SAGE Mao and China's Relations with the Superpowers in the 1950s:A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino-Soviet Split Author(s):Michael M.Sheng Source:Modern China,Vol.34,No.4 (Oct.,2008),pp.477-507 Published by:Sage Publications,Inc. Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/27746900 Accessed:15/05/201301:07 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use,available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive.We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. Sage Publications,Inc.is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to Modern China. 29 STOR http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Mao and China's Relations with the Superpowers in the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino-Soviet Split Author(s): Michael M. Sheng Source: Modern China, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Oct., 2008), pp. 477-507 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27746900 . Accessed: 15/05/2013 01:07 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Modern China. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Modern China Volume 34 Number 4 0 ctober2008477-507 2008 Sage Publications Mao and China's Relations 10.11770097700408315991 http://mc.sagepub.com with the Superpowers in hosted at http://online.sagepub.com the 1950s A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino-Soviet Split Michael M.Sheng Missouri State University This article reexamines the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-55 and 1958,and the initial Sino-Soviet conflict,with particular attention to Mao's dominant role in the events.In contrast to previous scholarship,based on newly avail- able sources it finds Mao to have been an erratic dictator who micromanaged China's military and political operations in the Taiwan Strait against the U.S.-Taiwan alliance with neither a long-term strategy nor a short-term plan. Mao's grandiose ambition to be the leader of the communist world led him into a conflict with Moscow,and the Sino-Soviet alliance began to unravel when China most needed allies.In the end,Mao's policy behavior was coun- terproductive and self-defeating:China's national interest,which Mao thought he was protecting and enhancing,suffered a great deal of damage. Keywords:Mao;Sino-Soviet-American relations;1950s;Taiwan Strait crisis Tn late 1954 and early 1955,shortly after the Geneva conference ended the Lconflict in Indochina,the People's Republic of China(PRC)massed a huge military force along the Taiwan Strait,attacking the offshore islands held by the Republic of China(ROC),an American ally.Coupled with the largest military mobilization since the end of the Korean War and land-, sea-,and air-coordinated assaults on the offshore islands was a vigorous nationwide propaganda campaign of"liberating Taiwan."Washington came to believe that this marked the beginning of Beijing's attempt to invade the ROC territories;the offshore islands would be first,Taiwan and Penghu next.Consequently,the Eisenhower administration reluctantly signed a Author's Note:I am indebted to Dr.Nancy Tucker of Georgetown University and Dr.Chen Jian of Cornell University,whose comments and suggestions were immensely helpful. 477 This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Mao and China's Relations with the Superpowers in the 1950s A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino-Soviet Split Michael M. Sheng Missouri State University This article reexamines the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-55 and 1958, and the initial Sino-Soviet conflict, with particular attention to Mao's dominant role in the events. In contrast to previous scholarship, based on newly avail able sources it finds Mao to have been an erratic dictator who micromanaged China's military and political operations in the Taiwan Strait against the U.S.-Taiwan alliance with neither a long-term strategy nor a short-term plan. Mao's grandiose ambition to be the leader of the communist world led him into a conflict with Moscow, and the Sino-Soviet alliance began to unravel when China most needed allies. In the end, Mao's policy behavior was coun terproductive and self-defeating; China's national interest, which Mao thought he was protecting and enhancing, suffered a great deal of damage. Keywords: Mao; Sino-Soviet-American relations; 1950s; Taiwan Strait crisis In late 1954 and early 1955, shortly after the Geneva conference ended the conflict in Indochina, the People's Republic of China (PRC) massed a huge military force along the Taiwan Strait, attacking the offshore islands held by the Republic of China (ROC), an American ally. Coupled with the largest military mobilization since the end of the Korean War and land-, sea-, and air-coordinated assaults on the offshore islands was a vigorous nationwide propaganda campaign of "liberating Taiwan." Washington came to believe that this marked the beginning of Beijing's attempt to invade the ROC territories; the offshore islands would be first, Taiwan and Penghu next. Consequently, the Eisenhower administration reluctantly signed a Author's Note: I am indebted to Dr. Nancy Tucker of Georgetown University and Dr. Chen Jian of Cornell University, whose comments and suggestions were immensely helpful. 477 This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
478 Modern China mutual defense treaty with Jiang Jieshi's government,hoping that would deter Beijing's aggression.The PRC under the leadership of Mao Zedong, however,was not deterred,and the crisis deepened while the People's Liberation Army's pressure on the offshore islands continued.In response, the United States assembled a huge air-naval force in the region.The Eisenhower administration,with the support of Congress,started to prepare the American people for the possible use of tactical atomic bombs.A nuclear war was on the brink.Facing a determined opponent and the for- midable U.S.military presence,Mao agreed to resolve the conflict through negotiations;Sino-American ambassadorial talks ensued shortly afterward. The first Taiwan Strait Crisis simmered down only to flare up all over again in 1958,leading toward another brink of nuclear war.At the same time,the Beijing-Moscow alliance started to unravel. What was Beijing's strategic objective in provoking the two crises? What were the consequences of Mao's policy for China?Some scholars emphasize the nationalistic nature of Beijing's policy,the main goal of which was to frustrate the alleged U.S.intention to detach Taiwan from China (Stolper,1985:3-11).'Others note the miscalculation and misper- ception on both sides,but they emphasize the supposed overreaction on the part of the Eisenhower-Dulles team,arguing that Beijing never really intended to capture Jinmen (Quemoy)and Mazu (Matsu)(Chang and He, 1993).2 Still other scholars stress domestic mobilization:Mao's chief inten- tion,according to this view,was to exploit international tension in order to promote his political agenda at home-thus implying that by going to the brink,Washington overreacted (Christensen,1996;Chen,2001:163-204). In all scholarly works in the field,Mao has been portrayed as a strong, nationalistic leader.With a grand style and strategy,he was rational and calculating-rightly or wrongly-when it came to protecting China against powerful adversaries.Curiously,although it is a commonly accepted among scholars that in both cases Mao was central in the policy process,no study has focused on Mao's policy behavior:what made Mao tick?The existing theories of rational actor,ideological influence,misperception,and the like reveal certain aspects of Mao's decision-making process.However, the assumption that any world leader,including Mao,is always rational is dangerously erroneous.Personality matters in policy making,particularly in a dictatorship such as Mao's China where the policy process is in the hands of one man (Greenstein,2000).3 The difficult part of the personality approach is,first of all,to depict and analyze the subject's personality traits and formation-which need psychological insights-and then to link cer- tain personality attributes to the particular historical event.This can be done This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
478 Modern China mutual defense treaty with Jiang Jieshi's government, hoping that would deter Beijing's aggression. The PRC under the leadership of Mao Zedong, however, was not deterred, and the crisis deepened while the People's Liberation Army's pressure on the offshore islands continued. In response, the United States assembled a huge air-naval force in the region. The Eisenhower administration, with the support of Congress, started to prepare the American people for the possible use of tactical atomic bombs. A nuclear war was on the brink. Facing a determined opponent and the for midable U.S. military presence, Mao agreed to resolve the conflict through negotiations; Sino-American ambassadorial talks ensued shortly afterward. The first Taiwan Strait Crisis simmered down only to flare up all over again in 1958, leading toward another brink of nuclear war. At the same time, the Beijing-Moscow alliance started to unravel. What was Beijing's strategic objective in provoking the two crises? What were the consequences of Mao's policy for China? Some scholars emphasize the nationalistic nature of Beijing's policy, the main goal of which was to frustrate the alleged U.S. intention to detach Taiwan from China (Stolper, 1985: 3?11).1 Others note the miscalculation and misper ception on both sides, but they emphasize the supposed overreaction on the part of the Eisenhower-Dulles team, arguing that Beijing never really intended to capture Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu) (Chang and He, 1993).2 Still other scholars stress domestic mobilization: Mao's chief inten tion, according to this view, was to exploit international tension in order to promote his political agenda at home?thus implying that by going to the brink, Washington overreacted (Christensen, 1996; Chen, 2001: 163-204). In all scholarly works in the field, Mao has been portrayed as a strong, nationalistic leader. With a grand style and strategy, he was rational and calculating?rightly or wrongly?when it came to protecting China against powerful adversaries. Curiously, although it is a commonly accepted among scholars that in both cases Mao was central in the policy process, no study has focused on Mao's policy behavior: what made Mao tick? The existing theories of rational actor, ideological influence, misperception, and the like reveal certain aspects of Mao's decision-making process. However, the assumption that any world leader, including Mao, is always rational is dangerously erroneous. Personality matters in policy making, particularly in a dictatorship such as Mao's China where the policy process is in the hands of one man (Greenstein, 2000).3 The difficult part of the personality approach is, first of all, to depict and analyze the subject's personality traits and formation?which need psychological insights?and then to link cer tain personality attributes to the particular historical event. This can be done This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Sheng/Mao China's Relations with Superpowers 479 more effectively in a book-length project that examines lifelong behavioral trends to show how certain personality traits of the subject-Mao in this case-affected his policy making.Therefore,this study will not proceed with a personality hypothesis.Instead it will simply show that newly avail- able Chinese materials,including Mao's writings,Chinese Communist Party(CCP)documents,contemporaries'recollections,and interviews with those who were participants in the events reveal a Mao that is significantly different from the existing portrait of him as a grand strategist.It will demonstrate that Mao not only single-handedly dictated Beijing's provoca- tive policy and micromanaged military and propaganda operations,but he also did so without a long-term strategy nor a short-term plan.He was dic- tatorial and impulsive,continually miscalculating the situation,leading toward a dangerous policy of confrontation.In the end,Mao's behavior was counterproductive and self-defeating;China's national interest,which Mao thought he was protecting and enhancing,suffered a great deal of damage. There is,however,sufficient evidence to argue that the 1958 crisis was, in part,designed to promote Mao's domestic agenda of the Great Leap Forward(GLF).If this was a part of Mao's strategy,he succeeded in manip- ulating international tension to serve his goal of domestic mobilization. Nevertheless,Mao's success in this regard was not only costly but also cat- astrophically so,because the GLF turned out to be a fantastic disaster.The final portion of this article demonstrates that the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the GLF were closely related not just in terms of one serving the other's purpose;they were both derived from Mao's desire to challenge the Kremlin for leadership of the worldwide communist movement. If a central argument in the existing scholarship is that Mao did not really want to capture the offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu.this study will prove otherwise.Mao consistently desired and planned for the "liber- ation"of Jinmen and Mazu,but he was indecisive and hesitant about using a frontal landing assault to achieve his goal due to his shifting calculation/ speculation on what the American reaction might be.When Washington stood firm,threatening with and preparing for possible use of nuclear weapons to defend the Guomindang (Nationalist Party:hereafter.GMD) territories in the strait,Mao backed down.However,this does not prove that the Eisenhower administration's decision to go to the nuclear brink was necessary;in fact,Mao was not prepared to engage the United States in a conventional war,let alone in a nuclear war.Did Washington's deterrence policy work in this case?How far should American policy makers have gone to maintain"credibility"in other parts of the world?I will leave those issues to my Americanist colleagues.Many scholars'criticism of Dulles's This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Sheng / Mao & China's Relations with Superpowers 479 more effectively in a book-length project that examines lifelong behavioral trends to show how certain personality traits of the subject?Mao in this case?affected his policy making. Therefore, this study will not proceed with a personality hypothesis. Instead it will simply show that newly avail able Chinese materials, including Mao's writings, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) documents, contemporaries' recollections, and interviews with those who were participants in the events reveal a Mao that is significantly different from the existing portrait of him as a grand strategist. It will demonstrate that Mao not only single-handedly dictated Beijing's provoca tive policy and micromanaged military and propaganda operations, but he also did so without a long-term strategy nor a short-term plan. He was dic tatorial and impulsive, continually miscalculating the situation, leading toward a dangerous policy of confrontation. In the end, Mao's behavior was counterproductive and self-defeating; China's national interest, which Mao thought he was protecting and enhancing, suffered a great deal of damage. There is, however, sufficient evidence to argue that the 1958 crisis was, in part, designed to promote Mao's domestic agenda of the Great Leap Forward (GLF). If this was a part of Mao's strategy, he succeeded in manip ulating international tension to serve his goal of domestic mobilization. Nevertheless, Mao's success in this regard was not only costly but also cat astrophically so, because the GLF turned out to be a fantastic disaster. The final portion of this article demonstrates that the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the GLF were closely related not just in terms of one serving the other's purpose; they were both derived from Mao's desire to challenge the Kremlin for leadership of the worldwide communist movement. If a central argument in the existing scholarship is that Mao did not really want to capture the offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu, this study will prove otherwise. Mao consistently desired and planned for the "liber ation" of Jinmen and Mazu, but he was indecisive and hesitant about using a frontal landing assault to achieve his goal due to his shifting calculation/ speculation on what the American reaction might be. When Washington stood firm, threatening with and preparing for possible use of nuclear weapons to defend the Guomindang (Nationalist Party; hereafter, GMD) territories in the strait, Mao backed down. However, this does not prove that the Eisenhower administration's decision to go to the nuclear brink was necessary; in fact, Mao was not prepared to engage the United States in a conventional war, let alone in a nuclear war. Did Washington's deterrence policy work in this case? How far should American policy makers have gone to maintain "credibility" in other parts of the world? I will leave those issues to my Americanist colleagues. Many scholars' criticism of Dulles's This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
480 Modern China "brinksmanship"is well-founded and credible.What is under-studied is Mao's own version of"brinksmanship"exhibited in the crises,and its con- sequences for China and the Chinese people.This article is an attempt to fill the void. The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954-55 The offshore conflict can be seen as a continuation of the CCP-GMD civil war.Although the Truman administration interjected the Seventh Fleet into the strait in 1950,Washington refused to commit itself to the defense of the offshore islands.Dean Acheson told Taibei explicitly in July 1950 that the United States would not defend those islands,nor would it support the GMD's offensive operations against the mainland from the offshore positions (Garver,1997:112-47).Nevertheless,Mao overestimated Washington's aggressive intention,and he was fearful of the imminent dan- ger of the United States seizing the offshore islands as a springboard for an invasion of the mainland.Early in 1951,China's initial campaigns in Korea prompted MacArthur to suggest that Jiang's ROC forces be used to harass the mainland to relieve PRC military pressure in Korea.Upon hearing the news,Mao fired a telegram to the field commanders in Fujian province on January 13,1951,warning them of a large-scale ROC invasion in the coastal area and demanding a contingency plan immediately.The next day, Chen Yi,the People's Liberation Army (PLA)commander of the East China Military Region,sent Mao a defense plan to deploy four armies around the city of Xiamen(Amoy)alone.Mao accepted the plan.In addi- tion,he ordered that the Twenty-fifth Army and the Third Artillery Division be moved from Korea and redeployed back to Fujian.Although the Truman administration quickly rejected MacArthur's suggestion,Mao's fear of an overly aggressive America ready to attack the mainland helped to realize MacArthur's strategic intention without any cost to the Americans.5 When President Truman recalled MacArthur,a clear signal of Washington's intention to keep the Korean conflict from spilling into China.Mao seemed oblivious to the obvious.Because of his unfounded fear,Mao made a plan in the summer of 1952 to seize the offshore islands while the Korean War was still raging (Nie,1986:26-38;Zhang,1992:195).Accordingly,between January and March 1953,the PLA shelled Jinmen several times,and in May and June of 1953,it seized several small islands outside Wenzhou Bay in Zhejiang province.After the ending of hostilities in Korea in July 1953,Mao approved Chen Yi's proposal to use five armies to take over Jinmen and to speed up the This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
480 Modern China "brinksmanship" is well-founded and credible. What is under-studied is Mao's own version of "brinksmanship" exhibited in the crises, and its con sequences for China and the Chinese people. This article is an attempt to fill the void. The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954-55 The offshore conflict can be seen as a continuation of the CCP-GMD civil war. Although the Truman administration interjected the Seventh Fleet into the strait in 1950, Washington refused to commit itself to the defense of the offshore islands. Dean Acheson told Taibei explicitly in July 1950 that the United States would not defend those islands, nor would it support the GMD's offensive operations against the mainland from the offshore positions (Garver, 1997: 112-41).4 Nevertheless, Mao overestimated Washington's aggressive intention, and he was fearful of the imminent dan ger of the United States seizing the offshore islands as a springboard for an invasion of the mainland. Early in 1951, China's initial campaigns in Korea prompted Mac Arthur to suggest that Jiang's ROC forces be used to harass the mainland to relieve PRC military pressure in Korea. Upon hearing the news, Mao fired a telegram to the field commanders in Fujian province on January 13, 1951, warning them of a large-scale ROC invasion in the coastal area and demanding a contingency plan immediately. The next day, Chen Yi, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) commander of the East China Military Region, sent Mao a defense plan to deploy four armies around the city of Xiamen (Amoy) alone. Mao accepted the plan. In addi tion, he ordered that the Twenty-fifth Army and the Third Artillery Division be moved from Korea and redeployed back to Fujian. Although the Truman administration quickly rejected MacArthur's suggestion, Mao's fear of an overly aggressive America ready to attack the mainland helped to realize MacArthur's strategic intention without any cost to the Americans.5 When President Truman recalled Mac Arthur, a clear signal of Washington's intention to keep the Korean conflict from spilling into China, Mao seemed oblivious to the obvious. Because of his unfounded fear, Mao made a plan in the summer of 1952 to seize the offshore islands while the Korean War was still raging (Nie, 1986: 26-38; Zhang, 1992: 195). Accordingly, between January and March 1953, the PL A shelled Jinmen several times, and in May and June of 1953, it seized several small islands outside Wenzhou Bay in Zhejiang province. After the ending of hostilities in Korea in July 1953, Mao approved Chen Yi's proposal to use five armies to take over Jinmen and to speed up the This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Sheng Mao China's Relations with Superpowers 481 construction of airfields and railways in both Zhejiang and Fujian provinces. Mao,however,quickly changed his mind about focusing on Jinmen.Instead, by the end of 1953,he ordered the seizure of the Dachen and Yijiangshan islands first.This new plan made sense because these islands were along the coast of Zhejiang province,north of the Taiwan Strait.From here,ROC air raids could reach Shanghai easily.Mao's new plan preoccupied the PRC military establishment for the first half of 1954 (Xu,1992:157-73;Chen,2001: 163-204).Up to this point,Mao's thinking and planning vis-a-vis the offshore islands seemed to be linked to the continuation of the long-standing CCP-GMD civil war.At the same time,the United States did nothing to prevent those small islands along Zhejiang's shoreline from being taken by the PRC,although some Washington officials were concerned with the political and psychological con- sequences of more victories by the"Reds"(Accinelli,1996:148). Mao's offshore island policy up to this point seemed to be in line with Beijing's general foreign policy after the end of the Korean War.Following the post-Stalin Soviet leadership's peaceful coexistence initiative,the PRC emphasized the need for peace in order to gain time for China's economic reconstruction.The earlier effort to export revolution was thus abandoned (Yang,2006:3-4).On November 23,1953,Mao sent Ho Chi Minh a tele- graph to persuade him to accept a peaceful solution to the war in Indochina: It is necessary and timely for the government of the Vietnamese Democratic Republic to formally express its willingness to use peaceful negotiations to end the Vietnam War.Only in doing so can we take the banner of peace into our hands in order to facilitate the fervent struggle of the French people and all peace-loving people all over the world,and to expose the lie of the French reactionaries who blame Vietnam for not wanting peace,which is a plot to lay the blame for the war at the door of Vietnam.As well,only in so doing, can we take advantage of and further the contradiction between the French and the Americans.(Pang and Jin,2003:552-53) This line of thinking seemed to be the norm in Beijing's foreign policy up to the end of the Geneva Conference.On March 2,1954,Zhou Enlai drafted a policy document entitled "Preliminary Document on the Estimation of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference,"which was dis- cussed and passed by the CCP Central Secretariat chaired by Liu Shaogi. The document followed the general policy of easing international tension and thwarting the American policy of isolation and embargo against China. On the Korean issue,it read,"We should recognize the north-south status quo,demand the withdrawal of all foreign troops,and restore transportation and trade between the north and south so as to establish the initial peace." This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Sheng / Mao & China's Relations with Superpowers 481 construction of airfields and railways in both Zhejiang and Fujian provinces. Mao, however, quickly changed his mind about focusing on Jinmen. Instead, by the end of 1953, he ordered the seizure of the Dachen and Yijiangshan islands first. This new plan made sense because these islands were along the coast of Zhejiang province, north of the Taiwan Strait. From here, ROC air raids could reach Shanghai easily. Mao's new plan preoccupied the PRC military establishment for the first half of 1954 (Xu, 1992: 157-73; Chen, 2001: 163-204). Up to this point, Mao's thinking and planning vis-?-vis the offshore islands seemed to be linked to the continuation of the long-standing CCP-GMD civil war. At the same time, the United States did nothing to prevent those small islands along Zhejiang's shoreline from being taken by the PRC, although some Washington officials were concerned with the political and psychological con sequences of more victories by the "Reds" (Accinelli, 1996: 148). Mao's offshore island policy up to this point seemed to be in line with Beijing's general foreign policy after the end of the Korean War. Following the post-Stalin Soviet leadership's peaceful coexistence initiative, the PRC emphasized the need for peace in order to gain time for China's economic reconstruction. The earlier effort to export revolution was thus abandoned (Yang, 2006: 3-4). On November 23, 1953, Mao sent Ho Chi Minh a tele graph to persuade him to accept a peaceful solution to the war in Indochina: It is necessary and timely for the government of the Vietnamese Democratic Republic to formally express its willingness to use peaceful negotiations to end the Vietnam War. Only in doing so can we take the banner of peace into our hands in order to facilitate the fervent struggle of the French people and all peace-loving people all over the world, and to expose the lie of the French reactionaries who blame Vietnam for not wanting peace, which is a plot to lay the blame for the war at the door of Vietnam. As well, only in so doing, can we take advantage of and further the contradiction between the French and the Americans. (Pang and Jin, 2003: 552-53) This line of thinking seemed to be the norm in Beijing's foreign policy up to the end of the Geneva Conference. On March 2, 1954, Zhou Enlai drafted a policy document entitled "Preliminary Document on the Estimation of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference," which was dis cussed and passed by the CCP Central Secretariat chaired by Liu Shaoqi. The document followed the general policy of easing international tension and thwarting the American policy of isolation and embargo against China. On the Korean issue, it read, "We should recognize the north-south status quo, demand the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and restore transportation and trade between the north and south so as to establish the initial peace." This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
482 Modern China On the Indochina issue,it called for an attempt to establish a truce around the sixteenth parallel.The next day,China officially responded positively to the Soviet invitation to participate in the Geneva Conference.Before Zhou's departure,Mao chaired several Politburo meetings to formally adopt this policy line (Pang and Jin,2003:554-58). On July 7,1954,Zhou flew back to Beijing before the final stage of the Geneva Conference to report to Mao,who still seemed to be intent on pur- suing the general line of international relaxation.Mao declared: In Geneva,we grabbed the peace slogan,that is to say that we want peace.On the other hand,the Americans did not grab the peace slogan;they want to fight. Thus,they lost the argument;they cannot be persuasive.Currently,more people want peace,and we need to cooperate with all the people who want peace,so that we can isolate those warmongers,that is the current U.S.administration.... Looking at the general international situation,the U.S.is quite isolated.After this Southeast Asian issue,that is the Indochina issue,being resolved,I think the U.S.isolation will increase.(Mao,1999:6.332-35) Seemingly confident,Mao went further to call for a change to the policy of self-imposed isolation from the West,which had been in place since 1949,in order to"clean the house before inviting guests."Now he thought it was time to engage in active diplomacy with the West in general.He thus went on to say: Right now,it has been impossible [for us]to shut the door tight;instead,the situation is very advantageous and we need to walk out the door....To relax international tension,countries of different systems can peacefully coexist. This slogan [was]originated by the Soviet Union,and it is our slogan as well. Now it becomes the catch word in [Anthony]Eden's mouth,in Nehru's too. They want to relax international tension as well.(Mao,1999:6.332-35) Toward that end,Mao even proposed that in order to prevent Washington from signing a mutual defense treaty with Taibei,Beijing should make more friendly diplomatic moves,such as negotiating with the United States in a more conciliatory manner on the issue of expatriates (Mao,1999: 6.332-35).However,two weeks later,Mao would abandon this policy ori- entation abruptly with no explanation and no discussion in the CCP leader- ship whatsoever.In late July 1954,Zhou Enlai succeeded in impressing the world with his diplomatic skills in the Geneva Conference,which ended the Indochina conflict.Unfortunately,Mao suddenly decided to create an inter- national crisis in the Taiwan Strait,and he did so by blaming Zhou Enlai. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
482 Modern China On the Indochina issue, it called for an attempt to establish a truce around the sixteenth parallel. The next day, China officially responded positively to the Soviet invitation to participate in the Geneva Conference. Before Zhou's departure, Mao chaired several Politburo meetings to formally adopt this policy line (Pang and Jin, 2003: 554-58). On July 7, 1954, Zhou flew back to Beijing before the final stage of the Geneva Conference to report to Mao, who still seemed to be intent on pur suing the general line of international relaxation. Mao declared: In Geneva, we grabbed the peace slogan, that is to say that we want peace. On the other hand, the Americans did not grab the peace slogan; they want to fight. Thus, they lost the argument; they cannot be persuasive. Currently, more people want peace, and we need to cooperate with all the people who want peace, so that we can isolate those warmongers, that is the current U.S. administration.... Looking at the general international situation, the U.S. is quite isolated. After this Southeast Asian issue, that is the Indochina issue, being resolved, I think the U.S. isolation will increase. (Mao, 1999: 6.332-35) Seemingly confident, Mao went further to call for a change to the policy of self-imposed isolation from the West, which had been in place since 1949, in order to "clean the house before inviting guests." Now he thought it was time to engage in active diplomacy with the West in general. He thus went on to say: Right now, it has been impossible [for us] to shut the door tight; instead, the situation is very advantageous and we need to walk out the door....To relax international tension, countries of different systems can peacefully coexist. This slogan [was] originated by the Soviet Union, and it is our slogan as well. Now it becomes the catch word in [Anthony] Eden's mouth, in Nehru's too. They want to relax international tension as well. (Mao, 1999: 6.332-35)6 Toward that end, Mao even proposed that in order to prevent Washington from signing a mutual defense treaty with Taibei, Beijing should make more friendly diplomatic moves, such as negotiating with the United States in a more conciliatory manner on the issue of expatriates (Mao, 1999: 6.332-35). However, two weeks later, Mao would abandon this policy ori entation abruptly with no explanation and no discussion in the CCP leader ship whatsoever. In late July 1954, Zhou Enlai succeeded in impressing the world with his diplomatic skills in the Geneva Conference, which ended the Indochina conflict. Unfortunately, Mao suddenly decided to create an inter national crisis in the Taiwan Strait, and he did so by blaming Zhou Enlai. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Sheng /Mao China's Relations with Superpowers 483 On his way home from Geneva,Zhou visited the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations.On July 23,he received a telegram from the chairman: In order to break up the collaboration between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek and keep them from joining together militarily and politically,we must announce to our country and to the world the slogan of liberating Taiwan.It was improper of us not to raise this slogan in a timely manner after the cease-fire in Korea.If we were to continue dragging our heels now.we would be making a serious political mistake.(He,1990:225)? People's Daily,the CCP's official organ,carried an editorial entitled "[We]Must Liberate Taiwan"the same day,which marked the beginning of a fierce nationwide propaganda campaign against the"U.S.-Jiang bandits." The next day Mao ordered a meeting to draw up a military plan,and a mas- sive military build-up in the region ensued immediately.What Mao did next was to make continuous military action off the coast of Zhejiang the first step of a larger plan aimed at the entire Taiwan Strait.Now the assault on Jinmen was not merely a military diversion;instead,it seemed to be at the center of his path and the first step of his"liberating Taiwan"campaign Washington had sufficient reason to be alarmed. Mao's erratic policy behavior not only changed the nature of the ongoing fight along the Zhejiang coast,it also reversed Beijing's general foreign pol- icy direction.There was no discernable strategic objective clearly laid out,nor was there a careful planning and policy deliberation process.Mao could not even wait for the arrival of Zhou Enlai,who was after all the premier and for- eign minister.Fear may explain Mao's rash decision to attack Jinmen.He had a long-standing fear that a military confrontation with the United States was inevitable,and it could happen in three places:Korea,Indochina,and the Taiwan Strait.This perception of "inevitability"was a major factor in his deci- sion to enter into the Korean War.When a settlement had been reached in Korea and then in Indochina,his fear of an overly aggressive America resur- faced regarding the strait.On July 27,1954,Mao sent Zhou another telegram, of which the contents were to be conveyed to the Kremlin. After the wars ended in Korea and Indochina,the United States will not con- cede to its failure in the Geneva Conference;it will for sure continue to increase international tension,to grab more spheres of influence from the British and the French,to increase its military bases,and to prepare for war against our country....Lately the U.S.and Jiang Jieshi are discussing a U.S.-Jiang mutual defense treaty...and possibly [the U.S.]will enlarge the This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Sheng / Mao & China's Relations with Superpowers 483 On his way home from Geneva, Zhou visited the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations. On July 23, he received a telegram from the chairman: In order to break up the collaboration between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek and keep them from joining together militarily and politically, we must announce to our country and to the world the slogan of liberating Taiwan. It was improper of us not to raise this slogan in a timely manner after the cease-fire in Korea. If we were to continue dragging our heels now, we would be making a serious political mistake. (He, 1990: 225)7 People's Daily, the CCP's official organ, carried an editorial entitled "[We] Must Liberate Taiwan" the same day, which marked the beginning of a fierce nationwide propaganda campaign against the "U.S.-Jiang bandits." The next day Mao ordered a meeting to draw up a military plan, and a mas sive military build-up in the region ensued immediately. What Mao did next was to make continuous military action off the coast of Zhejiang the first step of a larger plan aimed at the entire Taiwan Strait. Now the assault on Jinmen was not merely a military diversion; instead, it seemed to be at the center of his path and the first step of his "liberating Taiwan" campaign. Washington had sufficient reason to be alarmed. Mao's erratic policy behavior not only changed the nature of the ongoing fight along the Zhejiang coast, it also reversed Beijing's general foreign pol icy direction. There was no discernable strategic objective clearly laid out, nor was there a careful planning and policy deliberation process. Mao could not even wait for the arrival of Zhou Enlai, who was after all the premier and for eign minister. Fear may explain Mao's rash decision to attack Jinmen. He had a long-standing fear that a military confrontation with the United States was inevitable, and it could happen in three places: Korea, Indochina, and the Taiwan Strait. This perception of "inevitability" was a major factor in his deci sion to enter into the Korean War. When a settlement had been reached in Korea and then in Indochina, his fear of an overly aggressive America resur faced regarding the strait. On July 27, 1954, Mao sent Zhou another telegram, of which the contents were to be conveyed to the Kremlin. After the wars ended in Korea and Indochina, the United States will not con cede to its failure in the Geneva Conference; it will for sure continue to increase international tension, to grab more spheres of influence from the British and the French, to increase its military bases, and to prepare for war against our country....Lately the U.S. and Jiang Jieshi are discussing a U.S.-Jiang mutual defense treaty...and possibly [the U.S.] will enlarge the This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
484 Modern China blockade area to include the Guangdong coast and Tokyo Bay....[Thus.we still have a war in front of us,that is the war against the Jiang Jieshi bandits in Taiwan;we still have a task in front of us,that is to liberate Taiwan.(Li and Ma.1997:405) Under Mao's direction,in addition to the ongoing military operation in the coastal area of Zhejiang province,hostilities against Jinmen and Mazu in the strait were intensified.On September 3,1954,the artillery bombard- ment of Jinmen turned the continuation of the CCP-GMD civil war into a full-blown international crisis,pushing Washington to the brink of a nuclear confrontation.Mao's professed intention was to drive a wedge between Washington and Taibei,but his action completely defeated his purpose:he pushed Washington much closer to Taiwan.The Eisenhower administration continued the basic policy of the Truman administration and was very con- cerned that the United States might be dragged into a GMD-provoked war with the PRC.For this reason,Washington used military aid as a means to put a"new leash on Jiang,"as historian Robert Accinelli puts it.The United States certainly did not want to sign a mutual defense treaty with Taibei (Accinelli,1996:117).This was soon to change. In response to Mao's aggressive propaganda campaign,which was fol- lowed by a massive military mobilization,Eisenhower told reporters on August 17,1954 that"any invasion of Formosa would have to run over the 7th Fleet."Two days later,four U.S.destroyers paid a visit to the Dachens. After the artillery shelling of Jinmen on September 3,Washington started to move toward a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan in order to deter the PRC from further aggression (Accinelli,1996:154-83).Nevertheless,Mao continued to think that his willingness to go to the brink would force Washington to back off from making a commitment to defend Taiwan and the offshore islands.In early November 1954,the PRC Air Force started heavy bombardment of Yijiangshan,followed by naval attacks on the ROC warships in the area.On November 30,1954,Mao issued an order via the chief of staff that a landing on Yijiangshan be launched on December 20. In the order,Mao clearly spelled out that the political aim of this mili- tary offensive was to force the United States not to include the offshore islands in the mutual defense treaty (Xu,1992:178-80).At this point,Mao sensed that he could not prevent the mutual defense treaty from being signed,but he still believed that continued hostility would scare Washington away from committing to the defense of the offshore islands. However,the U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense treaty was signed on December 2,1954,and in it,the United States explicitly committed itself to the This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
484 Modern China blockade area to include the Guangdong coast and Tokyo Bay....[Thus,] we still have a war in front of us, that is the war against the Jiang Jieshi bandits in Taiwan; we still have a task in front of us, that is to liberate Taiwan. (Li and Ma, 1997: 405) Under Mao's direction, in addition to the ongoing military operation in the coastal area of Zhejiang province, hostilities against Jinmen and Mazu in the strait were intensified. On September 3, 1954, the artillery bombard ment of Jinmen turned the continuation of the CCP-GMD civil war into a full-blown international crisis, pushing Washington to the brink of a nuclear confrontation. Mao's professed intention was to drive a wedge between Washington and Taibei, but his action completely defeated his purpose: he pushed Washington much closer to Taiwan. The Eisenhower administration continued the basic policy of the Truman administration and was very con cerned that the United States might be dragged into a GMD-provoked war with the PRC. For this reason, Washington used military aid as a means to put a "new leash on Jiang," as historian Robert Accinelli puts it. The United States certainly did not want to sign a mutual defense treaty with Taibei (Accinelli, 1996: 117). This was soon to change. In response to Mao's aggressive propaganda campaign, which was fol lowed by a massive military mobilization, Eisenhower told reporters on August 17, 1954 that "any invasion of Formosa would have to run over the 7th Fleet." Two days later, four U.S. destroyers paid a visit to the Dachens. After the artillery shelling of Jinmen on September 3, Washington started to move toward a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan in order to deter the PRC from further aggression (Accinelli, 1996: 154-83). Nevertheless, Mao continued to think that his willingness to go to the brink would force Washington to back off from making a commitment to defend Taiwan and the offshore islands. In early November 1954, the PRC Air Force started heavy bombardment of Yijiangshan, followed by naval attacks on the ROC warships in the area. On November 30, 1954, Mao issued an order via the chief of staff that a landing on Yijiangshan be launched on December 20. In the order, Mao clearly spelled out that the political aim of this mili tary offensive was to force the United States not to include the offshore islands in the mutual defense treaty (Xu, 1992: 178-80). At this point, Mao sensed that he could not prevent the mutual defense treaty from being signed, but he still believed that continued hostility would scare Washington away from committing to the defense of the offshore islands. However, the U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense treaty was signed on December 2, 1954, and in it, the United States explicitly committed itself to the This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Sheng /Mao China's Relations with Superpowers 485 defense not only of Taiwan and the Penghus but also "such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement."By being vague about the off- shore islands,Dulles intended to keep the Communists guessing,thereby deterring Beijing from attacking them(Garver,1997:57).It was clear by now that Mao's aggressive policy had forced Washington's hand,and his original intention of preventing a U.S.-ROC treaty had backfired. Mao,however,was self-congratulatory,and he insisted that his aggressive policy had forced Washington to exclude the offshore islands from the treaty. He was in fear of the aggressiveness of the United States,which he greatly exaggerated.He thought that the mutual defense treaty "is not by any means a defense treaty....It is a treaty of total aggression"and war(Li and Ma,1997: 430).At the same time,he thought the only way to deal with U.S.aggressive- ness was to be more aggressive,and he unrealistically believed that he could have his way.In January 1955,he ordered that Yijiangshan be seized,regard- less of the newly signed treaty.The PLA succeeded in taking the island on January 18,1955,with an air-amphibious-land operation.Preparations were then undertaken to attack the Dachens,which were now within the range of the PLA's artillery (Xu,1992:181-85). Mao's aggressive behavior fostered a sense in Washington that the PRC onslaught on the offshore islands could not be stopped unless more drastic steps were taken.The Eisenhower administration thus made a further com- mitment to the defense of the ROC-held territories for which the United States was prepared to use tactical atomic weapons if necessary.Dulles told Taibei that the United States would publicly announce its intention to defend Jinmen if Jiang withdrew from the Dachens.On January 28,1955, the Formosa Resolution passed Congress,giving the president a blank check to use force to protect Taiwan,the Penghus,and "related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands."Mao won the battle in the Zhejiang coastal area but lost the war in the strait.Mao reportedly admitted the political failure of his "liberating Taiwan"campaign (Chang and He, 1993:1514),3 but he did not acknowledge his miscalculation or his failure to quickly back off from his misadventure. Before Mao's campaign in July 1954,the CCP had a strategic plan of "liberating"the offshore islands:from small to large,one island at a time, from north to south,from weak to strong.The PLA had been successful in taking over a few islands in the Zhejiang coastal area;Yijiangshan and the Dachens were the logical continuation of this strategy (Xu,1992:183). These islands were far closer to Shanghai than to Taiwan,and Washington did not intervene when they fell into the PRC's hands.That was until Mao waged his"liberating Taiwan"campaign and bombarded Jinmen.Had Mao This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Sheng / Mao & China's Relations with Superpowers 485 defense not only of Taiwan and the Penghus but also "such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement." By being vague about the off shore islands, Dulles intended to keep the Communists guessing, thereby deterring Beijing from attacking them (Garver, 1997: 57). It was clear by now that Mao's aggressive policy had forced Washington's hand, and his original intention of preventing a U.S.-ROC treaty had backfired. Mao, however, was self-congratulatory, and he insisted that his aggressive policy had forced Washington to exclude the offshore islands from the treaty. He was in fear of the aggressiveness of the United States, which he greatly exaggerated. He thought that the mutual defense treaty "is not by any means a defense treaty... .It is a treaty of total aggression" and war (Li and Ma, 1997: 430). At the same time, he thought the only way to deal with U.S. aggressive ness was to be more aggressive, and he unrealistically believed that he could have his way. In January 1955, he ordered that Yijiangshan be seized, regard less of the newly signed treaty. The PLA succeeded in taking the island on January 18, 1955, with an air-amphibious-land operation. Preparations were then undertaken to attack the Dachens, which were now within the range of the PLA's artillery (Xu, 1992: 181-85). Mao's aggressive behavior fostered a sense in Washington that the PRC onslaught on the offshore islands could not be stopped unless more drastic steps were taken. The Eisenhower administration thus made a further com mitment to the defense of the ROC-held territories for which the United States was prepared to use tactical atomic weapons if necessary. Dulles told Taibei that the United States would publicly announce its intention to defend Jinmen if Jiang withdrew from the Dachens. On January 28, 1955, the Formosa Resolution passed Congress, giving the president a blank check to use force to protect Taiwan, the Penghus, and "related positions and territories ofthat area now in friendly hands." Mao won the battle in the Zhejiang coastal area but lost the war in the strait. Mao reportedly admitted the political failure of his "liberating Taiwan" campaign (Chang and He, 1993: 1514),8 but he did not acknowledge his miscalculation or his failure to quickly back off from his misadventure. Before Mao's campaign in July 1954, the CCP had a strategic plan of "liberating" the offshore islands: from small to large, one island at a time, from north to south, from weak to strong. The PLA had been successful in taking over a few islands in the Zhejiang coastal area; Yijiangshan and the Dachens were the logical continuation of this strategy (Xu, 1992: 183). These islands were far closer to Shanghai than to Taiwan, and Washington did not intervene when they fell into the PRC s hands. That was until Mao waged his "liberating Taiwan" campaign and bombarded Jinmen. Had Mao This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:07:04 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
