as a lawyer, to a specific court in a specific location. As Klerman(1999)notes, common law judges surely desire promotion to higher, more prestigious courts. However, the ex ante probability of any given judge advancing is quite small. Many judges on the U.S. federal courts of appeals, for example, are appointed to those posts as their first(and almost certainly last) judicial office rather than by promotion from a trial court or state court. The likelihood of advancing to one of the nine slots on the Supreme Court is so small that it cannot be, for a rational judge, an Important motivator By contrast, the new civil law judge is typically a recent law school graduate who has passed a qualifying examination for entry into a minor judgeship. To remain in the entry-level post for an entire career would be a clear mark of failure. Prestige is gained by promotions and postings to more desirable geographical locations. The civil law judge, then, has greater motivation than the common law judge to gain the favor of the executive branch Although there has been very little empirical study of judicial independence, the existing evidence suggests that the executive uses this motivation to its advantage in civil law countries In 1879, the French government dismissed or forced the resignation of thirty-eight administrative edges who were deemed insufficiently loyal to the government(Brown and Bell, 1998). Using recent data, Ramseyer and Rasmusen(1997)find evidence that Japanese judges who decide cases against the government receive less attractive postings than those who find in favor of the government. By contrast, Salzberger and Fenn(1999)fail to find evidence that the government of the United Kingdom uses promotions as a tool to reward judges who rule in favor of the government9 as a lawyer, to a specific court in a specific location. As Klerman (1999) notes, common law judges surely desire promotion to higher, more prestigious courts. However, the ex ante probability of any given judge advancing is quite small. Many judges on the U.S. federal courts of appeals, for example, are appointed to those posts as their first (and almost certainly last) judicial office rather than by promotion from a trial court or state court. The likelihood of advancing to one of the nine slots on the Supreme Court is so small that it cannot be, for a rational judge, an important motivator. By contrast, the new civil law judge is typically a recent law school graduate who has passed a qualifying examination for entry into a minor judgeship. To remain in the entry-level post for an entire career would be a clear mark of failure. Prestige is gained by promotions and postings to more desirable geographical locations. The civil law judge, then, has greater motivation than the common law judge to gain the favor of the executive branch. Although there has been very little empirical study of judicial independence, the existing evidence suggests that the executive uses this motivation to its advantage in civil law countries. In 1879, the French government dismissed or forced the resignation of thirty-eight administrative judges who were deemed insufficiently loyal to the government (Brown and Bell, 1998). Using recent data, Ramseyer and Rasmusen (1997) find evidence that Japanese judges who decide cases against the government receive less attractive postings than those who find in favor of the government. By contrast, Salzberger and Fenn (1999) fail to find evidence that the government of the United Kingdom uses promotions as a tool to reward judges who rule in favor of the government