1954-55,"173-96.Also see Zhai Qiang,"Britain,the United States,and the Jinmen-Mazu Crises 1954-55 and 1958,"Chinese Historians,2 (Fall 1992):25-48. s The Central Daily News reported that the Communist shelling killed three Nationalist soldiers and wounded seven others,but it also expressed full confidence in the capability of the Nationalist army. The purposes of the mainland's"Liberate Taiwan"political campaign,according to the newspaper, were to influence the UN,to influence the neutral nations of Asia,to make trouble for the United States,to divert attention from domestic unrest,and to split the free world;September 4,1954,p.1; September 5,p.1;September 10,p.6.Chiang Kai-shek also drew attention to the political purpose of Beijing's attack on the offshore islands."The purpose of the Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands is to undermine the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty and the western Pacific security system."See Zhu,et al.,Zhonghua Minguo Shishi Jiyao,1954 (Taipei,1989),301.Although Chiang raised the issue of Quemoy with John Foster Dulles during a discussion in Taibei on September 9,1954,Chiang spent most of the time pressing Dulles for progress toward the treaty and U.S.support for a Nationalist "counter-offensive against the mainland."Chiang expressed no concern about an imminent loss of territory but spoke repeatedly about taking the initiative against the Communists.Shen,translated Memorandum of September 9 conversation between Chiang and AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
1504 Gordon H. Chang and He Di Instead, the Chinese documentary record indicates that China's leaders, and local commanders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in particular, considered the events of these nine months as little different in nature from what had transpired in the region since 1949 and not as a separate campaign; that is, they understood the events as an integral part of the continuing tensions of the Chinese civil war in the offshore area. The Nationalists had retained control of some thirty offshore islands, many just a few miles from shore, when they retreated from the mainland in 1949. "The civil war against Chiang Kai-shek never ended in the coastal regions," maintained a high-level, internal report of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on July 24, 1954.6 Because Nationalist and Communist military forces had frequently clashed in the southeastern China coastal area during and after the Korean War in 1953 and 1954, Beijing did not consider the September 3 shelling, though dramatic, to be a radical departure from the pattern or level of hostilities in the area. Other observers at the time, including forces friendly to the United States, also evaluated the September 3 shelling of, Quemoy, and the subsequent events in the offshore island area, in a different light than did Washington. The British government saw the activity as part of the latest round of feuding between the Nationalists and the Communists that had broken out during the summer of 1954, and it was not convinced that the Communists intended to attack Quemoy or were even principally interested in the island.7 The Nationalist military high command also expressed in private its belief that the Communists were only probing U.S. intentions with the shelling and were not about to launch an all-out assault on Quemoy. On September 10, the Chinese Nationalist Party organ, Central Daily News, dismissed the mainland's "Liberate Taiwan" campaign, which began in late July 1954, as simple propaganda and the Quemoy shelling as part of a political, rather than military, campaign.8 6 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee Propaganda Department and the Political Department of the Central Military Commission, "Guanyu Taiwan Wenti de Junshi Baodao de Zhishi," July 24, 1954, Zhongyang Dang'anguan, comp., Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Huibian: 1954 (hereafter, Wenjian Huibian), 2722-24. Also see Wang Yan, Mubiao-Yijiangshan (Beijing, 1990), 54; Han Huaizhi, Dangdai Zhongguo Jundui, 256; interviews with Zhang Aiping, Ye Fei, Lei Yingfu; research into restricted archives. 7 Humphrey Trevelyan to Allen, January 22, 1955, F0371/115038/FC1041/445, Public Records Office, Kew, England; ALUSNA, Taipei, to Secretary of State, September 3, 1954, 793.00/9-354, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Dockdrill, "Britain and the First Chinese Off-Shore Islands Crisis, 1954-55," 173-96. Also see Zhai Qiang, "Britain, the United States, and the Jinmen-Mazu Crises 1954-55 and 1958," Chinese Historians, 2 (Fall 1992): 25-48. 8 The Central Daily News reported that the Communist shelling killed three Nationalist soldiers and wounded seven others, but it also expressed full confidence in the capability of the Nationalist army. The purposes of the mainland's "Liberate Taiwan" political campaign, according to the newspaper, were to influence the UN, to influence the neutral nations of Asia, to make trouble for the United States, to divert attention from domestic unrest, and to split the free world; September 4, 1954, p. 1; September 5, p. 1; September 10, p. 6. Chiang Kai-shek also drew attention to the political purpose of Beijing's attack on the offshore islands. "The purpose of the Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands is to undermine the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty and the western Pacific security system." See Zhu, et al., Zhonghua Minguo ShishiJiyao, 1954 (Taipei, 1989), 301. Although Chiang raised the issue of Quemoy with John Foster Dulles during a discussion in Taibei on September 9, 1954, Chiang spent most of the time pressing Dulles for progress toward the treaty and U.S. support for a Nationalist "counter-offensive against the mainland." Chiang expressed no concern about an imminent loss of territory but spoke repeatedly about taking the initiative against the Communists. Shen, translated Memorandum of September 9 conversation between Chiang and AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1505 Why,then,did the Eisenhower administration mistakenly assess the situation and consider the shelling the start of a deliberate military confrontation?In September 1954,U.S.antipathy toward the Chinese Communists and fear of their international ambitions ran high in the aftermath of the Korean War and the Vietnamese Communist defeat of the French in Indochina during the spring of 1954.The United States had steadily increased its attention to the South China Sea and China mainland offshore area for some time before September 3.U.S. ambassador to the Nationalists,Karl Rankin,and military intelligence had both warned of the possibility of trouble,including the danger of a Communist attack on Quemoy,months earlier.s And two U.S.men in uniform,members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group,had been killed in the Communist bombard- ment,which was more serious than previous sporadic shelling. In addition,and perhaps more important,the Eisenhower administration became alarmed because the September 3 attack apparently demonstrated the failure of previous U.S.efforts at deterrence.In the spring and summer of 1954, the United States had twice sent ships of the Seventh Fleet to the Dachens (offshore islands along the Zhejiang coast)in a show of force to impress the Communists.As late as August 20,less than two weeks before the Quemoy shelling,Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent a strong message of reassur- ance to the U.S.ambassador to Japan,who had communicated to Washington his own and the Japanese government's worries about possible Communist military activity in the offshore area.Dulles pointed out that because of his recent article in Foreign Affairs,which advanced the doctrine that later became known as "massive retaliation,"he was certain that Beijing and Moscow fully appreciated the U.S.resolve to oppose Communist aggression."I do not think that the Japanese need be alarmed,"he wrote in his confidential letter,"because I do not believe that the Chinese Communists are in fact now prepared to challenge us in any major or sustained way and provoke further our sea and air power along their coast."In an August 24 press conference,Dulles pointedly warned the Commu- nists that an attack on Nationalist-held offshore islands might provoke a U.S. armed response.10 Thus the September 3 shelling most likely came as a rude shock for Washing- ton,considering Dulles's expressed confidence in the power of U.S.deterrent force.Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson Dulles,attached to Karl Rankin to State Department,September 16,1954,Chiang Kai-shek-1954, Box 23,Karl Rankin Papers,Seely Mudd Library,Princeton University.The U.S.ambassador on Taiwan reported to Washington on September 5 that he refused to "take the present fracas around Kinmen very seriously from a purely military standpoint";Karl Rankin,Offshore Islands Chronol- ogy,June 3,1955,Re:Offshore Islands,Box 28,Rankin Papers.Rankin,in his words,expressed "many times the opinion that there probably would be no major Communist assault"after the September 3 shelling because Beijing did not have the military capability.Karl Rankin,Memoran- dum of conversation with Chiang Kai-shek and others,May 4,1955,Re:Chiang Kai-shek,Box 26, Rankin Papers. 9 FRUS,1952-54,14:392-94,412-14,415-16. 10 FRUS,1952-54,14:545-47.Also see Brands,"Testing Massive Retaliation."American case studies that take September 3,1954,as the start of U.S.deterrent efforts begin,therefore,with an incorrect premise.Also see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein,When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?(Ottawa,1990). AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1505 Why, then, did the Eisenhower administration mistakenly assess the situation and consider the shelling the start of a deliberate military confrontation? In September 1954, U.S. antipathy toward the Chinese Communists and fear of their international ambitions ran high in the aftermath of the Korean War and the Vietnamese Communist defeat of the French in Indochina during the spring of 1954. The United States had steadily increased its attention to the South China Sea and China mainland offshore area for some time before September 3. U.S. ambassador to the Nationalists, Karl Rankin, and military intelligence had both warned of the possibility of trouble, including the danger of a Communist attack on Quemoy, months earlier.9 And two U.S. men in uniform, members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, had been killed in the Communist bombardment, which was more serious than previous sporadic shelling. In addition, and perhaps more important, the Eisenhower administration became alarmed because the September 3 attack apparently demonstrated the failure of previous U.S. efforts at deterrence. In the spring and summer of 1954, the United States had twice sent ships of the Seventh Fleet to the Dachens (offshore islands along the Zhejiang coast) in a show of force to impress the Communists. As late as August 20, less than two weeks before the Quemoy shelling, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent a strong message of reassurance to the U.S. ambassador to Japan, who had communicated to Washington his own and the Japanese government's worries about possible Communist military activity in the offshore area. Dulles pointed out that because of his recent article in Foreign Affairs, which advanced the doctrine that later became known as "massive retaliation," he was certain that Beijing and Moscow fully appreciated the U.S. resolve to oppose Communist aggression. "I do not think that the Japanese need be alarmed," he wrote in his confidential letter, "because I do not believe that the Chinese Communists are in fact now prepared to challenge us in any major or sustained way and provoke further our sea and air power along their coast." In an August 24 press conference, Dulles pointedly warned the Communists that an attack on Nationalist-held offshore islands might provoke a U.S. armed response.10 Thus the September 3 shelling most likely came as a rude shock for Washington, considering Dulles's expressed confidence in the power of U.S. deterrent force. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson Dulles, attached to Karl Rankin to State Department, September 16, 1954, Chiang Kai-shek-1954, Box 23, Karl Rankin Papers, Seely Mudd Library, Princeton University. The U.S. ambassador on Taiwan reported to Washington on September 5 that he refused to "take the present fracas around Kinmen very seriously from a purely military standpoint"; Karl Rankin, Offshore Islands Chronology, June 3, 1955, Re: Offshore Islands, Box 28, Rankin Papers. Rankin, in his words, expressed "many times the opinion that there probably would be no major Communist assault" after the September 3 shelling because Beijing did not have the military capability. Karl Rankin, Memorandum of conversation with Chiang Kai-shek and others, May 4, 1955, Re: Chiang Kai-shek, Box 26, Rankin Papers. 9 FRUS, 1952-54, 14: 392-94, 412-14, 415-16. 10 FRUS, 1952-54, 14: 545-47. Also see Brands, "Testing Massive Retaliation." American case studies that take September 3, 1954, as the start of U.S. deterrent efforts begin, therefore, with an incorrect premise. Also see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know? (Ottawa, 1990). AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1506 Gordon H.Chang and He Di AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
1506 Gordon H. Chang and He Di qjTh .... _ Q~~~~~~~~;.C o 0. Vcu .....i. .. ..........:. .e U2 - AR ....... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -J. .. . . .. . .........~~.~ . 004 Z bO op CC2 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1507 explicitly interpreted events as a failure of deterrence in a September 4 memo to Dulles,arguing that the shelling had proved earlier U.S.efforts could "no longer be relied upon to deter Communist attacks"and that"more positive action by the United States [was]necessary if these [offshore]islands are not to be swallowed up by the Communists."Specifically,Robertson pressed for direct U.S.involvement in the event of a Communist assault on a major offshore island.11 WHAT WAS THE ACTUAL PURPOSE of the shelling that so disturbed U.S.officials? The memoir of General Ye Fei,the Communist commander of the Fujian forces responsible for the bombardment of Quemoy,reveals that orders Beijing sent on August 25 instructed Ye Fei to shell Quemoy,not as a preliminary to an assault on the island but as a specific and limited response to what was perceived as an increase in U.S.and Nationalist military provocations in the area and the rumored negotiation of a mutual defense treaty between Washington and Taibei.It was Ye Fei personally,not the central authorities,who recommended September 3 for the shelling for the simple reason,General Ye believed,that the Nationalists planned to supply the island by ship on that day.Communist shelling of Quemoy after September 3 in 1954 and 1955 was,in fact,infrequent and light.12 Supporting the contention that the Chinese did not consider the September 3 shelling a prelude to a coordinated assault on Quemoy,or even as a serious probe of the U.S.commitment to defend the island,are the recollections of Chinese officials and of the Communist military commanders in charge of forces in the offshore island area at the time.In addition to Ye Fei (who was also the field commander of a failed attack in October 1949 on Quemoy and commander of the PLA Navy in the 1980s),General Zhang Aiping,commander of the Zhejiang forces (minister of defense in the 1980s),and Lei Yingfu,military secretary to Zhou Enlai and an adviser to Mao Zedong,both independently confirm that the only military plan developed at the time was one to take the Dachens,an offshore island group far to the north of Quemoy and Matsu held by the Nationalists;the plan included neither Quemoy nor Matsu.13 11FRUS,1952-54,14:561-63. 12 Ye Fei,Huiyilu (Beijing,1988),643;Kalicki,Patterns of Sino-American Crises,130.The CIA speculated that the shelling may have been linked to the signing of the SEATO(South-East Asian Treaty Organization)treaty.CIA,"Chinese Offshore Islands."The shelling may also have served as a diversion from the mainland's campaign against the northern offshore islands;David G.Muller,Jr., China as a Maritime Power(Boulder,Colo.,1983),24;He Di,"Evolution of the People's Republic of China Policy toward Jinmen and Mazu,"224;and Chen Xiaolu,"China's Policy toward the United States,1949-1955,"in Harding and Yuan Ming,Sino-American Relations,194. s Interviews with Zhang Aiping,Ye Fei,and Lei Yingfu.The recollections of the Chinese officials are supported by a CIA intelligence report issued several days after the September 3 shelling. According to the CIA,"Communist naval and ground force activity in the [Quemoy]area"was "not unusual,"and they had given no indication "they were readying their forces for an attempted invasion of the Quemoys."The report also confirmed that Chinese naval and air capabilities in the Quemoy area were extremely poor,with no railway link to the Fujian coast nor jet fighters"close enough to provide effective cover for operations in the Quemoy area."CIA,"Chinese Offshore Islands."On September 15,1954,the State Department's Office of Chinese Affairs summarized the intelligence information it had and concluded that"there is no evidence of a significant build-up"of landing craft around Quemoy,"no Communist air activity in the area,"and "all sources agree that there is now no indication that a Communist attack on the Chinmen [Quemoy]islands is imminent"; AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy 1507 explicitly interpreted events as a failure of deterrence in a September 4 memo to Dulles, arguing that the shelling had proved earlier U.S. efforts could "no longer be relied upon to deter Communist attacks" and- that "more positive action by the United States [was] necessary if these [offshore] islands are not to be swallowed up by the Communists." Specifically, Robertson pressed for direct U.S. involvement in the event of a Communist assault on a major offshore island." WHAT WAS THE ACTUAL PURPOSE of the shelling that so disturbed U.S. officials? The memoir of General Ye Fei, the Communist commander of the Fujian forces responsible for the bombardment of Quemoy, reveals that orders Beijing sent on August 25 instructed Ye Fei to shell Quemoy, not as a preliminary to an assault on the island but as a specific and limited response to what was perceived as an increase in U.S. and Nationalist military provocations in the area and the rumored negotiation of a mutual defense treaty between Washington and Taibei. It was Ye Fei personally, not the central authorities, who recommended September 3 for the shelling for the simple reason, General Ye believed, that the Nationalists planned to supply the island by ship on that day. Communist shelling of Quemoy after September 3 in 1954 and 1955 was, in fact, infrequent and light.'2 Supporting the contention that the Chinese did not consider the September 3 shelling a prelude to a coordinated assault on Quemoy, or even as a serious probe of the U.S. commitment to defend the island, are the recollections of Chinese officials and of the Communist military commanders in charge of forces in the offshore island area at the time. In addition to Ye Fei (who was also the field commander of a failed attack in October 1949 on Quemoy and commander of the PLA Navy in the 1980s), General Zhang Aiping, commander of the Zhejiang forces (minister of defense in the 1980s), and Lei Yingfu, military secretary to Zhou Enlai and an adviser to Mao Zedong, both independently confirm that the only military plan developed at the time was one to take the Dachens, an offshore island group far to the north of Quemoy and Matsu held by the Nationalists; the plan included neither Quemoy nor Matsu.'3 FRUS, 1952-54, 14: 561-63. 12 Ye Fei, Huiyilu (Beijing, 1988), 643; Kalicki, Patterns of Sino-American Crises, 130. The CIA speculated that the shelling may have been linked to the signing of the SEATO (South-East Asian Treaty Organization) treaty. CIA, "Chinese Offshore Islands." The shelling may also have served as a diversion from the mainland's campaign against the northern offshore islands; David G. Muller,Jr., China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, Colo., 1983), 24; He Di, "Evolution of the People's Republic of China Policy toward Jinmen and Mazu," 224; and Chen Xiaolu, "China's Policy toward the United States, 1949-1955," in Harding and Yuan Ming, Sino-American Relations, 194. 13 Interviews with Zhang Aiping, Ye Fei, and Lei Yingfu.The recollections of the Chinese officials are supported by a CIA intelligence report issued several days after the September 3 shelling. According to the CIA, "Communist naval and ground force activity in the [Quemoy] area" was "not unusual," and they had given no indication "they were readying their forces for an attempted invasion of the Quemoys." The report also confirmed that Chinese naval and air capabilities in the Quemoy area were extremely poor, with no railway link to the Fujian coast nor jet fighters "close enough to provide effective cover for operations in the Quemoy area." CIA, "Chinese Offshore Islands." On September 15, 1954, the State Department's Office of Chinese Affairs summarized the intelligence information it had and concluded that "there is no evidence of a significant build-up" of landing craft around Quemoy, "no Communist air activity in the area," and "all sources agree that there is now no indication that a Communist attack on the Chinmen [Quemoy] islands is imminent"; AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1508 Gordon H.Chang and He Di The order to Ye Fei reflected the thinking of Mao Zedong,China's command- er-in-chief,about the Taiwan Strait.Convinced that the United States fully endorsed the Nationalist harassment of the mainland,Mao held Washington responsible for the mounting tensions in the area before September 1954 and firmly believed that Beijing was the defender,not the aggressor,in the Strait. Isolated in the international community,with relatively limited information,and with Leninist assumptions about the relationship of imperialism and semi- colonies,Mao could not know that there were serious strains in the U.S.- Nationalist relationship or that Washington,uneasy about the Nationalist activi- ties,wanted to limit Chiang Kai-shek's attacks on mainland forces.He mistakenly assumed that Chiang was little more than a puppet of the United States.In addition,Mao questioned the sincerity of Washington's professed desire to reduce tensions with the Communist world after the 1954 Geneva Conference.As a result,he concluded that China had to respond to the perceived U.S.-Nationalist provocations that occurred in late 1953 and early 1954.14 Mao was especially worried that a U.S.-Nationalist mutual defense treaty, reports of which began to circulate in China in mid-1954,would play a role similar to that of the cease-fire in Korea and the Geneva agreement on Vietnam,which had formalized the division of those two close neighbors of China.15 He had no idea that substantial differences existed between the Eisenhower administration and Chiang over the proposed treaty.Thus,on July 23,Mao sent a telegram to Zhou Enlai,who was en route from Geneva to Beijing,which admonished, in order to break up the collaboration between the United States and Chiang and to keep them from joining military and political forces,we must announce to our country and the world the slogan of the Liberation of Taiwan.It was improper of us not to raise the slogan in a timely manner after the cease-fire in Korea.If we were to continue dragging our heels now,we would be making a serious political mistake.16 After Zhou's return to China,Mao convened a political bureau meeting at the leadership retreat at Beidaihe,where he presented,in his typically grand style, general guidelines for a propaganda campaign for the Liberation of Taiwan,the first such campaign against Taiwan in the history of the People's Republic. In Mao's view,the conflict with the Nationalists in the Strait occurred on political,military,diplomatic,and propaganda fronts.Politically,acquisition of Stryker to Walter Robertson,September 15,1954,Chinese Nationalist Troops on the Offshore Islands,Box 48,RG 59,Office of Chinese Affairs 1948-1956,National Archives. We do not exclude the possibility that included in the calculations of Mao and other central Chinese leaders was an interest in seeing the Nationalist and American reaction to a shelling of Quemoy.Indeed,if the Nationalists had simply abandoned Quemoy,the Communists would surely have occupied it.But the variety of evidence we have consulted shows that Beijing developed no operational plan to assault Quemoy linked to the September 3 shelling or anytime afterward in 1954 and1955. 4Zhou Enlai,"Jingji Jianshe de Jige Fangzhenxing Wenti,"November 10,1956,Zhou Enlai Xuanji, II(Beijing,1984),236. 15 FRUS,1952-54,14:343-44;interviews with Pu Shouchang and Lei Yingfu.Zhou Enlai's statement on the Mutual Defense Treaty,December 8,1954,Zhong-Mei Guanxi Cailiao II(Beijing, 1961),2077-81. 16 Wang Bingnan,Zhongmei Huitan Jiunian Huigu(Beijing,1985),5-6. AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993
1508 Gordon H. Chang and He Di The order to Ye Fei reflected the thinking of Mao Zedong, China's commander-in-chief, about the Taiwan Strait. Convinced that the United States fully endorsed the Nationalist harassment of the mainland, Mao held Washington responsible for the mounting tensions in the area before September 1954 and firmly believed that Beijing was the defender, not the aggressor, in the Strait. Isolated in the international community, with relatively limited information, and with Leninist assumptions about the relationship of imperialism and semicolonies, Mao could not know that there were serious strains in the U.S.- Nationalist relationship or that Washington, uneasy about the Nationalist activities, wanted to limit Chiang Kai-shek's attacks on mainland forces. He mistakenly assumed that Chiang was little more than a puppet of the United States. In addition, Mao questioned the sincerity of Washington's professed desire to reduce tensions with the Communist world after the 1954 Geneva Conference. As a result, he concluded that China had to respond to the perceived U.S.-Nationalist provocations that occurred in late 1953 and early 1954.14 Mao was especially worried that a U.S.-Nationalist mutual defense treaty, reports of which began to circulate in China in mid- 1954, would play a role similar to that of the cease-fire in Korea and the Geneva agreement on Vietnam, which had formalized the division of those two close neighbors of China.'5 He had no idea that substantial differences existed between the Eisenhower administration and Chiang over the proposed treaty. Thus, on July 23, Mao sent a telegram to Zhou Enlai, who was en route from Geneva to Beijing, which admonished, in order to break up the collaboration between the United States and Chiang and to keep them from joining military and political forces, we must announce to our country and the world the slogan of the Liberation of Taiwan. It was improper of us not to raise the slogan in a timely manner after the cease-fire in Korea. If we were to continue dragging our heels now, we would be making a serious political mistake.'6 After Zhou's return to China, Mao convened a political bureau meeting at the leadership retreat at Beidaihe, where he presented, in his typically grand style, general guidelines for a propaganda campaign for the Liberation of Taiwan, the first such campaign against Taiwan in the history of the People's Republic. In Mao's view, the conflict with the Nationalists in the Strait occurred on political, military, diplomatic, and propaganda fronts. Politically, acquisition of Stryker to Walter Robertson, September 15, 1954, Chinese Nationalist Troops on the Offshore Islands, Box 48, RG 59, Office of Chinese Affairs 1948-1956, National Archives. We do not exclude the possibility that included in the calculations of Mao and other central Chinese leaders was an interest in seeing the Nationalist and American reaction to a shelling of Quemoy. Indeed, if the Nationalists had simply abandoned Quemoy, the Communists would surely have occupied it. But the variety of evidence we have consulted shows that Beijing developed no operational plan to assault Quemoy linked to the September 3 shelling or anytime afterward in 1954 and 1955. 14 Zhou Enlai, "JingjiJianshe dejige Fangzhenxing Wenti," November 10, 1956, ZhouEnlaiXuanji, II (Beijing, 1984), 236. 15FRUS, 1952-54, 14: 343-44; interviews with Pu Shouchang and Lei Yingfu. Zhou Enlai's statement on the Mutual Defense Treaty, December 8, 1954, Zhong-Mei Guanxi Cailiao II (Beijing, 1961), 2077-81. 16 Wang Bingnan, Zhongmei Huitanjiunian Huigu (Beijing, 1985), 5-6. AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW DECEMBER 1993 This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:29:11 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions